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Foreword 
This thesis “As a matter of size” has been a long journey in terms not only of time used for 
researching and writing the doctoral thesis, but also for finding the right theoretical and 
methodological approach to study the concept of size empirically. This is a result of the different 
areas studied while attempting to identify empirically the impact of size. While size plays the 
dominating role, there is an underlying theme on the benefit of provisioning services in the 
public interest. 
During my work on the thesis, a lot of time and energy has been invested in other projects to 
explore twists and turns in the understanding of the theories and approaches applied. Several 
theoretical and methodological approaches have been investigated, as well as empirical studies, 
and not all have been presented in this thesis. Two of the articles published (one as co-author 
and one as main author) are present in the appendix B. None the less there is still a lot of 
material left for further work on regulation and public services. The doctoral process has been a 
process of in-depth gathering of information and data by mapping the available media data in a 
European context. Not all is presented in detail or in totality, but an attempt has been made to 
develop a work useful both empirically and theoretically within media studies. This also means 
that much secondary material has been studied and used in the dissertation, but this does not 
mean that I did not make a more original contribution in the dissertation (even though more of it 
is present in the two articles, and some require more development), as by using different 
databases I combined audience data of channels owned by media companies with the audience 
share to establish an overview of market concentration in each market. Such data is not directly 
available elsewhere, and did provide some interesting insights.  
The end-product submitted here is only half of the actual written material, and there is thus more 
work to be done in using the remaining material as spin-off articles. 
Too many people to be named have helped make this work possible. Thanks to all – no names, 
no one forgotten, would be the correct phrase. However, special thanks go to Prof. Anker Brink 
Lund, former GD of DR, Christian Nissen, Knud Emborg Ebbesen (formerly DR) and the 
Danish public broadcaster (DR) without whom this work would never have been possible. 
I hope you will find the work interesting. 
 
Christian Edelvold Berg, October 2012 
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Abstract 
This thesis “As a matter of size” demonstrates that size does indeed matter. Television markets 
have common characteristics across small and large markets, but the implications of these 
characteristics are varied due to the difference in size of economy and population. The influence 
of variable size is  a consequence of the economic conditions of scarcity (limited resources) and 
thus the relative critical mass of the media market. Thus, the influence of size is an expression of 
the television market's inability to operate on normal market terms for provisioning particular 
types of services. Larger markets (measured by economy and population) have a higher 
potential of securing such content commercially. But all markets suffer from challenges in 
securing provisioning of original domestic content. Market intervention and public subsidy play 
an important role when it comes to securing domestic production. Political intervention can to 
some extent counteract the effects of the common characteristics, by changing market conditions 
through political regulation or subsidisation. 
The thesis shows that the European television markets mainly operate under conditions of 
oligopoly, usually in the form of different types of duopolies. The effect of size on market 
concentration is not as unambiguous as estimated in the literature, as the scope and extent of 
market intervention influence this quite intensely. Moreover, the study shows that television 
markets are dominated by relatively few, usually local, media companies and the multinational 
companies in most markets currently do not pose a real danger - but there are signs of a 
development which requires further research. Public service companies remain relatively strong 
in the markets studied, and continue to play an important role as a counterweight to national and 
international commercial competitors. 
Different markets require different policies that take into account the conditions in that specific 
market, in order to achieve a certain desirable merited effect. The thesis supports the view that a 
"one size fits all" policy across several markets when it comes to media regulation, risks not 
yielding the warranted results. Markets with different conditions, exposed to the same type of 
regulation, might have overall positive effects, but could also easily have a very negative impact 
if the conditions in a particular market do not fit with the intent of the policy. It is therefore far 
from certain that a "one size fits all" regulation will have the intended uniform effect on the 
affected market across several markets. 
This is especially true for markets that are challenged by having both a small population and a 
small economy. In a sense it is a paradox that the interest at European level in fair competition 
and equal opportunity for success can lead to different conditions of competition in a domestic 
market, as players may be subject to various conditions (in a way it can also be regarded as a 
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consequence of domestic policy interventions), where the domestic players can face a strong 
international player, and as a result of the internal market and the Audiovisual Media Services 
directive, can achieve a competitive advantage, for example in relation to choosing the most 
lenient advertising rules. 
The analytical work of the thesis can substantiate claims that size has a significant effect and 
that there are concrete policy implications depending on size of economy and population, due to 
scarcity of resources in the individual market. 
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Resume på dansk (abstract in Danish) 
Denne afhandling ”As a matter of size” underbygger argumentet om, at tv-markeder har fælles 
karakteristika på tværs af små og store markeder, men samtidig, at konsekvenserne af disse 
karakteristika netop er forskellige som følge af henholdsvis økonomisk- og 
befolkningsmæssigstørrelse. Den indflydelse variablen størrelse har, er en konsekvens af de 
økonomiske knaphedsbetingelser og dermed af markedets relative kritiske masse. Dermed er det 
et udtryk for tv-markedets manglende mulighed for at fungere på normale markedsmæssige 
vilkår for bestemte typer af samfundsmæssigt meriteret indhold. Dette er et resultat af tv-
markedets markedsfejl og dets deraf afledte ufuldkomne konkurrence. Markedsintervention og 
offentlig subsidiering har derfor en væsentlig betydning, når det kommer til produktion af 
meriteret indhold. 
Politiske indgreb kan til en vis grad modvirke effekterne af de fælles markedskarakteristika, 
herunder knaphedsbetingelserne, ved at ændre markedsvilkårene gennem politisk regulering 
eller subsidiering. Analyserne viser, at tv-markederne overvejende fungerer under oligopole 
forhold. Virkningen af størrelse på markedskoncentrationen er ikke så entydig som anslået i 
litteraturen, da omfanget af markedsintervention også har en indflydelse. Undersøgelsen viser 
desuden, at tv-markederne er domineret af relativt få, som regel lokale, medievirksomheder, og 
at de multinationale selskaber i øjeblikket ikke på de fleste markeder udgør en reel fare - men 
der er tegn på en udvikling som fordrer yderligere forskning. Public service-virksomhederne 
forbliver forholdsvis stærke i de undersøgte markeder, og indtager fortsat en vigtig rolle som 
modvægt mod nationale og internationale kommercielle konkurrenter. 
Forskellige markeder har behov for politikker, der tager højde for de særlige vilkår på det 
specifikke marked for at opnå en bestemt ønskelig meriteret effekt. Analyserne underbygger, at 
der ikke findes en ”one size fits all policy”, når det kommer til medieregulering og mediepolitik. 
Markeder med forskellige vilkår, der udsættes for samme type af regulering, kan godt resulterer 
i overordnede positive virkninger, men særligt også negative virkninger – hvis reguleringen ikke 
er tilpasset markedet. Som udgangspunkt vil effekterne være forskellige, og forskellen vil 
afhænge det enkelte markeds særlige vilkår – det er derfor langt fra sikket, at en ”one size fits 
all” regulering vil have en ensartet effekt på de påvirkede markeder, samtidig er det ikke sikkert, 
at reguleringen opnår den ønskede effekt. Dette er især tilfældet for de markeder, der er 
udfordret af at have såvel en lille befolkning som en lille økonomi. På en måde er det et 
paradoks, at interessen for fair konkurrence og lige vilkår på europæisk plan kan føre til 
forskellige betingelser for konkurrencen på et indenlandsk marked, da spillerne kan være 
underlagt forskellige betingelser, hvor den indenlandske spillere kan stå over for en stærk 
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international aktør, der som følge af det indre marked og tv uden grænser direktivet (nu AVMS) 
opnår en konkurrencemæssig fordel. 
Det analytiske arbejde der er foretaget i afhandlingen, kan anvendes til at konkluderer, at 
størrelse har en betydning, og har konkrete policy konsekvenser afhængig af økonomisk- og 
befolkningsmæssigstørrelse, som følge af de begrænsede ressourcer og den tilgængelige kritiske 
masse på markedet. Men det kan også konkluderes, at der ikke findes én enkelt metode, der kan 
behandle denne udfordring, da dette netop er en konsekvens af de markedsmæssige vilkår som 
opstår som følge af de fælles markedskarakteristika. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The aim of this Ph.D. thesis is to study the influence of size in order to identify the differences 
between small and large television markets and to show how this can be relevant for media 
policy. More specifically, I shall analyse the structural influence of size on the mechanisms of 
the TV media market. This will be done by studying differences using scarcity conditions as my 
point of departure and using proxies for market volume, production of original domestic content 
and market competition. All in all, this will document important aspects of the reasoning behind 
the current forms of state intervention in media markets, and facilitate a more coherent 
discussion of the implications of size related to policy decision-making in Europei. 
 
That size matters in commercial markets is obvious, but when one asks how size matters in 
media markets with high levels of political intervention, little empirical evidence is available. 
Even less empirical evidence is available on how size matter for public service broadcasters 
(PSB), even though they are important institutions in most European media market. There is 
especially a lack of research on the influence of PSB in different regulatory frameworks. PSBs 
have been applied as policy tools for a long time with different purposes in diverse markets. 
This has led to a situation where size indirectly is taken into account by the PSB. None the less 
size as a concept stating the overall challenges for small markets often appears in policy debates, 
but it remains rare for actual research to be conducted, especially with a policy perspective. 
Availability of data is a major reason for this as cross-comparisons are very challenging as the 
actual policy-construction processes are usually hidden in “black boxes” in the public 
administration and political negotiation. This is also why PSB is not a direct part of this thesis, 
as I study the results based on input (money and investment in original production) and output 
(share and market concentration) in small and large markets. However, studying this at a 
structural level using comparative method will enable me to identify similarities and differences 
between small and large markets based on size. This will also because of the strong European 
tradition of PSB indirectly help substantiate the influence and importance of these institutions. 
As such the focus is on the impact of size for media policy in general. 
When developing media policy, size is usually ignored or regarded as a ‘black box’. I intend to 
open this box. In doing so, I will supplement former work from different fields of research, 
primarily Robinson (1960), Amstrup (1976, 1979), Handel (1981), Hanf and Soetendorp (1997), 
Ott (2000), Alesina and Spolaore (2003), Puppis (2009), Lowe & Nissen (2011). In spite of their 
efforts,  questions about the influence size has, and what policy implications may be triggered  
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in the wake of increasing international competition and the transnational regulatory regime of 
the European Union, are often still dismissed or overlooked. 
In this first chapter, I shall present my research problem and the subsequent hypotheses and 
research questions. After that, size is defined empirically, leading to theoretical and practical 
delineations, and the introduction to my choice of research design. Before doing so, however, I 
shall discuss my fundamental motivation for doing the thesis in the first place, i.e, offering my 
assistance in mitigating the current lack of knowledge related to policy implications of size, 
especially demonstrated by the efforts of European national states and the EUii. 
 
1.1. Policy implications of size 
My motivation for doing research of this kind is not strictly empirical, but also normative, i.e. to 
inform current debate on media policy nationally and transnationally in Europe. In the TV 
markets regulatory interventions have primarily been based on market failure and merit goods 
arguments legitimising Public Service Broadcasting (PSB). Consequently, most European 
nations have PSBs, but currently we are witnessing  a situation in which television markets of 
different sizes have had similar policies imposed on them in spite of dissimilar working 
conditions, as a consequence of EU competition policy for the common market and the 
audiovisual media service directive (AVMS), formerly known as television without frontiers. 
I shall argue that as far as television is concerned, size has been neglected not only theoretically 
and empirically, but also in European media policy. This became apparent when the concept of 
size was removed from a first draft of the Communication on Broadcasting from the European 
Commission after a consultation, only to be re-introduced in the following draft as a 
consequence of several small states and public broadcasting organisations presenting their 
arguments relating to size. In this respect, it became apparent from an empirical perspective that 
there was a belief in the influence of size which, while not contrary to the literature, was based 
more on the perceived challenge of small states, such as scarcity concerns and the protection of 
perceived merited interests. 
The thesis will demonstrate empirically that size is important and has policy implications for the 
television markets, but also that political intervention remains frequent and has a significant 
impact on the markets. My point is that as a consequence of their special characteristics, TV 
markets represent a strong case to be investigated for the purpose of studying the influence of 
size. Furthermore, that TV markets constitute a particularly interesting case is also due to the 
fact that conditions of TV market failure have long been an argument with clear empirical 
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consequences in terms of political intervention. This is also very clear empirically where more 
than €22 bn was allocated in subsidies in 2007 in Western Europeiii alone, making it the third 
largest publicly aided industry in the EU, only surpassed by the transport and agricultural sectors 
(Screen Digest, 2007). Furthermore, the interest in television and original domestic content by 
the European audience should not be underestimated with an average daily viewing in Europe of 
3 hours and 37 minutes per individual in 2008 (Eurodata TV, 2009). 
In short: Based on theoretical arguments, the impact of size as small and large markets are 
subjected to different market and content good characteristics, may lead to regulatory failures 
and incompatible market conditions, when regulating dissimilar markets with harmonised 
policies, which risks leading to externalities and, in the worst cases, adverse effects. 
 
1.2 Research problem 
I shall argue that size is a factor of great (but neglected) importance for European media policy. 
I will do so by investigating how size influences small and large markets by analysing the 
influence of size on the structural mechanisms of the TV media market in particulariv. More 
specifically, what will be studied is scarcity in terms of market volume and domestic production, 
as well as examining the market competition. This analysis will enable a more coherent 
discussion of the implications size has for policy in the European TV market, including the 
consequences this has for the reasoning behind the arguments for state intervention. The 
research problem can be stated as follows:  
I am going to analyse how size matters for television markets in Europe, measured and 
compared by statistical data, in order to discuss potential policy implications. 
The fundamental basis of my thesis is the scarcity argument. Scarcity in this sense means that 
the small markets lack sufficient critical mass to leverage the challenges posed by the 
characteristics of the market (level of market volume and available resources to invest in 
original domestic production as well as imperfect competition). This I shall argue have special 
implications for the role of public service broadcasting. 
The consequences of size may be that small markets cannot procure commercially the domestic 
services of interest in terms of information and cultural goods of sufficient quality independent 
of state intervention. To frame the analysis of size, the argument of similar characteristics but 
different leverage has been developed and will be used to analyse how size influences. This will 
help document empirically the influence of size and assess whether the argument that size 
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should play a more prominent and informed role is an important premise for the regulation of 
the European TV market. 
In other words: I shall argue that the consequences of size for the media lie in the inherent traits 
and distribution of the media content goods and media markets. Both the media content goods 
and the distributive infrastructure carry characteristics which have natural modes of market 
failure. These characteristics are intrinsically linked to market volume, particularly because of 
the public interest in original domestic content, and to the competitive market conditions. This 
leads to differences between small and large markets based on the content and market 
characteristics. Large markets have a broader basis for securing revenue, i.e. a larger market 
volume, to invest in original production, as well as a larger critical mass which means that there 
is the potential for more companies to enter the market. 
 
1.2.1 Hypotheses 
As a starting point, I have two hypotheses, each of which will be investigated through a set of 
research questions well suited to frame the analysis of the research problem on how size matters. 
 
Hypothesis one: Size is linked to scarcity and therefore influences the critical 
mass of television markets: meaning that size influences the critical mass in 
television markets based on availability of revenue understood as monetary TV 
market volume and the availability of original domestic content. Consequently 
the larger a market is, the greater is the potential volume of the television market 
and domestic production.  
 
This will be investigated based on three research questions: 
A. How does size influence the availability of revenue in television markets (TV market 
volume)? The larger a television market is, the more revenue should be available, which 
again sets the frame for the potential number of companies and the level of domestic 
production as this is based on scarcity considerations. 
B. How does size influence the level of original domestic content in television markets? 
The larger a television market is the more original domestic content should be available 
as the incentive for companies to invest in content should be higher. 
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C. Is there a relative influence of size (varieties of size) on TV market volume and 
production of original domestic content? Size influence could also be viewed relatively 
based on small and large categories, meaning that a large market measured by 
population, can be small measured by economy, which can result in different 
implications for policy. 
 
The investigation of the first hypothesis will be made based on these three research questions, 
each to be studied in a separate chapter and summed up in a conclusion. Combined, these three 
analyses will help investigate whether size matters for volume and production of original 
domestic content on TV markets and what policy implications this influence could have from a 
structural market perspective. 
 
Hypotheses two: Size influences the competitive conditions in television markets. 
This is a consequence of imperfect competition due to the characteristics of 
media markets and media content in combination with differences in critical 
mass (scarcity). Consequently the larger a market is, the better conditions are 
there for private commercial media, as the larger markets can sustain a higher 
number of companies, which should show in lower degrees of market 
concentration - if not at the overall level, then as the number of companies 
increase. 
 
The second hypothesis will be investigated based on two research questions: 
D. How does size influence the conditions of competition in television markets? This will 
be divided into two separate sub questions: 
a. How does size influence public and private television? 
b. Is it possible to identify differences in small television markets with same-
language large neighbours? 
E. How does size influence the level of concentration in television markets? This will be 
divided into two sub questions: 
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a. How does size influence market concentration from an overall structural 
perspective? 
b. Is it possible to identify any trends concerning ownership of multinational 
companies? 
 
The investigation of the second hypothesis will be based on these two research questions, each 
to be studied in a separate chapter focused on a set of sub questions and summed up in a 
conclusion. Combined, these analyses will help investigate whether size matters in TV markets 
and which policy implications this influence could have from a structural market perspective. 
 
1.2.2 Delineation of the analyses of the research problem 
This study will investigate the variable of size to explore whether or not there are differences 
between small and large television markets.  
The radio, online and print markets will not be included. Radio, online and print-markets are all 
interesting, and – with some variations - they have similar characteristics to television. 
Television is of main interest as this field is regulated nationally, as well as by the EU, which 
should make it easier to identify potential policy implications. Radio is also regulated, but 
mainly nationally and not to the same degree by the EU. Online and print are mostly also 
unregulated, except for cases of piracy, right of reply and other similar concerns. But it is a 
different type of regulation than for television. The objective is not to analyse the regulatory 
measures of the sample markets, as this is beyond the scope of the purpose of this dissertation. 
There will not be a detailed and comprehensive description of either the history of the individual 
media systems in each market or of the individual PSBs; this has been conducted by a number 
of media researchers, e.g. Kelly et al (2004), the Hans Bredow institute (1957-2004/2005) 
Internationales Handbuch Medien, as well as in qualitative studies in the individual countries. 
Nor will in-depth case-studies be conducted: this is a variable-oriented study, and single cases of 
regulatory history and effect will not be introduced. 
 The unit of analysis for the thesis comprises European markets; a sample of 26 European 
markets will be included, and depending on the chapter there are some markets divided based on 
language, namely Belgium (French and Flemish). The limit to 26 European markets is due to the 
difficult availability of media data, which requires resources and contacts to gather. Nonetheless, 
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this study will also be one of the more comprehensive pictures of the media markets based on 
empirical material from a mid-range of markets. The question of size has been examined in case 
studies based on single or a few cases, but few comparative studies based on quantitative data 
exist. An example of one of the few comparative studies is McKinsey (1999), conducted for the 
BBC which compares 20 countries. 
The intention is to enable statements on the observed similarities and differences concerning 
size as well as to identify potential patterns. This means acceptance of a social world which can 
be studied systematically and where it is possible to identify regularities/irregularities of social 
phenomenon. This also means that this study cannot claim to provide either the entire answer or 
the whole explanation as to how size matters, but it is an attempt based on economic theory with 
the purpose of establishing a particular interpretation of the influence of size based on the 
assumptions of public interest in the production of original domestic media content. 
The economics applied cannot be used to prove value-judgments in terms of which policies are 
the best, or if the media should or should not have state aid. That would in many ways be a 
question of ideology and values. What it can do, is to nuance and help explain trade-offs 
between different solutions and problems, but where values become the central concern, politics 
and political consideration enter the game. Therefore it is necessary to clarify that, while I will 
study size to investigate differences between large and small markets within a set of parameters 
based on the selected framework, I will not make normative value judgments in terms of what to 
do about the potential problems of small markets or small/large language areas, but I will 
attempt, based on theory and empirical studies, to nuance the arguments on the challenges of 
these. The explanation of empirical phenomena is the main purpose of theory and testing them is 
important in the further development and refinement of theory. I hope this dissertation can be 
used to further the understanding of how size, as a variable, affects markets in different ways, 
and also how this can be applied to nuance and refine media theory and policy in areas related to 
size, and understanding of the television media from an economic perspective and possibly 
establish a debate on public service broadcasting. 
 
1.2.3 Defining size 
The intention of this dissertation is to study the influence of size. Consequently a definition of 
how to measure this is required. Conceptually, I can distinguish between different facets of size 
such as territorial mass, industry, the military, population, market size or economy (Robinson, 
1960; Friedman, 1977; Trappel, 1986; Trappel and Meier, 1992; Findlay, 1996; Alesina and 
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Spolaore, 1997, 2003; Ott, 2000; Wittman, 2000; Puppis, 2990; Puppis et al. 2009; Lowe & 
Nissen, 2011). Omitting the military, most of the other facets can be argued to have a more 
continuous effect on the media, with the challenges being that these again are relative in terms 
of the operational definition. When conducting comparative research, I have to be able to define 
and discuss when a market is large or small and by which criteria. The demarcation applied can 
always be challenged by others, and it therefore becomes important to ensure that there is 
complete clarity in the distinction between large and small. So the concern is the definition of 
the included variables: what is small and in which context? Or, in short, what is smallness and 
what are the criteria for being small vs. being large? 
To give an example of the difficulty of definition, I can use the fact that the attempt to bring size 
back into media research has focused on population as being a measure, as seen in the Special 
Gazette issue (2009) definition of 15 million+ for large, while for Lowe & Nissen (2011) was 20 
million+. Small states are defined by others as those with less than 5 million inhabitants 
(Commonwealth Secretariat, 2008), while another use of population defines those states with 
more than 5 million people as large, and only those below 1.5 million as small, with the rest 
falling into the medium category (Ott, 2000). The point I have to make is that there are no clear-
cut definitions and the one applied here is not a final answer as to size, but will indicate some 
relationships of interest between the variables for use in a particular context. 
In short, size is a complex concept to work with; what is large in contrast to small? And is this 
only on the national level? How should a small market, home to a large broadcaster such as in 
the case of Luxembourg, count? Population size as a variable has been criticised (Hallin, 2009), 
but it remains useful (Puppis et al., 2009) and as I argue, we should perceive population as just 
one of several facets of size. Alesina and Spolare (2003, 2005) suggest different indicators for 
size such as, among others, the separate economic indicator of GDP and geographical area.  
The included markets are different in size; therefore it is necessary to stipulate clearly where 
they are respectively, large or small. A country with a small population but a large territory 
poses different questions to those of a small, flat country such as Denmark when it comes to 
penetration of and investment in telecommunication infrastructure. Size as a concept is quite 
ambiguous and relative, and in order to use it systematically, it is necessary to establish clear 
definitions for the facets used. As such it is necessary to note that there are no clear-cut 
definitions, but there are some useful indicators for size, such as population, economy, e.g. 
GNP, GDP or PPP GDP, geographical size (Ott, 2000; Alesina and Spolaore, 2003; Puppis, 
2009). 
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As pointed out in the literature, market size, territory, economy, the military and industry among 
others are all relevant facets of the concept of size. It would, however, be difficult to include 
them all. I will apply population, economy and language as variables, with the reasoning for this 
given below.  
Economy can also be measured in different ways; a usual way is GDP, GDP per capita, or GDP 
corrected for purchasing power parity (PPP). Another method is gross income or disposable 
income. Different measures will be used for different purposes. To limit the challenge of 
multicollinearity when conducting the multivariate statistical analysis a decision has been made 
to use a GDP per capita figure corrected for PPP. It can be argued that economy and market size 
are mutually dependent, but these facets can also be affected by the size of population. Markets 
such as Norway have large economies due to oil exports while being relatively small in other 
aspects; at the same time, Saudi Arabia has both a large population and a large economy due to 
oil. A large population with a small economy is also a possibility, as well as a small market with 
a population having a relatively large purchasing power. 
Population is directly related to the number of available customers. If the population is 
sufficiently high it achieves a critical mass capable of attracting investment, thus changing the 
market conditions. Market volume is an important selection criterion, but it can be viewed as 
dependent on both population and economy. Language, while having a relation to population 
size, is also related to neighbouring markets as well as the spread of the language globally. 
Small markets for television content, meaning language areas, face other challenges from large 
consumer markets, such as large language areas with an international perspective. While the 
domestic market of available consumers might be small, such as in Austria, the total German-
speaking market is large, equalling 100 million. Language is thus also a facet in determining 
actual market potential.  
All in all, size is a relative concept: Mexico, while having a relatively high population (110 
mio.), is still smaller than its neighbour the USA in both territory and population size. The same 
is the case for Canada which, while being small in population in comparison with the US and 
Mexico, is still big compared to most European countries, and is larger in territory than the US. 
Smaller markets can at the same time usually only maintain a smaller number of competing 
companies, and therefore tend to be more concentrated than their larger counterparts, which can 
entail an increased intervention into the market. Market concentration is central for small 
markets and in theory marks important differences between small and large. But these factors 
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are also related to the size of population, economy and language as they can influence the level 
of competition. 
The Austrian market risks higher levels of competition due to the German language, the same 
being the case for the French-speaking part of Belgium in relation to France. This indicates 
language affiliation affecting a country, especially if a small country has the same language as a 
larger neighbour (Puppis et al., 2009), but this is more a variance of size than a separate concern. 
This is of course speculation, but when studying the share of countries such as Austria and 
Switzerland, we find indications for an effect not normally visible for other small countries. 
Language area becomes a way of distinguishing small countries from each other. When looking 
at the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden), it can be seen that they also 
have the potential of cross-viewing, but for some reason this has not been as widespread as in, 
for instance, Austria. 
One interesting point to study is whether it is primarily the large countries which penetrate into 
their smaller same language neighbours, or if this can also be the case for small country 
neighbours. One interesting aspect here is actually the conception of language similarity; 
although the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) have somewhat similar 
languages, they are not as similar as German spoken in for instance Austria, nor the English 
spoken in Ireland. The same is the case for the Slavic countries: although similar, they are not 
completely alike. Thus cross-viewing is not as viable as in Austria and Germany, for example, 
or for that matter in French Belgium and France. Language will therefore be considered a 
separate facet of size, perceived as language area. 
What I argue is that while there are several different ways to measure size, there are three of 
particular interest for media economics in the form of economy, population and language. In this 
dissertation I will draw on Alesina and Spolare (1997, 2003) as well as Witman (2000) by 
including economy as an indicator for size measured by PPP in GDP and GDP in absolute 
terms, and Puppis et al. (2009) by including population and language. In principle, several more 
facets could be included, but for the purpose of this comparison these will present a particular 
variety of size based on case-study research within media studies and wider studies within other 
disciplines that could indicate some difference related to size. I am in line with Lowe & Nissen 
(2011) in finding it important to include both economy and language as separate indicators for 
size in an attempt to establish an increased coherence in the way it is applied in policy. For the 
purpose of the media, claiming that small is below 5 million (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2007) 
or even below 1.5 million (Ott, 2000) would bring miniscule leverage potential in terms of 
ability to provide domestically produced media content. Thus the 20 million population 
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definition by Lowe & Nissen (2011) is more useful as an indicator for the categorical definition, 
when it is taken into consideration that the analysis is mainly based on continuous scale 
variables based on the logic of the hypothesis, where the influence of size is argued relative as 
based on the differences in size. 
Size will be defined by three empirically testable parameters: population, economy and 
language. I apply both a scale definition and a categorical definition of size. Using a scale 
definition means that the larger the population or economy, the higher the critical mass is of the 
market and vice versa. Using a categorical definition means that the markets are grouped 
according to a pre-determined population and economy. 
• Scale population and economy definition: Population in millions and economy in 
PPP GDP per capita in dollars are used as scale variables, as the hypothesis states 
that in that the larger or smaller a market is, the more or less evident the influence 
of size becomes. 
• Categorical population definition: The categorical definition applied for population 
is that a small population is defined as below 20 million and large when above. 
• Categorical economy definition: The categorical definition applied for economy is 
that a small economy measured through GDP PPP per capita is below the 
European average figure of $24.216,80  in 2007, and economies equal to or above 
that are considered large. The figure of $24.216,80 is equal to the average of all 
European markets in 2007. This definition has been chosen in order to establish a 
non-subjective definition of economic size. 
• Language is used indirectly by analysing small markets with large same-language 
neighbours based on the categorical definition of population size. 
 
These variables and small/large definitions should give indications of the effect size can have. 
The definitions are based on a conceptualisation which has an inherent challenge of scale, 
meaning that the larger the economy or population, the easier provision will be; but this is also 
is the case vice versa. But this way of distinguishing the markets will establish some leverage 
with which to differentiate effects of size based on more than population, although this is the 
main parameter applied in terms of categorisation: for a list see the table in appendix A.  
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1.3 Theoretical argument based on the hypothesis 
I have argued that media markets in general and TV markets in particular are subject to market 
and content characteristics which will increase the influence of size due to conditions of 
scarcity. This is what leads to the different conditions in small and large markets. The argument 
is based on the conditions that media content good are generally identified as public goods due 
to their characteristics of being non-rival and non-excludable. This does not mean that these 
goods cannot be made exclusive using different methods, because through distribution they can 
become excludable. I argue that media content is a traditional public good in the specific 
linguistic and cultural context of a geographical market, but perceived from an international 
perspective, language and culture exclude and change the non-excludable media good to a club 
good, thus becoming excludable but remaining non-rival. This leads to the question as to why 
domestic content is necessary; the reason is that within a society there has to be a function for 
the diffusion of information such as news, debate and cultural programming within a specific 
national sphere of political influence in order to secure cohesion and the ability of citizens to 
navigate in a democratic society. 
A small population also means that there are fewer people to pay for a similar level of service. I 
therefore argue for a change in the way in which we perceive domestic production, as while 
media content does have the characteristics of public goods, they are, especially in small 
markets, limited to a particular cultural and linguistic context which functions as an exclusion 
mechanism, suggesting that it would be beneficial to perceive originally produced domestic 
content as a club good. 
The intention of my investigation is to study how size, as a variable, influences large and small 
markets differently. This will be done to help close some of the empirical and theoretical gaps in 
media theory as well as testing the theoretical assumptions applied in the hypothesis. I argue 
that, based on a conceptual framework derived from economics, we should see the conditions 
for the media with a) content characteristics of non-rivalry and the potential for either 
excludability or non-excludability (Samuelson, 1954; Buchanan, 1965, 1967; Holcombe, 1997) 
in combination with b) increasing returns to scale under conditions of consumption being 
independent of cost of production (Bator, 1958), leading to difficulties in achieving c) minimum 
efficient scale for media companies (Sutton, 1991, 1998) based primarily on one domestic 
market. Based on this we have a mode of market failure by existence (Bator, 1958). Based on 
the three conditions the television media market has per definition imperfect competition. 
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The argument is that every size of television market has characteristic dynamics that are more or 
less applicable everywhere, and that the explanation of key differences lies in relative market 
leverage. This can be conceptualised as an expression of the market’s inability to allocate 
resources efficiently in media. Consequently, the inherent assumption in the argument is that 
size matters for both performance and policy in TV markets. The prerequisite for this is the 
scarcity argument, meaning that the larger the market volume, the more revenue is available, 
and thus the higher the level of original domestic content possible. This can stimulate increase in 
competition. Consequently, it denotes that while small and large markets face similar challenges 
due the characteristics of media content and media markets, small markets have less available 
revenue, which in theory leads to difficulties with high levels of market concentration and 
reduced levels of original domestic content produced. This led to the construction of the relative 
market leverage argument which is described below.  
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Table 1: Theoretical reasoning: relative market leverage 
The claim is that smaller and larger TV markets have similar characteristics as a result of how 
broadcasting technology works; there are significant differences in the dynamics that 
characterise comparative contexts. These differences are caused by variations in market volume 
and supply, which affect the competitive conditions in the market as a whole. This suggests the 
importance of market leverage: differences in the dynamics accounting for variation in smaller 
markets are due to the market’s inability to leverage the critical mass necessary to provide media 
content goods, where cost of production is independent of consumption. In short, it costs as 
much to make a programme for a few people as for a multitude because costs are in large part 
fixed. This is especially pertinent to the dynamics of smaller markets because less ability to 
leverage must limit the potential for achieving higher efficiencies related to scale.v 
 
This is related to the media content good characteristics which make it difficult to establish a 
business based on a traditional profit model. I define a media content good by defining the 
media content characteristics. Media content characteristics are defined by the following main 
concepts: 
• Media content characteristics – MCC 
• Non-rivalry in consumption – NRIC 
• Non-excludability – NE  
• Excludability – E  
• Increasing returns to scale – IRS 
• Minimum efficient scale – MES 
 
I can express it like this: the difference between small and large markets is a consequence of 
market leverage as an effect of: 
 MCC = NRIC + either NE or E  
+ IRS 
High MES level  
 
The lack of volume in small markets establishes that their critical mass is insufficient to leverage 
the MCC adequately, leading to an increased potential of market failure, especially in the face of 
converging media. 
 
The established market failure concerns as a consequence the media content good characteristics 
combined with increasing returns of scale under costs of production being independent of 
consumption. These establish a high efficient scale level of domestic companies, but also the 
potential of utilising economies of scale for international players. 
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For smaller markets, this is problematic because domestic programming is typically unable to 
produce sufficiency across all types of genres in quantity, quality, or both. The market is 
materially too small to support that. Domestic companies in smaller markets therefore face 
difficulties in being unable to reach the efficiency of scale required to produce all the content 
that is needed domestically based on the market alone.  
 
This situation fuels a related tendency. Mass media require some form of collective funding 
because production cost is independent of consumption.vi Because content is expensive to 
produce but cheap to purchase, there is an incentive to buy tested formats, popular series, hit 
motion pictures, and other media goods because this lowers uncertainty in attracting viewers. 
Risk of market failure and lack of incentives are governing principles in determining a market’s 
lack of original domestic content.vii 
This complexity is explained by difficulties related to the nature of media content as public 
goods, as well as in economic theory where increasing returns to scale explain how the cost of 
production is independent of consumption. This situation produces typical challenges in 
securing sufficiency in original domestic content: 
The non-rivalry characteristic of media content (meaning that the same content can be consumed 
by more than one person at no added cost) with high potential for non-excludabilityviii; 
 Increasing returns to scale are important because the cost of production is independent of 
consumption (meaning that most of the costs are sunk in producing the first copy, with 
duplication being fairly cheap); 
Higher levels of efficiency in scale caused by the collective funding function, meaning that 
domestic broadcasters depend on single markets while multinational corporations are able to 
distribute the same channel or content – dubbed or subtitled – to several markets at once, 
making it much easier to realise economies of scale. This is especially important for smaller 
markets and single market broadcasters. 
The theoretical assumptions imply potential differences and explanations for size which could 
help nuance the discussion of size as well as the contemporary policy debates, especially in 
terms of state aid. The purpose of this approach is both to test the theoretical explanations and to 
study size and the television media. 
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1.4 How does size matter? 
The question of how size influences has been raised within media studies before (Trappel & 
Meier, 1990; Trappel, 1991; Meier and Trappel, 1992). But the focus was mainly on small 
stateix problems and the topic was not pursued for some time (Siegert, 2006), despite the fact 
that there have been several significant changes within media development since the 1990s. 
There have been recent attempts to bring back the small state issue within the media, two 
examples being the Special Gazette issue Puppis et al (2009) and Lowe & Nissen (eds) (2011). 
The method applied when studying size consisted of conducting case studies involving a few 
small markets, with interesting results. Unfortunately, comparisons with large countries were 
usually not included in such research, and there were limits on the number of markets included, 
consequently leaving the questions open as to whether or not there are differences between large 
and small markets. 
 
Size has not in general been neglected in academic literature. Other fields such as International 
Politics focus on issues such as small state behaviour within the EU and weak/strong states 
(Koehane, 1969; Dosenrode, 1993, 1997) and democracy (Dahl and Tufte, 1973; Ott, 2000); in 
Political Economy there is research into how small states develop different strategies to cope 
with their conditions (Katzenstein, 1985; Pedersen and Campbell, 2005); in Economics 
(Robinson, 1960; Friedman, 1977; Witmann, 2000; Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2003 & 2005) 
size has continued to be of some importance as a question of research. Most of these studies 
have argued that small markets experience different conditions. However, within media studies 
the number of comparative empirical studies has been relatively limited.  
Neglected issues in some of these studies on small states often encompass the lack of 
comparison between large and small markets. This leaves some difficulties in identifying what 
specifically constitutes a small market challenge and what is due to other conditions such as 
regional extension and lack of funding or, even more importantly, an effect influencing both 
small and large markets. 
In other words, there are arguments based on empirical studies claiming that size has an effect, 
but little comparative empirical evidence to substantiate a generalisation of the claim. Within 
media studies, size has thus been neglected in comparative research, leaving few studies 
available on its potential effect. 
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This was also an important part of the conclusion in the Special Gazette issue on small nations, 
where Puppis, d’Haenens, Steinmaurer & Künzler (2009: 110) stated that: “Only systematic 
cross-country research, considering big and small states with and without giant neighbors 
sharing the same language, will help us answer the question of how size matters”.   
I argue that within media studies there is a theoretical and empirical gap concerning size as a 
variable when it comes to the question of policy. In other words, if I want to answer the question 
as to how size matters for policy, it would be beneficial to study this empirically and 
quantitatively in order to establish an idea of its importance, by conducting a systematic 
comparative study including large and small markets as well as those with and without same-
language large neighbours. 
The difficulty is that it can be argued that size can be based on so many different 
conceptualisations and definitions that the fuzziness of the concept becomes increasingly 
complex to apply and define; for the definition used in the thesis see chapter 1.2.3, Defining 
Size. The issue of the everyday understanding of the concept further complicates the problem. 
Almost everyone has an understanding and conceptualisation of the fact that size is important, 
but within media studies little empirical material is available in which both large and small 
markets are compared. The purpose of this review is thus to clarify some areas which size is 
argued to affect and point out how this leads to differences between large and small markets for 
use in the analysis, and which can be followed up in chapter 2, Media market characteristics. 
When studied in detail, many of the conditions we argue are size-related in general literature 
might have other both beneficial but also adverse effects for the media. I cannot just apply the 
understandings from other fields of research without relating them to the potential effect on the 
media. 
 
First I will present some of the literature on how size is perceived to influence conditions 
differently in large and small markets. The purpose is to identify areas which present the 
potential for study.  
 
1.4.1 Identifying the influence of size 
In this chapter, the reason for studying size is argued based on literature and related to the effect 
for the broadcast media. This is done to conceptualise why size is interesting to study. First the 
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general factors are presented, after which those with the main potential impact on the media are 
presented in turn. 
Studying the literature in general, the following factors with relevance for the media distinguish 
large and small markets: a) Vulnerability, b) Dependency, c) Adaption, d) Competitiveness and 
e) Cohesionx (Robinson, 1960; Azar, 1975; Amstrup, 1976, 1979; Handel, 1981; Katzenstein, 
1985; Alapuro, 1985; Hanf & Soetendorp 1997; Ott, 2000; Alesina & Spolaore, 1997, 2003, 
2005; Alesina, Spolaore, Wacziarg, 2004). More specifically for the media, the question leads 
primarily to a focus on the special conditions for small markets. This leads to four primary 
factors of difference with relevance for the media between small and large markets in the form 
of vulnerability and dependence, as well as the linked problems in relation to market volume 
and resource shortages (Trappel and Meier 1992; Puppis, 2009).  As shown, there have been 
several attempts to study size before. There have been several other contributions in literature on 
how size influences which will be presented below. 
One of the most important factors of interest for the media, based on the literature in general, 
appears to be the difference between large and small market conditions and the way the state 
deals with them. Below, I will primarily focus on vulnerability and dependency, which are 
considered the points of macro influence, where market size and resource shortage are related to 
those differences when using economy, population and language as indicators for size. 
Due to their size, small markets are more vulnerable to fluctuations in the international economy 
and have to be flexible and willing to change in accordance with world markets, as a 
consequence of their (usually) open markets and dependency on trade. If a small country is not 
capable of adjusting and adapting to change it risks undermining its competitiveness. Large 
markets are more able to withstand and adjust the international agenda to their own and are 
therefore less vulnerable (Katzenstein, 1985, Jensen & Campbell, 2006).  
Small market characteristics of vulnerability and dependency due to the open economy as well 
as a lack of self-sufficiency also apply to the media sector and especially so to the broadcasting 
industry. From an economic perspective, this development is due to changes in incentive 
structure making the business profitable, especially where economies of scale and scope are 
possible.  
Market intervention, usually because of cultural, social, informational or democratic reasons, 
functions as a national self-defence mechanism with which to correct market failures, which 
vary in large and small markets. Formerly, the natural monopoly of the airwaves for instance 
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limited broadcast competition; however, new technology has increased the number and type of 
outlets and has thus established the potential for increased competitionxi.  
Vulnerability and dependency are the macro variables in this sense, but they are expressed in 
different ways. For the broadcasting market these will be indicated by: a) production of original 
domestic content b) market volume, c) language and d) international regulation. The related 
difficulties will be presented to demonstrate how in theory there should be differences between 
large and small markets. 
 
1.4.1.1 Production of original domestic content 
Electronic media content has the same characteristics as public goods: it is non-rival in 
consumption and non-excludable. Non-rival in consumption means that it does not matter 
whether one person or one million people are audiences to the same content, as the content does 
not diminish like for instance a cup of coffee; furthermore the content can be used again and 
again. Non-excludable means it is not possible to include some while excluding others from this 
good, or rather that no one can be excluded from using the good effectively, for instance people 
watching television together can easily do this at the same time.  
The problem from a small state perspective is that the cost of production is therefore the same as 
in large markets, due to a situation of increasing returns to scale based on the first copy cost of 
production. Electronic media content thus has conditions of increasing return to scale; however, 
due to distribution, it is possible to make these goods artificially scarce through encryption, e.g. 
club goods. But that does not change the problem from the state perspective on the provision of 
services in the general interest of society (based on having public good and/or merit good 
characteristics). Small markets are thus usually dependent on imports to ensure sufficient 
programming to satisfy consumer interest.  
The difficulty with electronic media content is that commercial enterprises cannot be certain of 
establishing a profitable business on domestic content due to high sunk-costs; thus experiments 
on content, unless cheap or with assumed high success rates, will not be provided by the market. 
In other words, the private commercial sector will have difficulties in providing diverse, high-
quality electronic media content. For commercial private companies there is a related difficulty 
of minimum efficient scale due to increasing return to scale: the broadcasting industry has high 
fixed costs due to the good characteristics; the cost structure makes it difficult due to the high 
fixed cost relative to the variable costs, meaning that the market structure will tend to be 
concentrated, forming structural barriers of entry. 
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From a state perspective this is a case of market failure, as the desired genres of quality will not 
be privately produced to a reasonable degree. This is because private commercial business has 
no incentive for doing so from a profit perspective.  
In short, large markets should have higher degrees of AV works production and export potential 
due to their larger production sectors; this is especially true of North America and the UK 
because of their particular focus and competition on fiction These countries also have an interest 
in the establishment of common markets and free trade due to their export potential, while their 
small counterparts have an interest in the protection of their own markets. This led to a 
controversy between the EU and the US concerning television, when the US claimed that the 
EU had violated the GATT agreement in their policies, i.e. the Television without Frontiers 
Directive (1989, amended 1997) article 4a on quotas for European works; for further discussion 
of this see Filipek (1992). 
Quotas are for instance retained in the AVMS directive where the Member States are obliged by 
§16 to ensure that “…broadcasters reserve for European works a majority proportion of their 
transmission time, excluding the time allotted to news, sports events, games, advertising, 
teletext services and teleshopping….”, as well as according to §17 to ensure: “that broadcasters 
reserve at least 10 % of their transmission time, excluding the time allotted to news, sports 
events, games, advertising, teletext services and teleshopping, or alternately, at the discretion of 
the Member State, at least 10 % of their programming budget, for European works created by 
producers who are independent of broadcasters.” Within the EU, there continues to be a focus 
on securing audio-visual production and access to European works by regulatory means. 
Market intervention to secure domestic production is not only present nationally in the 
individual Member States, but also present in EU regulation. Intervention usually takes place to 
ensure production of domestic [and European] content the argument is primarily related to 
cultural products. 
 
1.4.1.2 Market Volume 
Small markets have less potential for commercial funding than their larger counterparts, 
especially if television programming in the national languages of the smaller countries is taken 
into consideration.  
Production of programming for a limited audience in a specific language and cultural setting is 
costly and might not always be provided by small markets due to high costs. At the same time, 
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programmes are available in international trade from both large and small markets, especially 
from North America at a lower price than the cost of own-production and co-production.  
Smaller markets can at the same time usually only maintain a smaller number of competing 
companies, and therefore tend to be more concentrated than larger ones, which can entail an 
increased intervention in the market.  
Large markets also have a similar line of difficulties to small ones: high quality programming is 
costly and might not be profitable; however, foreign direct investment is more likely to be 
attracted to large markets. While large markets have more resources available, they also have 
the problems of securing nationwide services. Although the market size might be larger, this 
also means the amount of competitors increases when there is a potential for profitable 
investment.  
Certain goods and services will simply not be offered if the language area is too small to be 
profitable. This is also in line with the perspective represented by the EC Communication on 
broadcasting (2009, pkt. 42) which points out the potential problem of small member states 
funding public services: “The Commission will also take into account the difficulty some 
smaller Member States may have to collect the necessary funds, if costs per inhabitant of the 
public service are, ceteris paribus higher while equally considering potential concerns of other 
media in these Member States.” This is further elaborated in note 38: “Similar difficulties may 
also be encountered when public service broadcasting is addressed to linguistic minorities or to 
local needs”. In short, size is important and has policy implications, due to the relative cost of 
public goods being higher in small markets than in large.  
This is also where another difference between small markets and small markets with large 
neighbours comes into view: they will be treated as being a part of a “large language area”, with 
the consequences this entails. In other words, as pointed out above, language cannot function as 
protection in the same way for those types of markets.  
As such it is possible to argue that there are differences between the provision for large and 
small markets. Market concentration is a particular difficulty for small markets as the domestic 
market has difficulty in sustaining more than a few competing domestic firms and risks high 
levels of concentration, as the domestic companies with a primary domestic focus have 
difficulties in achieving minimum efficient scale. This also gives rise to high barriers of entry 
(Gal, 2003; Hoshkins et al, 2004) and this becomes a central concern for small markets and 
marks important differences between small and large markets where market strength becomes 
an important factor.  
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1.4.1.3 Small markets with same-language large neighbour  
The way small countries react to their lack of independence in the media sector can also differ 
from country to country depending on various conditions (Hallin, 2009), but small countries 
with large same-language neighbours have a special problem due to language (Puppis et al., 
2009) and are not able to use the same strategies as other small markets can.  
Small markets in a specific small language area can protect their electronic media market 
through language combined with regulatory measures, as has been the case in the Nordic 
countries (Lund & Berg, 2009).  
Small markets with same-language large neighbours are not able to use the same protective 
strategies. When studying the share of countries such as Austria, Ireland and Switzerland, I find 
indications for a higher degree of foreign television penetration which is not normally visible for 
similar small countries. Language area becomes a way to distinguish small countries from each 
other.  
Looking at the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden), it can be seen that 
while they also have the potential of cross-viewing, it is not as widespread and represents only a 
very small degree of the total television consumption.  
Another point of concern is the Slavic languages in Eastern Europexii: although somewhat 
similar, they are still different (somewhat as in Scandinavia, but with more variations). Small 
markets in larger language areas thus face other challenges than their other small counterparts.  
The cross-viewing in Switzerland, Austria and  French-speaking part of  Belgium, where 
protection through language and subsidised high levels of national production are not sufficient 
to secure the domestic market, makes different strategies to those used in other less vulnerable 
markets necessary,xiii especially because of the dependence of public broadcasters in Austria, 
Ireland and Switzerland on advertisement revenue.xiv Language can in this way influence the 
degree of vulnerability of a small market. 
 
1.4.1.4 International regulation 
Small states have less potential for exerting pressure in international relations due to their 
smaller markets and vulnerabilities; on the other hand, their large counterparts are more able to 
do this, with an example being the pressure from large markets and international organisations 
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for the liberalisation of the media markets in the EU, WTO and GATT (Hesmondhalgh, 2002). 
This is a beneficial situation for the large media markets with a developed content industry 
which can export the products, but the usually less developed industries in smaller markets face 
some difficulties in this respect. Filipek (1992) indicated this by the conflict between the US and 
the EU, as pointed out above. 
The challenge of international regulation is that the effects – adverse and beneficial - are not 
always evident when introduced. Often there will be a positive effect of the regulation, but there 
will almost always be a negative side effect as well. The challenge lies in the evaluation of the 
positive versus the negative effects. Increased liberalisation of cultural markets internationally 
might help increase competition, but at what cost to national cultural production? 
 
1.4.2 Small versus large summarised 
Size is related to national conditions in the markets and state regulatory measures. All the points 
made on size which has been presented above are related to the differences in market conditions 
between large and small markets. The literature indicates important differences between small 
and large states in potential media company conduct and thus national interest, when it is taken 
into consideration that the media has a central role in modern life where its news and debate 
function fulfils the role of providing an arena for public debate between politicians and the 
public, but also for securing different types of entertainment and cultural content (Hutchison, 
1999). In the table below the main differences between small and large market are presented 
briefly. 
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Table 2: Differences between large and small markets 
 Large Market Small Market 
Trade Higher degree of self-
sufficiency and less dependence 
on international trade. 
Open economy dependent on international 
trade and less potential for self-sufficiency. 
Risk of high degree of foreign media 
ownership and penetration 
International 
regulation 
More weight in international 
politics, e.g. trade issues in for 
example WTO. 
Less weight in international politics, special 
problem in terms of resisting pressure of 
opening AV markets. 
External 
shocks 
Less influenced by international 
political and economic 
fluctuations. Potential for less 
dependency on trade, more 
resistant to external shocks and 
more able to influence 
development (internally). 
The dependency on trade and open economy 
yields increased vulnerability to external 
shock through international political and 
economic fluctuations. More vulnerable to 
increased globalisation and less able to 
influence development due to a) by-passing of 
national regulation or b) liberalisation. 
Economies 
of scalexv 
Higher potential for economies 
of scale, due to large audience 
and advertisement markets, 
potentially leading to lower MC 
in media production; and higher 
potential for exports and for 
targeting neighbouring 
countries with domestic 
channels to increase revenue 
flow. 
Lower potential in benefiting from economies 
of scale as limited by small audience and 
small advertisement market, leading to higher 
MC in media production. Risk of 
advertisement and cable relay revenue flowing 
towards foreign commercial media companies, 
due to foreign penetration. Difficulty for small 
domestic media companies in reaching 
minimum efficient scale if based on domestic 
markets alone. 
Diversity Potential for higher diversity 
due to larger market size; the 
larger the revenue streams the 
higher potential for profit, and 
thus investment into the market. 
Risk of less diversity due to small market size 
with possible low potential for profit; main 
concerns are not necessarily diversity in terms 
of programmes, but domestically produced 
programmes. 
Competition More competitive broadcasting 
markets due to increased 
revenue, e.g. higher potential 
for profitable pay niche-
channels, especially pay 
channels. 
Potentially less competitive broadcasting 
markets, higher industry concentration, higher 
entry barriers. Problem if foreign channels 
massively target the nations, if there is interest 
in a domestic perspective on informational and 
cultural programmes in particular. 
Public 
goods 
Higher potential for the 
provision of public goods and 
for some of these goods if they 
are independent of a number of 
uses, such as broadcasting, 
entailing lower costs for 
providing these types of public 
goods. 
Lower potential for the efficient provision of 
public goods (especially security and defence), 
and for goods with high fixed costs, such as 
broadcasting, where the provision is 
independent of the use, entailing higher 
production costs and smaller domestic sales. 
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Summing up, I can argue that markets with a small population involve less potential for profit. 
Furthermore, they face problems of self-supply in terms of programming and thus require 
imports. A primary problem for small markets is the lack of an audio-visual industry. Whereas 
the large markets can to a certain degree expect informational and cultural programmes to be 
produced, small countries will usually have to secure such programmes by investing in the 
industry and adapting their markets by using different strategies.  
Vulnerability due to openness of economy, lack of resources and the necessity of imports leaves 
the media markets vulnerable if left unregulated. The small markets also face problems in terms 
of diversity, not necessarily in numbers of channels, but rather in programme supply. They also 
risk the late introduction of new technology, due to lack of incentives for such innovation, and 
they may also face problems in terms of language; small languages can on the one hand be 
beneficial in protecting the media market from foreign influence, especially if well regulated, 
but there is still the problem of sufficient high-quality domestic production.  
On the other hand, if a small market has the same language as a large neighbour, especially if 
there is regional extension, then it risks being considered a secondary market for that 
neighbour’s media activities, and this can potentially challenge its cultural identity because of 
foreign media dominance. In other words, language can either protect or harm small market 
media markets. Large broadcast markets are bigger in terms of available consumers and thus 
encompass different possibilities than small. 
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Table 3: Summarising differences between large and small markets 
Large Small 
• Support a higher degree of private 
commercial channels; 
• Cater for niche-audiences 
commercially due to a higher number 
of consumers; 
• Faster introduction of new technology 
and services because of higher 
potential for return on investment; 
• Drive towards increased concentration 
due to media characteristics, but to 
some extent because of critical mass; 
• Higher cost to secure provision of 
regional services;  
• Higher cost to secure and establish 
universal coverage. 
• Less potential for providing domestic 
programmes through private 
commercial broadcasters; 
• Higher cost for catering to narrow 
audiences with domestic programmes;  
• Company difficulty in achieving 
minimum efficient scale when not 
internationalised; 
• Risk of being highly concentrated; 
• Later introduction of technology; 
• Lack of incentives to establish 
universal coverage, e.g. penetration, 
unless the infrastructure is easily 
accessible; 
• Higher potential for international 
media companies to introduce niche-
channels, utilising economies of scale 
and scope (e.g. Discovery, CNN, 
Animal Planet). 
 
From a state perspective, there are several difficulties related to size as 1) there is a limit to how 
many competing companies can operate within each market depending on size and 2) small 
market firms risk problems of achieving sufficient scale; this is primarily the case if focus is on 
the domestic market. This leads to limits in the small market tendencies of being a) highly 
concentrated; b) having few domestic players and usually comprising small market structures of 
duopoly or oligopoly; c) high cost of producing original content in a range of genres and d) 
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imports are necessary. These are some of the challenges which could be identified in the 
analysis and will be studied more in depth in chapter 2 Media market characteristics. 
Basically this can be divided into limited market volume and content as well as limited market 
competition, which should be especially evident in a comparison between small and large 
markets. 
 
1.5 Research design 
Analyses of the influence of size are done by using a comparative design consisting of both 
small and large markets. The approach is variable oriented and at the structural level. The 
structural level is necessary to substantiate if size has a general influence in Europe. The applied 
method is comparative methodology using mainly analysis of quantitative data and desk 
analysis. This is supplemented by statistical analysis of the relationship between size and the 
dependent variables consisting mainly of multivariate regression analysis. Desk research is 
analysis of markets based on already existing material collected by others: either consultancy 
companies, governments, UN organisations or by interest groups in the field – so called 
secondary data.  
Most data in the thesis is from secondary sources. A single exception is that one set of data has 
been established for the purpose of the thesis using a set of data from Eurodata TV on TV 
channel audience share, combining this with database searches, studies of annual accounts and 
regulatory authorities on the ownership of the individual channels in the included markets. This 
led to the construction of a new set of raw data for use for the analysis in chapter 5, not available 
elsewhere, presented in appendix D. Please note, however, that the research has been discussed 
at length with people in the industry: public service broadcasters, and people from regulatory 
authorities – in addition background interviews have been conducted with people from the 
Danish public service broadcaster, the EBU office in Brussels, representatives of the 
Scandinavian public broadcasters and the BBC. 
The research on the influence of size is divided into two analytical chapters 4 and 5, each based 
on researching one of the hypotheses. Chapter 4 focuses on investigating the first hypothesis on 
differences of size based on market volume and original content. Chapter 5 focuses on 
investigating the second hypothesis on the difference of size on market competition. Studying 
these areas enables a broad and in-depth perspective on the influence of size on TV media 
markets.  
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Each analysis is meant to help identify the effects of size at the structural level. In addition 
market intervention using public broadcasters or other regulatory measures will be studied in 
both as part of the discussions. Language will mainly be taken into consideration in the 
investigation of the second hypothesis where there will be special emphasis on small markets 
with same-language large neighbours. 
The empirical investigation of the first hypothesis on the market volume and original production 
is related to the conditions of critical mass and thus scarcity. The indicators used are TV market 
volume and provision of original domestic content: 
• TV market volume will indicate if and which differences there are between large and 
small markets and how market size influences the market defined both by the aggregated 
and the individual sum of the three primary revenue streams (advertisement, subscription 
and subsidy). This is a critical mass and scarcity type of analysis, where the level of 
public subsidy will be a factor that could differentiate the markets, and thus change the 
rules of the game. 
• Production of original domestic content covers the dilemma associated with the 
production of public goods, where a traditional assumption is that the larger the market, 
the more capable it is of providing such services. The reason for entering original 
domestic content is due to the difficulty of collective financing and free-riding. This is 
also a critical mass and scarcity type of analysis. 
The indictors can be used to establish an overall idea of the influence of scarcity conditions 
under small market conditions. 
 
The empirical investigation of the second hypothesis is subject to questions on market 
competition and thus dependent on market intervention practices influencing the barriers to 
entry. The indicators used are competition, market concentration and language: 
• Competition will show the difference between the domestic and international actors and 
substantiate the influence of pan-European and global conglomerates vis- à-vis domestic 
companies. 
• Market concentration will show the overall competition in the markets, i.e. if the small 
markets are more or less concentrated than their large counterparts. Market concentration 
is measured using: a) concentration ratio using the combined share of the one to six 
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largest TV companies and b) concentration using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index 
(HHI). 
• Language is important as it can function as a measure to increase or decrease barriers to 
entry. Small markets with a large same-language neighbour will be especially subject to 
this, and therefore there could be differences between small markets with and without 
such a condition. Small markets with large same-language neighbours are expected to 
face conditions equal to those of the large markets. This is because language facilitates 
the ability of the commercial players in the large markets to perceive small markets with 
the same language as an enlarged part of their own, especially if these are regionally 
extended. 
The indicators should help establish if the competitive conditions are different in small and large 
markets, as well as help establish the effect of being a smaller country with a same-language 
larger neighbour. 
Combined, these analyses should give new insights into the influence of size, as well as the 
influence of market intervention practices. The analysis should enable a broader and more 
reasoned perception of how size affects the TV market than is currently available within media 
studies. The figure below shows the perceived influence of size based on the design. 
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Figure 1: Analysis of the structural influence of size.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In summary, this analysis should show differences in the markets based on which I will be able 
to establish if and how size is of importance at the structural level. This is based on 
considerations of critical mass and scarcity conditions. Consequently, the analyses should enable 
a more coherent perspective on the policy implications posed by size and the consequences this 
has for public policies in small and large markets. 
The concrete method of measuring size and the dependent variables is presented in more detail 
in chapter 3.3, measuring the influence of size 
 
The results of the analysis should enable a more comprehensive picture of the influence of size 
on the markets included. 
  
Size 
Market Volume 
Production of original 
domestic media content 
Market Competition 
Economy 
Population 
Public Policy (market intervention) 
Foreign influence (foreign channels & content) 
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1.6 Structure of the thesis 
The research thesis consists of six chapters and two résumés (one in English and one in Danish) 
and is structured in the following form: 
 
Chapter 2: Media market characteristics: In this chapter the initial theoretical argument as 
presented in the introduction is described in more detail, based on a discussion of the 
characteristics of media content goods, i.e. the characteristics of these particular types of goods 
(public/club good, merit goods, increasing returns to scale, minimum efficient scale and market 
failure). Concluding the chapter is the mix of consideration which lies inherently in the 
dissertation argument on the challenges of television markets. 
Chapter 3: Methodological approaches: In the methodological chapter the selected approach is 
presented along with the arguments against and on behalf of comparison. The advantages and 
disadvantages inherent in comparative methodology are presented and discussed. The pitfalls of 
empirical cross-market comparison are presented and related to the particular concerns of this 
dissertation. Furthermore the concept of size applied is defined, followed by the concrete 
empirical approach of measuring market volume, production of original domestic content and 
market competition is presented.  
Chapter 4: The influence of size on market volume and production of original domestic content: 
This chapter explores the logical side of the size argument on scarcity by identifying the 
difference in small and large market volume and originated production. A potential typology of 
size varieties is also investigated, followed by concluding on the argument. 
Chapter 5: The influence of size on market competition: This chapter investigates the influence 
of size on conditions of competition in television markets. This is also where the influence of 
state intervention in the market should become particularly evident. The analysis is done by 
studying public vs. private competition, penetration of foreign television channels, market 
concentration and ownership. Combined, this should establish the relationship between size and 
the competitive conditions in the sample markets. 
Chapter 6: Conclusion: This chapter concludes the empirical investigation into size, as well as 
the relative policy implications for the European TV markets. 
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Chapter 2. Media market characteristics 
2.1 Introduction 
This thesis revolves around the research problem of documenting and analysing how size 
matters for television markets in Europe in order to discuss potential policy implications. I have 
formulated two hypotheses on the influence of size based on considerations of critical mass 
(scarcity). The theoretical reasoning is that the influence of size is a consequence of small and 
large markets being subject to similar market and content good characteristics, which in effect, 
due to differences in size, leads to different market conditions. The consequences of size for the 
media therefore lie in the inherent traits and distribution of the media content goods and media 
markets. From a policy perspective this means that similar policies for dissimilar markets can 
result in unintended effects. 
Using the inherent traits and distribution of the media content goods and media markets I will 
present and discuss how the media markets are challenged in both large and small markets how 
this leads to difficulties in ensuring that original content caters for democratic, cultural and 
social needs. This is especially an issue in small markets, but particularly critical for small 
markets with same-language larger neighbours. Due to the public good characteristics and 
increasing return to scale, the financing of public goods is more difficult for small markets than 
large: this generates difficulties in terms of securing original production as they have to achieve 
minimum efficient scale to function profitably. 
In this second chapter, I will look into media market characteristics, as well as the related 
difficulties. First the public goods characteristics of media content will be presented, followed 
by a discussion of merit goods in relation to government intervention, then the issue of 
increasing return to scale for media content and market characteristics is presented; afterwards 
the difficulty related to minimum efficient scale is introduced, followed by a short discussion on 
market failure. Lastly the challenges of television are summarised. 
 
2.2 Public good characteristics 
This chapter introduces the characteristics of public goods in relation to electronic media content 
and the challenges of such conditions. 
Electronic media content has the same characteristics as public goods. They are non-rival in 
consumption, and non-excludable, meaning that it does not matter whether one person or one 
million people form the audience to the same content. This stands in contrast to private goods 
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being rival and excludable (Samuelsson, 1954, 1955 & 1958; Buchanan; 1967 & 1975; Ostrom, 
1990). 
Overall, however, it is possible to distinguish between four different types of goods based on 
these considerations of commodity characteristics being rival or non-rival and excludable or 
non-excludable: 
 
Table 4: Commodity characteristics 
Types of goods Excludable Non-excludable 
Rival Private Common resources 
Non-rival 
Artificially scarce goods/ 
Club goods 
Public goods 
 
Samuelson (1954; 1955; 1958; 1959) defined a particular set of goods as public goods, which 
due to inefficiency should be provided by government. He used broadcast television as an 
example to contrast a discussion in the FCC on whether to allow cable pay-television by 
applying the issue of non-rivalry. The distribution of television was made into a debate between 
Samuelson and Minasian (Samuelson 1958; 1964a; 1964b; Minasian; 1964a; 1964b); see also 
Buchanan (1967) on the discussion as well as Samuelson’s reply (1967). Samuelson’s (1954) 
paper focused on the issue of rivalry and non-rivalry in consumption, as well as the 
characteristic of non-excludability. Buchanan points to the issue of club goods and thus links in 
the issue of excludability of non-rival goods (1965) which is in line with Musgrave’s perception 
and as such bridged the gap between public and private goods (see also Buchanan, 1968). For 
the common good characteristic difficulties see Olstrom (1990), and Hardin (1968) for the 
tragedy of the commons. 
Mixed goods were also characterised (for instance by Musgrave (1969)) by pointing out 
externalities which could combine characteristics of private and social goods, in the sense of 
some goods being more meritorious than others in terms of whether the market would be able to 
provide enough demand for a particular good of this type through consumer demand, or if 
increased supply should be provided by government. For a general introduction and discussion 
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of public goods theory, both historically and theoretically, see the volume on Providing Global 
Public Goods edited by Inga Kaul (2003). 
The basic premise is that a media content good is non-diminishable as a consequence of non-
rivalry in consumption. However, through distribution, the characteristic of non-rivalry in 
consumption can be combined with either excludability or non-excludability; in other words, 
either a club or a public good. It can be argued that the characteristics are that of a public good, 
but they can change according to distribution; for instance news when distributed functions like 
a club-good in terms of access to that particular perspective on a news story; however, the good 
can easily be applied to a platform online or a newspaper and thus lose the club-good 
characteristic (not taking copyright into consideration). 
A point to make first is that it is not mainly the distributive mechanisms which are challenging, 
but more that the electronic media content have the same characteristics and difficulties as other 
types of creative works combined with the increasing returns to scale and cost of production 
being independent of consumption. In other words, it is a move from the original arguments on 
public goods to a discussion of the characteristics of the content good where the main focus is 
on non-rivalry conditions in combination with either excludability or non-excludability. In 
game-theory, the difficulty of private market public good provision is linked to the prisoner’s 
dilemma as presented below. 
 
Table 5: Private provisioning of a discrete public good 
 
Consumer 2 
Buy Do not buy 
Consumer  1 
Buy -50, -50 -50, 100 
Do not buy 100, -50 0,0 
Source: Varian, 1992: 417 
The principle here is that each consumer can choose whether or not to buy. What is important is 
the willingness to pay privately for a public good with a reduction of income for use in other 
consumption. The difficulty is that it becomes pareto optimal to provide the discrete public good 
if the consumer’s willingness to pay exceeds the cost of provision. The problem is that while it 
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would be pareto efficient to provide the discrete public good, the dominant actor strategy would 
be to free-ride, and thus the good would not be provided.  
Consequently, the result of this type of game is the non-provision of the good that would have 
been efficient if provided (Varian, 1993). As pointed out by Varian (1993:425), the difficulty 
when dealing with continuous provision is that: “the efficient level of the public good is 
determined by the condition that the average willingness-to-pay must equal the average cost”; 
however “if the median consumer wants the same amount of the public good as the average 
consumer, the amount of the public good is provided by voting will be efficient”.  
The free-riding difficulty is in essence what is established when an agent cannot be excluded 
from consumption, as this will raise the question of incentive to buy versus the incentive to 
benefit from others’ costs. When non-excludability is in play, single rational actors have no real 
incentive to purchase. The difficulty for broadcasting in this case is one of decreasing average 
cost on the one hand, but also the need for continuous provision on the other, as public goods 
within broadcasting are a continuous game. The problem of provision is thus a type of market 
failure. 
Failure by existence is the direct implication where the characteristics of public goods are 
present. Bator states this in the following way (1958): “there does not exist a set of prices 
associated with the (perfectly definable) bliss point, which would sustain the bliss configuration. 
The set of prices which would induce profit-seeking competitors to produce the optimal bill of 
goods, would be necessarily inefficient in allocating that bill of goods. Moreover even 
abstracting from production, no single set of relative prices will efficiently ration any fixed bill 
of good so as to place the system on its contract local, except in the singular case where at that 
output and income-distribution MRS’s of every individual are identically the same (or Zero for 
all but one). There is failure by existence”.  
The difficulty for the TV media is that programmes are indivisible and the variable costs are 
equal to zero, equalling zero marginal cost. In other words, the price of adding another person to 
the audience is zero. The costs of production are as such sunk and make producers face the 
difficulty of free-riding, as well as having to establish ways of spreading the cost through 
collective funding, either through advertisement, subsidy, subscription or PPV. 
There are externalities related to the non-provision of media services if these are not made 
available on the market, as well as if the market is left unregulated. Media content goods are 
interesting as they in principle bear the characteristics of a global public good on the one hand 
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(Kraul, 1999) and a club good on the other (Buchanan, 1965) when combined with a neo-
classical market definition taking market size in terms of geography into account.  
To conceptualise this: the same soccer match can be broadcast to the entire world and as long 
the viewers understand the rules of the game, the audience is able to understand what happens. 
However, taking culture and language into account changes the good characteristic from non-
excludable to excludable within a specific linguistic (and cultural) area. A specific piece of 
drama, regional news, national history and other programmes made for a specific cultural setting 
or language are not per se usable for another cultural or linguistic setting. While dubbing is 
easily applicable, changing from one language to another first of all imposes extra costs 
(increased transaction costs), and it also does not ensure that the programme is understood, nor 
perhaps even liked outside its cultural context. 
The challenge of media content and market characteristics in relation to commodity 
characteristics  have now been introduced and will be followed below with a presentation of the 
argumentation behind merit goods. 
 
2.3 Merit goods 
Following the discussion of public goods, it should be realised that this has changed into a 
discussion about the characteristics of specific types of commodities more than a question of 
state provision, but also that this does not in any way encompass all goods regulated by the 
state. This is where the question of desirable and undesirable goods and consumption enters the 
picture. When discussing such concerns I in a way leave micro economic theory, but in principle 
a question of cost-benefit for society remains. In order to conceptualise this I have to use the 
concepts presented by Richard Musgrave in his work on the Theory of Public Finance (1959); 
Fiscal Systems (1969); Public Finance in Democratic Society – The Foundations of Taxation 
and Expenditure (2000) as well as Musgrave & Musgrave on Public Finance in Theory and 
Practice (1980). 
The particularity of the question is that merit goods are goods which could be provided through 
private markets, but which are provided or subsidised by budget finance for various reasons 
(Musgrave, 1959). The argument in principle concerns debates on the social characteristics of 
goods, and the questioning of their particular desirability and undesirability, meaning evaluation 
of particular good merits or demerits in society.  
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As argued by Musgrave (2000): “The distinction between private and public or social goods 
arises from the mode in which benefits become available, that is, rival in the one and non-rival 
in the other case …. As a result, conditions of Pareto optimality differ, as do the appropriate 
mechanism of choice. But whether met through market or political process, both choices and the 
normative evaluation of outcomes rests squarely on the premise of individual preference. 
Consumer preference is taken to apply to both cases. The concept of merit (or for that matter, of 
demerit) goods questions that premise. It thus cuts across the traditional distinction between 
private and public goods. …issues which do not readily fit into the conventional framework of 
micro theory as based on clearly designed concept of free consumer choice”.  
The discussion revolves around choice, but not only consumer choice; it also includes the 
relation between consumer and state, and the interest in the regulation of consumer choice. 
 
Table 6: Additional social characteristics 
Good types with social characteristics 
De-merit Non-merit Merit 
 
Public interest and consumer choice can differ, should there be free consumer sovereignty with 
market provision of all goods viable for consumption. Resources should be allocated according 
to consumer demand, as per individual preference. In contrast to this, there are also public wants 
considered meritorious or de-meritorious by government (most likely a majority in a democratic 
society, but probably not always so), which directly interfere with free consumer sovereignty in 
an attempt to either further or limit consumption.  
In short, the state intervenes directly into consumer choice in order to change patterns of 
consumption. Even though these types of services could in general be provided by the market, 
the state intervenes to encourage or discourage usage (Musgrave, 1959; 1969). What is at stake 
here is conflict between public and private wants, where a group which presumably consists of a 
majority, but is potentially an elite, attempts to change consumption patterns. As argued by 
Musgrave & Musgrave (1980): the “issue of merit goods, dealing with situations where it may 
be questioned whether the basic premise of individual preferences offers an adequate 
framework for public sector analysis”.  
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The critics of public goods and the concern of market failure base their stance on the problem of 
state intervention by arguing on behalf of consumer sovereignty and that the market could and 
would have provided the service; but does that mean that we should have a channel carrying 
child pornography if there is a demand for it? Should we allow all types of content for all age-
groups? What happens when the consequences of a choice have consequences not only for the 
individual consuming the goods, but potentially for society as a whole or which indirectly harms 
another individual?  
A study of regulatory practice and EU legislation indicates that intervention to limit what is 
considered harmful is something which is done quite often. The Audiovisual Media Service 
Directive (AVMS) for instance allows restricting the broadcast of unsuitable content (article 2 
(4)-(6)) and protection of children from adult content (article 12). 
There can be various reasons for government regulation and it can be utilised in different ways. 
Musgrave points out (2000) that we can distinguish between a) pathological cases, b) rule of 
fashion, c) community preference and d) paternalism. When discussing broadcasting content we 
primarily focus on community preference, where this can be perceived as a result of historical 
processes of interaction with somewhat common values. As pointed out, we can expect the 
private commercial broadcaster to cater for services of general consumer interest and to an 
increasing degree to niche-interest, but content produced in a particular societal setting remains 
costly, especially for small markets, where high-quality programming of both informational and 
fictional genres will not be provided by the market alone. 
We are really discussing conditions in which the state substitutes individual choice by that of the 
collective by introducing regulatory measures to either deter or encourage consumption. In 
principle, we are referring to prohibitions or other types of penalising such as extra taxation for 
specific de-meritorious goods, while there might be established policies subsidising either 
partially or completely goods considered meritorious (Musgrave, 1969).  
As noted by Musgrave (1959:85), this entails that “Policies to provide merit goods, or to deter 
the provision of de-merit goods, cannot be explained in terms of our earlier approach to social-
goods theory. Although the approach calls for the compulsory acceptance of the voting decision 
and involved some interference with minority views, such interference is not accidental but the 
very purpose of public policy. The existence of merit goods thus defined may be taken to 
suggest that our society, which considers itself democratic, retains elements of autocracy which 
permit the elite (however defined) to impose their preferences. Or, it may be interpreted as 
adherence to community interests of values by which individual preferences are overridden. 
51 
 
Either explanation contravenes free consumer choice, the otherwise accepted principle of 
resource use”.  
This actually brings me back to the question of market failure on whether economics are 
sufficiently based on private consumer interest, where it has to be argued that in a world of 
states, this is not the case: it might be the case of coercive power changing allocation of 
resources and thus patterns of consumption for either better or worse, but this does not change 
the fact that in a world where politics, normative belief and uncertainty exist, there will always 
be an attempt to change patterns of consumption for various reasons. 
This also means that if I apply pure economic logic of the market alone, the logic of public good 
characteristics will not be sufficient to underpin the argument for Government intervention; only 
when this logic is combined with the logic of merit in the service of the public interest can we 
begin to establish arguments coherently and related to actual empirical practice.  
Below the characteristics for media content and media markets is studied using the discussions 
on increasing returns to scale to reinforce the additional challenge for media content. 
 
2.4 Increasing return to scale 
In general, we can distinguish between three types of scale: constant, increasing and decreasing. 
Traditional trade theory is based on constant returns to scale, where there are potential efficiency 
gains by economies of scale available through specialisation. Notable examples are the model of 
comparative advantages by Ricardo (1817), further developed by Dornbusch, Fisher and 
Samuelson (1977) and Heckscher and Ohlin (Heckscher, 1919; Ohlin, 1933). The line of 
thought is that through specialisation and trade, it becomes possible for nations to increase 
efficiency, more so than by producing domestically. This means that free trade is beneficial as it 
on the one hand creates value for both parties and thus results in gains, and on the other there is 
an opportunity cost involved in not taking advantage of it.  
For electronic media content we have increasing return to scale, or rather - in a way - the lack of 
a constant return to scale. This is because electronic media content carries characteristics of 
public goods as content comprise works of creativity. This leads to increasing returns to scale 
with conditions of consumption being independent of consumption. Under conditions of 
increasing return to scale, there is no competitive equilibrium: in other words, there cannot be 
perfect competition. The difficulty is that the production function for increasing returns to scale 
implies that the average cost curve associated with the point of production is sloping downward 
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at the level of output; as such the curve for marginal cost lies below the average costs (MC < 
AC). 
In the case of media content, free trade leads to all producers offering their programmes and/or 
formats to a world market with no real increased costs (besides securing non-infringement of 
their rights). With little extra cost other than marketing and distribution, they have an incentive 
(like all others) to increase sales, but under a condition where selling does not limit their ability 
to sell the exact same product again for use in another territory (or in some cases even in the 
same territory). 
Electronic media content is a case in which marginal costs can become less than the average 
costs of production. Average cost (AC) equals total cost (TC) divided by the quantity (Q) 
produced, i.e. produced units of a particular good for consumption, = 

 . Marginal costs 
include the cost of adding the next unit.  Marginal cost (MC) is the effect of change in TC when 
the Q changes by 1. In other words, the MC function is an expression of the derivative (d) of 
TC,  = 

. The problem of increasing returns to scale is that in relation to cost of 
production of media content, the cost of adding 1 audience unit of consumption is equal to zero.  
This is related to the high sunk-cost/fixed-cost of production with cost of production being 
independent of consumption, i.e. should the production only be seen by one person, the cost of it 
remains the same even if we change the number of viewers to one million. Cost is related to the 
level of audience which is able to watch, meaning that the more we are able to spread the costs, 
the lower they will become.  
In short, we have a condition where costs are declining when consumption increases (declining 
cost per unit). This makes producing programming for small markets inefficient if it is primarily 
interesting for the domestic market, while it becomes increasingly efficient as the market 
increases in volume. It is demand dependent, and what limits the company is the extent of the 
market. Under these conditions, we enter a market in which no single company is able to 
become profitable under a case of perfect competition. Under these conditions we operate in an 
imperfect market (Begg, Fischer & Dornbusch, 2005; Varian, 2003 & Stigler, 1951). 
The difficulty with electronic media content is that commercial enterprises cannot be certain of 
establishing a profitable business due to high sunk-costs; thus experiments on content, unless 
cheap or with assumed high success rates, will not be provided by the market. In other words, 
the private commercial sector would have difficulties in providing diverse electronic media 
content of a high quality. From a state perspective, this is a case of market failure, as the desired 
53 
 
genres of quality will not be sufficiently privately produced, because of a lack of profit incentive 
for the private commercial businesses.  
To exemplify: we first produce a children’s series, for example, for a television audience; if it is 
successful we can re-run it, sell it to foreign stations or on DVD, sell the rights to use the 
characters and so on, thus utilising economies of scope. We can continue to do this until there no 
longer is a consumer demand, and we can do this without having to produce the original work 
again. Furthermore, we can keep up interest by continuing the series to generate more attention. 
One example is Thomas & Friends (formerly Thomas the Tank Engine) which has now been 
aired for more than 25 years with ten different seasons. While the cost of production is a sunk-
cost, the revenue will likely have a long tail as new generations of children find the engine 
interesting. The important aspect of media content is the first copy cost of production, which 
does not have to be repeated for that particular piece of work. 
In other words, in order to conceptualise the world market of television, we need to understand 
that rights are sold, and furthermore that some markets appear to be more specialised than others 
within the audio-visual industry. When it comes to fiction production, good examples of this 
would be Hollywood and Mumbai. This brings the difficulty from the small markets to the 
international market: large markets have the potential of exporting to a greater degree than their 
small counterparts, but this is again related to culture and linguistics. AV-products are also 
cultural products, meaning that exports for some nations are from a limited range of produced 
content. Small markets have a problem in this regard, with the exception of specialisation in 
formats where the concept is sold for reproduction.  
Large markets thus have an advantage based on a higher amount of production as well as the 
potential of a bigger market. A large market such as the US has the potential of applying fast 
failure when testing shows for an audience. If the ratings are bad, the show can be cut:  the faster 
it is deemed a failure, the better, as it means lower costs and thus less loss of revenue; in other 
words, continuation would entail opportunity cost.  
On the other hand, if a show is a success, it can be syndicated and economies of scope can be 
applied, potentially worldwide. Successful examples include Beverly Hills, Friends, Seinfeld 
and SpongeBob SquarePants. SpongeBob SquarePants alone represents an annual $8 bn. 
merchandising franchise (Advertising Age, 2009). 
For commercial private companies there is a related difficulty of minimum efficient scale due to 
increasing return to scale: the broadcasting industry has high fixed costs due to the good 
characteristics, and the cost structure makes it difficult because of the high fixed-cost relative to 
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the variable costs, meaning that the market structure will tend to be concentrated and therefore 
will form structural barriers to entry. Minimum efficient scale will be introduced and discussed 
below. 
 
2.5 Minimum efficient scale 
This characteristic is based on the assumption that there is a lower limit for market concentration 
depending on market size on the one hand, and optimal company size on the other. The lowest 
concentration margin is a condition in which competition is the hardest possible, and all 
companies have exactly the optimal size (Sutton, 1991, 1998). Sutton distinguishes between two 
types of industries based on where competition is mainly on price and where conditions of 
research and development are important.  
There are differences between industries in the sense that if minimum efficient scale is relatively 
small compared to total market size in bakeries for example, while industries like electricity 
production and telecommunication have high minimum efficient scale due to high ratios of fixed 
cost as compared to variable costs, under such conditions the market tends to be dominated by a 
few players. This is especially true where there are conditions of natural monopolies with the 
average cost curve falling continuously for large ranges of output. In such conditions, only one 
or a few competitors might be available, leading the market structure to monopoly or oligopoly.   
In terms of the media, this characteristic poses an interesting difficulty or in a way a policy 
paradox, by stating the question: Do we have to take public interest into account? If not, should 
we allow that competition is based on primarily foreign produced content, especially in small 
markets? In order to conceptualise this we have to take into account the market boundary. In the 
case of the traditional mass-audience dual market model between advertisers and audience 
(usually with distributors) within a national market, this is not an issue, even if there are 
international distributors and advertisers. However, when introducing the media content good, it 
becomes more important: content is not a ”test card” screen on the tv,  or at least there would 
be little audience for such content; it is as such a work of creativity (commercial or non-
commercial). 
The problem here is that the public good characteristics of media content make it possible to 
claim that there is a world market for rights and existing media content which can be purchased 
and shown for a specific period within a given market. This, combined with the increasing 
return to scale issue, makes it difficult to ascertain that the companies in the market will produce 
the content deemed in the public interest by the individual state; instead, it would be more 
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prudent to assume that television companies will purchase cheap foreign production on the one 
hand and proven formats on the other, which could then be produced to fit the national cultural 
context.   
In such a situation, we must refer to the difficulty of securing production of original domestic 
content. In a market where there is an abundance of creative works which can easily be 
purchased to show for a period of time, why should a domestic company choose to do anything 
else? An easy answer would be that the audience prefers domestic television, which is the case 
empirically (see Eurodata TV, 2009), and that the companies are dependent on the audience 
watching their packaged content. If they did not, then services would not be offered for long. 
However, they would still face the difficulty of financing new productions, which could then be 
done at the lowest cost possible. The point here is that in a small market without state regulatory 
protection and/or public subsidy, the level of domestic production would be low or would 
probably consist of a combination of repeated domestic production and foreign programmes.  
This leads to a second difficulty, which is derived from company size: the larger the media 
company, the more able it is to cope with production failures which do not attract a sufficient 
audience. Separately, this also emphasises why size for a company is necessary to enable 
utilisation of scale by for instance securing channels in a number of nations to ensure the 
improved use of their own productions and rights, as well as using the potential of bundling 
rights to nations. Company size enables more efficient utilisation of economies of scale and 
scope in this instance, which at the international level can secure profit based on multiple 
markets, while those based only on single markets will face problems (unless aided by the state). 
 
2.6 Market failure 
Size in effect due to economic conditions can give rise to market failures for domestic 
broadcasters and thus lead to intervention due to public interest. When it comes down to it, the 
important factor remains the relation between state, market and civil society. 
Coase (1992) argued that in cases where the transactions costs for government are lower than for 
the market, state solutions offer more advantages. As pointed out by Hahn (1982), it remains to 
be questioned whether government intervention is desirable and less damaging than market 
failure. Keeping this in mind, it should be pointed out that there is no certainty that government 
provision will be more efficient than private (Holcombe, 1997), but evidently there is an 
incentive problem. It should be noted that any decisions on provision in terms of the electronic 
media can have a relation to the fear of monopolisation of ownership, or more accurately, the 
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prospect of a few people in control of the primary media: the situation of Berlusconi in Italy and 
Murdoch’s News Corporation are cases of concern (Hutchison, 1999; Doyle, 2002).  
 
What the critique of market failure theory and public goods tells us is that 
a) State involvement is not per definition necessary 
b) The actual cases where both non-rivalry and non-excludability are available are few- to 
non-existent, as excludability can almost always be established 
c) There is a choice of distribution system, meaning that private operators could also 
provide goods 
 
But what I find more important is:  
a) There are conditions where it is not business as usual, where the traditional economic 
approach risks leading to adverse effects 
b) That while it is possible to exclude, this does not mean that there should be established 
exclusion 
c) That rivalry matters, as the same cup of coffee cannot be used twice, but media content 
can be used more than once; and while the second time a particular audience watches the 
programme the experience might be inferior to the first, the content remains in existence 
for usage as reruns where it might be of interest to a new audience. 
 
What I have identified is a version of Shapiro and Varian’s (2003:50) statement that information 
goods are "costly to produce but cheap to reproduce”, where this is the basic premise 
underlying the problem of size as a consequence of the critical mass requirement. This means 
that what I discuss are mechanisms of choice. For the market, the combination of population and 
economy should show the same mechanism in countries if they have the same relative 
conditions, which for this dissertation would be small population, small economy or large nation 
and so on. These mechanisms are, however, dependent on the state-market relationship. The 
conditions do not change the fact that broadcasting content, after it has been produced, is non-
rival and can be either excluded or non-excluded, with this choice being related to funding.  
To understand government intervention [and public broadcasting principles] I have to include 
the merit argument, and argue on a public merit good reasoning instead of public alone. In short, 
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I have to bypass the argument that the individual consumer knows what is best as I have to 
consider public interest as well. This opens a separate question of community/public versus 
individual interest, but when operating with state interest, the community/public interest 
supersedes the interest of the single individual. Can we choose to adhere to the principle of 
consumer sovereignty as argued in micro economic theory, or not?  
When presented in this way, it becomes an either/or question, but what is needed is to include 
the concerns about externalities, and the media content commodity does carry particular 
characteristics which require attention to secure provision. So the market versus state tension is 
also an individual versus community/collective tension where the question of merit becomes 
increasingly relevant, as the state has an interest in ensuring its continuation. The problem for 
the media market can be presented like this: 
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Table 7: Media market characteristics of interest 
Media Commodity 
a) Idea based commodity, which has to be 
produced 
b) Either non-excludable or excludable depending 
on mechanism of distribution 
c) Non-rival 
d) Increasing return to scale 
e) Cost of production is independent of 
consumption; e.g.  first copy cost of production 
is most important 
f) Commodities have longevity; they can be 
shown in different places at the same time and 
repeats are possible 
g) Risky business as high production costs 
combined with low potential of predicting 
relative success, e.g. economies of failure 
h) Potential of franchise/merchandise if sufficient 
interest is attracted 
 
This commodity has to be produced based on an idea for 
a programme, which means that I have to distinguish the 
conditions before and after production  
Before production: first there has to be an idea for the 
content which has to be produced. This establishes a 
high cost of production due to the needed combination 
of equipment and personnel for a certain quality. The 
high cost presents the difficulty of funding as the 
success of a particular programme is an unknown and 
thus becomes a risk when not all genres and services 
will be catered for unless funding has been secured 
beforehand, meaning that not all risks will be taken. 
Content is based on an idea or a particular presentation 
of reality depending on the type of genre; sports in this 
way become an exception. 
After production: media content carries characteristics 
of non-rivalry when produced; it can have longevity and 
an average declining cost due to the cost of production 
being independent of consumption. The commodity 
characteristics also entail that there is the potential for 
repeats as well as use in different places at the same 
time; the same series could be played in the US, 
Norway and South Korea at the same time if there is 
sufficient interest. This also establishes the potential for 
merchandising and franchising if the commodity attracts 
sufficient interest. 
Market  
a) Distribution mechanism of packaged content, 
i.e. a channel either continuously or as PPV 
b) The business model is based on either 
advertisement revenue, subscription revenue, 
sponsorship, teleshopping, public revenue or a 
combination of these  
c) High level of minimum efficient scale for 
companies based on a single domestic market 
due to economies of scale 
d) Economies of scale (increasing) and scope; 
potential for global markets using thematic 
approach 
e) High barriers to entry and exit 
f) Tendency for high levels of concentration 
Due to its content characteristics, the media market has 
a tendency to become concentrated, which is the 
reasoning behind the high level of minimum efficient 
scale. The minimum efficient scale difficulty can be off-
set by targeting several markets at the same time, and is 
thus especially difficult when there is only a single 
domestic market.  
There are economies of both scale and scope, but the 
increasing returns to scale due to links to consumption 
present a difficulty of average declining costs. The main 
problem lies in establishing the infrastructure for 
distributing the packaged content.  
The combined characteristics of market and content 
establish high barriers to entry in particular, but also exit 
for a domestic player.  
Source: Own depiction 
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I have not seen convincing arguments that the private market can be expected to provide all 
types of content, but rather that the main focus will be mass-audience-related in the first instance 
of domestic provision and niche-oriented in the second due to financing mechanisms.  
 
2.7 The challenges of broadcasting 
Summing up, it can be seen that from a state perspective, there are several difficulties related to 
the issues of public good characteristics, increasing return to scale and minimum efficient scale, 
with the primary being: a) there is a limit to how many competing companies can operate within 
each market, depending on size and b) small market firms risk problems in achieving sufficient 
scale; this is primarily the case if the focus is on the domestic market. This leads to limits in the 
tendencies of small markets to be highly concentrated, as they have few domestic actors, and 
usually small market structures of duopoly or oligopoly. The high cost of producing original 
content in a range of genres means that imports are necessary. 
Small markets have less potential for commercial funding than their larger counterparts, 
particularly if broadcasting in the national languages of the smaller countries is taken into 
consideration. Production of programming for a limited audience in a specific language and 
cultural setting is costly and might not always be provided by small markets due to high costs. 
At the same time, programmes are available in international trade from both large and small 
markets in abundance, especially from North America, at a lower price than the cost of domestic 
production and co-production. Smaller markets can at the same time usually only maintain a 
lower number of competing companies and therefore tend to be more concentrated, which can 
entail an increased intervention in the market.  
Large markets also have a similar range of difficulties: high quality programming is costly and 
might not be profitable. While they have more resources available, they also have the problems 
of securing content for nationwide services. Although that market size might be larger, the 
number of competitors increases when there is a potential for profitable investment. Certain 
goods and services will simply not be offered if the language area is too small to be profitable 
due to minimum efficient scale, i.e. lack of critical mass. 
I argue that media markets and especially television markets face difficulties in which a 
traditional approach of securing competition should be considered unreliable. My point is that 
this is shown in the discussion of market failure and the more detailed study of the 
characteristics, which indicate that the characteristics of the broadcasting market and content 
establish difficulties in securing competition and thus lead towards market concentration, but 
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also that this is dependent on the critical mass of the market or, in short, how many companies 
of efficient scale the individual countries can sustain, and how high the market barriers are for 
potential new entrants, both domestic and international. This is in reality a condition of scarcity 
based on critical mass. Critical mass is an expression of the availability of resources, i.e. market 
volume, talent mass and more, which again is an expression of scarcity of revenue for particular 
purposes, scarcity of talent and more. This also means that competition can become a double-
edged sword: if wielded correctly it can be utilised wisely to increase overall quality in the 
market, while if used badly it will lead to declining quality and cut-throat competitive 
conditions, which can reduce citizen/consumer benefit. 
We know that consumers prefer domestic linguistic content, even though national media 
companies are subjected to competition from international niche-channels (and thus 
multinational corporations); this content has to be dubbed or subbed in order to be made 
understandable for the majority (usually). This would be a significant problem for small markets 
when faced with their inefficiency in combination with competition with multinational 
corporations. We have to enable the conceptualisation of the exchanges of both the state and 
companies/organisations at national and international levels. An example of this is evident in 
Scandinavia, where the primary commercial television companies without public service 
obligations are a) owned by a multinational corporation and b) act opportunistically by 
maximising utility by transmitting under the more relaxed advertising rules in the UK. 
I argue that by conceptualising language and thus culture as excludable factors, that although 
electronic content has the characteristics of public goods, these are actually club goods 
(artificially scarce goods) due to the limitations of language, as even when dubbing, the 
linguistic and cultural nuances can get lost. An example is content produced for small markets: 
although in principle non-excludable and non-rival, when language is introduced into the 
equation it becomes a function of excludability. Language thus becomes another function of 
exclusion, where media content as a consequence becomes similar to jointly supplied goods, e.g. 
club goods. Denmark and Danish-produced content thus becomes a club in the sense of it being 
non-rival but excludable, meaning that it would only be the 5.6 million Danes who would enjoy 
primary understanding: even if that particular piece of content was distributed worldwide, only a 
fraction of people would understand it. The main difference in this perspective is that instead of 
perceiving a market as national, it should be seen internationally to enhance the understanding 
of electronic content in a multi-linguistic environment. 
The particulars of this have some consequences when I examine the difficulties of broadcast 
markets, where the goods per definition are non-diminishable. The point here is that electronic 
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media content is non-diminishable (Varian, 1992), but this does not change the fact that it could 
be produced for the particular purposes of a society. I also have to take into account the 
investment perspective of new original content, which when it comes down to basics is behind 
the reasoning for some of the elements generating market failure in the broadcast markets; as 
such we have both production functions and channel output functions where content is shown. 
The individual channels could easily purchase sufficient content to fill the output time, but what 
interests the audience the most is (original) domestic programmes. This also relates to the 
argument for broadcasting market failure in lack of provision.  
I have to distinguish between a production value chain and the television value chain, where 
production is only one, albeit vital, link. This is important in order to understand the difference 
between the channel output of packaged content and the production of content. This is because 
the media market characteristics of the dual market of broadcasting are well known and often 
applied in the literature (e.g. selling audience to advertisers, attracted by shown content).  
 
Table 8: Simple phases related to individual programmes/shows 
1st 
programme production 
2nd  
Showing 
3rd 
Performance 
4th 
Re-use 
Idea 
generation 
Production Finalising 
Part of packaged 
output 
Audience 
results 
Selling, repeating 
or format 
Source: Own depiction 
 
When we take the individual programme creation process into account, we can see that while 
the broadcasting phase is related to the value chain of television business, the chain of 
programmes is somewhat different as it retains significant scarcity issues. There is a limit to 
talent, especially in small markets; production facilities might also be limited and - not least - 
where does the financing revenue come from for a product which, when finalised, achieves non-
rival characteristics and has economies of scale in consumption? The incentive structure of 
actually producing particular programmes is also at stake; just as most states subsidise the 
production of domestic films, there is a situation in which television content, or high-quality 
62 
 
online content for that matter, will not be produced as there are no guarantees of profit: this is 
especially true in small language areas. 
This does, however, also emphasise the difference between the movie theatre economy and 
television when discussing concerns like inefficient exclusion with content where the cost of an 
extra audience besides that first one is more or less insignificant; e.g. MSC = 0. When we 
discuss television we have the potential of offering roughly 8.600 hours of content per channel 
annually. Keeping full flow provision is a continuous process, where we can fortunately reuse 
the content created by repeating it.  
Furthermore, for films, series and more, there is also the potential for international sales which, 
in cases like Beverly Hills 90210, can make particular shows quite profitable compared to the 
original costs of production; this can even be done while using the same content in the particular 
producer’s home market. It can also be applied in several countries simultaneously on thematic 
channels. Both conditions are due to the media content characteristics of non-rivalry and 
economies of scale in consumption. 
From a national domestic position, one of the difficulties is securing sufficient original domestic 
content; this is because of the risk of failure, especially in small markets. This is where another 
primary use becomes apparent: different types of content based on ideas can be used as formats 
for those productions by other producers - indies or broadcasters – while it actually appears like 
domestic content, as “domestic personnel” are used in the production phase; this alone can 
reduce risks significantly as the idea phase for that production is reduced, thus lowering overall 
costs.  At the same time risk is reduced, with the level of that risk being dependent on the track 
record in other countries. 
Overall, the economic conditions of the commodity are dependent on the potential of the content 
produced versus the relative risk taken in selecting that investment instead of another. The 
imperfect market conditions lead to difficulties in securing provision of all types of interests, 
especially so when the volume of the market becomes niche in type. While a programme might 
still be viable to produce, it will have to be done for the international market, where the 
aggregated mass of the niche audience might be large enough to risk the investment. 
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Table 9: Conditions before and after production 
Before production When shown, after production 
Scarcity of resources and talent Non-rival condition 
High cost of complete production; incl. idea 
phase 
Economies of scale in consumption; +1 
audience = 0 MSC increase, e.g. negligible 
cost 
Risky investment in unproven idea (making 
talent more important) 
Repeatable and potential of long-tail; 
copyright protected (unless only format) 
High risk of failure, but also if mass-audience 
related, potential of high profit 
Language dependent 
Source: Own depiction 
 
The various challenges of the broadcast media are in reality in combination with concerns of 
culture the primary reason for public broadcasting along with a merit-good line of thought, 
where the key issue becomes public merit goods. As pointed out by Andrade (2001), both 
broadcasting and telecommunications have been deregulated significantly since 1973; even 
though this has been the case, and especially in combination with high market concentration, 
there continues to be a strong argument in favour of public broadcasting to secure domestic 
services.  
The reason for this is that “a strictly commercial approach to television – even in large and rich 
markets – is not reconcilable with cultural goals. Such an approach is even more unrealistic in 
smaller countries and in most countries of the world”(Juneau, 1997). It becomes a question of 
incentive, not only from the individual consumer, but also from the industry in terms of what 
sort of provision and why? The challenge from a state perspective is that as a community and a 
culture from a merited perspective, there is a difference in what will be provided and what there 
could be an interest in having provided. 
The cultural argument is strong. “When we consider what I call the satellite culture,” said T. S. 
Elliot, “we find two reasons against consenting to its complete absorption into the stronger 
culture. The first objection is one so profound that it must simply be accepted: it is the instinct 
of every living thing to persist in its own being… It would be no gain whatever for English 
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culture, for the Welsh, Scots and Irish to become indistinguishable from English-men. What 
would happen, of course, is that we should all become indistinguishable featureless “Britons”, at 
a lower level of culture than that of any of the separate regions. (as citied in Juneau, 1997).  
This is in principle also connected to the argument on perceiving domestic content as a club-
good; we provision goods from our own culture with a reason for distinguishing it from others. 
Otherwise we might as well purchase productions from other nations as they are available in 
abundance. As Tracey (1992) argues, philosophies of broadcasting are related to or rather “born 
out of a philosophy of society”. We cannot remove the civil society and cultural dimensions 
from the discussion, and this is why public broadcasting as an argument to limit market failure 
remains coherent, and why the market–state discussion is insufficient to grasp PSB and also 
why [public] merit good arguments remain the strongest for intervening into the market in a 
particular community to secure universality of the services provided in the service of the public. 
An element which is sometimes forgotten when looking at media products is that languages and 
culture exclude. It is forgotten because we look at these goods mainly from a national 
perspective and not an international one.  
No matter how we look at it, even if the Danish television station was able to reach a watching 
world population of 6 billion people, only a fraction would be able to understand the 
programmes, not only in terms of the language, but also in terms of cultural differences. The 
rules of the game in this way become governed by the language in question; while sports are 
differentiated due to the rules being international, a watching Asian audience would not 
understand the commentators, but could understand the rules of the game. Is this interesting and 
why should we even perceive language (and culture) as an excluding factor? Small markets’ 
potential for export is relatively limited, although this is not necessarily the case for formats, and 
this actually proves the point, as the shows based on international formats are given a national 
domestic appearance: in other words, they buy the idea and make it national. While you can 
almost always sell a good and proven concept or idea, it is more difficult to sell content devised 
and produced for a particular small language area. 
From an international perspective, this implies that domestic broadcasters with domestically 
produced content lack the potential of utilising economies of scale and scope sufficiently partly 
due to their market being national and partly due to the produced content. In contrast, 
multinational corporations are able to utilise the potentials of the public good in a way which 
also utilises economies of scale and scope by a)producing to an international market and b) 
using dubbing/subbing. This is also why this is interesting. By applying the geographical 
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perspective from the traditional perceptions of the market and combining it with the usual de-
contextual public good in relation to media content, we can perceive language and an excludable 
factor making Danish and more or less Denmark into a club. In other words, domestically 
produced content should rightly be perceived as a public good from the national perspective, but 
it is actually a club good from the international perspective. 
To illustrate, we should perceive this in the number of citizens or consumers of interest. The 
number of n from a national domestic perspective is somewhat different between large and 
small nations on the one hand, but also between national domestic companies and international 
companies on the other. The Danish state primarily focuses on securing the provision of 
necessary content for the Danish market. In contrast the German state, while also primarily 
securing domestic provision, also attains some international output through Deutsche Welle: 
here, they manage public good status as the n equals a larger language area than the German.  
A Norwegian domestic broadcaster focuses primarily on the national market producing content 
in Norwegian, making it a club good; in contrast, an international company such as Disney 
utilising economies of scale and scope can take complete advantage of the potential of the media 
goods by targeting as many countries as possible using dubbing, but with international content 
and only very limited or no domestic content having an effective n equalling not the entire 
world, but very close to it. It is estimated to be profitable based on advertisement, cable relay, 
merchandise sales or other revenue sources.  
In other words, the differences lie in the potential number of customers; whereas a state at a 
national level is correctly assuming that in order to secure national domestic content, subsidies 
are needed due to the nature of the commodity, from an international perspective this is due to it 
being a club good. On the other hand, an international media company has the potential to utilise 
the media goods to their fullest extent across markets to an n higher than those of most nations. 
This actually has consequences for both public and European policy. Realistically, if the 
argument is correct, then the EU is too small to manage de facto competition against content 
from, for instance, the US. There are too many languages and too little competition between 
European media companies compared to the content available from US production. From the 
international perspective, the EU member countries (except France, Spain, Poland, Germany and 
the UK) risk being trampled by international content, with consequences for their own culture 
and production industries. The nation-state has to preserve its nationality, language and 
production, while at the same time having to cope with the demand for uniformity of rules at the 
EU-level.  
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The reason is not due to lack of content production at a European level, but rather that the 
entertainment, TV series and drama from North America are not only cheaper but have also 
been through a significantly harder competition process before being labelled a profitable and 
perhaps continuous series. On the other hand, this also places a great strain at the EU-level, as 
the content is produced by a collective of “clubs” not able to compete directly at the European 
level but more within a regional context.  
 
2.8 Analysing the influence of size 
Testing the hypotheses stated in the introduction requires analysis of the available revenue in the 
market, the level of original content and a study of the market competition with focus on barriers 
to entry in terms of concentration. The important issue is finance, meaning the availability of 
funds, also defined as critical mass. The availability of funds in a market is related to the media 
company’s potential for profit and willingness to invest in original domestic content. This is 
linked to population and the economy, which means that in theory I should be able to identify 
differences between small and large markets conditioned on these two premises on account of: 
a) Available revenue where critical mass becomes paramount for funding 
b) Level of original domestic content  
c) Market competition and therefore also the level of market concentration 
 
The reasoning for this is linked to the provision of public goods and the logic of merit goods, 
where due to the characteristics of broadcast markets and media content, I cannot expect small 
markets to provide what is of general interest to the same degree as large markets can.  
In the next chapter of the dissertation the methodological approach is discussed and the applied 
empirical measurement used to investigate the hypotheses is presented. 
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Chapter 3. Methodological approaches 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the methodological approach consisting of both the theoretical challenges 
and empirical measurement. The influence of size and the differences I can observe in small and 
large markets are the primary focus of this thesis. This makes the relevant units of analysis the 
individual national markets combined with regional markets for some of the countries with 
special language conditions.  
In consequence, the thesis is planned as a comparative variable oriented study of measureable 
units of size. The phenomenon of size is expected to matter; the question is how it shows 
empirically. The operational definition of size has been defined in the introduction in chapter 
1.2.3, Defining size, page 19. There will be a natural bias as well as error term for the 
immeasurable units and effects of size. It is thus important to point out that this dissertation does 
not claim to answer all the questions concerning size, but it gives a perspective on a variety of 
size definitions and their potential policy implications for European markets. As pointed out by 
Robert Dahl and Edward Tufte (1973), size is quite an ambiguous concept and there are various 
ways of operationalising it. The choice made on how to study size is thus exactly that: a choice, 
one way among others to conceptualise how size influences. The purpose of this chapter is to 
clarify the basic methodology of this thesis. 
In this chapter, I shall present firstly the selected approach including the challenges and pitfalls. 
This is done in chapter 3.2, Why compare?, where a short discussion of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the variable oriented approach is presented, followed by the challenges of 
conducting empirical cross-market comparison, as the implications for the project. Subsequently 
I present the methods applied for measuring the influence of size in chapter 3.3, Measuring the 
influence of size, by defining the measurement in each five research questions (A-E) related to 
the two hypotheses. 
 
3.2 Why compare? 
The first question which needs an answer is why we compare at all. The point of this 
dissertation is two-fold: on the one hand to argue that the overall market characteristics are 
similar, and on the other that the difference size constitutes is a consequence of the difference in 
critical mass of resources available. To show this we have to compare small and large markets. 
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There are various approaches to comparative research (see for instance Przeworski & Teune, 
1970; Lijphart, 1971, 1975; Skocpol, 1984; Ragin, 1987). The point is that comparative research 
has a long tradition of highly useful works which have had tremendous impact not only on 
research but also on our understanding of society. Comparisons can be used to establish 
similarities and differences based on various characteristics; without comparisons it would be 
difficult to establish if there are variations of social phenomena and how they can be 
differentiated. As argued by Gabriel Almond (1966: 878): “It makes no sense to speak of a 
comparative politics in political science, since if it is a science, it goes without saying that it is 
comparative in its approach” … “whether it: be in the experiment, in the analysis of the results 
of quantitative surveys, or in the observation of process and behavior in different contexts in the 
real world, is the very essence of the scientific method”. In short, without comparisons, how 
would it be possible to identify difference?  
Overall, I have to include an understanding of the objective behind the research in order to 
establish whether comparisons are relevant. I can distinguish between two overall rationales of 
political science research: 
a) Research conducted to solve actual policy problems in order to improve if not how 
policies work, then to reduce adverse effects  
b) Research conducted to advance knowledge within the field (Hakim, 2000) and to 
potentially increase the overall quality of the data the current knowledge is based on.  
 
Thus, there are two criteria which can be distinguished; importance for the policy making, and 
contributions to the scholarly body of knowledge by increasing the available number of verified 
explanations of particular areas (King et al. 1994). 
The research proposed in this dissertation revolves around the influence of size on the TV media 
with a primary focus on European states. The relevance of this is that more than €22 bn. 
annually is contributed in public revenue to public television companies, as well as it being a 
medium viewed by almost all European consumers.  
Size thus becomes a case of interest if the conditions caused by it are different in ways that 
establish variations in the challenges for states in general and small states in particular. It would 
be difficult to establish if there were actually differences between small and large states by 
comparing only either small or large states. 
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The objective of this dissertation is twofold; firstly it is an attempt to establish a new brick in the 
wall of knowledge within the field by using comparative empirical studies aiming at explaining 
how size influences the broadcast media; secondly the research potentially could help deduce 
policy implications in the form of externalities of policy and adverse effects. In order to advance 
the field it is important to establish more comparative research crossing more than the few case 
studies. The reasoning for this lies in the low level of large cross-nation comparisons within 
media studies with an emphasis on empirical research; usually the diachronic approach is 
applied mainly in studies comprising only a few markets.  
There are several challenges involved in selecting such an approach which have been pointed 
out by Satori (1991), Collier & Mahoney (1996), Ragin (1987, 2000), which become evident in 
the material presented by John H. Goldthorpe (2000), who argues on behalf of the variable-
oriented approach; see also the discussion between Goldthorpe (1997) and Ragin (1997) on the 
same issue. Below the advantages and disadvantages of the variable-oriented approach are 
briefly presented. 
 
3.2.1 Variable-oriented approach 
The method applied is a comparative variable-oriented method, which will allow some degree of 
generalisation, at least for Europe. The main challenge is first to argue why it is beneficial to 
apply a variable-oriented approach for this type of study. 
As argued by Ragin (1987: 53): “…the variable-oriented approach is theory-centered. It is less 
concerned with understanding specific outcomes or categories of outcomes and more concerned 
with assessing the correspondence between relationships discernible across many societies or 
countries, on the one hand, and broad theoretically based images of macrosocial phenomena, on 
the other.” Understanding social phenomena as complex where generality is only possible to a 
certain degree underscores the case-study approach versus the focus of the variable-oriented 
approach on the potential of establishing general explanations, while ignoring to some degree 
the complexity (Ragin, 1987).  
This can also be perceived as a thick-descriptive versus a thin-descriptive approach. From a 
case-oriented perspective, the main emphasis is on contextualised descriptions of the cases 
based on recognition of historical development for understanding and identifying important 
factors. The case-oriented approach requires some degree of familiarity with the selected cases, 
which is also why it becomes difficult to include large numbers of them. In contrast, this is also 
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where the variable-oriented approach can be applied, but at the cost of the familiarity and 
contextual understanding of the individual cases in the sample.  
Concerning this dissertation, it would not be possible to establish sufficient familiarity with the 
context of all the markets involved to present a meaningful and thick-descriptive analysis 
containing all involved objects of analysis. The variable-oriented approach will be applied as the 
primary methodology in this study which will have a price in terms of the thick description and 
primary date, but will have a benefit in terms of generalisability. 
Ragin points out the following on what should be investigated in variable-oriented studies 
(Ragin, 1987: 56): “…The investigator examines relationships between general features of 
social structures conceived as variables. The implicit model of causation central to this strategy 
is structural. Social units, such as nation-states, have structural features which interact in the 
sense that changes in some features produce changes in other features, which in turn may 
produce changes in others. … In this approach, data on social units provide snapshots of 
instances of structural processes. Thus, structural features and their interrelations can be 
represented in terms of variables and intercorrelations. By studying the patterns that emerge 
from such snapshots of structural processes (that is, by studying correlations between variables), 
it is possible to derive empirical generalizations about the structural processes…”.  
This presents a challenge for this dissertation, due to the difficulties of access and availability of 
resources which limit the access to data; on the other hand, the number of cases involved do not 
allow for the degree of familiarity required for an in-depth comparative case-study approach, 
without substantial external research assistance. The 26 national markets involved do not allow 
complete use of the most sophisticated econometrical tools, but it is sufficient to apply them and 
secure the validity of the results through some degree of contextualisation of particular areas. 
The variable-oriented approach can be criticised for over-simplification as the use of statistical 
techniques requires that, as pointed out by Ragin (1987), we are interested in the “average effect 
of a cause in a theoretically defined set of observations”. The choice of a variable-oriented 
approach means that there is a limit in terms of how much of the actual complexity of the 
relationship and limitations in terms of descriptiveness. However, due to the number of cases 
used it would be an immensely challenging prospect to go in-depth with all the markets included 
as required by a case approach. 
The intention in this chapter has not been to establish a comprehensive and detailed account of 
all the challenges involved in comparative research, but mainly to indicate the consequences of 
pursuing a variable-oriented approach. For more detailed discussion of variable- versus case-
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oriented approaches, see Ragin (1991) Issues and Alternatives in Comparative Social Research, 
and Van de Vijver & Leung (1997) Methods and Data Analysis for Cross-Cultural Research for 
a more extensive treatment of the subject. 
 
3.2.2 Challenge of comparison 
In comparative studies there are four primary methodological problems which have to be 
addressed in order to qualify as an empirical study. These are 1) The small n and too many 
variables problem, 2) Galton’s problem, 3) the black box problem, 4) the problem of selection 
bias and 5) the challenge of multicollinearity. See, for example, Goldthorpe (1997, 2000), 
Rauchmeyer & Stephens (1997) and Ragin (1997). Each of these will be discussed in turn. 
These challenges link to considerations of comparability, case selection, units of analysis, level 
and scale of analysis as well as the risk of the independent variables being collinear. 
 
3.2.2.1 Small n and too many variables 
A main challenge is having too many variables or too small a number of cases. This study 
having 26 observations in the least category has to be careful in terms of not including too many 
variables.  
 
The small-n problem refers to the problem presented by Lijphart (1971:685): “The principal 
problems facing the comparative method can be succinctly stated as: many variables, small 
number of cases. These two problems are closely interrelated. The former is common to 
virtually all social science research regardless of the particular method applied to it; the latter is 
peculiar to the comparative method and renders the problem of handling many variables more 
difficult to solve”. Having too few cases and too many variables are two different challenges, 
but one problem is that assessing too few cases often results in too many variables with which to 
establish coherent explanations. This also remains a challenge for the analysis in this 
dissertation. 
 
In relation to the challenge of small n, Goldthorpe (1997) argued: “…it is above all else 
necessary to recognize here is that au fond the small N problem is not one of method at all, but 
rather of data: more specifically, it is a problem of insufficient information relative to the 
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complexity of the macrosociological questions that we seek to address. … Conversely, what is 
vital to overcoming the small N problem is in principle easy to state, albeit in practice toilsome, 
even where possible, to achieve: that is, simply to increase the information that we have 
available for analysis.” 
The small-n too many variables problem has often been posed by Goldthorpe (1997, 2000) and 
King et al. (1994), who argue on behalf of a statistical orientation, but the problem of over-
determination remains, caused by the potential of too few degrees of freedom in the statistical 
analysis. It thus becomes a critique of case-orientation relying on small n. And as pointed out by 
King et al. (1994), as the number of observations increases, the confidence in the tests 
performed also increases, as we in effect have enhanced the observable implications of the 
proposed model. If I relate this to the discussion between variable-orientation versus case-
orientation, there is criticism from proponents of small-n comparative methodology, as they 
argue that thick-description and particular circumstances become more or less invisible at the 
macro-level, and thereby they risk excluding viable explanations. I can also argue that even if 
there is a relationship in the model, there is no guarantee that I actually measure what I intend to 
measure at the aggregated level (as pointed out by Satori 1991). 
 
In a way, the small-n, many variables challenge is a trap for researchers, as in an attempt to 
salvage an explanation we include more variables, which can cause small-n difficulties again. 
The same goes for small and large sample studies, as the small sample studies yield more thick-
descriptive explanations, which the large sample studies can benefit from in their thinner 
descriptive explanations. 
 
It is in effect a choice between methods and availability of data; this also refers to the selection 
of cases, where the scale of the analysis is chosen. I have decided on a mid-scale comparative 
analysis. Unfortunately, for various reasons, availability of media data is quite scarce and this 
has limited the analysis to 26 markets. This places some challenges on the comparative analysis, 
but by applying this sample, I can investigate the argument and attempt to identify whether there 
is a difference between small and large markets as suggested by the hypothesis.  
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3.2.2.2 Galton’s problem 
Galton’s problem is the predicament of dependence between countries, or, phrased alternatively, 
the problem of historically non-independent cases. Galton’s problem as identified by Raoul 
Naroll (1961, 1962, 1965) causes statistical problems when the common dependence or 
influence of historical factors affects the similarity of cases. 
Galton’s problem in essence argues that similarities identified between cultures could be caused 
by imitation, learning or diffusion which appear as dependence both within and between 
countries in the form of auto-correlation. Take Europe as an example: these countries are 
dependent, imitate and learn from each other, but when we then identify similarity, what is it 
exactly we identify? Is it an historical process, legislation or otherwise? If we test the 
hypothesised argument based on similar development, we risk having institutionalised 
dependence between the countries in question, which can threaten what we actually compare 
and how we can explain it, or rather interpret the statistics. For statistics at least, we have to take 
it into account by adjusting and conducting the relevant significance tests. The challenge is one 
common to all cross-cultural research, i.e. both variable-oriented and case-oriented.  
Naroll (1961, 1965) suggested the first ways to deal with this challenge in statistics and thus 
how to identify similarity based on geographic closeness and cultural resemblance. This is a 
challenge when the intention is to test theories. Let’s take the liberal convergence thesis of 
Hallin & Mancini (2004:76): “…there is a trend in all countries toward commercialization of 
the media and professionalization of journalism and other media-related occupations, and a 
corresponding separation of the ties that once connected the media to the world of politics – 
most particularly to political parties and other organized social groups. There is, in this sense, a 
convergence toward the liberal model”. What is the trend they identify? Is it globalisation, is it 
that other countries imitate the liberal system, is it evolutionary, or is it all three?  
Looking at the countries they compare, there is high potential for imitation processes, learning 
and other relationships making them dependent on each other (for instance OECD); thus it is not 
necessarily a comparison of independent cases. The obvious answer would be to secure cases 
independent of each other, but political systems and economies are usually open, especially in 
small countries. How can we find actual independent cases in the first place? And secondly, is 
that at all warranted in this study of size where we actually expect the conditions to be similar?  
Galton’s problem is relevant for understanding the difficulty of using, for instance, small 
countries with large same-language neighbours as the only cases, but on the other hand, these 
should in theory be the deviant cases and present interesting relationships between the two 
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markets. The problem has been ignored in political science comparative studies for some time, 
and this is probably in relation to the openness of political systems and the tendency of diffusion 
of best practice, as for instance the UNESCO (2005) publication on public broadcasting. I have 
to be aware of the challenge of this problem and be able to counter it in statistical time-series 
analysis, for example, and in other tests of statistical significance.  
Within media studies, several arguments are actually based on the logic of similarity and 
dependence, such as the cultural imperialism hypothesis or the aforementioned liberal 
convergence hypothesis. The advance of international trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
developmental aid as well as international organisations such as the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), the World Bank, the United Nations (UN) and so forth ensures increasing dependency 
between the countries and even more so between markets; I cannot in any way in the selected 
markets for this study argue that they are based on independent cases.  
They are dependent: the small national markets are theoretically and empirically argued as being 
dependent between themselves and between the small and large markets. This is something I 
have to take into consideration when establishing explanations, but it is also a problem which 
can prove a point in itself on the influence of size. Following Goldthorpe (1997) and 
Rauchmeyer & Stephens (1997), I agree that the problem posed is overstated and can be 
investigated and compensated statistically: at least it should not be a direct hindrance to 
conducting comparative studies. 
 
3.2.2.3 The black box 
Theory and empirical evidence goes hand-in-hand for both variable-oriented and case-oriented 
methods. The variable-oriented statistical analysis carries the cost of not understanding 
particularities of the individual cases (Rueschmeyer, 1991). Using size as an example, I can 
apply a regression on the relationship between population size and market size; this will offer 
insight into the relationship between population and different types of revenue, but it will 
explain little on the reasoning for, the level of public revenue or the daily strategy of media 
companies. This would require more in-depth understanding of the individual cases and market 
conditions. Thus, I have a black box.  
Goldthorpe argued the black box challenge in the following way (1997): “We know the "inputs" 
to the analysis and we know the "outputs" from it; but we do not know much about why it 
should be that, within the black box of the statistical model that is applied, the one is 
transformed into the other.” For the analysis utilised in this dissertation I point out that there 
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have been several case-studies of various types of size on which this dissertation can on the one 
hand rest and on the other supply a more general approach. Without the work of Trappel & 
Meier, I would not have been aware of the small same-language neighbour difficulty 
beforehand, but would have deviant cases I would have had to explore independently in detail 
for explanations. In this, I support the fact that the individual method offers reciprocal support 
and potential for substantiating theory on different levels of analysis.  
The challenge of the black box is inherent in the variable-orientation, but in contrast, few case-
studies are able to cope with all relevant variables and information to completely unlock the 
box. Variable orientations have a separate use to depict a general relationship; while case-
oriented have the capability of showing a more embedded understanding. 
I have to acknowledge the existence of a black box under all circumstances in order to reduce 
complexity. It is inherently a part of variable-oriented analysis, but rather than arguing that it is 
a problem, I will take the approach of it being a choice, a sacrifice of thick-understanding a few 
cases to a more general understanding of the involved mechanisms. It is a question of weighing 
statistics versus depth of understanding.  
I will use statistics in an attempt to conceptualise the influence of size which will leave potential 
blind spots which can be studied more in-depth using qualitative methods. The intention of this 
dissertation is to establish a mid-range level of description to help illustrate the differences 
between markets, and thus, that not all markets have similar conditions to the Austrian, 
Switzerland and the French speaking part of Belgium ones. Case-studies and in-depth studies 
help unlock the black boxes using particular and thick-descriptive approaches. I in contrast 
cannot reach that level of unlocking with the applied method, but instead what will be left is a 
structure available for further analysis. The study conducted will suffer from the black box 
problem of the variations within the individual markets. 
 
3.2.2.4 Selection bias 
Selection bias is a problem when using a sample of the population which leaves the resulting 
sample non-representative of the population. Usually, this is concerned with variable-oriented 
statistical analysis, where this type of bias can distort the analysis. The consequence can be one 
of over-representation on the one hand and skewed distribution on the other, especially if the 
variables are selected according to scores (gerrymandering in statistics). The outcome of this in 
statistical probability theory, on which statistical analysis rests, is a high risk of interference in 
the causal relationships. Sampling bias is one of the challenges, caused by for instance self-
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selection of the sample population. However, selection bias is a cause of concern for both case-
oriented and variable-oriented analysis: see for instance Ragin, 1997. 
The markets have been selected to represent the European television media markets in order to 
identify similarities and differences between small and large markets. I have selected the cases 
based on size, large language neighbour and availability of data. Not all markets had the same 
level of detail in the data, which would have made a comparison difficult at best, and potentially 
wrong at the worst.  
I have chosen the markets where the data was on a level of acceptable comparison; this also led 
to the exclusion of several markets where it was questionable. In the various chapters, there is a 
core of 26 markets in each structural analysis. This will have consequences in terms of the 
degree to which the findings can be generalised.  
Furthermore, one can ask why these cases have been chosen and not others: the selection has 
been based on the principle of sufficient examples with which to conduct the analysis of interest 
of the European television landscape. The markets selected are representative for the EU and 
will help establish a reasonable level of comparison between the TV media markets. 
 
3.2.2.5 Multicollinearity 
The prerequisite in multiple regression analysis is that the independent variables (predicators) 
are not highly correlated. Multicollinearity occurs when two or more independent variables are 
highly correlated. Multicollinearity is something that, when studying the influence of size, I 
have to ensure is limited when conducting the multiple regression analysis. 
Berry & Feldman (1985:38-40) state that: “First, multicollinearity is a problem referring to 
correlated independent variables in a specific sample of data, and not in the overall population. 
… “Second, note that – setting aside the case of perfect collinearity – even a high degree of 
multicollinearity does not violate the assumptions of regression”. … “Third, multicollinearity 
should not be conceived as something that either “exists” or “does not.” Rather 
multicollinearity exists in degrees and the degree determines how important a problem is posed. 
When multicollinearity is present in only a very small amount, there is little reason to be 
concerned about its impact, but as the degree of multicollinearity increases, its consequences 
becomes more pernicious”.  
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The problem of multicollinearity is separating the effect of the independent variables on the 
dependent variable. This is a problem because the more alike the correlated variables are the 
more difficult it becomes to determine which variable is accountable for the variance in the 
dependent variable. The more correlated the independent variables are, the more challenging the 
problem. As such multicollinearity constitutes a quite serious threat for the estimation regression 
is normally applied for.  
Using regression with highly correlated independent variables can result in overly sensitive 
parameter estimates (Farrar & Glauber, 1967). In a sense as stated by Goldberger (1991) it 
becomes a challenge of micronumerosity (see Goldberger, 1991 for a more detailed discussion 
on the issue of collinearity).  
In short multicollinearity leads to high levels of standard error as there is uncertainty in terms of 
the effect of the different independent variables. In short, a lack of data will result in too small a 
sample to test the assumption. 
This is a serious challenge for a study involving size of population and economy, where the 
tendency is for high levels of multicollinearity between these variables. In order to take this into 
account in the statistical analysis multicollinearity is not problematic in the multiple regression 
analysis. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) will be applied. Fox and Monette (1992) argued 
that: “The variance-inflation factor is a useful diagnostic because it indicates directly the harm 
inflicted by collinearity on the precision of the estimation”. VIF can be used to interpret if there 
is excessive multicollinearity. The test will be conducted at the same time as the multiple 
regressions and will be reported along with the other results. 
Identification of too high levels of collinearity is based on the rule of thumb, that if the 
individual multiple regression models has variance inflation factors higher than 10 it indicates a 
serious multicollinearity problem (Marquardt, 1970), while others would treat a VIF score above 
5 with caution (Belsey, Kuh and Welsh, 1980). Preferably it should be as close as possible to 1 
as this would indicate that there is no collinearity. 
Note that controlling the statistical analysis for multicollinearity is highly important in this type 
of study where variables concerning population and economy tend to be highly correlated. 
 
3.2.3 Implications for the project 
I have accounted for the methodological approaches, perspectives and problems faced when 
conducting comparative research. Faced with the methodological discussion I agree that the 
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considerations of comparative studies often lack some understanding of the basic pitfalls in 
comparative methodology. While I am aware of the challenges and problems presented, this 
does not mean that they can be bypassed. 
For this research I have chosen an empirical comparative variable-oriented study. This has also 
required rigorous consideration of the sample of the units of analysis, and the decision to 
analyse Europe to secure a basis for discussing potential policy implications. Availability of data 
on the national markets is a severe barrier for empirical research within media studies, especially 
when conducting comparative studies. 
The empirical studies presenting systematic evidence-based research within media studies are 
few and far between for various reasons. The understanding gained by studying the methods 
applied and evidence used in comparisons established the question of where the evidence behind 
the evidence-based conclusions originated. When I studied this, I found a general lack of focus 
on comparison of more than a few markets.  
In the literature I found others with a similar perception, for instance Michael Elasmar (2003) 
who noted that: “My interest in developing this book [The Impact of International Television] 
can be traced to an observation I first made during the course of my doctoral studies … I found 
out that most writers, including those of books, articles, and conference papers, assumed that 
imported TV programs have a strong cultural influence on local viewers. However, when sorting 
articles according to their topic and method of inquiry, I could only find a very few empirical 
studies about this topic. Where was the systemic evidence that was being relied on for assuming 
strong influence? I figured that the evidence must have been profuse as the writers were so 
confident in their contentions of strong influence. I was determined to find it. The more I 
searched, the more disappointed I became. … I could not believe that there were only very few 
empirical studies about this topic”.  
The same is true for size. Little empirical evidence containing both small and large markets is 
available, which poses the question: are the conditions observed only viable for small markets? 
This is a challenge caused by the lack of empirical evidence available for a larger scale analysis. 
I will face all sets of problems discussed above. The black box is the most evident and the one 
which cannot be avoided, but this will also imply that the comparative research can be used to 
further development of qualitative studies and thereby hopefully the development of theory in 
comparative media studies. I cannot hope to conduct in-depth case-studies of the individual 
markets, as this would require far more time with the number of cases included; therefore per 
79 
 
definition, there will be a black box of particular similarities and differences which cannot be 
explained within the individual markets.  
I see no reason to hide this black box, but this is also in line with the method applied: I sacrifice 
particularisation to gain more breadth in the analysis. Weighting between explanatory strength 
versus particularity led to the conclusion that the more valuable approach in relation to the 
existing research would be to conduct a variable-oriented study consisting of medium-scale 
observations, e.g. 26. There will be a black box of how size actually impacts differently in the 
individual markets based on specific historical and cultural conditions embedded in each 
society, but what will be established is the overall effect of size based on the model. There will 
also be a specific focus to ensure that there is limited multicollinearity between the independent 
variables, which can jeopardise the degree of trust in the study. 
The definitions of size applied in this study are defined in chapter 1.2.3, Defining size, page 19. 
The method of measuring the influence of size on the variables of interest is defined below. 
 
3.3 Measuring the influence of size 
I will conduct a comparative variable-oriented study applying statistical and comparative 
methodology. The research problem of this thesis is to analyse how size matters for television 
markets in Europe, measured and compared by statistical data, in order to discuss potential 
policy implications. 
This is done by stating two hypotheses in chapter 1.2.1, Hypotheses, on page 16-18, each with a 
set of research questions used to frame the analysis. The analysis is divided into two separate 
chapters in order to study each hypothesis individually. Each analytical chapter has a set of 
chapters used to substantiate part of the hypotheses. The variables analysed are based on the 
study of the influence of size given in the introduction and chapter 2, Media market 
characteristics, discussing media content and market characteristics. Each analytical chapter 
will be considered below in order to clarify how the variables are measured. The empirical 
analysis of the influence of size is intended to investigate how size matters for television 
markets using comparative method supplemented by statistics.  
The primary statistic technique applied is multiple regression. The technique is used to predict 
the variance in a dependent variable based on independent variables. The multiple regressions 
will establish the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable that the set of independent 
variables explain (size of economy and population). This is done at a specific significant level, 
80 
 
i.e. by a significance test of R2. The multiple regressions on the hypothesized relationships are 
tested using a significance level of 5%. 
These settings are used when the multiple regression are conducted in each of research questions 
A, B, D and E, which specify a linear relation of the independent size variables and the 
dependent. Note that all regressions are tested for multicollinearity using VIF with an 
acceptance criterion of VIF < 5 (Belsey, Kuh and Welsh, 1980) and for serial correlation using 
the Durbin–Watson test with an acceptance criterion of equal to or below 3 (Field, 2005). 
In the chapter 3.3.1 below the operationalisation applied for investigating the first hypothesis 
will be presented, followed by chapter 3.3.2 where the operationalisation for the second 
hypothesis is presented. 
 
3.3.1 Analysing the first hypothesis on the influence of size on market volume and 
the production of original domestic content 
This chapter will describe how the first hypothesis and the related research questions are 
operationalised. First the hypothesis is stated, as on page 16, after which each research question 
has a separate chapter which describes how the dependent variables are measured. 
 
The first hypotheses it that Size is linked to scarcity and therefore influences the critical mass 
of television markets: meaning that size influences the critical mass in television markets 
based on availability of revenue understood as monetary TV market volume and the 
availability of original domestic content. Consequently the larger a market is, the more 
potential volume of the television market and domestic production is possible. 
The hypothesis revolves around the influence of size on the structural market conditions of 
scarcity, i.e. the critical mass available in the market. There are two variables of interest when 
investigating the first hypothesis, a) the level of available revenue in the market and b) the level 
of domestic production.  
The analysis of the first hypothesis consists of three different sub-analyses each with the 
purpose of investigating part of the hypothesis on the influence of size using the measures of 
market volume and production of original domestic content argued above. The three sub-
analyses (Research questions A-C) are introduced in turn with the related variable, but first the 
sample markets are introduced. 
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3.3.1.1 Sample markets used in the analysis 
The analysis of the first hypothesis is conducted based on a sample of 26 European markets, all 
of which are influenced by the EU policies, either by being Member States or be being affiliated 
by membership of The European Economic Area (EEA)xvi. The table below shows the markets 
as divided by categorised size. 
 
Table 10: Sample markets for the first hypothesis by categorised state size 
 
Categorical population definition 
Small Large 
 n 19 7 
Categorical 
economy 
definition 
Small 9 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, 
Portugal 
Poland, Romania 
Large 17 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Norway, Slovenia, Sweden 
France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, UK 
Source: Own depiction/model  
 
The sample consists of 26 European countries which should as such be sufficient to establish an 
overall idea of the influence of size on market volume and original domestic production in a 
European context.   
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3.3.1.2 Research Question A: How does size influence the availability of revenue 
in television markets (TV market volume)? 
This chapter will describe how TV market volume is measured to enable analysis of the 
influence of size on this variable. First the research question is stated, followed by how it will be 
researched. 
RQ A: How does size influence the availability of revenue in television markets? The larger a 
television market is, the more revenue should be available, which again sets the frame for the 
potential number of companies and the level of production of original domestic content as this is 
based on scarcity considerations. 
This will be researched by investigating whether the strength of the relationship between size 
and market volume follows the assumption that the larger the market, the more revenue is 
available. Size is used as a scale variable as this is important for the investigation of this part of 
the hypothesis on scarcity and market leverage, where the larger the market (population and PPP 
GDP per capita), the larger the market volume. This is because advertisement and subscription 
revenues are related to respectively industry interest in advertising, and pay-TV subscription is 
related to consumer interest as well as ability to pay subscription fees. Secondly, the larger the 
size of the population, the more costs can be spread out and thus lowered. Multiple regression 
and quantitative data will be applied to study differences between small and large markets. The 
dataset will also allow a discussion of the different markets and their market volume using the 
quantitative data with the purpose of substantiating in more detail the statistical analysis. 
In order to measure the influence of size on the level of available revenue, i.e. TV market 
volume, this variable has to be defined. For the purpose of this thesis TV market volume is 
measured by combining the three different main revenue resources in a television market: 1) 
advertisement, 2) public and 3) subscription. This of course does not include all available 
revenue in a market, but it represents the major part of the TV market volume. In some markets 
donations play a role for the TV market as well as revenue from sales of produced content and 
rights in general. These figures are not included, not because of an inability to find a solution by 
including more types, as several annual accounts have been analysed, but usually the accounts 
were insufficiently detailed to include the figures. The combined figures of these three sources 
of revenue will be defined as a proxy for TV market volume on which I will investigate the 
influence of size. 
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The analysis is based on secondary data from the sources mentioned below:  
• The public revenue is from a variety of sources with annual reports of financial figures in 
combination with Screen Digest and controlled by using EBU figures. Furthermore, in 
markets where public radio companies are independent, their public subsidy has been 
included in the calculations to ensure comparability. The inclusion of public radio 
revenue was to ensure that the markets with separate companies did not fall below the 
level of similar markets, where television and radio are combined. 
• For advertisement revenue a combination of the World Association of Newspapers’ 
annual publication and the Euromonitor database for exchange rates and corrections, is 
used, the figure representing the method of calculating this in the individual markets. 
• The subscription revenue is from the Screen Digest Television intelligence database 
representing the individual domestic market figures. 
 
The sum of these different sources is used as a proxy for market volume. As mentioned above 
this is not a “total” market volume, but as these sources represent the main revenue sources for 
television companies it represents a realistic picture of the individual market volume in the 
sample markets. In short, total market volume is defined as the total sum of combining 
advertisement, public and subscription revenue. As such it is a measure representing the 
consumer expenditure on media in a specific market. 
 
3.3.1.3 Research Question B: How does size influence the level of original 
domestic content in television markets? 
This chapter will describe how production of original domestic content is measured to enable 
analysis of the influence of size on this variable. First the research question is stated, followed 
by how it will be researched. 
RQ B: How does size influence the level of original domestic content in television markets? The 
larger a television market is the more original domestic content should be available as the 
incentive for companies to invest in content should be higher. 
This will be researched by investigating whether the strength of the relationship between size 
and production of original domestic content follows the assumption of the hypothesis that the 
larger the market, the higher the level investment in domestic production. Size is used as a scale 
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variable, as this is the important for this part of the hypothesis on scarcity and market leverage, 
where the larger the market (population, PPP GDP per capita), the more potential there is for 
providing original domestic content. Small markets have less ability to provide original media 
content. Multiple regression and quantitative data will be applied to study differences between 
the ability of small and large markets to provide original domestic content. The dataset will also 
allow a discussion of the different markets and their market volume using the raw dataset with 
the purpose of substantiating in more detail the statistical analysis. 
In order to measure the influence of size on the level of original domestic content production I 
have to identify a variable allowing such an analysis. Several considerations were made in this 
regard as what were required were figures that to some degree could be considered comparable. 
A first attempt was made to identify the level of original production measured in hours from the 
broadcasters. However, this attempt met with part failure as the levels from commercial 
broadcasters were not easily available; a success was the data from the public broadcasters, but 
having half a market’s level of domestic production was considered insufficient for the purpose 
of investigating the hypothesis.  
A decision was made to apply investment in domestic production as a method of measurement. 
This resulted in a figure of volume of originated programming understood as all programming 
commissioned by domestic operators rather than acquired from the international market in 
million euros. The figures include funds used for news, but it does not include funds used for the 
acquisition of sport rights. Using the measure as a proxy for original domestic programming will 
allow the hypothesis on how size matters for the production of original domestic content to be 
investigated. 
The analysis is thus based on secondary data from Oliver & Ohlbaum Associates (2009). The 
expenditure on originated content expenditure in 2006-2007 on originated content is defined 
above. The analysis using this variable will help substantiate the hypothesis on differences based 
on size in terms of investment in original domestic programming. In short, original domestic 
production is measured using investment in million euros in original production, meaning the 
funds the television companies invest in new content. 
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3.3.1.4 Research Question C: Is there a relative influence of size (varieties of 
size) on TV market volume and production of original domestic content? 
This chapter will describe how the relative influence of size on the TV market volume and 
production of original domestic content variables is measured. First the research question is 
stated, followed by how it will be researched. 
RQ C: Is there a relative influence of size (varieties of size) on TV market volume and 
production of original domestic content? Size influence could also be viewed relatively based on 
small and large categories, meaning that a large market measured by population, can be small 
measured by economy, which can result in different implications for policy. 
This will be researched by investigating whether the relative influence is understood as 
interaction between size of population and economy, which should enable me to distinguish 
between varieties of size influence in relation to TV market volume and scale of original 
domestic content production. The analysis is done using the categorical definition of size by 
dividing population and economy in small and large markets, and thus testing if different 
conditions of being small and large can be identified. This will substantiate part of the 
hypothesis that government intervention can help leverage the influence of size. 
In order to measure the relative influence of size I will apply the categorical definition of size 
based on economy (small, large) where a large market is understood as a market where the GDP 
PPP per capita is equal to or above the European average figure of $24,216.80 in 2007 and 
where population (small, large) where a large population is understood as a market with a 
population equal to or above 20 million. Besides this I will use the two variables on TV market 
volume as presented under research question A and original domestic production as presented 
under research question B. 
In short this analysis will help show that different varieties of size have different conditions, 
meaning that markets with a small population and economy have a different condition than for 
instance markets with a large populations and economy. 
 
3.3.1.5 Summarising the analysis on market volume and original domestic content 
The focus in chapter 4 will thus be on the difference in scale between small and large, first in 
relation to TV market volume, and then to scale of domestic production. This is in conclusion 
used to test whether there are relative influences of size based on categorisation of population 
(small, large) and economy (small, large) in relation to the scale of TV market volume and 
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production of original domestic television content. The combined analysis chapter 4 is carried 
out to substantiate the first hypothesis based on the three research questions stated about where 
size should influence as a consequence of similar market and content characteristics. This will 
help verify if the theoretical assumptions can be considered in accordance with empirical 
observations. 
  
3.3.2 Analysing the second hypothesis on the influence of size on market 
competition 
This chapter will describe how the second hypothesis and the related research questions are 
operationalised. First the hypothesis is stated, as on page 17, after which each research question 
has a separate chapter, which describes how the dependent variables are measured. 
 
Following the analyses of the first hypothesis, I will study market competition using the second 
hypothesis as an analytical frame, which states that Size influences the competitive conditions 
in television markets. This is a consequence of imperfect competition due to the 
characteristics of media markets and media content in combination with differences in 
critical mass (scarcity). Consequently the larger a market is, the better conditions are there 
for private commercial media, as the larger markets can sustain a higher number of 
companies, which should show in lower degrees of market concentration if not at the overall 
level, then as the number of companies increase. 
The second hypothesis revolves around the influence of size on the overall market conditions in 
television markets. Theoretically scarcity, i.e. the critical mass available in the market combined 
with the market and content characteristics, especially minimum efficient scale and increasing 
returns to scale, should lead to highly concentrated markets. However, in this analytical chapter, 
the influence of government intervention should be especially evident due to the existence of 
PSBs.  
None the less, the hypothesis should still be viable, but I also have to secure some degree of 
indication on the effect of government intervention. The purposes of these measurements are to 
investigate whether I can identify the influence of size on market competition, and secondly if 
the expectations concerning government intervention can be identified when tested using these 
proxies. There are five variables of interest; three of these are used to analyse the first research 
question: a) competition between public and private channels, b) competition between foreign 
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and domestic channels as well as c) language, mainly focused on small markets with same-
language large neighbours; the two remaining variables are used to analyse the second research 
question on d) market concentration and e) ownership. 
 
The analysis of the second hypothesis consists of two different sub-analyses each with the 
purpose of investigating part of the hypothesis on the influence of size using the measures of 
overall competitive conditions. Below the two sub-analyses (Research question D-E) are 
introduced in turn with the related variables, but first the sample markets are introduced 
followed by a short introduction to competition. 
 
3.3.2.1 Sample markets used in the analysis 
The analysis in chapter 5 will be conducted based on a sample of 26 European markets, all of 
which are influenced by EU policies either by being Member States or by being affiliated by 
membership of the European Economic Area (EEA). Table 11 shows the markets divided by 
categorised size. 
 
Table 11: Sample markets for the second hypothesis by categorised state size 
 
Categorical population definition 
Small Large 
 n 19 7 
Categorical 
economy 
definition 
Small 9 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, 
Portugal 
Poland, Romania 
Large 17 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Norway, Slovenia, Sweden 
France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, UK 
Source: Own depiction/model  
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The sample consists of 26 European countries which should as such be sufficient to establish an 
overall idea of the influence of size on market competition in a European context. Note that one 
extra country – Switzerland – has been included in the analysis on markets with same-language 
large market neighbours where separate data for the French, German and Italian speaking parts 
of Switzerland is important, but this is only the case for chapter 5.3. Also note that Switzerland 
is not part of the EEA, but is part of EFTA and has bilateral agreements I (1999) and II (2004) 
with the EU concerning a range of areas. As the extra country is only present in a limited part of 
the analysis it is not included in the table above. 
 
3.3.2.2 Competition and the level playing field 
To frame the analysis of competition the concepts used in the thesis on this is defined below, 
before the actual measuring of the variables is defined. 
Competition as defined in the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics means: “rivalry between 
two actors over a limited resource or reward” … “Competition is a rivalry between 
individuals (or groups or nations), and it arises whenever two or more 
parties strive for something that all cannot obtain”. The second hypothesis will 
study competition in a synchronic perspective for 2008, using the companies’ share of the time 
the audience used on watching television. Competition can take place in a variety of ways, for 
instance between: 
• Companies in general 
• Public and private companies 
• Foreign and domestic companies 
 
 
These differences can result in different market structures, which can vary depending on 
the size of the market. The analysis has to take this into account. Competition between 
companies in general can be analysed by studying the level of concentration in a market, 
which will also reveal the overall market structure, while competition between public 
and private companies requires identification of ownership, and the same goes foreign 
and domestic channels and foreign and domestic companies. Note that it is possible to 
have a channel originating for instance in the UK, but owned by a Danish company. 
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Having a single market in Europe with focus on reducing obstacles for trade, the concept of a 
level playing field is often used. The concept a level playing field is important in terms of 
understanding the purpose of the single internal market. The Oxford Dictionary defines the 
concept as: “a situation in which everyone has a fair and equal chance of succeeding”. This 
basically means that all companies should have equal opportunity to succeed, without being 
subject to unfair competition due to state interference, monopoly conditions or other factors. 
Although competition and concentration in a market is completely interlinked, I have decided to 
measure competition in two ways by separating the analysis of market concentration from the 
analysis of the overall competition. 
Following the second hypothesis the television market should be concentrated as a consequence 
of the content and market characteristics, but Europe is also known as having fairly strong 
intervention practices on behalf of public television, which should be evident in the analysis. As 
focus is also on the importance of state intervention, the impact of public ownership will be 
studied. 
Contrasting the measurements used to investigate the first hypothesis is somewhat more 
challenging as most of this data is unavailable for direct use from secondary sources. In order to 
examine market competition comparatively, country of origin (see chapter 3.3.2.3.2 below for a 
detailed definition) and ownership (see chapter 3.3.2.3.1. and 3.3.2.4.1 for a detailed definition) 
will be used to establish a dataset for use in this thesis to measure competition. In order to 
measure the influence of size on the level of competition audience share figures will be used to 
show the differences in small and large markets by using a set of different techniques.  
Below the analyses of research questions D-E are introduced in turn with how the related 
variables are measured. 
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3.3.2.3 Research Question D: How does size influence the conditions of 
competition in television markets? 
This chapter will describe how conditions of competition are measured to enable analysis of the 
influence of size on this variable. First the research question, including sub-questions, is stated, 
followed by how it will be researched. 
 
RQ D: How does size influence the conditions of competition in television markets? This will 
be divided into two separate sub questions 
a. How does size influence public and private television? 
b. Is it possible to identify difference in small television markets with same-
language large neighbours? 
 
This will be researched by investigating the influence of size on market competition to identify 
the difference between public and private, and between domestic and foreign companies 
respectively in small and large markets to identify differences in regards to size as well as 
impact of government intervention. This will show if the small markets tend to have smaller 
private market share than their larger counterparts, as well as the difference in degree of 
domestic vs. international share. 
Analysis of size influence on market competition in television markets will be done by using the 
two sub-research questions. This will allow investigating the relationship between size and the 
strength of the public and private audience share, as well as domestic and foreign television 
share using multiple regression and quantitative data. This will also allow me to identify the 
degree of state intervention in the sample markets. Additionally it will allow me to measure 
differences based on language, especially in relation to small markets with same-language large 
neighbours. 
In order to analyse these sub-questions related to differences in the competitive conditions of 
public and private channels as well as to divide domestic from foreign channels the concepts 
have to be defined in a way which is empirically measurable. 
In order to measure market competition I will use two different methods to categorise the data: 
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• I will differentiate between ownership of public and private companies to assist in 
measuring differences between small and large markets in the degree of state 
intervention and commercial market.  
• I will use the country of origin principle to distinguish foreign from domestic channels; 
in this way it becomes evident which channels are subject to similar rules and to what 
degree a particular market is subject to foreign competition.  
The public and private ownership will be presented below, then the country of origin principle 
will be defined, followed by an analysis of the effects of language in regard to small markets 
with same-language large market neighbours. 
 
3.3.2.3.1 Ownership: Public and private 
Ownership will be applied as a method to enable me to distinguish private from public 
ownership. Ownership in this sense is from an overall perspective used to identify whether or 
not a particular television channel is owned by a private or a public company. This will help 
identify the importance of government intervention in each market. Public ownership is 
understood as where a television channel is owned publicly in a broad sense, either by the state 
or indirectly by the state through for instance a foundation. But it does not mean that the state 
retains direct control over the particular channel or company. Private ownership is understood as 
channels owned by private companies or persons. 
Public and private ownership will allow me to measure effect of state intervention in the 
individual sample markets, as well as in combination with the country of origin principle to 
distinguish foreign public and private channels from domestic. 
 
The analysis is based on secondary data from the sources mentioned below:  
• The data from EURODATA TV (2009) on television channels and their share in 2008 
from each market is used to identify the names of the television channels in each of the 
selected sample markets. 
• The names of the television channels are then combined with information from the 
European Audiovisual Observatory’s database MAVISE, the Television Business 
International Yearbook, and in a few situations contact with regulatory authorities to 
construct the information necessary to separate public and private ownership for the 
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channels. In cases where a public company owns a share of a company, it would count as 
a public company if above 50% of the shares were owned by the public company. 
 
The variable alone can be used to identify share of public and private television channels. This 
will help identify differences in terms of public and private share in small and large markets. 
 
3.3.2.3.2 Country of origin principle 
The country of origin principle is applied to measure the penetration of foreign television 
channels by identifying the individual country of origin, and thus whether or not these are 
foreign or domestic in a particular market. 
The country of origin principle is defined by using the definition of the European Union, as 
stated on an EC website concerning the understanding of the principlexvii: “The country of origin 
principle means that when a service provider wants to provide his services into another Member 
State without a permanent presence there, he has, in principle, to comply only with the 
administrative and legal requirements of his country of establishment. This means that Member 
States may not restrict incoming cross-border services from a provider established in another 
Member States by applying its own administrative and legal regime in addition to the 
requirements the service provider is already subject to in his Member State of establishment…”.  
The importance of this principle for television is not to be underestimated, as it is identified thus 
in AVMS §33: “The country of origin principle should be regarded as the core of this 
Directive, as it is essential for the creation of an internal market. This principle should be 
applied to all audiovisual media services in order to ensure legal certainty for media service 
providers as the necessary basis for new business models and the deployment of such services. It 
is also essential in order to ensure the free flow of information and audiovisual programmes in 
the internal market.” 
An example of this is that jurisdiction of a television channel is in the country of origin, 
meaning that for instance a channel whose country of origin is the UK targeting another country 
adheres to rules in the UK, and not in the country of reception. The purpose of this principle is 
to secure the free competition in the internal market – but still also having some minimum rules 
to which the Member States are required to adhere. 
The analysis is based on secondary data from the sources mentioned below:  
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• The 2008 data from EURODATA TV (2009) on television channels and their share in 
each market is used to identify the majority of television channels in each of the selected 
sample markets. 
• The channels are then checked in terms whether or not they originate in a particular 
sample country or from a foreign country. This is done by using primarily the MAVISE 
database from the European Audiovisual Observatory and in some cases the independent 
regulatory authorities’ websites for more detailed information.  
 
This method of measurement can be used to identify share of domestic and foreign television 
channels. More importantly it can also assist in identifying if market conditions are different for 
small markets with larger same-language neighbours, and in combination with the defined 
ownership below on public and private competition it can help establish a more detailed picture 
on difference in competition between small and large markets. 
 
3.3.2.3.3 Language: Small market with same-language large neighbours 
Language is important as it can function as a measure to increase or decrease barriers to entry. 
Small markets with a large same-language neighbour will be especially subject to this, and it is 
therefore of interest in terms of identifying any difference between these and similar small 
markets in contrast to larger ones.  
Small markets with large same-language neighbours are expected to face conditions equal to 
those of the large markets, or at least harsher than ordinary competition as a consequence of 
their similar language. This is because language makes it easy for the commercial players in the 
large markets to perceive small markets with the same language as an enlarged part of their own, 
especially if these are regionally extended. 
To analyse this I will use the analysis on market competition to include a separate analysis on 
small markets with a same-language larger neighbour. That is because usage of the country of 
origin principle allows me to identify difference between a small market with and without larger 
same-language neighbours in terms of relative foreign penetration from the same-language 
markets into the domestic market. 
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Data and usage is similar to the use of the methods above using country of origin and public – 
private ownership. The measure is important to get a grasp on the challenge of a particular 
category of markets in Europe with particular conditions. 
 
3.3.2.3.4 Summarising competition measurement 
In short, the combination of foreign and domestic based on the country of origin in combination 
with public and private ownership will enable me to compare the influence of size on the 
differences between the public and private competition, as well as the degree of difference there 
is in domestic television vis-à vis-foreign television channels. Figure 2 below illustrates the 
division. 
 
 Figure 2: Analytical overview of competition 
 
 
The figure illustrates the analytical perception used to answer the first research question. 
Furthermore, the combination will allow me to establish the level of government intervention as 
well as establish an idea of foreign penetration. 
 
3.3.2.4 Research question E: How does size influence the level of concentration in 
television markets? 
To frame the analysis of concentration the concepts and measurements used on this is defined 
below. First the research questions as well as sub-questions are stated, followed by how it will 
be researched. 
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RQ E: How does size influence the level of concentration in television markets? This will be 
divided into two sub questions: 
a. How does size influence market concentration from an overall structural 
perspective? 
b. Is it possible to identify any trends concerning ownership of multinational 
companies? 
 
This will be researched by investigating the influence of size on market concentration to identify 
difference in level of concentration in small and large markets, as well as to identify difference 
with regard to impact of government intervention. The analysis will show if smaller markets are 
more concentrated than their larger counterparts, as well as the position of the PSBs in the 
sample markets. 
Analysis of size influence of market concentration will be done by using the two sub-research 
questions. Using this division will allow investigating the relationship between size and the level 
of market concentration by using multiple regression. Importantly, it will also allow me to 
identify the importance of state intervention. Furthermore, there will be established a short 
overview of transnational ownership of television companies in order to identify the potential 
difference in impact of multinationals in small and large markets. 
In order to analyse these question concerning difference in market concentration the concepts 
have to be defined in a way which is measureable. 
In order to measure market concentration and transnational ownership I will use two different 
markets to categorise the data: 
• I will use ownership to identify the owners of television channels to identify the largest 
television companies in each market, which will also help identify differences in the 
degree of state intervention. Identification of ownership of individual television channels 
is also a prerequisite for measuring market concentration.   
• I will use market concentration to identify differences in the level of market 
concentration measured by two different methods, namely concentration ratio (CR) and 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to enable perception of differences. 
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3.3.2.4.1 Ownership 
I will use ownership to assist in measuring market competition by studying State intervention 
and as a perquisite for analysing market concentration. Similar to above it will be a technique to 
define the units of analysis before analysing them. The concept will be used to help measure 
market competition two-ways:  
Firstly, it will be applied as a way to link television channels in particular market to the 
company which owns them. This enables the basis for measuring market concentration. This 
proved a bit challenging as ownership by share of television channels made it somewhat 
difficult in some markets. In some instances, where joint ventures are involved, a decision was 
made on where to place the particular channels. One example is the joint venture between BBC 
World Wide and Virgin Media television LDT, where the channels have been placed under 
Virgin. This information is present in appendix D. 
For instance, the Danish publicly owned television station TV2/Denmark A/S consists of six 
channels, one of which is owned jointly with MTG (TV2 Sport), and five own channels (TV2, 
TV2 Zulu, TV2 Charlie, TV2 Film, TV2 News). Combined these channels establish a share of 
40% daily audience share, and 41,9% in primetime. This means that TV2/Denmark A/S 
represent the single largest television company measured by audience share in Denmark. The 
channels with relation to TV2/Denmark was identified and the share combined to establish the 
company overall position in the market. 
Secondly, it will be applied as a method to identify transnational ownership using ownership in 
each of the included markets as a way to identify the influence of multinational corporations on 
domestic television markets. Note, that ownership by a multinational corporation of a domestic 
company does not make that particular channel foreign based on the country of origin principle. 
This is as such way to measure foreign ownership of television companies. 
This enables me to identify the impact of multinational corporations in each market by studying 
for instance the position of for instance Pro.7.Sat.1. in the sample markets.  
The analysis is based on secondary data from the sources mentioned below:  
• The data from EURODATA TV (2009) on television channels and their share in 2008 
from each market is used to identify the names of the television channels in each of the 
selected sample markets. 
• The names of the television channels are then combined with information from the 
European Audiovisual Observatory database MAVISE, the business database – with 
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financial reports – Amadeus, the Television Business International yearbook, and in a 
few situations contact to regulatory authorities to construct the information necessary. 
 
Combined, these measurements of ownership are required to measure market competition. One 
set of data has thus been constructed specifically for use for the analysis in chapter 5 to enable 
investigation of the hypothesis; this was done by using the share of individual channels from 
EURODATA TV and identifying the ownership of these channels using databases. These data 
have been established combining different data sources in the research process and consist of 
original information not directly available elsewhere. The data is available in appendix D. 
 
3.3.2.4.2 Market concentration 
Market concentration measurement is a useful tool with which to indicate the level of 
competition in the television market. But it also illustrates the importance of political 
intervention. Along the same line of argument, it can also identify differences in market 
structures and company ownership. While I mainly focus on the European markets, research on 
the legislation and regulation of the horizontal merger guidelines of the EU (2004) and the US 
(1992, revised 1997)xviii will be applied to establish some tools and methods on how and why to 
study market concentration. The concentration in a market is a function of the number of firms 
and their respective share of a market (Albarran, 1996), television viewing in this case. In other 
words, it is a tool used to illustrate the relative market competition (Tirole, 1988). 
The hypothesis that television markets in general are highly concentrated and operating under 
conditions of oligopoly is based on assumptions of imperfect competition based on market and 
content good characteristics. The theory of oligopoly, being relevant for TV markets, is 
embedded in literature, but little research has been done to indicate the overall market 
concentration ratios comparatively. A main challenge lies in the method of measurement, where 
Hannah and Kay (1977) have argued on behalf of one-parameter concentration indices, 
containing both the Concentration Ratio (CR), the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and entry 
measurements. Both the CR and HHI are commonly used; see for instance Whinston (2006) for 
application in horizontal mergers as well as Porter & Zona (1993, 1999) for research into 
collusion in relation to state highway construction and school milk contracts.  
Although application of competitive behaviour comprises more than market concentration 
measured horizontally, is does provide a picture of the competition in the individual markets, 
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indicating the market structure and thus is useful for further research. However, there have been 
cases such as the electricity market, where it has proved an inadequate measure, as indicated 
empirically by Borenstein, Bushnell and Knittel et al (1999). The intention here is to establish an 
initial perspective on comparative TV market concentration, in order to document this 
empirically. 
Applying the market share of television viewing is equal to establishing consumer consumption 
of the television commodity; it is thus useful to establish the current level of concentration in an 
environment characterised by fragmentation of audience. The degree of market concentration is 
usually evaluated based on number of companies (one, few, and many) and their relative size. A 
market is considered concentrated if it is dominated by a limited number of firms. In short, the 
fewer the producers, the more market power the individual firms can utilise due to their market 
position. 
Market competition and market concentration are related and increased market power of single 
or few companies can have adverse effects on the competitive environment. This will allow 
studying the level of concentration in the markets, and to which degree the markets can be 
identified as concentrated. 
The analysis is based on the data established by combining the raw data from EURODATA TV 
and ownership as defined above. This is thus a set of data established specifically for this thesis. 
In order to measure market concentration the prerequisite of how to determine market share of 
the individual companies in the market has to be defined and how this will be applied to the 
concentration measurement techniques. 
 
3.3.2.4.2.1 Measuring market concentration 
Market concentration calculations are based on primary owner, meaning that they show the 
aggregated share of television viewing for a particular media corporation. What the tables 
indicate is the concentration of television viewing based on the aggregated share of corporations 
owning or having a majority share in specific television channels in different companies. 
There are several different ways of measuring market concentration: two of the more usually 
applied are the CR and the HHI (Albarran, 1996; Hoskins, 2004; Wirth & Bloch, 1995; Tirole 
1989). 
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Applying these two methods for measuring market concentration is also in line with what has 
been pointed out in the EU (2004) Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the 
Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings (hereafter EU 
guidelines) are given in point 16: “The overall concentration level in a market may also provide 
useful information about the competitive situation. In order to measure concentration levels, the 
Commission often applies the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI is calculated by 
summing the squares of the individual market shares of all the firms in the market. The HHI 
gives proportionately greater weight to the market shares of the larger firms. Although it is best 
to include all firms in the calculation, lack of information about very small firms may not be 
important because such firms do not affect the HHI significantly”. As supplemented in the 
guidelines, note 17, the “If appropriate, the Commission may also use other concentration 
measures such as, for instance, concentration ratios, which measure the aggregate market share 
of a small number (usually three or four) of the leading firms in a market.” Both measures of 
concentration will be applied in the analysis. 
The HHI and CR are applied to estimate the relative market concentration where the index 
ranges between zero and 10,000, while the CR maximum is 100. In both cases, the closer the 
figure is to zero, the less concentrated the market and the more atomistically it functions, while 
the higher the figure and the closer it is to 10,000, the more monopolistic it is, where pure 
monopoly conditions are at the top. In between there are oligopoly and duopoly conditions. As 
pointed out in the EU guidelines, small companies do not impact the HHI as the weight given to 
larger companies is proportionally larger; to counter the fact that I mainly consider the six 
largest companies, I have corrected the remaining share into single percentage companies to 
increase the level of concentration to a more correct level.  
Furthermore, to establish differences between all-day and prime-time concentration, both have 
been included in the calculation. There is still a small bias for the most fragmented of markets, 
meaning that for those border cases, I have to take into account that the figure might be a little 
higher, but not by much as the largest have been included in the calculations.  
As not all data for all markets were available a dataset based on the six largest TV-companies in 
each market and their type of ownership was constructed, see appendix D. 
Two different measurements will be applied to establish the overall market structure in each 
market. 
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3.3.2.4.2.1.1 Herfindahl- Hirschman Index (HHI) 
The HHI will be applied to establish an initial level of market concentration based on the HHI 
level set by the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (1992, revised 
1997) in their Horizontal Merger Guidelines (hereafter US guidelines) for concentration market 
shares in chapter 1.5, which are the following: “The Agency divides the spectrum of market 
concentration as measured by the HHI into three regions that can be broadly characterized as 
unconcentrated (HHI below 1000), moderately concentrated (HHI between 1000 and 1800), and 
highly concentrated (HHI above 1800)…”. Applying this framework will help establish the 
difference between small and large markets, as well as the overall difference between the 
included markets. 
 
HHI is calculated in the following way: 2 where s2 represents the squared market 
share of the media company. The N represents the total number of companies in the market. The 
application of squared market shares means that the largest companies are attributed a higher 
importance for the concentration than the smaller companies.  
 
This is also why the lack of smaller companies is not important; the main concern is to recall 
that the share of the rest must not be represented as a single company as this might skew the 
resulting level of the index, i.e. having a 10 % market share left can have an impact if the 
company represented is a single entity, but if it is 10 single 1 % companies, or even 20 ½ % 
share companies, the impact would be minimal.  
This is also the reason why I can apply the HHI using the six largest companies’ market shares. 
In short, the equation ensures that the market share of the larger companies is attributed a larger 
weight; this is done by considering the relatively higher importance of the competition process 
(Tirole, 1988). 
The ratios from the US will be applied to establish the level of concentration in each market. 
 
3.3.2.4.2.1.2 Concentration Ratio (CR) 
The dataset allows me to establish separate concentration ratios for the one to six largest 
companies, hereafter CR1-6, in the sample markets. The figure represents the number of total 
share each company has when combining all the channels they own. The CR1-6 index will be 
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applied to study the difference in concentration and ownership in the included markets. I will 
present CR1-6, because this is a supplement to the HHI analysis, which will enable me to 
identify differences in the market power and constellation of companies, such as duopolies. 
The CR is a simple but effective way of showing the relative concentration within the market 
(Bain 1953; Tirole, 1988) and has been applied broadly in literature as the determinant for 
market structure.  Concentration ratio is calculated the following way:   where the 
si represents the i’th company market share, n is the included number of companies used to 
measure the concentration ratio. 
The measurement of the CR is based on ownership as defined above, where the individual 
channels of a company is combined to establish a figure for its market position. 
I will apply the CR1-6 figures to establish the degree of change between the CR (n’s), meaning 
that if you have a CR4 of 83.4 as in Denmark, is becomes easy to neglect the fact that the first 
two companies represent 68.9 of these (DR and TV2 Denmark A/S), and also that this places 
severe limits on how large the 5’th included company can be. Applying the variation between 
the i’th companies can indicate the market structure in terms of major companies. 
The analysis will be useful in determining the market position in different markets, and help 
enable use of the HHI for a separate measurement of the market structure. 
 
3.3.3.4.2.2 Summarising market concentration 
In short, this combined analysis will help establish if size influences these aspects of market 
competition, but also if there is a difference. I expect size to impact the market concentration 
level, but also that I can identify the influence of state intervention. To be clear, I cannot know 
how these variables relate to size, although I in general expect media markets to be 
concentrated; this goes for both small and large and there is no pre-conditioned research 
available substantiating the size impact using analysis of this type. On the other hand, following 
the same logic, interpreting the results is also challenging, as what I see might well be a 
consequence of intervention practices. This chapter could establish information on the 
consequences of governmental intervention or the lack thereof. Furthermore it will help 
establish is small markets are more concentrated than large, or if television markets in general 
are highly concentrated. 
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3.3.2.5 Summarising the analysis of market competition 
The focus in chapter 5 will thus be on the difference in competition between small and large 
markets, and in small markets with large same-language neighbours. Furthermore it will help 
identify the scale and scope of state intervention in the market. The combined analysis of public 
and private ownership as well as domestic and foreign television in chapter 5.3, with the 
analysis of market concentration and transnational ownership in chapter 5.4, should establish an 
overall idea of how size influences in small and large markets. The combined analysis in this 
chapter is carried out to substantiate the hypothesis that size should influence market 
competition as a consequence of similar market and content characteristics, but also if this is 
offset by state intervention. This analysis will help verify whether the theoretical assumptions 
can be considered in accordance with empirical observations. 
 
3.3.3 The structure of the analysis 
The structure of the analysis follows the hypothesis and related research questions:  
The first hypothesis presented in chapter 3.3.1, Analysing the first hypothesis on the influence of 
size on market volume and the production of original domestic content, is studied using three 
research questions (A-C) operationalised in chapter 3.3.1.2 till 3.3.1.4.  
The analysis in chapter 4, The influence of size on market volume and the production of original 
domestic content, will investigate the first hypothesis where research questions A-C represents 
the three research questions which are analysed in turn.  
The second hypothesis presented in chapter 3.3.2, Analysing the second hypothesis on the 
influence of size on market competition, is studied using two research questions (D-E) 
operationalised in chapter 3.3.2.3 and 3.3.2.4. 
The analysis in chapter 5, The influence of size on market competition, will investigate the 
second hypothesis, where research questions D-E represents the two research questions which 
are analysed in turn.  
The combined analysis will help document the influence of size in the European television 
markets using statistical data as presented in chapter 1.2, Research problem, and should enable 
discussions and conclusions on potential policy implications of size.  
In the chapter below the first hypothesis will be investigated by studying the relationship 
between size and TV market volume as well as original domestic content.  
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Chapter 4. The influence of size on market volume and the provision 
of original domestic content 
4.1 Introduction 
The media plays a central role in modern life: its news and debate function provides an arena for 
public debate between politicians and the public, but also for securing different types of 
entertainment, informational and cultural content (Hutchison, 1999). Media pluralism does not 
appear due to an invisible hand, neither does media content, just because of consumer demand, 
since there is no guarantee of the home-produced commodity being more profitable than 
acquired content. This is because it is challenging to establish a profitable business in a single 
domestic market alone. The conditions for the provision of media content in small markets are 
absent. Traditionally, newspapers had the benefit of the subscription model in combination with 
advertising, and this model moved successfully on to the TV markets, with the result being more 
dependable revenue streams, at least for now; at some point the television industry will face the 
same challenges as the newspapers, but for now and for the foreseeable future, the current 
conditions will dominate. However, even if the change happens, the argument presented below 
will continue to hold for as long as culture remains representative of an exclusionary function. 
My first hypothesis is that Size is linked to scarcity and therefore influences the critical mass of 
television markets: meaning that size influences the critical mass in television markets based on 
availability of revenue understood as monetary TV market volume and the availability of 
original domestic content. Consequently the larger a market is, the greater the potential volume 
of the television market and domestic production.  
This is based on the argument that every size of television market has characteristic dynamics 
that are more or less applicable everywhere, and that the explanation for key differences lies in 
relative market leverage. This can be conceptualised as an expression of the market’s inability to 
allocate resources efficiently for television content, which is generally the case in media markets 
due to conditions of imperfect competition and the higher potential for market failure in media 
goods. This analysis focuses attention on how size influences market conditions. I approach the 
task by examining differences in market volume and domestic programming between smaller 
and larger markets. I utilise population size and economy size as proxies for market size as 
defined in chapter 1.2.3, Defining size, on page 19.  
I begin with quantitative analysis to clarify the available revenues in the individual television 
markets. This establishes TV market volume and is the result of combining the three primary 
streams of funding for television: public subsidy, advertising and subscription. I rely on 
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statistical multiple regression to investigate the relationship between size and market volume. 
The findings are substantiated by using the quantitative data. 
 
Secondly, I study whether size influences the level of investment in domestic TV content. That 
is handled by investigating the volume of originated programming, defined as all programming 
that is commissioned by domestic operators rather than acquired from the international market. 
This is useful for identifying the relationship between the two size variables (population and 
economy) on the expenditure for originated content. The same statistical techniques are applied. 
Thirdly, I substantiate the claim that size of population and size of economy interact. This is 
useful for establishing how size influences TV market volume and expenditure on originated 
content both individually and through interaction. Both the size of the population and the 
economy are important because they influence the critical mass of the market. The larger the 
market, the more revenue should be available on the one hand, and the more cost can be spread 
on the other. I argue that the provision of domestic content is influenced by size, due to the logic 
of collective funding and increasing returns to scale.  
Investigating the first hypothesis begins with a recap of the essential argument, followed by 
three chapters (4.3-4.5) where the relationships of interest are investigated. Chapter 4.2, The 
argument on the difference in the influence of size, focuses on why there should be a difference. 
That is followed by empirical analysis of the TV market volume (chapter 4.3). Then indication 
for difference based on expenditure on originated content is demonstrated empirically (chapter 
4.4). This leads to the presentation and testing of four varieties of size (chapter 4.5). The 
analysis concludes with a discussion of the importance of size in the way that TV markets are 
structured and how TV systems work (chapter 4.6). 
 
4.2 The argument on the difference in the influence of size 
The theoretical argument presented in chapter 1.3 is that the influence of size is a consequence 
of small and large markets being subject to similar market and content good characteristics, 
which in effect due to differences in scarcity (critical mass) leads to different market conditions. 
Although it is certainly the case that smaller and larger TV markets have similar characteristics 
as a result of the way broadcasting technology works, there are significant differences in the 
dynamics that characterise comparative contexts. These differences are caused by variations in 
market volume and supply. This suggests the importance of market leverage: differences in the 
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dynamics accounting for variation in smaller markets are due to the market’s inability to 
leverage the critical mass necessary to provide media content goods, where cost of production is 
independent of consumption. In short, it costs as much to make a programme for a few people as 
for a multitude because costs are fixed, in large part. This is especially pertinent to the dynamics 
of smaller markets, because less ability to leverage must limit the potential for achieving higher 
efficiencies related to scalexix. 
The argument is based on an assumption: it is in the joint interests of both the state and 
consumers to secure domestically-produced content because audio-visual representation has a 
crucial role in contemporary national culture. The culture that characterise a people as a nation, 
both in their distinctions and connections, are produced and must be continually reproduced in 
society. A complex interaction between preservation and incorporation is obvious everywhere, 
and increasingly today this is related to influences from abroad via the impact of globalisation. 
This is not always a peaceful, easy-going process, but rather frequently characterised by clashes 
over values and identities, both inside domestic cultures and in response to external cultures. 
Domestic content distils and represents these cultural dynamics in various generic formulations, 
including humour, news, drama and current affairs – really, in every genre as the concept of 
“working through” clarifies (Ellis 1999). For matters related to cultural identities, self-
perceptions and perspectives on the world, and every collective routine of social practice in 
societies today, domestically originated television content plays crucial roles. 
For smaller markets this is problematic because domestic programming is typically unable to 
produce sufficiency across all types of genres in amount or quality, or both. The market is 
materially too small to support that. Domestic companies in smaller markets therefore face 
common difficulties, i.e. difficulties they all experience, in being unable to reach the efficiency 
of scale required to produce all the content that is needed. 
This situation fuels a related tendency. Mass media require some form of collective funding 
because production cost is independent of consumptionxx. Because content is expensive to 
produce but cheap to purchase, there is an incentive to buy tested formats, popular series, hit 
motion pictures, and other media goods because this makes attracting viewers more likely. Risk 
of market failure and lack of incentives are governing principles in determining a market’s lack 
of original domestic contentxxi. 
Financial strength is a relevant issue when it comes to the media, especially when studying the 
relative potential of investment into domestic content as well as being able to withstand 
fragmentation and increased international competition. Below, I will look further into this issue 
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by studying the volume of the television market. Media content commodities are public goods, 
while encryption changes them to excludable and thus into club goods (Samuelson 1958; 1967, 
Buchanan 1965; Ostrom, 1990); some can be argued as being merit, or de-merit goods 
(Musgrave, 1969). The electronic media content good carries characteristics of non-rivalry per 
definition and can be non-excludable as well as excludable, depending on the form of 
distribution. Nonetheless, their characteristics as creative worksxxii establish them with public 
good characteristics in terms of their productionxxiii. 
In other words, the companies face difficulties in reaching an efficient scale for enabling 
domestically commercial media companies with national produced content. This is an effect 
caused by characteristics of electronic media content goods, and this brings about the condition 
of collective funding, where cost of production is independent of consumption. To clarify this, I 
have to emphasise the funding of television, which usually comprises advertisement, 
subscription relay from distributors, public subsidy or a combination of all three. Advertisement 
is a risky way of doing business, especially in small markets, and particularly if dependent on a 
single domestic market, as domestic companies in times of crisis have difficulty investing in the 
content of interest due to decreases in advertisement revenue. Subscription relay, while being 
more stable, is still problematic as it is dependent on the willingness of the consumer to 
maintain the subscription and not to select a substitution, especially if the distributor attaches 
less popular channels to popular ones to secure supply. As it is expensive to produce domestic 
content and cheaper to buy programmes, there is an incentive to purchase tested formats such as 
series, films and other content known to attract viewers, rather than investing in a project of 
which the success is unknown and the period of production potentially long. Risk and lack of 
incentives caused by market and media content good characteristics are the governing principles 
here when it comes to the lack of original domestic content.xxiv 
This complexity is explained by difficulties related to the nature of media content as public 
goods, as well as in economic theory where increasing returns to scale explain how the cost of 
production is independent of consumption. This situation produces typical challenges in 
securing sufficiency in original domestic content: 
1. The non-rivalry characteristic of media content (meaning the same content can be 
consumed by more than one person at no added cost) with high potential for non-
excludabilityxxv; 
2. Increasing returns to scale because the cost of production is independent of consumption 
(meaning that most of the costs are sunk in producing the first copy, with duplication 
being fairly cheap);  
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3. Higher levels of efficiency in scale caused by the collective funding function, especially 
important for smaller markets (meaning that domestic broadcasters depend on single 
markets while multinational corporations are able to distribute the same channel or 
content – dubbed or subtitled – to several markets at once, making it much easier to 
realise efficiency of scale). 
4. The scale and scope of the market intervention are determined politically and thus are 
based on what is considered to be in the merited public interest in a particular market. 
 
Smaller and larger media markets certainly share challenges that are inherent in television and 
indeed in other forms of mass media (especially newspapers, but also radio and online). These 
create considerable difficulties in ensuring adequacy in the public service dimensions of media, 
long accepted as being of essential importance in the EU and other mature democracies (if only) 
because media are necessary for answering the democratic, cultural and social needs of 
respective societies. It has also long been accepted that smaller countries share challenges in 
being subject to significantly higher degrees of vulnerability to and dependency on foreign-
originated content. This legitimises varying levels of policy intervention that are intended to 
correct the deficiencies.  
I argue that the small and large media markets share challenges which lead to difficulties in 
ensuring the provision of original content serving democratic, cultural and social needs. The 
argument is that states have common challenges in the broadcasting market, which the market is 
not capable of securing independently of state intervention. This is a familiar premise presented 
in relation to state intervention in the electronic media market (Peacock, 1986; UNESCO, 2005). 
A similar line of argument has been present in the EU since the Amsterdam Treaty, when a 
Protocol on the system of public broadcasting in the Member States was adopted (Treaty of 
Amsterdam 2 October 1997). This is also in line with arguments presented in the revised 
communication on broadcasting from the EC on the application of state aid rules to public 
service broadcasting (2009) where the states have the right to provision services in the general 
economic interest (SEGEI) as per the Treaty and the Protocol when of the purpose is fulfilling 
the democratic, social and cultural needs of a particular society as well as securing “pluralism 
including cultural and linguistic diversity” (communication, point 47). Furthermore, it is 
explicitly noted that smaller Member States face real limitations in their ability to finance public 
services in media due to the higher cost per inhabitant (Communication, point 42).  
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Media is a risky business and there is a reason for publicly supporting broadcasting in terms of 
securing content. These are some of the problems common to the broadcasting industry, which 
from a policy perspective could require market intervention in both large and small markets, but 
it can be argued they are affected differently, as the level of collective funding for securing the 
same level of services will impact on small markets more than large, as a result of how cost can 
be distributed. However, even in the US, the largest media market of this study, there is an on-
going debate on the topic of subsidising news production (Downie & Schudson, 2009).  
The market in and of itself cannot be expected to provide the full variety of desired programmes, 
especially in smaller countries with their reduced volumes of domestic resources. To this I can 
add the even greater problems with regard to informational and educational programmes, that 
are typically not commercially profitable. In practice, this means that while the costs for a one-
hour production are relatively the same in Germany and Denmark, for example, the main 
difference lies in the number of people available to co-finance production, as well as the relative 
wealth of the respective societies (an issue that becomes especially pointed in certain countries 
in Eastern and Central Europe today). As a function of population size alone, Danes must pay 
more per capita than Germans if they want to enjoy the full range of media goods that are 
typically considered necessary for democracy, society and culture.  
The background to this discussion hinges on the notion of a public interest in providing specific 
media goods and services to society as a whole, and which are inherently beyond the particular 
tastes of an individual consumer (McQuail 1992). This implies the importance of accounting for 
differences in the volume of public expenditure on media as a factor of available revenue. Of 
course, the commercial sector has an understandable interest in establishing common markets 
and promoting free trade.  
The potential of export markets does significantly increase business opportunity. But it is 
equally understandable that in smaller markets, policy-makers have a quite reasonable interest in 
ensuring the viability of domestic audio-visual production in all the varied genres of content and 
media products necessary for the well-being of the societies for which they are responsible, and 
to which they must be accountable.  
The fact that this is understandable on both sides accounts for the continuing disagreement 
between the EU and US over policy in television trade (among other things). The US claims that 
the EU violated the GATT agreement in formulating policies that require some percentage of 
European originated works in the totality of programme output in Member States (e.g. in the 
Television without Frontiers directive from 1989 that was recently amended in 2007 and again 
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in 2010 as the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (see Filipek (1994) for further 
information). 
EU legislation since the mid-1980s has facilitated the establishment of the dual system of public 
and private broadcasting sectors competing in Europe, along with a strong commercial media 
sector that is now able to compete in scale and scope across the continent. This has undeniably 
benefitted diversity in content and pluralism in provision.  
Although under fierce attack today, public subsidy has been essential to ensure that competition 
is robust for markets where it would otherwise collapse due to problems inherent with 
economies of scale inside and across European media markets. Ironically, however, EU policy is 
today limiting the competence of state policy to handle media matters, matters that have 
undeniable importance for both historical and cultural interests as well as efficacy in the 
performance of competition. The evidence points to a very different conclusion than the 
contrary claims about public subsidy creating ‘unfairness’ in conditions of competition. 
The reason for choosing the relation between the dependent variable media market volume and 
the independent size variables of population and economy is that if there were no relation, this 
would make the reasoning behind existing policy problematic; if the relationship on the other 
hand was positive, it would establish that small markets were in effect challenged in a way 
where policy directed towards large markets would risk worsening the effects. This should also 
show the market failure argument concerning the level of media content provision, in the 
relation between TV market volume and the provision of public goods. To be fair, it would also 
question the validity of studying large market policy success, as implementation could easily 
have little effect, or in the worst cases adverse effects in a small market. 
Nonetheless, most markets are vulnerable and dependent to some degree on foreign production, 
and this is expressed in different ways: for the broadcasting market this should be indicated 
clearly based on the volume of the media market and the (in)ability to provide domestic media 
content goods. This entails the fact that vulnerability and dependency are ex ante conditions of 
the overall challenges facing the TV markets. It also means that these concepts are more 
descriptive than actual as they are attributed to an effect of a separate condition, here in the case 
of TV markets related to scarcity, critical mass and the media content good characteristics. 
This analysis deals with material limitations and necessities caused by differing levels of 
potential in market leverage in variously sized markets, which affect the ability to provide 
domestic public services in the media. Despite claims of market distortion and the desire for 
some universally applicable template to steer media policy fairly in respective Member States, 
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variability in market conditions means that what might count as distortion in one country cannot 
be considered as such in another.  
There is no universal best practice. Rather, policy in each Member State must take account of all 
the particularities and traits of each respective television market, even if the medium as a 
technology has inherent characteristics that create commonly shared challenges, as noted earlier. 
There is a case to be made that in the struggle between commercial and cultural interests, which 
is certainly evident in EU media policies, what has been taking shape in recent years appears to 
be tailored more towards catering to the interests of the large Member States with their inherent 
advantages than to the small Member States with their inherent disadvantages. 
There are four points to highlight. Firstly, that size is important for the television market volume 
as the size of the population and economy influence the critical mass of the market. The larger 
the market, the more revenue should be available, and the more cost should be spread out. 
Secondly, if this is correct, a relation between size and the provision of domestic media content, 
defined as expenditure on originations, should follow. In connection with the point above, I 
argue that the provision of domestic media content should be influenced positively by size, due 
to the potential for spreading out cost based on the logic of collective funding and due to the 
increasing return to scale, and therefore the potential for more than a few companies to achieve 
efficient scale. Furthermore, the prerequisite for this is that the total available revenue is higher 
in large markets. Finally, I argue that I should be able to identify interaction effect between the 
categorical (small, large) size variables. 
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4.3 Research question A: How does size influence the availability of 
revenue in television markets (TV market volume)? 
4.3.1 Introduction 
I argue that there is a relation between size and the available revenue in the television market, 
i.e. the market volume. The three sources of revenue all influence the total market volume. If 
this is correct, I should be able to identify an effect of size on TV market volume as per research 
question A. 
My hypothesis is that I should are able to identify an effect of size on television market volume. 
I have argued this to be positive due to the characteristics of media content and the difficulties of 
the non-rival in consumption characteristics which ensure difficulties of collective funding and 
minimum efficient scale in combination with increasing return to scale. The problem here is that 
the bias should consist of a positive number dependent on other potential revenue sources which 
may well be higher in large markets. The argument is that market volume defined as the 
aggregated measure of public subsidy, advertisement revenue for television and subscription 
revenue in million € is dependent on size defined as the size of the population in millions and 
economy as PPP GDP per capita in dollars. 
The analysis is a first step to ascertain the relationship which in theory should be there, based on 
the characteristics combined with scarcity considerations and thus critical mass. Should this not 
be the case, size might not have an effect on television market volume, which would be an 
interesting finding in itself.  
To investigate this, I applied a multiple regression analysis for both the independent variables of 
population size and economy size on TV market volume. As the number of observations is 
limited to 26, I must be cautious about conclusions. On the other hand, the sample includes the 
majority of EU member states, so there should be fair validity for the European context. This 
analysis is a first step to ascertain whether the expected relationship is statistically significant. 
First I will present the multiple regression analysis of market size on TV market volume. 
Subsequently, I examine the statistics:  first the individual markets are ranked and divided into 
the three types of revenue. A short conclusion on the empirical findings ends the chapter.  
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4.3.2 Regression analysis on TV market volume 
This is the first step in substantiating the influence of size on the television markets, where I will 
present the difference between smaller vis-à-vis larger markets. This can help position my 
argument on the importance of leverage. 
 
I assume that size influences the level of market volume: this calls for a statistical analysis of the 
hypothesised relationship between size of economy and population regressed on TV market 
volume. The results of the regression can be stated like this: 
 Table 12: Regression statistics on the relation between population and economy size on 
the TV Market volume 
*** (**) [*] denote significance at p < 0.01, (p < 0.05), [p < 0.1]. The regression statistics are 
available in appendix C.1. 
 
The table shows the results of the multiple regression for population and economy size in 
relation to TV market volume, and indicates that even based on this sample, the regression does 
a good job of explaining the variation: the explanatory strength for the overall model is around 
93%. The assumed relationship between size and TV market volume has been substantiated with 
this. Summarised, the model is statistically significant with the coefficient of determination 
 Population Economy 
Coefficient 154.459*** 0.006*** 
SE 8.568 0.19 
t-statistic 17.835 3.238 
Observations 26 
Adjusted R2 .933 
R2 .938 
F statistic 174.932 
Prob > F 0.000 
Durbin-Watson 1.883 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 1.018 
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showing a strong positive relationship between the variables in question in terms of the variation 
between the overall model of size and TV market volume. This means that the smaller the 
market, the less available revenue there is, i.e. in small markets there is less revenue than in the 
large. This is in line with theory, but implies that small markets provide less domestic media 
content: this will be investigated in chapter 4.4, The influence of size on the level of original 
domestic content in television markets, below. Furthermore multicollinearity is not a concern 
when using these particular variables for measuring size as the VIF figure is just a little above 1. 
The model proposed substantiates the relationship between size and TV market volume in terms 
of the level of revenue as hypothesised. This confirms the first step of my statistical analysis of 
size, which also illustrates the difficulty of small markets in securing sufficient size to provide 
public services, e.g. they cost more per capita due to the public good characteristics of media 
content, assuming that the less volume a market has, the less revenue is available for domestic 
production. The increasing return to scale difficulty combined with the problems of reaching 
minimum efficient scale in the market lead to high potential levels of market failure in the 
television markets if there is an interest in domestically-produced content in small markets; 
while larger markets are more able to sustain production, they also face the difficulty of 
providing specific niche content, which cannot be utilised efficiently through economies of scale 
at the international level.  
The results for population and economy size in relation to TV market volume indicate that the 
regression is robust in explaining variation. The assumed relationship between size and TV 
market volume is substantiated. This also partly underlines the importance of studying whether 
there are varieties of size influence. For instance, while Poland is large when measured by 
population, it is relatively small when measured by economy. This is a good contrast with the 
Danish market, which displays the opposite characteristics. This points to the relative character 
of size where a small population with a relatively large economy can, in principle, invest a 
similar amount of revenue to a market with a large population but a small economy. In short, the 
model is statistically significant with the coefficient of determination showing a strong positive 
relationship between the variables. 
This initial analysis confirms the first step in my statistical analysis of size and supports my 
discussion about the difficulties that small markets have in lacking sufficiency of size (in one or 
both dimensions) to provide public services in media. They simply cost more per capita due to 
the public good characteristics of media content as larger markets can spread the costs more. 
The increasing returns to scale combined with a difficulty in reaching efficiency lead to a higher 
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potential for market failure in domestically-produced content. This is especially the case in 
smaller markets. 
Below, I shall look into the relative figures using statistics on the variation between the three 
types of revenue in individual markets to further elaborate the results of the regression. 
 
4.3.3 Market volume distribution by type 
In this chapter I examine the distribution of revenue in the individual markets. My purpose is to 
identify the differences between these markets regarding the distribution of the three types of 
revenue (subsidy, advertising and subscription). 
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Figure 3: TV market volume by type of revenue in million € in 2007 (by total market volume) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on Screen Digest for public and subscription funding and Euromonitor International for advertisement funding 
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Figure 3 shows the division of revenue sources in the included markets as well as the size of this 
revenue in million Euros. The smallest market in aggregated terms is the Estonian with €77 
million, followed by the two other Baltic markets, Latvia with €94 million and Lithuania with 
€300 million.  The largest market is the UK with €16,212 million and the second largest is 
Germany with €14,126 million, followed by France, Italy and Spain. The big five also represent 
the largest market volumes. The middle markets are largely made up of the Nordic states, 
Switzerland and Austria, but also large population markets with weak economies such as Poland. 
The most interesting aspect is the diversity of the revenue levels where the individual markets 
are dependent on different types of revenue. Nonetheless, from an overall perspective, the 
variance in the included markets is quite interesting, and there is potential for further research 
into the impact and importance of different revenue types for television diversity.  
The table also indicates some noteworthy differences between large and small markets, or rather 
the size of the advertisement revenue. It is interesting that the large matured markets have such 
differences to the small maturing markets. The big five markets in Europe have the largest TV 
advertisement markets. It is quite interesting that Hungary has a relatively large advertisement 
market compared to similar market types, but on the other hand, the Hungarian public 
broadcaster is relatively weak measured by audience share. The small markets are very diverse in 
terms of revenue, and public subsidy is just one factor of difference, while level of subscription 
revenue also plays a role. As well as the difference in advertisement revenue level. We can learn 
a lot about the structure and dependencies of the small and large markets by studying these three 
types of revenue, as they present information on the revenue dependencies of media companies 
as well as which markets have what types of structures, i.e. pay-penetration. Surprisingly, the 
markets are quite diverse, with different levels, and the effect of public subsidy makes interesting 
study. 
Europe is often compared with the US. The US market, with advertisement revenue of €43,668 
million and subscription of €51,229 million, almost rivals the aggregated EU markets. For the 
US case the entire EU market revenue would have to be pooled to be of comparison. Even the 
pooled resources of the five largest EU markets would only be above 50% of the US total. That 
puts into perspective whether or not the EU can actively establish reasonable competition on 
audio-visual products with the US. 
Most markets apply public subsidy. However, the level of that support is quite different. Several 
small population markets use public subsidies to reach a higher market volume through public 
broadcasting corporations, than similar sized markets measured by population. Public subsidy 
and subscription revenue play major roles in some markets, but what can be claimed to be of 
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importance to media companies is the diversity of revenue to reduce risk of fluctuation. 
European markets overall appear to have small population, high economy markets where public 
revenue plays a strong role. Large markets measured by both population and economy such as 
the UK and Germany, also have very high levels of public subsidy. 
Small markets in general, not surprisingly, have smaller TV advertisement markets; relatively 
they represent a higher cost per household and per capita than large markets. This is in line with 
the theory on public goods. A main point to remember is that what is shown on TV is content. 
What generates revenue on TV is content, either through subscription fees or by selling the 
audience to advertisers.  
This means that revenue on TV is generated by (a) what the advertisers are willing to pay for 
their productions to be broadcast to a specific target group in a specific timeslot on a specific 
date or (b) what the consumers either on-demand or through subscription are willing to pay for 
access to pay-TV networks.  
The markets with relatively little public revenue have higher advertisement revenue to some 
degree: Germany and the UK are interesting exceptions due to their particular public television 
structure. Just as the relative public expenditure per capita in general is less, in large markets the 
same is the case for advertisement. As the cost is mainly for the first copy production, large 
markets should either have a higher amount of original content production or lower relative 
costs, because what is sold to advertisers is the audience and the audience gets the content. We 
know empirically that audiences in general prefer domestic content, and the tables on revenue 
confirm that large state markets in general have a higher potential for providing domestic content 
as a result of larger market volume. 
The markets with the largest advertisement revenue are also some of those with the strongest 
private commercial media companies. It might be interesting to study what type of original 
production is provided; in general the smaller markets should be more dependent on imports and 
have lower degrees of original production. The interesting aspect here is what differences there 
are in origination and the potential impact on small markets vis-à-vis their larger counterparts.  
A separate aspect here comprises the content production originating from the US, caused by the 
relatively high media revenue available. Although advertisement revenue is used to represent 
part of a market’s available resources for the media, it is also revenue that can be earned by 
foreign-owned or foreign broadcast TV channels, especially in the small markets. This can lead 
to less available revenue for domestic TV companies for production of new (original) content.  
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This is part of the fragmentation problem and the small markets with same-language large 
market neighbours are especially vulnerable to this diversion because of their being secondary 
markets. Small markets with weak domestic media are very vulnerable; and in worst case 
scenarios this can increase the dependency on foreign imports (negative spiral), weaken the 
domestic production industry (due to reduced revenue), or result in an increased dependence on 
well-known and tested formats. Such a development can pinpoint the reasoning for increased 
public subsidy of the domestic media if the intent is to secure content produced with a national 
perspective.  
Studying the figures leads to the question of the dependency hypothesis, where, when I take into 
account TV market volume difference, I can argue that most markets and media companies are 
dependent on foreign-produced content, i.e. acquisitions. The interesting points lies in where the 
media companies buy programming from and why, as well as what effect we can perceive from 
the level of public subsidy, which plays quite a large role in some markets measured against the 
relative market volume. 
The analysis reveals that most markets apply public subsidy to some degree. But the level is 
quite different for several smaller population markets, which provide more public subsidy in 
order to attain a higher market volume. Moreover, this is done mainly via PSB. Denmark and 
Ireland also have pools of public funding for TV production, established in 2007 and 2003 
respectively, and there is also the EU media programme supporting TV production. Public 
subsidy and subscription revenue also play major roles. But what seems of greatest importance to 
media companies is that the diversity of revenue has varying risk reduction potential in relation 
to wider fluctuations of domestic and regional economies.  
European markets in general have small populations in comparative terms, and thus even in large 
economy markets such as Germany and the UK, public subsidy plays a strong role in supporting 
domestic audio-visual production. We should also observe that the markets with the largest 
advertising revenue are among those with the strongest private commercial media companies. It 
is fair to say that most individual European markets are small in comparison with giants like the 
USA. 
Furthermore, the tables point towards the level of political involvement. Public subsidy is 
revenue allocated politically, although large markets have the potential to allocate more than 
small ones and do so in most developed economies; however, it is dependent on political choice. 
Public expenditure is an expression of a political choice in terms of how to deal with perceived 
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merited interests and/or market failure; thus the size of public revenue is more attributable to 
historical reasons and political climate than other factors.  
Studying the figures of the total public expenditure illustrates a fairly diverse picture in terms of 
large and small markets, as there appears to be no definite relation between public expenditure 
on broadcast media and size: however, what it does indicate is that large states have more 
potential to subsidise the market than their small counterparts. The big five European markets 
(Germany, UK, France, Italy and Spain) are the top five countries, which clearly shows that. 
Within Europe the east–west cleavage is evident, indicating that some market types are more 
vulnerable to external pressure and competition than others, i.e. I cannot assume equal challenges 
for all markets. Public expenditure is an expression of political will manifest in terms of how 
governments choose to deal with media goods, either as merit goods or in terms of market 
failure. 
This chapter 4.3 has established the influence of economy and population size on the level of TV 
market volume, which was as I had expected. Intervention in the market from the state can be 
argued to play a major part in increasing volume in the TV market. When studying the 
descriptive quantitative data, and the data on the US market, it is evident that the US market was 
of such a large size that the top five European markets aggregated would only be a little above 
50% of it.  
Importantly, this also means that when I take into consideration the difference in public subsidy, 
we can see that the European markets on the one hand are dependent on public subsidy, but also 
on the other that when it comes to pay-television and level of subscription revenue, the 
maturation continues to be on-going. Overall, I have highlighted what I call a first step in 
identifying the influence of size by determining statistically that size as measured by population 
and PPP GDP per capita influence the level of volume in the TV market.  
There is no doubt that size matters for TV market volume. Size measured by population and 
economy have both been shown to have significant, instrumental influences on the availability of 
resources for TV broadcasting. Of course, factors beyond size also matter, as indicated. The level 
of subscription revenue is dependent on the penetration of pay television, and the level of public 
subsidy is dependent on the political will to intervene, as well as historical and cultural concerns 
establishing path-dependency. Advertising revenue is dependent on the level of turn-over of 
companies in combination with their interest in TV advertising. So although the aggregated 
levels of population and economy size are significant factors, there are several underlying 
mechanisms in play. 
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In chapter 4.4 below, the relationship between size and expenditure on originated content will be 
explored to demonstrate that this would be a logical step following the documentation of size 
influence on TV market volume. 
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4.4 Research question B: How does size influence the level of original 
domestic content in television markets? 
4.4.1 Introduction 
The hypothesis is that size is of importance to scale economies, meaning that due to the 
relationships already demonstrated, I expect to see a strong positive relationship between size on 
the levels of investment in originated content as per research question B. If proven correct, this 
will substantiate an argument that differences in state circumstances owing to the relative 
variation of size in populations and economies lead to differences in the ability to provide public 
media services. I will again apply multiple regression to substantiate the relationship between the 
dependent variable (expenditure on originated content) against the independent variables. The 26 
markets comprising my sample are again relatively limited in global terms, but sufficient to 
substantiate the relationship for European policy concerns. The reasoning behind the assumed 
linearity is that the larger the market, the more able it is to provide such goods. I assume that size 
influences the level of expenditure on originated content. This requires analysis of the 
hypothesised relationship between size regressed on expenditure for originated content. 
In this chapter 4.4, the intention is to show the influence of size on expenditure on originated 
content in the domestic markets. This will indicate if size has an impact, but also that, if this is 
so, it would entail differences in the policy interests depending on the scale of economy and 
population as these variables influence the market condition, i.e. in the case of Europe it would 
entail different conditions for small population and small economy markets, such as in Eastern 
Europe for instance, when compared with the Nordic markets. Above in chapter 4.3, I have 
identified the difference between volume in small and large markets, and in this chapter 4.4 I 
shall further examine the influence of size by studying originated TV production. 
The hypothesis is that size is of importance to scale economies, meaning that due to the 
relationship shown above, I expect a strong positive relationship between size and the level of 
investment in originated media content. Should these variables be strongly correlated, it will be 
demonstrated that size does matter, and also that public subsidy increases the level of 
expenditure on originations and thus helps the production industry to fulfill consumer demand 
for domestic production. Furthermore, it would help substantiate the small–large population and 
economy matrix on the variance of size. This analysis, in combination with the relationship on 
market volume above, will help substantiate my argument on difference in state circumstances 
conditioned by the relative size of population and economy leading to differences in the ability to 
provide public services. 
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In order to investigate the relationship, I shall apply a multiple regression on the relationship 
between the dependent variable expenditure on originated content defined as the level of 
expenditure on originated production against the independent variables of size (economy 
measured by PPP GDP per capita in dollars and population in millions). The reasoning behind 
the assumed linearity is that the larger the market, the more able it is to provide these goods; 
furthermore, it can be argued that the higher the level of public subsidy, the higher the level of 
provision. In other words, I should be able to deduce the effect of size on the level of media 
content provision. The relationship is understood to be positive, as the larger the market, the 
higher the level of provision. I have argued that the larger market should have higher levels of 
TV content provided due to their characteristics, but this does not mean that small markets 
cannot reap an advantage by using the characteristics of these goods and selling the ideas for 
shows (in practice defined as formats, where the idea and set-up are described) to other markets 
producers for a fee: Big Brother is a successful example from the Netherlands, as is Strictly 
Come Dancing from the UK. 
First I shall conduct the multiple regression analysis of size on expenditure on originated content, 
after which I shall elaborate the results comparatively using the  statistics for the individual 
markets per revenue type and per capita. The empirical findings will conclude this chapter.  
 
4.4.2 Regression analysis on the provision of domestic TV content 
I  have demonstrated that size was important for the level of available revenue, i.e. TV market 
volume, it should follow that size is important for the level of provided originated TV content; 
this will be studied using regression analysis, to be further elaborated using statistics for the 
individual markets afterwards.  
I assume that size influences the level of originated content. This requires analysis of the 
hypothesised relationship between size and the expenditure on originated TV content. The results 
can be shown like this: 
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Table 13: Regression statistics for expenditure on originated TV content (2006/2007) 
 Expenditure on originated content 
Population Economy 
Coefficient 46.042*** 0.022** 
SE 4.231 0.009 
t-statistic 10.883 2.340 
Observations 26 
Adjusted R2 0.840 
R2 0.853 
F statistic 66.469 
Prob > F 0.000 
Durbin-Watson 1.914 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 1.018 
*** (**) [*] denote significance at p < 0.01, (p < 0.05), [p < 0.1]. The regression statistics are 
available in appendix C.2 
 
What can be seen from this regression based on a 26-market sample from Europe is that one 
extra unit of either population in millions or economy in PPP GDP per capita influences the level 
of originated content. The figures indicate that size in a European context can be convincingly 
shown to carry strength, where 84% of the variation in expenditure on originated content can be 
related to the size variable based on the overall model. Furthermore the regression is significant 
and there is no real multicollinearity between the independent size variables with a VIF figure 
just above 1. In other words, the larger these variables are, the more leverage there is and 
consequently, the higher the level of expenditure on originated content. 
This verifies my initial hypothesis on the relationship between size and originated content. These 
results were as expected by economic theory, e.g. size help establish framework conditions for 
market volume as indicated in the analysis above, and thus secure conditions for commercial 
broadcast activity in  facilitating  economies of scale; whereas private commercial companies are 
able to utilise economies of scale across markets, public broadcasters usually have to function in 
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their particular market of interest, which can limit their ability to utilise economies of scale, 
especially in small markets. 
This makes sense with scarcity conditions of talent and resources in the production phases where 
limitation in smaller markets in particular can lead to reduced production because of a lack of 
ability to take advantage of economies of scale in the provision of public services where the end-
product is similar to public goods.  
Even though news and debate programmes are relevant, their export potential when they are 
produced in small markets is quite low. This does not mean that there is no domestic production 
in small markets, but rather that the large market conditions establish a more viable frame for 
commercial activity as it becomes more feasible to reach economies of scale; the small markets 
can in this regard function as subsidiaries where the larger production companies can purchase 
entry or set up ventures to utilise economies of scale.  
Government can in general counter some of the challenges caused by the market and content 
good characteristics by using public broadcasters, i.e. represented by the level of public revenue, 
but this will not counter all, nor will it allow perfect competitive conditions in the individual 
markets.  
Higher levels of subsidy leading to increased domestic production are also rational, as this would 
be the primary purpose of intervention. Large markets having the volume to a higher degree 
service the demand for certain genres, which combined with public revenue secures high levels 
of provision, as is the case in the five largest markets; the small markets with high levels of 
expenditure, e.g. the Nordic countries, are highly subsidised and have a dual system with a 
combination of pure public, hybrid and commercial broadcasters; see for instance Lund and 
Berg, 2009. As will be indicated in figure 5 on page 129 below, these also establish these 
markets as some of the most expensive per capita. 
There are some issues of relevance which need to be addressed: the difficulty of measuring 
public goods is also apparent in this case. It is necessary to point out that the problem lies in the 
higher cost of domestic production (compared to buying in programmes) combined with the 
influencing factor of public expenditure.  
The economies of scale argument is relevant: a small market can only sustain a few production 
companies due to minimum efficient scale, where larger markets have the potential for 
production industry clusters, not primarily dependent on public revenue. The Netherlands, for 
instance, has had success with formats, which benefit from the logic of increasing returns to 
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scale as a creative work, where the purpose is that the purchased design can be adapted to the 
individual state, market and civil society culture and language. This also means that commercial 
or public broadcasters in small markets can buy in formats with proven success and adapt them 
to national culture, and as such have a new piece of original material, which could be 
problematic if this is the only original production there is besides news.  
What can be argued is that from a political decision-making perspective, it would be beneficial 
for small markets to visualise a state as a ‘club’ sharing culture and language, and while 
television content does carry the characteristics of public goods, when language and culture are 
applied they in a sense become club goods.  
The purpose of originated content is to secure national culture, language and to provide news and 
debate. This is done for the benefit of a particular group. While the UK and the US can benefit 
from language in terms of potential commercial use of the economies of increasing returns, this 
is more challenging for a small club with an individual language and culture. At the same time, 
competition with the larger club is difficult, as the market volume is bound to create successful 
shows, i.e. using logic of failure (i.e. a market situation where shows are taken off, it they fail to 
live up to a set of criteria, as only one out of ten shows will perhaps succeed), which can be 
bought by other markets more cheaply than the original production can be produced.  
 
4.4.3 Expenditure on originated TV content in the individual markets 
I will further elaborate the production of original domestic content by showing statistics of the 
individual markets below, where it will become evident that large markets have the highest 
expenditure on TV content as is also shown using multiple regression analysis. First, the data for 
the individual market is presented, then for the relative expenditure per capita and finally for the 
categorised state size. The intention is to establish an overview of the individual markets as well 
as to discuss particularities. 
Figure 4 shows the expenditure on originated TV content per market and will establish an 
overview of the challenges faced by small markets and substantiate the relative size influence. 
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Figure 4: Expenditure on originated TV content per market in € million 2006/2007 (from 
lowest to highest) 
 
Source: Oliver & Ohlbaum performance (2009) 
 
The figure shows the expenditure on originated content and indicates the market difference, 
which, as the regression pointed out, illustrates that the larger the market, the higher the 
expenditure on original production. The market with the highest expenditure on originated 
content is Germany with €4,512 million, followed by the UK with €4,140 million: these are by 
far the ones investing the most. They are also the ones representing the largest language markets: 
Germany has a language market of around 100 million people capable of understanding German, 
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and the UK has the benefit of lingua franca, with a large global primary language market of 
around 400 million as well as an important secondary nearly global market.  
These are markets with a huge potential for export, but are also the ones with very high levels of 
public subsidy. The markets with the least expenditure on originated content are the Baltics and 
Cyprus, ranging from €11 to €17 million, indicating differences in terms of their relative size, but 
also possibly pointing to political differences.  
To conceptualise the actual difference in the markets, I can point out that the BBC alone had a 
TV content expenditure of roughly €2,132 million in 2009, and also importantly had commercial 
business sales of around €508 million for television activities, such as channels, content and 
production. The BBC group surplus for the 2009 financial year was roughly €291 million (BBC 
annual report 2009). When studying the figures, it becomes evident that the BBC is a giant and 
an important distributor of content, and not only for Europe. 
There is also a set of markets comprising Sweden, Norway, Belgium and Denmark which appear 
to have a higher than expected level of expenditure on originated content. This can to some 
extent be explained with reference to the combination of hybrid and public broadcasters in these 
Nordic markets and the combined Flemish and French language market PSBs in Belgium; 
however, these also happen to be small population and large economy markets.  
It is also worth noting that these markets equal or have higher levels of expenditure on originated 
content than for instance Poland or Romania. Portugal is a separate case altogether. I have 
classified it as a small economy based on my exclusionary PPP GDP per capita categorisation; 
however, it has very high levels of expenditure on originated content, and there are two elements 
which can help explain this: a) language markets and b) both commercial and public television 
companies are active in the production of original content.  
The purpose of this table is also to show the problem slightly differently. Firstly, there is a clear 
small-large difference in Europe; and secondly there is a large population, large economy market 
advantage in terms of securing domestic production, but also a small population, large economy 
strength. The markets with the highest public subsidy also have high levels of expenditure on 
original content. Nonetheless, Germany and the UK individually both have the same level of 
expenditure on originated content as the aggregated expenditure in the 21 small markets.  
The minimum efficient scale challenge for domestic small market companies appears to be an 
empirical challenge if there is an interest in securing strong, diverse content markets 
domestically. In combination with the large market TV market volume and scale of production, it 
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enables them to export to the small markets which identify with them culturally, establish 
windows, and purchase bundled rights, which all are elements allowing companies to take 
advantage of increasing returns to scale. For these works to be introduced into different language 
markets only requires either dubbing or subbing. Germany and the UK are also the markets with 
the highest amounts of public subsidy.  
The markets with more than one public broadcaster or hybrids, meaning Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, Belgium, Germany and the UK, are the ones with the highest expenditure on 
originations. Due to the special ‘pillar’ system of public broadcasting in the Netherlands, they 
also have a high expenditure level. But still, the difference in size is almost 10 million measured 
by population, and yet the Danish media system generates a particularly high rate of expenditure 
on new content in relation to its population size; in contrast, the 10 million population markets of 
Greece and Portugal are both below the Danish level of expenditure on originated domestic 
content.  
Furthermore, the table shows the related issue of relative strength between the models. For 
instance, the three markets with special conditions all have both advertisement and public 
subsidy revenues, but even so they are still competing with the Nordic duo-models. On the other 
hand, the table also indicates the benefit of scale for large markets: a plausible estimation of 
production environments would be a claim that the German and UK markets are quite 
competitive. In order to establish a little more relative evaluation, the per capita figures shown in 
figure 5 will be discussed below. 
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Figure 5: Expenditure on originated content in the TV market per capita in € 2006/2007 
(from lowest to highest) 
Source: Oliver & Ohlbaum performance (2009), own calculations based on national statistics on 
population collected by Euromonitor. 
 
The Danish and Norwegian markets with €86.1 and €771 per capita are the ones with the highest 
level of expenditure on originated content, followed by the UK with €68.2, Ireland €64.7 and 
Germany €54.8. This is interesting as it shows that the two Nordic markets should have a level of 
provision higher than similar markets, which when I look back at the subsidy and total market 
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level, in chapter 4.3, might very well be the case. The least expenditure is found in Lithuania 
with €3.8 per capita, followed by Latvia with €4.8, Romania with €5.8 and Poland with €8.8. 
There is no clear cut distinction stating the small markets per definition have the highest per 
capita or vice versa. I have both types of markets, from the highest to the lowest, and what I 
identify is more in line with a difference in the stage of economic development or the relative 
size. 
The per capita figures illustrate rather dramatically that it costs relatively little for big market 
countries to produce much more originated content compared with their small market 
counterparts. Per capita expenditure confirms my expectation that public subsidy is the crucial 
influence determining the level of originated content. In the light of this data, it seems clear that 
small market countries are able to sidestep the typical difficulties associated with media market 
and content good characteristics through public subsidy and/or regulatory measures. 
The relationship between size and the provision of expenditure on originated content is very 
strong, and without public subsidy there would be significantly less expenditure on originated 
content. The small/large population and economy cleavage appears clearly and poses questions 
for further research in terms of what effect, if any, less provision of expenditure on originated 
content entails. An interesting aspect is that large and small markets have roughly equal 
expenditure per capita, with the large markets having higher expenditure. In other words, the 
large markets provide higher levels of expenditure on originated content, but have roughly the 
same level of expenditure as small ones, which is in line with theory.  
Denmark and the other current or legacy duo-systems have a higher than average level of 
expenditure on originated content. Denmark appears as a special case with a higher level of 
provision than warranted by its TV market volume. This is also substantiated when controlling 
for markets with two or more public or hybrid TV broadcasters, where there was a positive effect 
on the level of expenditure on domestic content. This is usually regulated in a way in which the 
hybrid broadcasters receive benefits and privileges such as must-carry conditions from the state 
in return for providing a certain level of service such as informational content [especially news 
and local news] as well as drama and children’s programmes. The Danish system is in this sense 
extremely successful, as domestic content is available on most of the channels, albeit quite 
differently. There are similar systems in Norway and Sweden, but in a different variety, where 
the hybrid, or former hybrid is privately owned.   
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When I combine all the indications, the picture of dependence on foreign content becomes 
evident: the smallest markets are not able to provide entirely home-grown programming [not that 
this is necessarily important], and for the most part they are dependent on acquisitions from large 
markets. What is also important is the relative size concern, where France, Italy and Spain and 
especially Germany and the UK have substantially higher levels of domestic content than for 
instance Romania and Poland. If I base my assumptions on population size alone, the picture I 
get is distorted, as what I see above in general appears to be some relative combination of 
population and the relative consumer purchasing power. 
In this chapter 4.4, I have looked into the provision of domestic content across 26 markets and 
have substantiated that there is a linear relationship between the size variables on the expenditure 
on originated TV content using regression analysis. This has been as I suspected based on the 
potential of joint-funding functions and non-rivalry conditions where cost of production is 
independent of cost of consumption. Furthermore, I have studied the individual figures in total 
and relative character where the differences in the individual markets became apparent, as did 
the existence of a cleavage in the European landscape when taking into consideration the benefits 
of being large.  
An overall perspective where the five largest markets appear to account for around 75% of the 
total expenditure on originated content does pique some interest in terms of their programme-
exports vis- à-vis the small markets as well as the difference between small and large market 
provision in terms of hours per genre. Markets with duo-systems also appear relevant, as what I 
identified was an increased effect when taking into consideration these types of systems when 
estimating the level of expenditure on originated content; a similar picture was available when 
studying the relationship using per capita figures.  
The per capita figures indicated what I also showed to be a possibility using regression analysis: 
that small eastern European markets face a separate set of challenges to their central and northern 
European counterparts. While this also might be a political choice, it does pose some questions 
as to how this affects the market and what types of programming are provided.  Surprisingly, the 
per capita figures also substantiated that while theory pointed out that keeping a similar level of 
provision should result in lower costs in larger markets, what I see is that while this holds good 
when comparing them to similar markets, it also tells me that some markets have very high 
levels of provision, such as the UK and Germany.  
The findings verify my hypothesis on the relationship between size and originated content, and 
are precisely as expected in economic theory. Population and economy size help establish the 
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framework conditions for market volume, as earlier indicated in this analysis, and thus secure 
conditions for commercial television activity in allowing utilisation of economies of scale. It is 
especially important to understand that private commercial companies are able to utilise 
economies of scale across markets, while public broadcasters (for the most part) are confined to 
functioning in the home domestic market, thereby necessarily limiting their capabilities to utilise 
proximate economies of scale. This makes sense, given the general scarcity of talent and 
resources that correspondingly limit the scope of what is possible in domestic production. Very 
often as well, a considerable portion of available resources must be invested in news and current 
affairs programmes because these are so highly relevant to the public service mandate, but for 
such programming the export potential is extremely low in smaller markets with unique 
languages.  
Large market conditions establish more viable frames for commercial activity even here, because 
it becomes more feasible to achieve economies of scale and also because their languages tend to 
be spoken abroad. Smaller markets thus function as subsidiaries where the larger production 
companies find it attractive to gain market entry or to set up ventures that allow them to better 
utilise economies of scale already largely achieved elsewhere. In general, it is fair to say that 
smaller states can only realistically counter some of these challenges by relying on PSB, i.e. by 
investing public revenue in public media.  
Obviously this will not counter everything, nor should it in the interests of pluralism. On the 
other hand, no media system appears yet to have produced perfect competition. The evidence is 
conclusive: size does impact the level of provision for originated content. However, there are 
differences among the small states and markets in their ability to provide this, with the main 
difference reflected in per capita figures. The result is not always purely a matter of market 
economics, but rather indicates the importance of political choices via the affordance of subsidy. 
Overall, I substantiated my hypothesis as presented on the relationship between size and 
expenditure on originated content as well as the importance of public subsidy. Below, I will 
establish the relative importance of size using a multivariate [factorial] general linear model 
(GLM) forming a four-field matrix of categorised state size on TV market volume and 
expenditure on originated content to investigate research question C on varieties of size, i.e. the 
relative influence of size being dependent on the market leverage. 
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4.5 Research question C: Is there a relative influence of size (varieties of 
size) on TV market volume and production of original domestic content? 
4.5.1 Introduction 
So far I have been able to substantiate the assumed relationships between the continuous size 
variables and TV market volume, as well as the impact on expenditure for originated content. 
Analysis of smaller and larger markets reveals differences in levels of available revenue for the 
TV market, and how that affects the provision of domestic content. Market intervention through 
public subsidy for originated content appears to be quite important, even crucial, for determining 
the level of such provision in individual markets in all countries in Europe, and especially 
important for smaller market countries. 
The public broadcasters in this perspective appear to have a more significant role than originally 
expected in the markets in securing domestic content in Europe, and function as a buffer for 
different modes of market failure but especially so in the small markets. The arguments on 
dependency and vulnerability appear to have merit in the sense that there is a difference, and that 
small markets are worse off than their larger counterparts, and thus by default under classic 
assumptions of dependency will import more programming than they are able to export.  
My argument is that the influence of size is a consequence of small and large markets being 
subject to similar market and content good characteristics, which in effect due to differences in 
size leads to different market conditions. My main point hinges on the factor of market leverage. 
This is relevant due to industry conditions where high fixed costs combine with a recurring need 
for fresh investment in new domestic production. This is where scarcity in the absolute volume 
of available talent comes into play, because that is a crucial input for capacity to train creative 
personnel. Where there is a smaller talent pool and also a small financial base there are two 
scarcities, making the domestic market less commercially viable due to lack of incentives. Both 
aspects of market leverage constitute the critical mass needed to justify joint investments by 
reducing risk on the one hand and increasing commercial incentive on the other. 
To summarise, the assumed relationships between the continuous size variables and TV market 
volume as well as level of expenditure on originations appear substantiated, i.e. small and large 
markets have differences both in their levels of available revenue and in the provision of 
originations, based on the gradual increase and decrease of overall volume and scale.  
What remains is what can be defined as varieties of size based on categorised size variables of 
small and large populations and small and large economies, i.e. interaction between the 
categorical population definition (POPCAT) and the categorical economy definition (ECOCAT). 
134 
 
Large population markets are defined those as having a population of 20 million or above, while 
large economy markets have a PPP GDP per capita equal to or above the European average 
figure of $24,216.80 in 2007 as per the definition in chapter 1.2.3, Defining size. 
The challenges posed by the media market and media content good characteristics are not equal 
between markets. While I argue that the relative characteristics are similar, this does not 
necessitate that the influence of size is equal because of the varying potential of leverage; rather 
than that, it is exactly different between markets, depending on the scale of size as well as the 
level of political intervention in the form of regulatory measures. While the characteristics are 
similar, the leverage and thus advantages and disadvantages of having a larger or smaller size of 
population or economy are different. 
To substantiate my argument, I will apply a multivariate general linear model (GLM) analysis 
using the categorised size variables (economy and population) to study the relationship, instead 
of size as a continuous variable as above. This will be done on the dependent variables of 
television market volume and expenditure on originated content. 
First I shall present the suggested hypothesis based on the initial argument and the results of the 
analysis in chapter 4.3, Research question A: How does size influence the availability of revenue 
in television markets (TV market volume)?, and 4.4., Research question B: How does size 
influence the level of original domestic content in television markets. After this the descriptive 
variable statistics will be presented, then the multivariate tests on the suggested relationship are 
conducted; this is followed by the test-between-subjects on the relationship between the size 
variables of population and economy in relation to TV market volume and expenditure on 
originated content. Finally, I conclude with the statistics and the overall model. This way, I will 
attempt to substantiate the relative influence of size using the leverage argument. 
 
4.5.2 Categorised state size leverage argument 
The data indicates that the larger a market is on a combination of size of population and 
economy, the easier it is to provide domestic content (due to scale economics). Being a small 
eastern market defined with a small population and a transition economy can be detrimental 
(caused by a combination of insufficient finance and lack of political interest). On the other 
hand, a small northern market with a small population but an established economy has an 
increased potential for providing new content (due to level of investment based on financial 
capability and political interest). The east/west difference can be considered as related to this 
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difference and will be illustrated below, where the relative challenge from a theoretical 
perspective is presented.  
In principle, I deal with conditions where size of economy (small, large) and population (small, 
large) can range continuously. However, for simplification purposes, I operate with the four 
overall types to clarify my point. My main concern is leverage, which is here understood as the 
collective funding potential where the relative cost can be spread among a larger number of 
individuals or households in a form of joint funding; this is relevant as we have conditions of 
high fixed cost combined with recurring investment into new domestic production with 
conditions of increasing returns to scale and cost of production being independent of 
consumption.  The is where the second condition of scarcities enters the picture: the small 
markets for instance have less talent-mass to train creative personnel from and less available 
revenue, which makes the market less commercially viable due to a lack of incentives for 
domestic production. Large economy markets being more commercially viable in terms of 
potential revenue also have a higher potential for public subsidy if there is a political interest. 
Both leverages can constitute different critical masses for potential joint-funding as well as 
potential commercial incentive. 
I operate with four different overall varieties of size, each of which has different leverages in 
terms of size, using those I should be able to conceptualise the challenges posed by size based on 
similarity and difference in the markets.  
• Type 1 represents small population and small economy market conditions (-,-): This is 
the market with the lowest potential leverage, where the population club is relatively 
small in terms of the potential for spreading the relative cost, and with the small economy 
potential of expanding the market to a higher level using public subsidy; combined, this 
equates to a smaller market volume and reduced level of originated content.  
• Type 2 represents small population with large economy market conditions (-,+): These 
markets have the same small club to collectively fund the originated content, but the 
difference here is that the market can be both more commercially attractive and that 
political intervention through for instance public subsidy can be established to a higher 
level if there is political interest. 
• Type 3 represents markets with a large population, but a small economy (+,-): These 
markets have a larger club available for collective financing, and there is also more 
potential for public subsidy similar to type 2 due to the larger population.  
• Type 4 represents combined large economy and population markets (+,+): In these 
instances there are larger clubs (population) to increase the joint funding, and combined 
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with large economy conditions this makes these markets more commercially viable as 
well as enjoying increased potential for public subsidy. 
What remains to be assessed are varieties of size based on the categorisation in my typology of 
size, with a focus on the extent to which leverage is different between markets depending on the 
relative scale of sizes of population (small, large) and economy (small, large). My main point 
hinges on the factor of market leverage. This is relevant due to industry conditions where high 
fixed costs combine with a recurring need for fresh investment in new domestic production.  
This is where scarcity in the absolute volume of available talent comes into play, because that is 
a crucial input for capacity to train creative personnel. Where there is a smaller talent pool and 
also a small financial base, this amount to a double challenge: there are two scarcities, making 
the domestic market less commercially viable due to lack of incentives. Both aspects of market 
leverage constitute the critical mass needed to justify joint investments by reducing risk on the 
one hand and increasing commercial incentive on the other. 
To substantiate the model, I carried out a multivariate general linear model analysis using the 
categorised size variables to study the relationship. This was done on the dependent variables 
(TV market volume and expenditure on originated content). First the multivariate tests were 
conducted, followed by the test-between-subjects function. Finally the statistics were 
summarised to assess the overall model. 
 
4.5.3 Analysis on the evidence of the categorised state size leverage 
Here I shall apply a factorial general linear model (GLM) design analysis of the relationship of 
the categorised size variables on TV market volume as well as domestic content. This way the 
argument can be studied statistically to illustrate any differences in the relative leverage 
attributed to categorised size of population and economy in TV market volume and expenditure 
on originated content. First the descriptive statistics are presented, followed by the multivariate 
test statistics to substantiate that there are individual effects for the dependent variables. This is 
followed by between-subject tests where the strength and significance of the relationships and 
potential interaction will be studied. A short discussion of the results of the chapter close the 
analysis. 
 
  
137 
 
Table 14: Descriptive statistics for market volume and originated TV content expenditure 
in million € 
 
I have identified that size influences the market volume and level of expenditure on originated 
content. With this I establish categories of small-large interaction between categorised 
population and economy where I intend to investigate the influence of size. The descriptive 
statistics indicate an initial difference of size for both variables, where I can identify difference in 
the mean scores between small and large population and economy, but also show that there is 
difference based on the means: I have to accept that the observations in some of the single 
 
Categorised 
Population 
Categorised 
Economy Mean SD N 
TV market 
volume 
Small 
Small 760 733 7 
Large 1345 670 12 
Total 1129 733 19 
Large 
Small 1456 750 2 
Large 9866 3222 5 
Total 7463 4884 7 
Total 
Small 915 753 9 
Large 3851 4350 17 
Total 2835 3784 26 
Expenditure 
on originated 
content 
Small 
Small 87 106 7 
Large 292 167 12 
Total 216 176 19 
Large 
Small 230 148 2 
Large 2838 1431 5 
Total 2093 1729 7 
Total 
Small 119 123 9 
Large 1041 1400 17 
Total 722 1208 26 
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categories are low. But as there are no empty categories, I will proceed with the statistical tests 
of the model. 
 
I have suggested a multivariate factorial GLM design with two independent variables with two 
levels each, i.e. small and large based on categorised size as well as two dependent continuous 
variables. In this sense I operate with a two-way GLM model. As my model includes multiple 
independent variables of categorical nature, i.e. the two size variables (population and economy) 
as well as multiple continuous variables, it can be called a factorial design, where the 
independents are factors. Please note that this is not to be understood as the multivariate 
statistical analysis called actor analysis, as there are differences. 
I will test three effects in the analysis below. First I test if there is a main effect for categorised 
population (POPCAT) [small, large], categorised economy (ECOCAT) [small, large] and the 
effect for the interaction of POPCAT and ECOCAT. What this means is that I want to know if 
the independent variable is dependent on the other. This also means that I can indicate the 
hypothesis on which they are based: 
 
Table 15: Hypothesis 
Main effect of: Hypothesis  Tests 
performed at  
Type of population size There is a difference between market volume and 
expenditure on originated TV content in million € 
based on categorised population size 
α = .05 
Type of economy size There is a difference between market volume and 
expenditure on originated TV content in million € 
based on categorised economy size 
α = .05 
Interaction effect of 
population and 
economy size 
There is a difference between size in population and 
economy on TV market volume and expenditure on 
originated TV content in million € 
α = .05 
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First I shall conduct the multivariate tests to see if these are significant. I will test if there are 
increases in TV market volume and expenditure on originated content based on the two 
independent variables of size. In order to do this I will calculate a multivariate F value of Wilk’s 
(λ), Pillai's Trace, Hotelling's Trace and Roy's Largest Root. I will report the Wilk’s Lambda 
indicating the significance of the four test conditions and the partial Eta-squared. Wilk’s Lambda 
range between 0 and 1 and the lower the value, the more effect is attributed to the model.  
The reason for reporting Wilk’s Lambda is to take into account the potential of covariance 
between the measures which has to be taken into consideration when conducting a test of 
significance: it gives an exact F-statistic. I will also look at Hotelling’s Trace which will give a 
more conservative F-statistic to ensure that there is significance; this will be done in case there is 
a difference in the test statistics. Should I achieve significant multivariate tests I am able to 
conclude that the respective effects of size are significant. While this is a complex test, it can 
identify any differences usually not revealed by other categorical tests.  
I will now move on to test whether each of the effects is significant for one of the dependent 
variables. This will be done by applying four similar multivariate tests on the with-subjects 
effects to indicate if they are equally rated. The multivariate tests denote whether each of the 
effects in the models is significant for one of the dependents and used to consider the 
independents and the interaction between them. 
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Table 16: Multivariate tests of the relationship between categorized population (POPCAT), 
categorized economy (ECOCAT) and the interaction effect on TV market volume (TV MV) 
and expenditure on originated content (EOC) 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df 
Error 
df Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerxxvi 
Intercept 
Pillai's 
Trace .837 53.864
a
 2.000 21.000 .000 .837 107.728 1.000 
Wilks' 
Lambda .163 53.864
a
 2.000 21.000 .000 .837 107.728 1.000 
Hotelling's 
Trace 5.130 53.864
a
 2.000 21.000 .000 .837 107.728 1.000 
Roy's 
Largest 
Root 
5.130 53.864a 2.000 21.000 .000 .837 107.728 1.000 
POPCAT 
Pillai's 
Trace .677 22.041
a
 2.000 21.000 .000 .677 43.081 1.000 
Wilks' 
Lambda .323 22.041
a
 2.000 21.000 .000 .677 43.081 1.000 
Hotelling's 
Trace 2.099 22.041
a
 2.000 21.000 .000 .677 43.081 1.000 
Roy's 
Largest 
Root 
2.099 22.041a 2.000 21.000 .000 .677 43.081 1.000 
ECOCAT 
Pillai's 
Trace .652 19.650
a
 2.000 21.000 .000 .652 39.300 1.000 
Wilks' 
Lambda .348 19.650
a
 2.000 21.000 .000 .652 39.300 1.000 
Hotelling's 
Trace 1.871 19.650
a
 2.000 21.000 .000 .652 39.300 1.000 
Roy's 
Largest 
Root 
1.871 19.650a 2.000 21.000 .000 .652 39.300 1.000 
POPCAT 
* 
ECOCAT 
Pillai's 
Trace .590 15.111
a
 2.000 21.000 .000 .590 30.222 .997 
Wilks' 
Lambda .410 15.111
a
 2.000 21.000 .000 .590 30.222 .997 
Hotelling's 
Trace 1.439 15.111
a
 2.000 21.000 .000 .590 30.222 .997 
Roy's 
Largest 
Root 
1.439 15.111a 2.000 21.000 .000 .590 30.222 .997 
a. Exact statistic / b. Design: Intercept + Size + Size3 + Size * Size3 
 
All four tests are significant; as such I will only report Wilk’s Lambda (λ). Wilk’s Lambda (λ) is 
significant for categorised population with a λ value of .323 and its associated F and p values, 
F(2, 21) =22, p < .001, ηP2 = .677 and for categorised economy with a λ value of .348 and the 
associated values F(2, 21) =19.6, p < .001, ηP2 = .651. On all accounts I can reject the null 
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hypothesis and conclude that TV market volume and expenditure on originated content change 
with the size variables. Studying the interaction effects of categorised population*categorised 
economy I see a λ of .410 with corresponding F and p values of F(2, 21) =15.1 p < .001, ηP2 = 
.590. I can reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is interaction between the variables 
as expected by my model. 
 
I have identified effects of the dependent variables on the categorised size variables, and can 
conclude that each effect is significant for the dependent variables, and move on the 
identification of the effect, which will be done by testing the between-subjects effects.  
The tests of between-subjects effects is an analysis of variance indicating the effect within the 
individual size categories [small, large] of the independent variables. When there is 1 degree of 
freedom it means that there are two levels of size [small, large] meaning that two minus one, 
equalling 1 df for the estimation of variance for the main effect of the variables. When I claim 
that there are main effects I point out a result representing a constant difference between the 
levels of the independent variable, i.e. factor.  
For my variables, identifying main effects would mean that there is a difference statistically 
between for instance small and large population size, irrespective of economy size. As will be 
shown below, it is possible to have simultaneous main effects of the factors. More importantly, 
and the reasoning for conducting a multivariate factorial GLM, is that they allow me to scrutinise 
interaction effects between the independent variables.  
First and foremost it is important to point out that I want to investigate whether there is an 
interaction between size of population and size of economy where I also identify cross-over 
interaction between small, small; small, large; large, small and large, large conditions. The 
factorial design of the GLM is a useful analytical tool to examine the influence of variations of 
size using statistics. 
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Table 17: Tests of between-subjects effects on categorised state size 
Source Dependent 
Variable 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Partial 
Eta 
Squared
xxvii
 
Noncen
t. 
Paramet
er 
Obs. 
Power
xxviii
 
Correct
ed 
Model 
TV MV  3.078E8 3 1.026E8 44.91
1 
.000 .860xxix 134.732 1.000 
EOC 2.795E7 3 9306135
.604 
23.84
9 
.000 .765xxx 71.620 1.000 
Intercep
t 
TV MV 1.947E8 1 1.947E8 85.21
5 
.000 .795 85.215 1.000 
EOC 1.283E7 1 1.283E7 32.86
9 
.000 .599 32.789 1.000 
POPCA
T 
TV MV 9.174E7 1 9.174E7 40.16
0 
.000 .646 40.160 1.000 
EOC 7805551.
841 
1 7805551
.841 
20.00
3 
.000 .476 20.057 .990 
ECOC
AT 
TV MV 8.735E7 1 8.735E7 38.23
8 
.000 .635 38.238 1.000 
EOC 8549192.
427 
1 8549192
.427 
21.90
9 
.000 .499 21.965 .994 
POPCA
T * 
ECOC
AT 
TV MV 6.611E7 1 6.611E7 28.94
0 
.000 .568 28.940 .999 
EOC 6237039.
250 
1 6237039
.250 
15.98
4 
.001 .421 15.929 .968 
Error TV MV 5.026E7 2
2 
2284319
.195 
     
EOC 8584641.
074 
2
2 
390210.
958 
     
Total TV MV 5.669E8 2
6 
      
EOC 5.004E7 2
6 
      
Correct
ed Total 
TV MV 3.580E8 2
5 
      
EOC 3.650E7 2
5 
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This multivariate GLM model with economy size (small, large) and population size (small, 
large) as between-subjects factors identified an effect of the continuous dependent variables TV 
market volume and expenditure on originated content with the corrected model significant for 
each dependent TV market volume with F(3, 22) =44.9, p < .001, ηP2 = .860 and for expenditure 
on originated content with F(3, 22) =23.8, p < .001, ηP2 = .765. The individual size factors had 
effects for categorised population indicated effects on TV market volume with F(1, 25) =40.2, p 
< .001, ηP2 = .646 and for expenditure on originated content with F(1, 22) =20.0, p < .001, ηP2 = 
.476.  
The variable categorised economy indicated effects on TV market volume with F(1, 22) =38.2, p 
< .001, ηP2 = .635 and for expenditure on originated content with F(1, 22) =21.9 p < .001, ηP2 = 
.499. What is also revealed are main effects of the categorised size variables, which is qualified 
by the interactions between categorised population and economy on TV market volume with F(1, 
22) =28.9, p < .001, ηP2 = .568 and for expenditure on originated content with F(1, 22) =15.9, p= 
.001, ηP2 = .421.  
The results of the test of between-subjects effects show that the multivariate GLM is significant 
for both dependent variables. Furthermore, I can conclude that the effect of factors in the model 
is significant. All interactions have sufficient observed power, understood as the change of a 
study having a significant effect, i.e. ≥.80, to ascertain that the chances for type II error are 
sufficiently low for identifying non-significance by the F test. The partial Eta squared indicates 
the degree of variance in the dependents explained by the independents, meaning that the partial 
Eta-square figures (ηP2) here are a measure of effect size which for my model of size indicates a 
relative strong model fit with adjusted R squares figures respectively for TV market volume 
effect .840 and expenditure on originated content effect at .733.  
This indicates that what I have identified is an effect of categorised size variables and the 
interaction between the categorised size variables on the television market volume and the level 
of provision of originated content. 
 
4.5.6 Summarising the results 
The multivariate GLM design has been identified as statistically significant based on the 
multivariate tests and the between-subjects test. This has revealed that in statistical terms, there is 
a difference for both categorised population and economy on the dependent variables proxies for 
market volume and domestic content. Furthermore, I also identified a statistically significant 
interaction effect between the categorised size variables indicating an effect on market volume 
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and expenditure on originated TV content: this is in line with the mean figures in the descriptive 
statistics as well as the results in chapter 4.3 on market volume and chapter 4.4 concerning 
expenditure on originated TV content. 
There is a statistically significant effect in assessing the relative impact of population and 
economy. The respectively large population and economy markets exhibit higher levels of TV 
market volume as well as expenditure on originated content, while small population and 
economy markets exhibit less TV market volume and expenditure on originated content. 
Importantly for the model, there is a positive and statistically significant interaction effect 
between population and economy; the combination affects the scale of TV market volume and 
expenditure on originated content. As for the varieties of size, the results show interaction effects 
between the categorised size variables. This analysis does not specify which policy solutions are 
best for which individual markets, of course. That is a matter for political deliberation and 
decisions on the basis of social preferences. It says that all markets are not equal, and strongly 
refutes the policy preference currently in vogue that a one-size-fits-all framework is appropriate.  
The problem in general lies in the fundamental effects of population size and economy size. A 
small market faces different challenges if it must simultaneously deal with a small population 
and a small economy, e.g. Latvia. The parameters and possibilities are quite different from the 
situation in a large market where there is simultaneously a big population and a big economy, 
e.g. Germany. The degrees of freedom are better for small market countries that have bigger 
economies, like Sweden. EU policy makers do a grave disservice to the needs of Member States 
when they fail to properly take into account the comparative degrees of differences in difficulty 
in providing originated media content under the respective conditions.  
Of course it is understandable that policy makers would like to simplify processes and 
procedures, as these also simplify their lives and work. The higher one ascends in the policy-
making apparatus, the more complex and complicated the issues that must be tackled.  
The desire for simplification is fine to the extent that it is about ensuring fairness, but it verges 
on being simplistic when it results in policies that demonstrate insensitivity to variance in 
material conditions, and limits domestic competence to handle local matters with appropriate 
sensitivity to realities on the ground, culturally and socially, as well as economically. An 
argument that makes sense for the commercial media sector as a whole or in a particular type of 
market environment is not inherently right in all cases or under all conditions. The exercise of 
wisdom is important for the appropriate execution of the policymaker’s obligations. 
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In conclusion I argue that I have substantiated the relative influence of categorised state size, 
having identified differences in the effects of the categorised size variables as well as the 
interaction between them on the market volume and expenditure on originated content I have 
confirmed my hypotheses. I should take into account that there are differences across markets 
based on their particular characteristics related to the overall leverage conditions as well as the 
scale and scope of intervention practices in the market, which can establish difficulties if the 
policy options of the individual markets are limited by policies directed against other categorised 
state types.  
Uniform policies across media markets with the purpose of securing beneficial effects based on 
state intervention may very well lead to adverse effects because of the difference in relative 
leverage. However, more research more research into the interaction effects of the size variables 
is require to understand how this in effect influences the varieties differently.  
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4.6 Conclusion on the investigation of the first hypotheses 
4.6.1 Introduction 
While I accept as a prerequisite that size matters, I also argue that it is important to study this 
comparatively using both small and large market samples. There is more than just one type of 
size influence and it becomes challenging to identify when applying case studies alone. I take the 
point of view that we cannot base this on an argument of just size, but rather that we should 
operate with varieties of sizes. Size, measured by both population and economy, influences both 
the television market volume and the domestic television content, and while I could not include 
all possible variations of size definitions in this study, I did identify influence based on the 
independent variables of size. That size influences is also what is documented empirically using 
the relative influence of population (small, large) against economy (small, large) on the proxies 
for TV market volume and expenditure on originated content. 
The conditions of size have been overlooked, and more or less ignored as a potentially important 
factor for understanding the challenges facing the television markets, as well as being included in 
consideration of what policies could be followed to counter some of those challenges politically. 
Both small and large states face challenges when it comes to the television markets, especially so 
in terms of securing the provision of the warranted content: if the club interested in a particular 
type of content is not large enough then it will not be catered for commercially,  and only 
politically if there is a merited interest. Even though we are in a period where the business 
models are under change, this does not alter the fact that content of specific genres and types still 
needs to be produced and it also needs to be of a certain quality: this is especially so for small 
group informational and cultural programming. 
The analysis of size on TV market volume showed that there is a significant relationship between 
population and economy in relation to the scale of market volume. The analysis of size on 
expenditure on originated content showed that there is a significant statistical relationship 
between population and economy in relation to the level of expenditure on originated content. 
The multivariate GLM indicated statistically significant effects for the categorised size variables 
on both TV market volume and expenditure on originated content, but also demonstrated that the 
interaction between the categorised size variables had merit, as assumed in my constructed 
classification of size.  
That size matters for the level of market volume and originated content could thus be the short 
conclusion of this chapter; in short, the presentation above tested empirically what was expected 
on the influence of size based on the regression analysis. In this my prerequisite assumption on 
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the importance of size was verified as statistically significant, as suspected based on the case 
study research in the literature. The case presented when studying the categorised size figures is 
one of highly subsidised and regulated television markets.  
Interestingly, I could also substantiate that my varieties of size hold significance as I can identify 
differences related to the interaction of the categorised size variables. The main interest lies in 
the identified statistical significant effect in the interaction between the categorised size 
variables. This also indicates that when size is discussed, we should take into account not only 
the relative level of population, but also the level of economic development understood as per 
capita purchasing power. Also notable is the level of political intervention in the markets, which 
appears to impact the level of TV market volume and expenditure on originated content through 
public subsidy, especially in the economically strong markets. 
First I will consider what can be concluded based on the individual chapter of TV market volume 
(4.3), domestic content (4.4) and varieties of size (4.5), after which I shall position this chapter in 
relation to theory and potential implications of policy. 
 
4.6.2 TV market volume 
The analysis indicates differences due to population and economy size on the volume of the 
television market, i.e. size matters. This is not surprising: I expected that size would matter from 
the onset. The surprising element is the scale of difference in the market volume, and the extent 
to which this reveals resource scarcities in small markets and the importance of diversity in 
revenue dependency. Advertisement revenue is linked to the scale of the economy, which 
follows the logic of the market, as the marketing budgets usually form a percentage of the 
revenue; should the revenue decrease due to economic fluctuations, advertisement revenue will 
do the same, as seen in the in the years 2008-2009. Subscription revenue is on the rise, due to the 
establishment of niche content and the purchase of sports-rights for exclusive sports channels, 
premium content, adult content, on-demand functions and more. This makes for tough 
competition in the rights market for content, as having premium rights are important survival 
conditions for both advertisement-financed and subscription-financed channels. The suspected 
influence of public subsidy is a consequence of political choice, where the size of the economy 
can have influence.  
Political decision-making and path-dependency have established traditions of public subsidy 
creating public broadcasting organisations with the purpose of sustaining creative works and 
indirectly subsidising domestic production industries. Uncertainty and asymmetric information 
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have established difficulties in political decision-making for the media markets, and there is a 
fear of foreign influence on several levels such as 1) ownership, 2) imported content, 3) domestic 
news and debate.  
The cultural imperialism consideration was one of the reasons behind the Television without 
Frontiers Directive (TWF) due to the trade deficit of AV-works with the US. There is a fear that 
foreign culture could encroach on national culture: while enrichment of culture through exposure 
to other cultures can be perceived as positive, dominance by another culture is from a state 
perspective problematic. Thus the perspective of the state is to secure the media markets through 
regulatory measures in order to ensure national culture and production. On the other hand, the 
intention of securing a domestic production industry faced with conditions of increasing returns 
to scale in small markets in particular makes the competitive conditions difficult. 
It is relevant to point out that the larger the market, the more revenue is available, as I suspected 
based on scale theory; this also means that minimum efficient scale is a relevant issue for small 
state domestic broadcasting. This is especially relevant in terms of the east/west cleavage of 
financial conditions, as the Eastern European markets have higher degrees of vulnerability to 
international competition.  
A set of questions arises due to this: a) what is the effect of foreign influence on the media 
system and what influence does this have on domestic production in small markets? b) how does 
this influence production of originated content? c) does this influence the potential of the small 
production industry? These questions will not be answered here; however there is some degree of 
relevance from a policy perspective: the emphasis in Europe is based on securing a single market 
on the one hand thus emphasising competition rules, and on the other the individual Member 
States focus on securing cultural issues, such as the production industry.  
Already in the late 1980s with the establishment of the TWF directive there was a focus on 
competition with US content production, although what changed the issue is that when 
combined, the aggregate revenues of EU Member States only just manage to compete with the 
revenue available in the US. In other words there is a significant difference in scale. The US 
market have good competitive conditions for audio-visual production; in contrast we have the 
European myriad cultures and languages with some common rules and legislation focusing on 
catering to their particular domestic market but with little common strategy on content 
production besides the Media 2007 programme. 
In the green paper from the European Commission (1994) on “strategy options to strengthen the 
European programme industry in the context of the audiovisual policy of the European Union” 
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they make an argument in point 3.3.2 on how to turn diversity of the European landscape into an 
advantage:  “As for 'cultural barriers', the increased specialization of supply will, to some extent, 
enable Europe to develop a quality market where the diversity of programmes will become a 
valuable economic asset. As the public is faced with an exponential increase in services and a 
growing variety of forms and media, the differentiation of products on the market will be a vital 
factor. The trend towards more uniform programmes supplied by companies seeking to maximize 
their share of the audience will be followed by a fragmentation of the market; companies will be 
forced to develop a strategy based on differentiation with the aim of satisfying ever-smaller 
audiences that are nevertheless capable of sustaining a specific product. This opens up the 
prospect of a European audiovisual industry where diversity and quality of production are 
allowed to flourish and which at the same time is economically viable…. It is tempting to draw 
conclusions from this analysis for trends in the market as a whole in the 21st century, but we 
must bear two things in mind: concentrating on 'market niches' may be a way of safeguarding 
and developing diversity, but it is no substitute for a wider strategy aimed at building up 
attractive programme catalogues for broader segments of the European and world markets; to 
make the most of these 'market niches' we need a pan-European approach: the narrower the 
target audience, the greater the need for broad geographical coverage….” 
As the European production industry stands now, competition with the US market on fiction and 
entertainment must be considered extremely hard. Europe is not a single, nor dual, nor tertiary 
language or cultural market. The US market is multi-cultural, which generates an indirect 
advantage when establishing production, but without per se state interest in providing for all 
cultural segments. Europe in contrast consists of many different independent languages and 
cultures, each having to sustain and enhance its culture and creative works and usually with 
differences in copyright protection, leaving the state more or less responsible for securing 
sufficient revenue to ensure minimum efficient scale. The largest European markets are also the 
ones with the highest public subsidies. One might well suspect that the European content 
industry production is so dependent on public subsidies that there are no real exit strategies, nor 
that this would be applicable.  
 
4.6.3 Domestic content 
Size had an impact on the level of domestic TV content provision, as indicated by the regression 
analysis of the relationship between size and expenditure on originated content. In this sense my 
analysis showed what I expected: size matters for the level of expenditure on originated content. 
All in all, the results are largely in line with theory; the small markets appear more vulnerable, 
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but there are differences between the ability of small and large markets to provide expenditure 
for production of originated content. The main difference was in the relative per capita figures, 
where the per capita expenditure was not clear between the included markets; rather, based on 
the regression, it is what we should expect related to subsidy and political choice in combination 
with market potential of exports. The differences between the markets are significant; however, 
we need further in-depth qualitative studies of the levels of provision in the individual markets in 
order to substantiate this analysis further. 
 
An EC green book points to the following challenges for the television industry, as per point 
2.1.2 in the EC green paper (1994:7-8): “Strategy options to strengthen the European 
programme industry in the context of audiovisual policy of the European Union: 
In the television sector the explosion in programme demand has failed to boost the European 
programme industry, which remains locked into fragmented national markets. 
(i) Explosion of demand and rising production costs 
The proliferation of broadcasters in the 1980s combined with longer viewing hours produced a 
veritable explosion of programme demand. Increased receipts have not compensated for rising 
production costs or for soaring fees for rights to broadcast sports events. Programme budgets 
have been cut and broadcasters have had to make massive use of non-European material from 
programme catalogues that have already paid for themselves on other markets. 
(ii) Low rate of programme circulation within Europe 
 Moreover, as most of the new broadcasting services have been developed on a national basis, 
television production has focused on satisfying national audiences with very little by way of 
programme circulation within the Community (other than in language areas). The small number 
of co-production and co-financing ventures involving operators from more than one Member 
State is not conducive to the development of projects likely to attract European or world 
audiences. This has had an adverse effect on the production of television films in particular but 
television series, cartoons and documentaries are also affected, and these programmes are vital 
for the creation of catalogues. They are stock programmes which can be screened repeatedly. 
Catalogues of such programmes are the economic heritage of the television programme 
industry.” 
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The economies of scale and the importance of population size for collective financing become 
evident when the figures are studied. If this is put in a theoretical perspective of non-rivalry in 
consumption, the reasoning for the difference becomes evident. When we have conditions of 
rivalry in consumption, collective funding would only mean less of a particular good to be 
distributed between the payers, i.e. if all of us buy a Mars Bar and share the costs collectively, 
we only have to pay a fraction of its cost, but we also only receive a fraction of the chocolate bar.  
For the media this is different: when we share the cost of the content, there is no reduction in the 
amount of good we receive, meaning that we all receive an equal amount of the good. This also 
means that when there are fewer persons to pay for the content, the provided content will either 
be of a smaller scale or of reduced quality.  
This is the result of non-rivalry in consumption with costs of production independent of costs of 
consumption, and these are the funding challenges facing television companies. Large markets 
are in this way more able to provide higher levels of expenditure on originated content, and 
while they also represent the highest levels of public subsidisation – the UK and Germany 
especially soxxxi - this does not mean that this is the case for all included markets, such as for 
instance the large population markets of Poland and Romania. Small markets are not lost, but 
heavily dependent on having a strong economy, political intervention or export potential if they 
are to secure a certain level of provision; thus there also appears to be a strong economy 
perspective. What the figures also indicate are that there are significant differences related to the 
question of size, where there appears to be interaction between the size and population variables. 
A consideration of the importance of public revenue has to follow that logic of the market. Both 
large and small markets subsidise; while the scale is different the importance of these 
investments should not be underestimated in terms of the individual markets’ production 
environments. At the same time there should be an investigation into the degree to which the 
European production industry is dependent on public revenue and PSBs for continued survival, 
as well as the considerations which could be taken into account to strengthen a combination of 
broad European interests and the individual small state cultural interests.  
A single fit policy, except minimum requirement, for these markets when it comes to original 
domestic content does not appear to be a viable solution. There appears to be a serious difference 
between the included markets, and what becomes a challenge here for European legislation is 
instigating policies which take into account both the particularities of the individual merited 
interests of both small, small markets such as Latvia and large, large ones such as Germany. 
152 
 
There remains a challenge, where the large population and economy markets appear to have 
most of the benefits. 
 
4.6.4 Varieties of size  
I have identified a statistical significant effect, and I have found that a statistical difference for 
both the categorised population and economy exists, meaning that the respectively large 
population and economy markets can expect higher levels of TV market volume as well as 
expenditure on originated content, while the small population and economy markets can expect 
less. This is also what I expected based on the analysis in chapters 4.3 and 4.4. Importantly for 
my model, I have also identified that there is a positive and statistical significant interaction 
effect. 
As for the variations in size, it shows that there are interaction effects between the categorised 
size variables, and accordingly we should consider if and how these relative size considerations 
are expressed and could be substantiated using qualitative comparative research. With the data 
available it becomes difficult to evaluate and find potential policy solutions to individual market 
challenges. What I have done is to identify the differences based on categorised size in the 
constructed model. But this also indicates that there are differences related to size differences 
within the individual categories.  
 
The predicament indicated in my four varieties of size is that in general there are three main 
effects. First we have the influence of the population size; secondly we have the influence of the 
economy size and thirdly the interaction between the variables of size of population and 
economy based on categorised state size.  
This means that my initial idea of relative leverage holds merit. Small states based on categorised 
size face different challenges when they have a small population and a small economy, exactly 
because the market and content good characteristics are similar. This means that because of 
different leverage, the challenges facing different state types are dissimilar, indicating that a type 
1 like Lithuania (-,-) having a small economy and small population is in a sense worse off than 
for instance a type 2 such as Norway (-,+). The Polish challenge (+, -) as a type 3 with large a 
population but small economy is different when contrasted with the challenges facing type 4 
Germany (+,+) with both a large economy and large population. However, type 2 and type 3 still 
have more options than a type 1, though less than a type 4.  
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Generally, the differences between small and large states based on categorised state size are 
apparent when studying the aggregated figures, where the relative figures were more diverse, 
especially in the case of public subsidy. The strongest difference lies between type 1 (small, 
small) and type 4 (large, large) conditions, but this also means that if type 1 is put under 
regulatory conditions as though it were a type 4, unintended adverse effects could possibly be 
seen in the market.  
Based on this model of categorised state size substantiated using a multivariate factorial GLM 
design, I argue that the difference between the four varieties has policy implications, where the 
different types require different policy options to circumvent the market and content good 
characteristics in order to achieve both market efficiency and circumvent the scarcity concerns 
and to find ways of establishing incentive structures to make it viable for commercial companies 
to enter the market to make a profit, and in some degree to act in accordance with the state-
merited interests on behalf of the public. In a similar vein, I argue that the role of PSBs remains 
similar as they counter market failures, but also that their role of balancing in the market will be 
different depending on political choice in combination with the level of public–private 
competition. 
Policy-makers need to take into account the difficulty of providing the media content good in 
small markets under their particular conditions, and also that the good can be used strategically 
to focus on core national domestic production and purchase or cooperate with other markets or 
broadcasters in securing provision of services at a higher level, which is not viable in the 
individual market.  
An example is the cooperation between the five Scandinavian PSBs in the Nordic region called 
NORDVISION, focused on co-production, programme-exchange and the sharing of experience 
and expertise to find a way round some of the small-market scarcity challenges. A similar 
potential lies in the non-profit Commonwealth Broadcasting Association (CBA) International 
Programme Bank where programmes are offered to the members free of charge. The purpose of 
the bank is the exchange and access to high quality programming for the members with the aim 
of improving available quality broadcasting content. The programme bank works by members 
submitting programmes and allowing other members to obtain this content for use in their 
domestic market. While this does not generate new content, like the Nordic cooperation in 
Nordvision, the CBA Programme Bank can enable developing markets to focus their production 
on core areas, while having access to an increasing supply of alternative programming. There are 
a variety of policy options available to circumvent the challenges posed by size, as indicated by 
these two examples. I will illustrate the model below using a matrix scatter. 
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Table 18: Matrix scatter of categorized population (POPCAT) and categorized economy 
(ECOCAT) on the dependent variables TV market volume (TV MV) and expenditure on 
originated content (EOC) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This matrix shows where the individual markets are placed relative to their TV market volume 
and expenditure on originated content levels based on categorised state size. As we can see, the 
individual markets are not placed in exactly the same spot, as different markets have different 
scale. What I can use this for is to indicate that my proposed model of size with four different 
combinations shows me the aggregated and statistical effect of the relationships, and also that 
within each square there could in principle be four new varieties of size. What we also need is to 
understand is how this in effect impacts the individual markets, but this requires new in-depth 
case-research. 
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In general, the multivariate factorial GLM design analysis indicates that my assumptions of 
economy of scale based on the collective funding function under the conditions of non-rivalry 
have merit in terms of the small market challenges as compared to their large counterparts. There 
appear to be positive signs for allocation challenges in these markets, and as the markets across 
size have similar characteristics, it becomes less interesting commercially to invest directly in the 
production environment because of the lack of incentives. 
 
4.6.5 Theoretical considerations and implications for policy 
The empirical material supports the notion that size is an important factor for understanding the 
similarities and differences in the potential of small and large states for countering the general 
market challenges rooted in the TV market and content good characteristics. The argument 
presented on the relative market leverage being dependent on size of population and economy 
where there is both interaction and cross-over effects appears to have merit. These conditions 
influence the frame of competition by placing restraints on the rules of the game, in the sense of 
scarcities and incentives. The relative leverage of the state thus represents their potential of 
countering market failure based on size of population and economy. While the four variety of 
size model represents my perspective on the influence of size documented using comparative 
methodology, it can also be used to question whether the EU policy on the media takes size into 
consideration by allowing sufficient room for individual state policy.  
I have illustrated that the US market volume is larger than the combined EU market in terms of 
available revenue; at the same time the originated production in Europe is more divided and 
there are several barriers to entry to efficiency in the small markets, while competing with 
content produced in North America, the UK or Germany. The influences of public funding in 
Europe secure originated production in the markets with a perceived political interest, or for 
various historical and/or cultural reasons.  
In this way the small markets are able to bypass some of the challenges, such as lack of critical 
mass, through collective funding. For the large markets, public subsidy helps sustain their 
production industries and increases the competitiveness of their markets. The big five markets 
represent around 75% of the origination expenditure (Oliver & Ohlbaum, 2009). Public funding 
is currently the key to securing original production in Europe, and there is no real exit strategy in 
the face of international competition.  
This indicates how size impacts, by showing the benefits of being large both in population and 
economy; in the same line of reasoning it presents the challenges of small, small categorised 
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states where scarcity concerns are more severe. In order to rectify the market failure caused by 
market and content characteristics, political intervention appears important for securing domestic 
content provision, but it is more important for some types of states than others.  
The analysis indicates that small market producers will have a hard time reaching efficient scale; 
this can lead to increased pressure on public broadcasters with the argument that they have to 
purchase their domestic content from domestic producers instead of producing it themselves. 
While this can be cost-efficient, it might also establish conditions where the public broadcasters 
in small markets decide which companies survive, because the producers can indirectly end up 
becoming dependent on public revenue. There are several variations in such arguments, but the 
conditions applying to the broadcast media markets also apply to the producers.  
The state’s interests in regard to the commercially-oriented production companies therefore have 
to be taken into consideration when intervening, as does the degree to which the public 
broadcasters function as indirect industry subsidisation. Small market producers can also be 
purchased by foreign production companies seeking expanding markets before the domestic 
market reaches maturation; while this actually might be a benefit for the market, it can also 
question what interests we support with indirect public revenue.  
The point here is that relatively high level market concentration will appear under all conditions 
as the revenue is limited unless the states either force broadcasters (public or private) to purchase 
production from independent producers or they make funds available for production. While it is 
relatively easy to set-up a production company, it requires ideas as well as getting them produced 
to reach some kind of efficient scale. 
Television media companies also have high levels of efficient scale, and if they are dependent on 
a single market, this can pose a serious challenge, especially if they are also dependent on a 
single type of revenue. Large or multiple market companies are able to reap the benefits of scale 
economies which can help secure the provision of particular services in the general interest, such 
as news and debate, but there will remain areas and interests where there is no economically 
viable incentive to establish provision under the media market and content good characteristics. 
This also provides some explanation for state intervention through regulatory measures to ensure 
the provision of domestic media content, as is the case in most European markets using public 
service media with a focus on domestic media content and/or funds for domestic content.  In 
short, companies can either adapt to the conditions in their particular markets, small or large, or 
they can give up.  
157 
 
This is also where economies of scale become important. When there are conditions of cross-
ownership, the multinational corporations can play the bundling game of rights utilising 
economies of scale, by acquiring for instance the rights to all areas where they have interests. 
While this poses a challenge for companies relying on domestic markets, it also presents the 
benefits of scale. In principle, this also means that such ownership can be beneficial for the 
domestic market insofar as this allows for reduced acquisition prices and increases investments 
in original domestic programming. This is also a potential benefit of the EU legislation under the 
right conditions, but could also be considered a double-edged sword depending on the actual 
strategy of the multinational corporations in relation to the individual markets; differences in the 
strategies in Lithuania and Denmark indicate that this might have some merit.  
The EU policy has helped establish conditions in Europe where it has become feasible to spread 
costs securely across borders to utilise the economies of scale and scope, but this does not mean 
that the interests of large media corporations and states are similar. Instead we have what has 
been identified before as conditions in which cultural concerns stand against commercial 
concerns and where the large media corporations, depending on strategy, can either be 
favourable or detrimental, but this requires further research with that particular focus. 
When studying the dependency hypothesis, we should take into consideration the economic risk 
of TV as a business, especially content production, which combined with increasing audience 
fragmentation establishes dependence of public broadcasters on foreign imports.  European 
broadcasters are dependent on foreign programming imports and/or co-production of 
programming, especially from North America and the UK, but also Germany.  It can be argued 
that this is a question of scarcity where resources available for production of programming in 
combination with the willingness to risk resources play a role.  
In Europe the main producers of domestic television programming are the public broadcasters, 
and as they are supposed to provide the whole palette of genres, but especially news and factual 
programmes; there are limits to their potential of investment as the competition becomes stronger 
in the individual markets. In Europe dependencies of this type are not only on North America, 
but also the UK. But what we in effect are looking at is a dependence on other markets’ 
production of domestic content which can be considered of interest in a commercial or civil 
society perspective in a particular market setting.  
An example is the dependency of the Greenland public broadcaster on Danish publicly-owned 
broadcasters DR and TV2/DK programming, while another is the overall dependency on US and 
to some degree UK content in Europe; this is especially the case for commercial broadcasters 
158 
 
dependent on importing successful programmes to secure the business. Keep in mind that this is 
not per definition a problem, but rather a natural exchange of content commodities. 
Scarcity conditions continue to rule the television markets, and what remain important are the 
established incentive structures for commercial activity in combination with scale and scope of 
political intervention. Consumers can be accustomed to domestic programming by public 
broadcasters, which can force domestic commercial companies to adjust their programming 
strategies to this. This is indicated by the markets with duo-broadcasters in a dual system, where 
the averages of volume and investment in originated content are higher than for most other 
market structures.  
Policy can, in other words, make a difference, and this is especially evident in the UK, Germany, 
Denmark and the rest of the Nordic markets. In this sense what becomes important is what is 
considered to be meritorious, and what push-pull factors there are in the individual markets to 
secure consumer and state interests versus the company focus on profitability. In this respect 
what are important are the media companies’ incentives for acting in accordance with state 
interest vis–à-vis the required level of political intervention in the market. Using public 
broadcasters is in this sense cost-efficient, especially if they are able to establish framework 
conditions for competition, i.e. setting the rules of the game in such a way that they supplement 
the intended state policies. This can be defined as having a balance function, where the PSBs 
become standard setters in the markets, and where existing and new entrants either have to focus 
on niches or follow the rules of the game. The UK and the Nordic markets are core examples. 
However, this also poses a challenge in the contemporary environment of audience 
fragmentation. The increases in fragmentation of audience based on niche-channels in effect 
undermine the core of the television business model reliant on advertisement; this in combination 
with the increased focus on the cable television model with calls against bundling of channels to 
further free choice can threaten the development of new content as the dependency on such 
revenue is increasing [but continues to be market dependent].  
Public subsidy remains what appears to be an easy solution to secure domestic content, but in 
practice it will be under continued pressure as it can easily be challenged as being detrimental to 
private competition as well as raising questions of scale and scope of their activities: this is 
where the remit and political acceptance of the state and civil society interest stand against 
commercial interests.  
What I have identified is also a beneficial effect of PSBs, in the sense of the effect of their level 
of public subsidy. But what is also apparent is that there are differences in the roles which PSBs 
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can hold in the individual markets, besides securing some minimum rules of the game in some 
cases and placing higher standards for competition in others. This is based on the logic that the 
more revenue is available, the stronger these organisations are as competitors in the individual 
markets, as their focus is not [in general] on profit, but in fulfilling their purpose of existence. 
There are concerns of policy as a consequence, as what becomes important is how European 
legislation allows the individual markets to take into account what they consider of interest in 
response to their particular historical and cultural conditions using political intervention in 
relation to their relative leverage. 
 By applying comparative methodology, I have analysed the relationship of size on a proxy for 
the TV market volume in combination with a proxy for production of original domestic content. I 
have done this to establish a more detailed and comprehensive understanding of the influence of 
size. What I have found is that size does indeed matter, but also that the variety of size matters 
even more for the way in which we can perceive its influence in terms of the leverage argument 
under the conditions of having similar market and content characteristics across markets.  
This makes me question whether the way we take size into account in current European policy, 
while having some benefits in some instances, actually has adverse effects in others with 
detrimental consequences for available policy options. The focus on an all-encompassing market 
is indeed beneficial from a commercial perspective as this allows utilisation of economies of 
scale and scope across markets with similar requirements, but this also means that the markets 
with the strongest commercial players are those with first mover advantages, and this can 
threaten the development potential of domestic players.  
What must be conceptualised is that, based on size, markets are different in a way that goes 
beyond the approach applied in, for instance, the Communication on Broadcasting. There also 
has to be an understanding that the media industry contains elements of importance based on 
cultural and historical perspectives that contrast with the interests of the commercial media. 
When taking into account the four varieties of size model, I have presented a frame in which to 
show these similarities and differences based on categorised state size. There are of course other 
concerns, but what I have presented is a way of perceiving how size in effect influences 
differently and how these results can be interpreted. 
What this suggests is that we should perceive the individual markets relative to their particular 
challenges in combination with the level of political interest as expressed by public subsidy and 
regulatory measures, as well as their historical and cultural traditions. However, the benefit of 
legislation such as the TWF and now the AVMS directive is that it has helped to establish the 
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European markets as a single whole, which has benefitted the development of companies able to 
utilise the economies of scale required to function efficiently. However, this has also challenged 
particular market types with a level of competition where barriers of entry cannot be effectively 
erected.   
This does not mean that European legislation does not allow the perceived interests of a state in 
particular markets to be taken into consideration, as this is possible by the articles of the Treaty 
which allow state aid on the basis of services in the general economic interest and cultural 
considerations, such as for promoting cultural diversity. Taking this into consideration, the EU 
policies on this have some merit and some de-merits in terms of securing a whole-market 
perspective. 
I am not directly critical of EU policy on the media; rather, I perceive that there are both 
beneficial and adverse effects as seen from a state perspective. My concern is that the policy as it 
is put into effect is directed to the benefit of large states and large market commercial companies, 
which could be detrimental for the small state policy options as proposed and indicated by my 
model based on categorised state size. Companies entering and utilising large market scale 
benefits are reaping the benefits of these policies, while small states face the challenges; this is 
especially true for the public broadcasters which have been given the purpose of correcting 
market failure. However, as comprehensive studies into the effects of these policies in the 
different types of categorised states have yet to be conducted, it is too early to understand the 
effects. In short, we need more research on these first steps to ascertain the similarities and 
differences between the four varieties of size suggested. 
Market and content good characteristics cause imperfect conditions of competition and limit 
investment in original production as a result of uncertainty of profitability, especially in small 
markets. Political intervention in the television market appears to be an important remedy for 
securing production, but different conditions warrant different policy strategies. There is no 
single policy fit for all when it comes to the media, as it appears to be dependent on the 
individual market leverage combined with the political interest. Both media market volume and 
expenditure on originated content are related to population size and PPP GDP per capita as scale 
variables, as well as population and PPP GDP per capita for categorised size. The level of 
provided originated media content is dependent on the relative leverage of the markets in 
combination with the level of public subsidy and regulatory measures in the market.  
It is possible to argue that the state intervenes in order to off-set or limit the degrees of failure by 
subsidising originated production of media content. This does not remove market failure, but it 
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makes the states more able to secure the wanted services. For small markets this becomes 
challenging, as there are limits to the market and thus failure on several accounts, with the 
primary one being structural as there is a limit of the number of companies able to reach efficient 
scale as a result of the conditions of non-rivalry, increasing returns to scale under the cost of 
production being independent of consumption.  
While the set of common challenges based on market and content good characteristics affect 
large and small markets similarly, they have different leverage. What I have provided is another 
way to perceive size which takes into account that there is more than one type of size, and with 
my varieties of the concept I hope to have established a first step in an increased understanding 
of its potential influence and how this can help further qualitative studies into the perceived 
influence of size and how the different types of markets deal with their particular characteristics. 
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Chapter 5. The influence of size on market competition  
5.1 Introduction 
Globalisation and increased commercialisation within television can threaten and weaken 
national culture and history (Herman & McChesney, 1997; Aalberg, Aelst & Curran, 2010). 
Consequences of increased audience fragmentation are the deterioration in the shared 
experiences and sense of society (Graham & Davies, 1997) which is for instance seen in the 
decrease in the number of programmes with more than one  million viewers in Denmark (DR, 
2009). Such a development risks undermining a sense of common purpose and the public 
discourse needed for a functional democracy and the establishment of a common frame of 
reference (Dries & Woldt, 1996).  
High levels of media concentration can damage the common knowledge in society as this is not 
per se the focus of commercial media; on the other hand very high levels of fragmentation (low 
level of concentration) can result in similar consequences. PSBs can counterweight 
monopolisation and widen the choice of programming and thus have a positive influence on the 
quality and behaviour of the system of broadcasting as a whole (Graham & Davies, 1997).  
Current EU regulation on television based on the analysis in chapter 4, might very well benefit 
large companies utilising economies of scale and scope, but at the same time risk harming 
diversity and benefitting convergence in television markets. 
Therefore it remains important to take size into account, as not all markets are able to sustain a 
strong domestic TV media environment with high levels of original domestic production when 
competition is between domestic and internationally owned companies.  
This is because a domestic company might be large domestically but measured against the 
economic strength of the international company it can very well be minuscule. Public companies 
are no exception to this, and even their function might very well be under pressure when 
competing in an increasingly international environment with large international companies 
utilising economies of scale.  
 
My second hypothesis is that: Size influences the competitive conditions in television markets. 
This is a consequence of imperfect competition due to the characteristics of media markets and 
media content in combination with differences in critical mass (scarcity). Consequently the 
larger a market is, the better conditions there are for private commercial media, as the larger 
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markets can sustain a higher number of companies, which should show in lower degrees of 
market concentration - if not at the overall level, then as the number of companies increases. 
 
This will be analysed by studying market competition from an overall perspective using public 
and private competition, penetration of foreign television channels, market concentration and 
foreign ownership. Furthermore, as a consequence of arguing that state intervention 
circumvents traditional economic logic by limiting commercial conduct, i.e. for instance the 
barriers to entry, this also has to be taken into account in the analyses. However, it remains 
certain that the basis conditions due to scarcity and thus minimum efficient scale would create a 
drive towards higher levels of concentration in smaller markets to ensure sufficient commercial 
funding: but without taking state intervention into consideration a vital element in understanding 
the influence of size would be lacking. 
In this analysis two related perspectives on market competition are studied to identify the 
influence of size. 
1. First I shall document the level of competition between public and private companies in 
the individual markets, as well as demonstrating the difference between domestic and 
foreign television channels market share. The influence of size on these four indicators 
will be investigated using multiple regression analysis in combination with statistics for 
the individual markets in the sample.  
The purpose is to illustrate the relative difference between public and private media strength, as 
well as to examine the difference between domestic and foreign television in small and large 
markets. Based on the analyses in chapter 4, I suspect that the commercial companies are 
stronger – measured by share - in the larger markets. Furthermore the analyses will allow me to 
investigate the influence of language for small markets with same-language large neighbours 
using these market shares divided into domestic and foreign based on the country of origin 
principle. 
2. Secondly, I will investigate if size influences market concentration - measured both by 
HHI and CR - as one could suspect based on the presentation in chapter 1, Introduction, 
and chapter 2, Media market characteristics. Note that it is taken into account that market 
concentration is a theoretically defined function of the number of companies and their 
relative strength, but also that state intervention has to be taken into account, meaning 
that regulatory measures and PSBs set the rules of the game for commercial broadcasters.  
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I will investigate this by using the defined market concentration measurements and using 
multiple regression analysis on the relationships as well as by presenting the statistics for the 
individual markets. Furthermore, I will use the market concentration measurements 
comparatively to establish the ownership strength in terms of market share of audience in the 
individual market in order to draw up an overview table of the strongest media companies in the 
sample.  
The purpose is to study the influence of size on the TV market concentration levels, and to show 
that while size matters, market concentration is also a function of a combination of factors 
including regulatory measures taken by the state. TV markets based on economic theory tend to 
be concentrated, either moderately or highly; this can be the case for both small and large 
markets as indicated by the literature. Here I will also investigate the influence of multinational 
corporations and their different strengths in the individual markets. 
 
Combined, I will use these empirical studies with the theoretical insight from the literature to 
establish the influence of size as well as the role of political intervention and public media in 
most European TV markets. 
The analysis begins with some follow-up considerations on market concentration and ownership 
in chapter 5.2, Ownership and market concentration. The discussion includes a theoretical 
introduction to market structure with focus on market concentration, in combination with results 
from empirical studies on competition and ownership. This is followed by chapter 5.3, How does 
size influence the conditions of competition in television markets?. which focuses on the 
influence of size on the conditions of competition between public and private TV companies, as 
well as domestic and foreign television channels, including a discussion on language based on 
small markets with same-language larger neighbours. That is followed by an investigation of the 
influence of size on market concentration and ownership in chapter 5.4, How does size influence 
the level of concentration in television markets. The analysis concludes with a discussion of the 
influence of size on the competitive conditions in the market and market concentration, which is 
followed by an overall conclusion of the analyses. 
  
165 
 
5.2 Ownership and market concentration 
5.2.1 Introduction 
I will make the case that the scale and scope of intervention alters the rules of the game in 
the European television markets, especially in the face of the scarcity conditions 
substantiated in the analysis of the first hypothesis. What, based on theory, I would suspect 
to be a consequence of size, therefore also depends on the degree of state intervention. My 
point is that the media markets, especially heavily regulated TV markets, should not be 
analysed independently of politics, as market (economics) and politics are interdependent. 
This is also what was evident in the analysis in chapter 4.3 where public subsidy in some 
markets accounted for quite high percentages of the market volume. 
There are several elements of interest when it comes to media competition (including market 
concentration and ownership), ranging from the concern over media pluralism to securing 
production of domestic content. The state emphasises its concerns by a merited interest in 
securing a national production environment as well as original domestic production on the one 
hand, but on the other there is also a focus on ensuring a level playing field between public and 
private media companies in order to protect fair competition, i.e. a level playing field where all 
companies have equal chances of success. This results in a dual-sided policy focus where market 
and state interests clash. This is because commercial actors do not per se have an interest in 
securing domestic production unless there is an incentive to do so, such as potential increases in 
profits, while the state has an interest (paternalistic or otherwise) in taking merited public interest 
into account, for instance news production. 
The argument is that market intervention is based on regulating state-merited interest as 
crystallised in legislation concerning for instance PSBs, subsidies, content requirements, 
advertisement limitations and more. Size matters; however, even small states are able to regulate 
in a way which in effect sets the rules of the game, thus circumventing the economic logic, 
which establishes a theoretical drive towards high concentration in smaller markets. The reverse 
of this would be large states with higher concentration due to regulation, which can also be a 
condition of market intervention based on public interest. However, in some cases the national 
manoeuvrability has been limited because of international legislation –in Europe especially 
because of EU legislation.  
Market structure will be discussed below first from a theoretical perspective (chapter 5.2.2), then 
based on the challenges of competition and market concentration (chapter 5.2.3), and finally 
what this means for television markets (chapter 5.2.4). 
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5.2.2 Market structure from a theoretical perspective 
Market concentration is an often discussed concern when it comes to the media, yet little 
comparative material has been made available to study either the level of concentration, or the 
tangled ownership of media corporations and channels around the globe.  
Market structures are used to compare the relative conditions of a particular market as compared 
to ideal models of for instance perfect competition or oligopoly. While television and other 
media markets tend to be concentrated, there are also related challenges, such as high barriers to 
entry, economies of scale, increasing returns to scale and more. While these conditions have 
some similarities to, for instance, pharmaceutical markets, they differ insofar as their distribution 
and protection of rights are concerned. I will attempt to establish the level of concentration in the 
markets and the type of structures this relates. 
Historically, market structure has been studied for a long period of time; perfect competition by 
Jevons (1871), Edgeworth (1881), Clark (1899) and Knight (1921) and monopoly by Marshall 
(1890) and Straffa (1926). The features of imperfect competition in monopolistic markets were 
emphasised by Chamberlin (1933), Robinson (1933), Sweezy (1939) as well as Dixit & Stiglitz 
(1977); for oligopoly conditions see Cournot (1938), Bertrand (1883) and Chamberlin (1933). 
While these are mainly some of the first authors with original work, several remain relevant 
today with conceptualisation of, for instance, first mover advantage by Cournot, or the duopoly 
conditions of the leader-follower game proposed by Van Stackelberg (1934). 
Market structure is usually defined with the help of four ideal models used to construct 
predictions of market and producer behaviour. It is likely to change over time in accordance with 
company, political or similar strategic action. As such, all analyses are time-dependent, but 
because of that it is also a useful tool with which to study the media market (Bain, 1968; Varian, 
2003; Albarran, 1996).  
In general, the elements of market structure comprise the number and size distributions of 
companies, product-type, entry and exit barriers, information flows and price control. Market 
structure can be perceived as being on a continuum of competitiveness between the two outer 
points of perfect competition and monopoly (Hoskins, 2004). What is of interest for the 
broadcast media is primarily the condition of oligopoly.   
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Table 19: Market structure 
 
Market structure is an expression of the organisational market characteristics which appear to 
have a strategic influence on market price and competition. In this chapter, some of the 
conditions which can influence the overall perception of market structures will be introduced. 
There are divided into 1) Market concentration, 2) Degree of product differentiationxxxvi, 3) 
Market barriersxxxvii and 4) Cost-structuresxxxviii. The main point discussed here is the concept of 
market concentration. 
Depending on how these variables interact, there will be different types of market competition 
and thus market structures. For the broadcast media in particular, this means conditions 
characterised by a tendency towards market concentration, as a consequence of market failure. 
The market structures are ideal types, but the trend is towards oligopoly due to regulatory 
measures as well as market and media commodity characteristics.  
When taking the media into account, the main points in relation to market structure are that 
concentration in television markets, especially small ones, should be evident based on theory 
following the conditions of high fixed costs, economies of scale and scope, the cost of 
production being independent of consumption and dual market situations. Measuring 
concentration is not sufficient to understand the market structure, nor the influence of size, but it 
 Perfect 
competitionxxxii 
Monopolistic 
competitionxxxiii 
Oligopolyxxxiv Monopolyxxxv 
Number of 
producers 
Many Many Few One 
Product 
type 
Homogeneous Heterogeneous Homogeneous/ 
Heterogeneous 
Homogeneous/ 
Heterogeneous 
Market 
barriers 
None Few Many Total 
Information Perfect Perfect/imperfect Perfect/imperfect Perfect/imperfect 
Industry 
examples 
Stock market, 
commodity 
markets for 
primary goods 
Furniture, textiles, 
restaurants 
Carproduction, 
pharmaceuticals, 
broadcasting 
Electricity 
production, 
Source: Based on Varian (2003); Albarran (1996) 
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will indicate the difference between small and large markets and establish an overall idea of the 
market structures in the included sample markets. 
 
5.2.3 The challenges of competition and market concentration 
Media ownership and thus market concentration has been viewed as a problematic issue in most 
democratic societies due to the risks it entails – this has for instance led to regulation in several 
markets to limit ownership. Traditionally, television has had very high barriers to entry which 
limited the potential competition from new entrants in the market, which continues to involve 
large investments in infrastructure and a licence to operate. From an economic perspective, it 
leads to reduced competition, which due to the natural monopoly characteristic of the airwaves 
has been a general problem (Doyle, 2002), although one which has been reduced through 
technology such as DTH, Cable, IPTV and DTT (Hoskins et al., 2004). 
In consequence, in theory there could be a higher concentration of media ownership in small 
markets, due to the challenge of achieving efficient scale. It can also lead to diversity problems, 
if the concentration results in reduced opportunity for different opinions, especially in the case of 
minority groups. A general fear also centres on the possibility of controlling the media output, 
especially the news, generating a potentially one-sided public debate. On the other hand, if not 
perceived on the national level but on the global, it can be argued that it enables increased 
utilisation of economies of scale (thus reducing costs), as well as increasing competition 
nationally against the global conglomerates (Doyle, 2002).  
The trend of deregulation in the EU in particular has led to a higher focus on the potential 
problems of increased concentration. Below I will discuss the potential beneficial and adverse 
effects of concentration, and thus also of competition.  
Technology and regulation like the TWF (1989, 1997) and AVMS (2007, 2010) directive in the 
EU to some degree limited regulatory barriers to entry. The individual television markets in 
Europe consequently faced growing competition as the number of channels competing for the 
same audience increased. This was primarily driven by increasing access to subscription services 
and pay-television through DTT, IPTV, DTH or cable. The existence of strong public 
broadcasters can also be perceived as a market barrier, making a potential new entrant question 
whether their company can reach an efficient scale in that market, if they are mass-audience 
financed. 
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There are two primary concerns limiting competition in television media markets: media content 
characteristics and high barriers to entry which deter new entrants, both of which establish a 
drive towards concentration. While what has happened in the EU is a massive fragmentation of 
audience, this is not the same as to claim that there has been a massive increase in the number of 
new entrants in terms of companies. Rather, what it usually means is that there has been an 
increase in channels from already existing companies carrying international subtitled or 
synchronised content. However, it could also be international channels which utilise economies 
of scale by entering a new market with almost the same content as in the others, with the main 
difference being that the material has been dubbed or synchronised into the native language.  
Barriers of entry do not per se limit or decrease welfare or consumer surplus; in some cases it 
can be more optimal to limit the number of companies in a market through regulatory measures. 
This was done in for instance Sweden and Denmark with establishment of DTT, or with licences 
for new terrestrial television or radio channels. Other conditions in the television market relate to 
the question of rights where premium rights can help establish or limit competition for the 
audience, as is the case when there are exclusive agreements concerning the broadcast of sports, 
new movies, series and so on. 
 I will mainly focus on the structural barriers. In the case of television I can argue, based on the 
presentations in chapter 1.4, How does size matter?, and chapter 2, Media market characteristics, 
that these markets carry high levels of efficient scale, but also that this is dependent on 
regulatory measures taken by the state, as shown in the analysis in chapter 4, The influence of 
size on market volume and the provision of original domestic content. Sunk-cost is an example of 
this, where new entrants will have to invest to enter the market, but the investment is lost if the 
company withdraws, because it has little or no alternative value. The higher the investment 
required for entering the market, the bigger the deterrent for potential entrants. Examples of 
sunk-costs are advertising, investment in films, programmes and formats, computer games and 
research as well as research and development (R&D) in general.  
Television companies relying primarily on foreign productions do not carry the same risks as 
those investing in new productions. This is because companies investing in domestic content do 
not know if the ROI will be higher than the one from acquired programmes: there is no such 
guarantee. What incentive is there then to produce original domestic programmes? Formats are a 
less risky option, but while they can be domestically altered, they are based on an imported idea. 
Acquisition of programmes is the lowest risk option and should they not live up to the 
expectations, they can fairly easily be replaced.  
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In small markets, original domestic programming is not a best practice option due to the scarce 
amount of resources. Consumer interest can establish an incentive for television networks to 
secure domestic production, but at the same time, there are no guarantees of success. Therefore 
the acquisition of programmes and formats with a good track record becomes a more attractive 
option.  
The higher the degree of increasing returns to scale there is on a market, the less attractive it 
becomes for new companies, and the more attractive it is for existing companies to penetrate new 
markets to utilise economies of scale and scope. Television business requires content, and while 
much can be bought, own-production is usually more attractive to the audience. When the 
content is produced and has a general appeal there are benefits in utilising these structural market 
characteristics to secure the lowest possible average costs.  
 
Under conditions of increasing returns to scale, the minimum efficient scale of companies is 
relevant as this can establish a negative influence on the influx of new entrants. The threat to 
domestic markets thus often emanates from international channels utilising scale economies to 
their benefit; measured in terms of competition this is beneficial, but in regard to the consumer 
interest in domestic production, there are two possible outcomes: either (a) the companies in the 
market will secure shares through domestic programming and premium rights, or (b) they will 
attempt to reduce costs by acquisitioned programmes. 
The usual argument is that free competition is beneficial as it provide the most diverse supply of 
good to the best price (Blumler 1992; Garber 1993). In policy discussion there is an assumption 
that increased competition would secure diversity, even though this has been shown to be 
uncertain in studies (Wildman & Owen, 1985). It remains inconclusive, to what degree 
competition is beneficial or adverse to the diversity and quality of media products (Litman 1992; 
Wright 1994; McQuail 1992). Studies indicate that excessive (cut-throat) competition can result 
in decreased diversity (Wurff and Cuilenburg 2001, Blumler et al. 1986; Einstein 2004).  
In short, competition might actually not be beneficial for diversity under all conditions. 
Competition can be beneficial insofar as it forces broadcasters to compete on programmes and 
their quality; however, there can also be adverse effects if the development is a continuous 
downward spiral of ever-cheaper domestic productions. 
The open international and the European markets in particular are a dual-faced entity for small 
markets and are beneficial to large markets. This is caused by two separate conditions:  a) there 
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is less content production in small markets and b) the large market media companies are used to 
higher levels of competition as the large markets can sustain more companies. This can be a 
benefit to the content producers able to utilise scale economies, as indicated in other industries 
(Bernard & Jensen, 1999, 2004) where companies exporting tend to be more efficient than their 
non-exporting counterparts, meaning that exporting companies either face more competition and 
adapt or have to be more efficient to enter the export markets. This is also why an international 
focus can be important for commercial TV operators to ascertain their business success, but from 
a state perspective it can threaten the level of original domestic content, especially in smaller 
markets.  
According to Nickel (1996), based on U.K. data, competition has positive effects on 
productivity; this was supported by Disney, Haskel & Heden (2000), who in their study of 
143,000 establishments in the UK supported Nickel’s results. Consequently, the state and 
consumers are both better off with companies competing to ensure productivity. However, this is 
not a one-sided concern; for instance, Schumpeter (1942) argued that there are several benefits of 
larger companies and for companies in concentrated markets. Based on profit-maximisation, he 
argued that innovation would be driven by an expectation of increased profit. This is because in a 
concentrated market, the company knows that it should be able to achieve a return on the 
investment as the profits are not lost due to competition on the market. As pointed out by Tirole 
(1988), conditions of dominance can impede innovation incentives, because the larger the profit 
a company has before innovation, the less the increase will be after it. In short, while the 
company can increase profits through innovation, this is caused by the cannibalisation of its old 
technology/product: Tirole (1997) calls this the replacement effect. 
Market concentration is a Janus-faced condition in which the negative sides comprise conditions 
in which companies representing very high levels of concentration or monopolies can lack 
incentives to develop new products or services in accordance with consumer interest; they may 
also lack incentives to cut costs and may have the ability to engage or keep excess labour; and in 
such a situation, the organisation can suffer. Under conditions of supernormal profits, these funds 
can be applied to establish higher levels of entry through predatory behaviour. However, 
concentration also carries positive benefits, as it can bring the benefits of economies of scale, i.e. 
lower AC, especially where there are high levels of fixed costs such as in television and 
communication industriesxxxix. This can also ensure more revenue available for R&D to adapt to 
the market conditions and thus increase general efficiency. There are therefore industries where a 
higher level of market concentration can be perceived as beneficial, and this is indeed the case of 
broadcasting, insofar as we accept the premise of cultural difference prompting the development 
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of and interest in high quality original works of content, be it news, documentaries, dramas or 
other types of programme. 
Arrow (1962) demonstrated that in innovations reducing the marginal costs of production 
(process innovations), the incentives of monopolies protected from competition of products and 
R&D are lower than for companies in a competitive environment. However, under the condition 
that the innovation rights remain under the innovator, monopolies can have higher incentives for 
product innovation.  
On the other hand, as pointed out by Tirole (1997), the reverse can lead to reduced innovation, as 
the monopolist then makes its own products obsolete. Monopolists may invest in innovation to 
secure their position in the market and thus strategically to deter competing companies and new 
entrants, and ensure that they themselves release any new products; this was indicated by Gilbert 
& Newbery (1982), meaning that R&D investment provides monopoly companies with the 
incentive to secure their position and profits.  
What this also means is that where companies are under oligopoly competition, the dominant 
providing company has an incentive to invest more in R&D as a pre-emptive strategic move. The 
discussion on this indicates that high levels of market concentration can have both beneficial and 
adverse effects. For television this is especially true, as all products are by nature creative works 
produced with high sunk-cost; a good recipe for content is thus highly regarded, which is also 
why formats, especially those with a good track record, are viewed positively, as this reduces 
risk. 
Each new type of show, programme or even episode of a drama series is a creative work based 
on an idea and a purpose; as such it requires research, development and some level of testing. In 
shows such as The Fear Factor for instance, where the contestants have to eat different ominous 
looking foods, these have to be tested beforehand to ensure that they are actually edible. 
Competition in television therefore becomes a competition for talent and the rights to premium 
and attractive content. Television content comprises innovative products, requiring serious 
research and development. Combining these with the condition of collective funding under the 
sunk-cost and consumption being independent of cost of production, it is possible to establish 
that the domestic media company has to be willing to take the required risks to ensure its 
business with domestic content, or make the decision to take the middle road with formats and 
the secure road by acquiring programmes. 
Gilbert (2006) pointed out that the companies which provide horizontally differentiated products 
can have an incentive to offer new products themselves to cater for variations in consumer 
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preference for similarly priced products. This is actually another road taken by television 
networks, where they in order to secure revenue and market share have launched supplementary 
channels which on the one hand compete and cannibalise their main generalist channel, but on 
the other can help limit new entrants with the same type of channel. News and children’s 
channels are examples, where these have been launched either to counter or to deter international 
competition, but in general domestic broadcasters have an interest in securing their own revenue 
and deterring competition at the same time. Instances with several supplementary niche-channels 
in both public and private domestic broadcasters are not uncommon and can be considered an 
active counter-strategy. 
This is also where the importance of copyrights and exclusivity enters the picture. When 
broadcasters or producers have invested in the production of what is in principle a non-rival 
product, there is a risk from day one that it can be found on the Internet with little possibility of 
capturing the violators. This harms the second condition which helps content industries, namely 
taking advantage of economies of scope, e.g selling boxed DVD sets, and even in some cases the 
potential of selling the content internationally. Why should a network buy a show when 
consumers can go online and view it before it hits the screen domestically? This can also threaten 
the first condition of economies of scale, as it can limit syndication.  
As argued by Ludvig von Mises (1998 [1944]: 24): ”…Hardly anyone attacks the copyright 
laws. Thanks to the monopolistic position that these laws secure to authors, it is possible for 
successful writers of fiction, and likewise of non-fiction, books and articles destined for the 
general reader to make a living from their writing. The author no longer depends on the 
munificence of some Maecenas as in the older days. He depends on the buying public”. 
Contemporarily, with the potential of disseminating material online, electronic media content 
producers in particular face challenges in securing rights for their work, not to mention payment 
for it.  
This is especially true for the AV-production and television industry (as well as music 
industries), where the first showing of a film in a cinema, or the first airing on prime-time TV or 
otherwise can lead to an illegal copy being distributed online, which is freely, but not necessarily 
legally, available for all with access to a computer with an internet connection. This can hardly 
be defined as public acceptance of the rights to one’s own intellectual work.  
Caused by its commodity characteristics, the high quality content commodity can end up 
returning to a situation in which the generosity of a patron becomes required, where rights are 
purchased in bundles and released freely or in combination with subscription to specific services.  
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These industries face the free-riding consumer behaviour directly and thus stand to take the most 
damage as well. This can become a long-term threat against AV productions caused by consumer 
behaviour without regard to the economic logic; just because it is freely available, it does not 
mean that a product had no cost of production, when the idea on which a creative work has been 
based required time, effort and financial investment. 
Concentration in markets carries both disadvantages and benefits. Problematic conditions can 
arise when companies have the potential to utilise monopoly power in very highly concentrated 
markets, or when they enjoy a degree of market power which allows them to collude through ‘tit 
for tat’ games or voluntarily lead to limit competition in the market and potentially distort it in a 
way which causes inefficiencies and loss of welfare.  
However, there are also conditions where a certain level of concentration is required to secure a 
sufficient scale of business. Should a possible entrant not perceive a potential for profit in 
competition, it will not enter the market. The TV market, when focusing on a single domestic 
market, has high levels of concentration requirements if based on the mass-audience model. Only 
one or two of such companies would be viable in small markets, whereas more would be able to 
reach an efficient scale in larger markets. 
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Table 20: Benefits and disadvantages of high levels of market concentration 
 
Based on the conclusions of the theoretical chapters and the discussion above, I can assume that 
the existence of market barriers constituted by the media market and commodity characteristics 
establish conditions that from an overall incentive perspective lead to market structures tending 
to be oligopolistic.  
Media companies operate with conditions of high fixed costs and high efficient scale levels, 
economies of both scope and scale, as well as the particular condition of   first-copy costs in 
combination with high regulatory intervention. This recipe can easily lead the media industry 
towards monopoly or oligopoly structures. It also positions the potential leverage of small and 
large markets differently. 
Through the discussion above I have indicated that insofar as the characteristics in both small 
and large media markets are similar both have the potential for being more or less concentrated 
Benefits Disadvantages 
Economies of scale, market concentration and 
monopoly can decrease the average costs of 
production due to higher critical mass; this can 
in principle generate lower consumer prices. 
Inefficient allocation of resources and 
production caused by lack of incentives. This 
can entail higher prices and thus loss of 
consumer surplus. This can also be caused by 
diseconomies of scale if the company 
becomes too large to function effectively. 
R&D requires some volume to innovate in 
industries with high fixed costs, which can lead 
to improvements or reduced prices, with one 
case being the establishment of the format 
business. 
Risk of reduced innovation: if there are very 
high levels of market concentration and little 
competition, there are few incentives for 
product innovation. A case similar to the 
monopoly days of public broadcasting 
International competition can secure overall 
competition; even though there are high levels 
of concentration in the national market, 
television is a case of this. 
Risk of reduced quality of products and 
services caused by lack of interest in 
production development and potential for 
higher profit at lower cost. 
Monopoly can arise if the company in question 
is more efficient than its counterparts and thus 
out-competes them – and as such it can be a 
sign of successful strategic conduct and good 
products/services. In particular, Google and 
Facebook would be examples of this, but this 
does not ensure that they do not have 
competitors. 
Risk of super-normal profits caused by lack of 
competition. Collusion by cartels or 
monopolistic conditions can cause the 
company or companies to charge higher than 
average prices and thus generate higher profits 
than would have been the case under 
competition. This is because the company 
becomes a price-maker instead of a price-
taker. 
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depending on their particular combination of structural barriers and organisational strategic 
conduct, in combination with the level of public intervention in the form of public broadcasters. 
This appears important when taking into account the analyses of funding, especially public 
funding, in chapter 4.3, How does size influence the availability of revenue in television markets 
(TV market volume)? 
 
5.2.4 What does this mean for television? 
Concentrated media ownership has been increasingly in focus as broadcasting is turning more 
global due to increased internationalisation and technological advances. These developments 
have resulted in multi-channel environments (Hoskins et al., 2004), but also in international 
ownership where multinational corporations utilise economies of scale by entering new markets 
with similar content, or where domestic TV stations are acquired by international media 
corporations.  
The strategic answer from domestic private TV and PSBs was to launch their own channels to 
stem the loss of share and revenue. While these strategic actions were necessary to reduce losses 
in market share and revenue, they also inadvertently intensified the audience fragmentation; in 
some markets this is attributable to cannibalism of own audience by using niche-channels to 
deter entry of competing commercial companies. The development of the niche-channels led to a 
fragmentation visible by studying the leading channels’ audience decline, which over time can 
undermine the traditional FTA (free-to-air) advertisement-funded business model.  
If perceived not on the local level, but on the global, the development can be argued to enable 
increased utilisation of economies of scale as well as altering local media conduct against the 
global conglomerates in attempts to deter new entrants (Doyle, 2002).  
This is reasoned in the economic logic of the media content goods which cause conditions of 
imperfect competition as well as allowing utilisation of increasing returns to scale economies. 
This is in line with theory as it can be argued that the economies of scale in the television market 
are a consequence of the initial sunk-cost investment combined with the continuous investment 
in programming, i.e. media content which is non-rival in nature can be re-used as long as there 
remains interest in the content. This follows the logic presented by Shapiro and Varian (2003:50) 
that information goods are "costly to produce but cheap to reproduce” as a consequence of their 
characteristics.  
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I will show that most markets are subject to few player conditions, e.g. under conditions of 
oligopoly. Indeed, the economic characteristics of the market and media content goods should 
create drives towards high market concentration for TV markets in general, as these based on the 
hypothesis are similar. By applying economic logic, it would be correct to assume that small 
markets have fewer players based on scarcity considerations; however, this does not take into 
account market intervention practices. Furthermore, as a consequence of market intervention, the 
link I should assume based on theory between size and the level of market concentration might 
not be the case. 
I argue that the differences in scale of political market intervention practices result in conditions 
that circumvent traditional economic logic by balancing potential commercial conduct. The 
argument in literature on why market concentration should be higher in small markets is based 
on scarcity of revenue; however, as governments intervene using both regulatory measures and 
PSBs, the rules of the game in the market change, usually to the benefit of local players. Scarcity 
considerations continue as intervention practices also follow the scarcity principle as public 
revenue is limited, meaning that the public funding used for PSBs amounts to €7.3 bn. in 
Germany, €5 bn. in Japan and €4.2 bn. in the UK, which is in contrast to the Canadian PSB 
which gets €643 mn. the Spanish €544 mn. and the Danish €469 mn. (Screen Digest, 2010). All 
this is dependent on political choice. The public funding alters the market and in effect the PSBs 
will function as balances to the commercial players, both local and global. This, in combination 
with audience preference for domestic content (see EurodataTV, 2009), positions the local public 
and private players as the main players in their individual markets (as argued by Tunstall 2008, 
albeit slightly differently), as the incentive to invest in domestic production is higher than for the 
international channels.  
My point based on the analysis in chapter 5.2.3 is that market concentration ratios in small and 
large markets do not have to be different as they become dependent on the magnitude of political 
intervention in the individual market settings, and not on commercial revenue scarcity alone. 
And while the multinational corporations have increased in volume, this is related to the increase 
in pay-television and digitalisation, meaning that as they primarily utilise economies of scale, the 
level of domestic content in these international channels is fairly limited, often preferably 
culturally neutral.  
What I will show is the TV market concentration level, the position of PSBs and the share of 
multinational corporations within the six largest players. This will establish an indication of 
domestic vs international players, as well as the primary market structure in TV markets. 
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This analysis will show that the media markets are one of the instances where it can be argued 
that neither the market nor politics exist independently. They should be studied jointly, as 
politics can affect the market and the market can compel political action. None of these forces 
exists in a void; for a similar perspective, see the literature on Public Choice (Mueller, 2003), 
Political Economy (Mosco, 1996; Evens, Rueschemayer & Skocpol, 1985) or Positive 
Economics (Friedman, 1962). In Europe this has led to dilemmas on the question of securing 
competition and regulation as well as cultural versus commercial concerns in broadcasting. This 
is substantiated as Western Europe alone subsidised the PSBs with more than €22 bn. in 2007, 
making it the third largest publicly aided industry only surpassed by the transportation and 
agricultural sectors (Screen Digest, 2007). Consequently, the traditional supply and demand in 
the market is offset as a result of domestic content from PSBs changing available market supply 
and potentially audience demand. What is promoted here based on the hypothesis is that TV 
markets in general are under conditions of oligopoly with relatively few players. 
This is in line with Graham & Davies (1997), who argue that left alone, broadcasting would end 
up heavily concentrated as a consequence of the market. Their argument is that the PSBs are 
advantageous as they are able to promote specific roles in a media system; this would not be 
viable for commercial players on the one hand, and difficult to regulate on the other. The 
argument is based on a counterweight to monopolisation, widening of audience choice and 
influencing the quality and behaviour of the system as a whole.  
I will substantiate this argument here as being a consequence of failures in the television market, 
which PSBs can help remedy. The reason is the effect of market intervention: by using PSBs to 
alter the rules of the game, the intervention can function as a balance to the commercial 
companies in the market. The consequence of these interventions in best cases are PSBs as 
standard setters which impose a specific level of services and quality which the competitors have 
to equal, otherwise the consumer has the choice of a PSB provisioned service. It would follow 
that market concentration is influenced by a variable in the form of government intervention. 
Increased competition for audience and revenue is a result, but internationalisation has also 
changed the conditions so that a part of the domestic revenue available for television is now 
diverted from national to international media companies. International corporations such as 
Disney and VIACOM divert revenue from domestic TV, increasing the competition for revenue, 
usually while carrying little or no domestic content. Domestic actors become increasingly 
dependent on alternative revenue because of this, and the level of domestic content is therefore 
threatened.  
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The primary difficulties of increased competition for revenue are lower domestic production, and 
increases in acquisitions and repeats, which are the main ways of reducing costs. Domestic 
media companies face increasing competitive pressure, forcing increased focus on profitability. 
But the increase in competition caused by either the potential of new entrants or actual entrants 
distorts the balance in the markets and forces the media companies to adjust to the new situation, 
where numbers of supplementary thematic niche-channels are on the rise.  
This can theoretically be either helpful or harmful for the overall market concentration and thus 
competition, but it also influences the revenue streams. In order to adjust to this, domestic media 
companies have different strategic choices, whereby they can either accept a lower market share, 
establish new channels, and de- or increase domestic content and/or the quality of existing 
domestic content.  
In some markets a feasible solution could be to increase domestic content to out-compete the 
new entrants based on audience favourites; this does not per se mean that this is the best solution 
in terms of immediate profit, but rather that it could be an option in that it would retain barriers 
to entry. One of the main challenges in media studies is that there is no comparative perspective 
on the global development that enables critical assessment. 
Below, the analyses of the competitive conditions start with an initial focus on competition 
between public and private as well as domestic and international channels. 
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5.3 Research Question D: How does size influence the conditions of 
competition in television markets? 
5.3.1 Introduction 
I have shown in the analysis of the first hypothesis in chapter 4 that there is an interaction effect 
caused by size of population and economy in the TV market volume and expenditure on 
domestic content. This confirmed my hypothesis of size influence based on scarcity and 
incentive concerns on the TV market volume as well as on the level of domestic content. 
Combined, this helped substantiate the first hypothesis and the theoretical argument that the 
relative conditions in the markets are similar as a consequence of market and content good 
characteristics. What is different is the relative leverage of population and economy. What I shall 
study here revolves around the influence of size on market competition based on the research 
question D presented in chapter 1.2.1 and chapter 3.3.2.3.   
I argue that there is a relationship between size and the competition between public and private 
respectively domestic or foreign companies in small and large markets. The analysis is carried 
out to identify difference in regards to size as well as impact of government intervention. This 
will allow me to identify if the larger markets tend to have larger private market share as well as 
the difference in degree of domestic vs international share. 
However, this might not entirely be the case, based on the level of state intervention in the 
markets, which is evident in chapter 4.3. This means that in effect size is not the only variable 
influencing the TV market concentration levels, but rather is probably a function of a 
combination of factors including regulatory measures taken by the state, besides the drive 
generated towards concentrated markets as a consequence of media market characteristics.  
The argument is therefore based on chapter 1, table 1, and the discussion in chapter 2, Media 
market characteristics, that the television markets in general have characteristics of imperfect 
competition based on market and content good characteristics, and thus tend to be concentrated. 
The theory of oligopoly, being especially relevant for TV markets, is deeply embedded in 
literature, but little research has been carried out to indicate the overall market structure of 
television markets using cross-market methods.  
Here I will study the competition between public and private companies where competition as 
defined in the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics means: “rivalry between two actors over a 
limited resource or reward” … “Competition is a rivalry between individuals (or groups or 
nations), and it arises whenever two or more parties strive for something that all cannot obtain”. 
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Competition in the terms of TV is singular in the sense that both public and private companies 
compete for the same viewing audience who spend a specific amount of time watching 
television. They compete by using substitutable products where taste and interest influence the 
chosen viewing at a specific time. At the same time, the time audience has available for 
television viewing is limited making prime-time programmes, here meaning the peak period of 
audience watching, the most preferable time to gather the viewers. Competition can also be dual-
sided depending on the specific business model of the television companies in relation to their 
different channels.  
Advertisement-based business models face other challenges as they are dependent on gathering 
mass-audience to finance their operations either in a singular market, or segmented across 
multiple markets. Subscription-funded channels function the same way, but as business models 
they are dependent on their audience choosing their channels for the household portfolio or being 
placed in a specific channel-bundle by the platform operator; in this way international channels 
can relatively easily penetrate a market even if the audience is quite limited. Publicly-funded 
channels or broadcasters are dependent on fulfilling their specified purpose or losing legitimacy. 
These variations in the competition for the television audience show that there can be significant 
variations across the individual markets based on political decision-making as well as the 
individual market characteristics. 
Public and private media co-exist in the market where they compete for audiences and, in most 
cases, also advertisement revenue. This also means that there is a pressure from private media 
companies on national legislation to limit the activities of their public counterparts, as well as 
increased competition for premium rights. The public media have to walk a fine line between 
preserving distinctiveness and attracting broad audiences to retain a national domestic legitimacy 
from state, market and civil society.  
Competition is a condition where one or more parties fight for the same scarce resources in the 
same setting. Television networks compete for market share and revenue, which both constitute 
scarce resources. Audience viewing is equal to the time used on viewing television content: this 
is a scarce resource which can be sold to advertisers, but also to pay-tv channels, where high 
audience rating can enable the network to increase the price of access.  
Competition can have both adverse and favourable effects on the market. On the positive side it 
can limit prices and secure quality, while on the other side it can cause unfavourable conditions 
such as ruinous competition with high levels of low-quality programming, or where competitors 
can end up as ripe pickings from outside players due to lack of stability.  
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Demand and supply conditions, incentives, profit, return of investment, marginal cost, 
commodity characteristics, barriers of entry and exit are all conditions affecting the economy of 
the media. The purpose of the media industry is the same as other industries in a market 
economy: to secure economic and social welfare in society. However, from a state and civil 
society perspective, the media companies have a separate function as they are expected to 
provide and diffuse (critical) information to their audiences (in an understandable way). 
In this chapter I will establish the degree to which size affects the relative strength of public and 
private television. This will also establish if and how the conditions of small markets with large 
same-language neighbours are affected differently from small and large markets in general. The 
competitive environment should show high levels of variance as the level and type of market 
intervention is different. This chapter will thus give an indication of the relative impact of these 
market interventions as well as the overall balance of public and private market competition, and 
will potentially contribute to the concern over a level playing field. 
The general competitive differences in large and small market competitive conditions in the 
broadcast markets will be studied by (a) the difference between public and private competition 
and (b) the influence of foreign channels. This is followed by an analysis of same-language 
neighbour problems based on the influence of foreign channels. The intention is to establish 
whether there are differences between small and large markets, especially the small markets with 
same-language large neighbours.  
 
5.3.2 Public - Private competition 
The purpose of this chapter is to study the degree to which I can identify differences in public 
and private share based on size. While share of television consumption should not directly be 
affected by size in the traditional sense, the relative share of private and public companies should 
from an overall perspective be influenced by size based on the difference in market volume as 
indicated in the analysis of the first hypothesis in chapter 4. This analysis will help substantiate if 
this is empirically the case. It will also establish an overall picture of the variance of these 
strengths in different markets, as well as the characteristics of the small markets with large same-
language neighbours where this should be especially evident based on Meier and Trappel (1992) 
as well as Puppis et al (2009). 
The purpose of this is twofold: first of all to identify influence of size on public share (domestic 
and combined with foreign) as a proxy for state intervention and the influence of size on private 
share (domestic and combined with foreign) as a proxy for identifying if larger markets have 
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more domestic private markets as suspected based on economic theory. The rather large 
intervention in terms of public subsidy of public broadcasters should influence the relative share 
levels, but at the same time larger markets should have more beneficial conditions for private 
commercial TV companies. The analyses should help establish if there is a relationship between 
size and the relative share of public and private companies. 
First I will establish if there is a relationship between size and the public/private audience share. 
This will be done be using multiple regression analysis of the continuous scale variable of size 
on the public and private share of audience in the sample markets. 
The intention of these regressions is to examine the hypothesised relationship between the sizes 
of economy and population and the audience share of public and private. The public share is 
differentiated by domestic and total, where total is equal to domestic combined with foreign 
public share. Likewise the private share is differentiated by domestic and total share. First the 
public and then the private share statistics are presented. 
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Table 21: Regression statistics on the relation between size and audience market share 
*** (**) [*] denote significance at p < 0.01, (p < 0.05), [p < 0.1]. The figures for Belgium are the 
mean for French and Flemish speaking Belgium. The regression statistics are available in 
appendix C.3. 
 
The regression of size on the level of domestic public share shows a significant and strong 
statistical relationship explaining 47.9%, the relationship based on total public share was a bit 
stronger explaining 51.1%, which is a consequence of some markets having penetration of 
foreign PSBs, especially Ireland, Austria and the French-speaking part of Belgium. Size 
influences the scale of public share, which is expected based on the findings in chapter 4.  
The larger the size of economy and population the more investment in public television and the 
larger the market volume. A well-funded public television company can invest more money into 
original domestic production and possibly more channels. 
At the same time this does not have to influence the potential for public companies as this is 
(usually, but not always) mainly funded publicly, with a few exceptions like Denmark, where 
TV2/Denmark is commercially funded, and markets like Austria and Ireland, where the PSB 
 Public Share Private Share 
 Domestic Total Domestic Total 
 Population Economy Population Economy Population Economy Population Economy 
Coefficient .156* .001*** .100* .001*** .239** -.001*** .014 -.001*** 
SE .087 .000 .092 .000 .115 .000 .095 .000 
Obs. 26 26 26 26 
Adj. R2 .479 .511 .503 .256 
R2 .520 .550 .543 .315 
Prob > F .000 .000 .000 .013 
Durbin-
Watson 1.792 1.906 2.200 2.134 
VIF 1.018 1.018 1.018 1.018 
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funding is split almost equally between public and commercial funding. This also means that in 
markets like Norway, where the second largest television company (TV2/Norway) is 
commercially funded but private, the influence would be different from Denmark where the two 
main companies are publicly owned, but differently funded. Furthermore, as the commercial 
channels are dependent on (usually, but again not always) mainly advertisement or subscription 
revenue it means that the main channels must attract large audiences to fund their continued 
operations. This is also why the result of the regression on private share can be equally strong. 
The regression of size on the level of domestic private share also shows a strong and significant 
statistical relationship explaining 50.3% of the variance, while the relationship based on total 
private share was weaker with 25.6 % and while significant for the model overall, it was not so 
for the population part of the size variable. Size thus also influences private share, but remains 
strongest for the domestic part, as most large markets mainly consist of domestic television, 
which is in accordance with the findings in Eurodata (2009) stating that domestic television 
continues to be primary. 
What this means is that size influences the commercial television share because large markets 
(both population and economy) have higher levels revenue available than smaller markets. This 
is in a way similar to the relative size effect identified in chapter 4.5, as the relative size 
influence means that small population markets, but large economies, like Norway, have a strong 
private commercial presence as well as a strong public one, the same being the case for the UK, 
even though it also has a strong public presence.  
This means, looking again at Denmark, but also at Ireland and Austria, that state intervention is 
of massive importance as this influences the type of players present in a market, as well as the 
level of foreign penetration, which can also lower the domestic share in small markets with 
similar languages as their larger neighbours.  
This also accounts for the reduced strength of the relationship when it comes to the total private 
share, as the country of origin principle means that in some domestic markets the commercial 
companies utilise the AVMS to establish origination from another market, usually in order to 
achieve economies of scale, and/or to achieve more lenient advertisement rules, than in the target 
domestic markets. 
Based on these regressions I can claim a relationship between size and public as well as private 
share. This regression showed that the level of public and private share is influenced by the size 
variable. This was somewhat expected based on the theory presented in chapter 2, Media market 
characteristics, and the results from the analyses of the first hypothesis in chapter 4, as there are 
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several factors involved in the decision on what is seen on the individual channels and funding 
levels – but also that the larger markets (size of population and economy) tend to have stronger 
public broadcasters, and more potential for commercial television (due to larger critical mass). 
What could have been the case was that the larger markets could have a lower public share, due 
to the increase in the segmented niches, but this was not indicated in the analysis. The reason is 
that the level of policy involvement in relation to the domestic public broadcasters, and the 
resulting public share, can be considered to be a result of a politically defined frame of operation 
based on history and culture in the individual markets.  
What can be argued is that it is determined more based on the political intent in the particular 
market setting; UK and Germany, for example, both have a fairly strong political intervention in 
the market with a direct effect on share, in contrast to Romania, for instance.  
What remains interesting is the degree of policy influence in the television market and how this 
can be explained. This also indicates that for further analysis I could ask what influences the 
domestic public share in order to identify which factors regulators could apply to influence the 
overall market setting.  
For private share I can identify a similar picture to the one found in public share, with a strong 
relationship for private domestic television. The domestic private share result can be argued to 
have a relationship to the way in which the television market works in Europe in particular, 
where there is significant cross-penetration from, for instance, the UK and Italy, leading to quite 
a large difference in some markets, yielding a weaker relationship for the total private share. 
However, overall, the regressions indicate that I can assume that size overall is strongly 
correlated with public and private share, especially domestic. These results are in line with the 
conditions of scarcity identified in analyses of the first hypothesis in chapter 4, and the 
challenges of size based on minimum efficient scale combined with increasing returns presented 
in chapter 2.  
What this tells me is that the state can circumvent the scarcity conditions in the market by 
investing public funds or other benefits. Larger markets in the sample tend to have relatively 
strong public television companies – especially the rich markets. At the same time foreign 
penetration means that the domestic television share in the large markets has less foreign 
penetration, while small markets have more, especially in the used sample. 
The relative levels of both domestic and total private share indicate similar strong relationships. 
Total public share had the strongest relationship, stronger than the domestic public share. This 
187 
 
can be argued to be a consequence of the foreign penetration in Europe in particular, where 
specific markets function as outlets for channels applying the country of origin principle, as well 
as markets sharing a language with a larger neighbour which establishes penetration of these in 
the smaller markets. Similarly the second strongest relationship was domestic private television 
which indicates that the larger a market is, the more attractive it becomes for private companies 
to attempt entry into the market and the more competition the public companies will be subject 
to, but only if political intervention or regulatory regimes do not set up barriers to entry (direct or 
indirect). 
When both public and private share can be attributed to strong size influence, I can ask the 
question as to what influences the individual share levels of public and private companies. I have 
an indication that the public policy and thus political intervention establishes the rules of the 
game. Overall the multiple regressions indicate that the scarcity conditions found in chapter 4.3 
and 4.4 in the analysis of the first hypothesis plays an important role in the European market, due 
to the strong tradition for public broadcasting, but also that the variety of size from chapter 4.5, 
shows that size is relative and a strong economy combined with a large population constitute one 
setting, while a small economy but large population constitute another. The most important point 
in this appears to be that state intervention in the markets for the most part is massive. 
I will show the statistics on the competitive conditions in the individual sample markets below to 
establish a comparative perspective. 
 
5.3.2.1 The competitive conditions in the individual markets  
Below, the competitive conditions between public and private broadcasters will be studied 
comparatively by using statistics of the individual markets. This will provide an overview of the 
individual markets, as well as enable study of similarities and differences between them. The 
competitive conditions will be shown by dividing them into four categories of domestic and 
foreign public channels, and domestic and foreign private channels.  
Together, this will illustrate the relative market strength of domestic versus foreign TV and the 
relative strengths of private and public television. This will also indicate the difference between 
small and large markets in terms of the strength of market intervention in the form of public 
market share.  
The synchronous picture will illustrate the balance between public and private media. 
Furthermore, this will substantiate the difference of effect in small markets with “large 
188 
 
languages”, such as English, French and German. First this will be shown below using 26 
different markets where Belgium is divided into French and Dutch markets, (i.e. 27 markets due 
to separation). 
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Figure 6: Public and Private Market share in 2008 (by domestic public share) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Original categorisation of data based on ownership type (public and private) and country 
of origin principle (domestic and foreign) by using Eurodata TV data on channel names and 
audience share. Data is rounded, furthermore there is residual data as a consequence of data 
below 0.1%. not being reported, and that some markets do not report some channels publicly if 
they do not pay to be measured. Some markets also record viewing of VHS and DVD, which is 
not included. 
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The figure shows the market share of television between public and private players in the 
relevant markets. The picture it establishes is one of high degrees of variance between markets, 
but in most of those involved, the private broadcasters have more than 50 % of the total market 
share, with the exceptions being Denmarkxl, Austria and Ireland. What appears intriguing is the 
spill-over effect defined as non-domestic originating television, where there are some apparent 
differences between the markets, as well as the reasoning on the differences between the 
included markets.  
I will not investigate the background for the massive variance, but I have to point out that there 
might be differences between markets where public and private broadcasters dominate, not only 
structurally, but also potentially in programming availability.  
Domestic television channels are dominant in all but a few markets: this is not surprising and 
from a perspective of further research, establishing time-series comparison on the development 
of share would enable a perspective on public share. In studying the markets with high levels of 
foreign penetration, the initial observation is quite different: I can identify different types of 
penetration.  
That small markets with same-language large neighbours have massive spill-over of both public 
and private television is apparent under certain conditions of regional extension. The data also 
indicate that spill-over poses challenges in a set of markets not only concerned with same-
language small neighbours.  
Besides those clear cases, there are also a) the Nordic markets where there is significant spill-
over from channels carrying international subtitled as well as domestic content, and b) national 
markets with ethnic, linguistic or other minorities such as Estonia’s Russian minority, as well as 
c) thematic channels targeting various European markets from countries of origin such as the 
UK, Italy and Sweden. This will be studied in more depth below in chapter 5.3.2.4, Foreign 
penetration: spill-over effects and chapter 5.3.3, Language and the next door challenges. This is 
an area which requires further general research where the provisioning of programming from 
both public and private broadcasters in the markets is analysed comparatively with similar and 
dissimilar markets. 
When studying the variance in the national markets, those of Denmark and Romania stand out as 
especially different, as they represent the highest and lowest scores of public television. 
Comparing populations of, respectively, more than 21 million against 5.6 million can be 
considered atypical, but it does provide some insights into the impact of market intervention – 
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especially taking into consideration that Denmark invests more than twice the amount in public 
subsidy as Romania.  
As I argue that the conditions in the markets are equal based on the similar characteristics of 
content and market, that would also entail as a consequence of size that they have different 
starting points on how to deal with or counter these difficulties. These conditions set the frame 
for the competition in terms of scarcity of revenue and personnel as well as overall and 
segmented audiences. The size variables do not directly influence the inter-market public and 
private competition, which to a large degree is defined by the frame established through policy 
and intervention practices; in this sense I can differentiate between state and market policy 
orientation, where I use share as proxies for that, i.e. it becomes evident that a market with 
almost 70% audience share on publicly owned television channels such as in Denmark holds 
some strong regulatory measures.  
Romania is a market with private company dominance, while the Danish case is one of public 
ownership dominance, to the degree where the channels from TV3 (MTG) and SBS TV are 
broadcast from London to bypass Danish regulatory measures on, for instance, limitations on 
advertisement. From a company perspective, it makes no sense to place higher restriction on 
operations than required. Almost 70% of television viewing in Denmark in centred on the two 
publicly-owned TV-networks. In contrast 7.4% of the viewing in the Romania is public – but 
nonetheless, even in the most market-dominant system, there is a market intervention. 
Although Romania and especially Denmark could be considered outliers, they are not so 
different from the markets closest to them. Denmark is somewhat different from the market with 
the highest domestic public media share, with the main difference being that TV2/Denmark 
equals 40% of the share and the rest is taken by the other publicly owned network DR. Denmark 
is a case of public duopoly. In contrast to that Italy is a case of a public-private duopoly, as the 
market is almost divided between PSB RAI and MediaSet owned by Berlusconi.  
Overall, I can point out that while larger markets can have a lower public share than their smaller 
counterparts, this is a result of policy in combination with cultural and historical path 
dependencies of political decision-making. 
When studying state-oriented regulation, the Nordic markets appear especially interesting. The 
condition of the Nordic markets of Denmark, Norway and Sweden is significant because of the 
combination of either existing or previous hybrid broadcastersxli combined with DTH (direct to 
home) competition from MTG channels and SBS TV a Pro7/Sat1 subsidiary. These were 
systems of duopoly with public broadcasters having specific responsibilities, but in combination 
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with a broadcaster receiving special benefits such as must-carry if they provided specific services 
in the interest of the public. 
Small markets with a same-language large neighbour have less domestic television - Austria, 
Ireland and French-speaking Belgium all have massive foreign penetration from larger same-
language neighbours. This also underlines the potential problem of private media originating in 
small markets with large market neighbours (same language) in getting advertisement revenue in 
competition with the large market channels, where the spill-over effect is most significant. 
French-speaking Belgium is an interesting case with one of the lowest domestic public 
broadcasting shares in central and northern Europe. In general, these markets have a relatively 
high consumption of public television, due to a high consumption of both domestic and 
neighbouring public television. Swiss regional areas are other examples of this, with significant 
foreign penetration in the individual language areas from the surrounding similar larger language 
markets; see chapter 5.3.2.4. 
Eastern Europe is an interesting example of the weakening of public television in small markets 
due both to competition from private commercial media companies and/or political intervention 
in some, resulting in PSBs which have been almost crushed by commercial media, while in other 
markets they have managed to retain a relative strong position (EBU Strategy Brief, 2003). 
However, it was also reported that both Central and Eastern European markets were experiencing 
an explosion of theme-channels and thus were subject to a very dynamic development (Eurodata 
TV Worldwide 2007, annual report). The interesting part is that where some small market PSBs 
succumb, others survive and remain strong despite the development. Thus studying the PSBs can 
yield an interesting aspect of the differences not only between large and small markets, but also 
in strategies both from a national and an organisational perspective in small markets in, for 
instance, programming and funding.  
One non-European example is Canada, a large market with an even larger market neighbour, 
which also has a spill-over; the share is relatively small, but taking into account prime-time 
programming, I can see that the top 10 programmes in Canada are all from the US (based on 
Eurodata TV, 2009); in order to avoid spill-over and thus loss of advertisement revenue, the 
Canadian broadcasters use American content. 
There are some quite strong differences between the markets, and as my regression analysis 
indicated size holds significance as an explanatory variable with quite strong relationships. 
There are two factors of interest in the degree of competition between the public and private 
networks and accordingly the level of channel supply in the market to meet demand. This is 
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where market volume and level of domestic production have an impact; in the process of 
constructing the table it became evident that when the mass is larger, it attracts or enables more 
competition, which becomes possible due on the one hand to larger niches and on the other to the 
potential of bundling less popular channels in with high-profile popular ones on pay-tv.  
Recalling that the public media companies are in effect market interventions with a specific 
mission, I have to acknowledge that what appears important are the concerns (cultural or 
otherwise) relating to the reasoning behind public broadcasting. 
One of the main drivers in the European context of public media is to secure domestic production 
of content and reach the whole population based on a principle of universality; in theory, there 
should be a level of funding allowing for differences in expenditure and the subsequent level of 
original production produced for the input. Secondly, the willingness of the private networks to 
invest in the market rather than relying on acquisitions also establishes a difference, where the 
relationship between dominant public and private networks can have a role.  
In none of the markets included in the analysis has public television been completely abolished; 
there is a certain longevity of the institutional structure in which the practice of muddling 
through and coping with change suppresses extreme structural changes. The choice of market 
intervention carries path dependency characteristics: if the US were to establish an entity similar 
to the BBC, it would take time and would generate high levels of both criticism and discussion, 
while an actual abolition of the BBC in the UK would unthinkable.  
Political decision-making and a long-term process of embedding practices in social and cultural 
structures have constructed path dependencies which resulted in the existing systems of 
broadcasting where major dislocations will generate friction between the old and the new 
companies. The public broadcasters represent a particular system guided by political action, 
bound up with state, market and civil society. 
Upholding a balanced competition between public and private when the figures are taken into 
consideration prompts the question as to what a level playing field actually means. Is there really 
a level playing field, where all have equal opportunity to succeed, when some companies are 
able to use the country of origin principle to circumvent rules in the individual domestic 
markets? Furthermore, all market intervention is per definition a distortion, but that is not really 
the nub of the matter. The real question is when is it unduly distorted? The argument could also 
be changed to ask when intervention to remedy the perceived market failure ends in government 
failure. The second question is whether the intervention is to benefit the population based on 
community or niche interests; when the distortion is limited, does it then not risk running counter 
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to the original purpose of the intervention? There is a fine line, which is difficult to identify, this 
also indicates difference in the perceived interest of the state towards the media and how this is 
expressed in regulatory intervention practice.  
This is also why community-merited interests are what should be considered as public good 
provision, as there is a difference between public good characteristics and the actual public 
benefit gained by services provided on behalf of the public. The public–private media balance of 
share is quite diverse and appears linked to a variety of reasons such as a) distribution platforms 
and the reach of these; b) channel supply – meaning increases of product diversity; c) regulatory 
measures – barriers to entry and exit; d) funding regimes and levels of PSB, e.g. the means 
allocated to enable the institutions to fulfill their purpose; e) the historical development of media 
as well as f) the purpose of the public media as designated by the state. 
In the chapter below I will discuss foreign penetration of small markets sharing a large language 
a little more thoroughly. 
 
5.3.2.2 Foreign penetration: spill-over effects 
In this chapter I will study the relative overspill of share between markets measured as the share 
of television viewing from stations based in other markets. There have been several indications 
of small markets sharing their language with large market neighbours; this will be studied in a 
little more detail below to substantiate differences based on sharing languages as well as the 
conditions required for effect. As stated in chapter 3.3.2, Analysing the second hypothesis on the 
influence of size on market competition, Switzerland has been included in the analyses below. 
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Figure 7: Foreign Penetration (by foreign private share) in 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Original categorisation of data based on country of origin principle (domestic and 
foreign) using Eurodata TV data on channel names and audience share. The markets of Italy, 
UK, France, Czech Republic, Portugal, Slovakia and Greece have been left out as a consequence 
of limited data on foreign country of origin channels. This is mainly because channels with a 
share below 0.1 is not reported, but also a consequence of for instance the position of the UK and 
Italy in regards to being the host to channels targeting other markets. 
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In figure 7 foreign share equals the share of television viewing in stations under the jurisdiction 
of the regulatory authorities of other markets as per the country of origin principle. The main 
hypothesis concerning this is that small markets with large same-language neighbours have the 
highest spill-over. 
Foreign spill-over is not exclusive to same-language markets: it is most evident in the markets 
which share a language as well as being regionally extended. Penetration happens from both 
public and private channels, which in principle can cause different challenges: this concern will 
not be discussed in length as it is outside the scope of this dissertation. The variance and 
difference between the markets with foreign penetration establish that I cannot single out one 
reason for spill-over.  
As expected, the small markets beside a large same-language large market neighbour have a 
significantly higher spill-over than other markets if they are regionally extended; without some 
direct regional extension the effect is not comparable. French-speaking Belgium has the highest 
degree of foreign penetration, which is caused by RTL-TVI being counted as originating in 
Luxembourg, followed by the Swiss regional markets. The relatively low figure in Ireland is due 
to their relatively strong private commercial broadcaster TV3. The understanding of smaller, 
instead of small appears relevant in this respect, with the same being the case between Cyprus 
and Greece, where the Greece PSB ERT penetrates into Cyprus. 
Neither small nor large markets in general have significant spill-over, but there are several 
exceptions besides the same-language nations with large neighbours.  
The Scandinavian markets in particular have relatively high degrees of foreign spill-over, 
although mostly from the UK; the channels with the highest share also carry domestic material, 
and in this way in effect avoid the regulation in their target markets. But this type of spill-over is 
not exactly similar to that in the small markets with large neighbours as these channels often also 
carry domestic content.  
There is also some spill-over in the Baltic markets, especially Estonia; this has some relation to 
the Russian-speaking minorities, as well as in Slovenia where there are different minority 
groups. Perceived separately, this is somewhat similar to the problem in small markets with large 
same-language neighbours, but here it consists of a large minority also interested in being 
supplied with media content in their native language. There are also positive benefits of the spill-
over, such as that minority groups can watch (or listen) to programmes in their primary language, 
if there are no domestic alternatives that allow this. Should this end in split civil societies, a 
separate challenge for the market in question would be presented. 
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Initially,  I can identify three different aspects of spill-over: a) “national” channels with domestic 
content by-passing national legislation by broadcasting from another market; b) foreign channels 
without domestic content spilling over into the neighbouring markets and being viewed there; c) 
minorities serviced by foreign channels in their own language. These represent separate 
problems.  
From a policy perspective, the by-passing of national legislation from a regulator-perspective as 
in the case in the Nordic market as well as in French-speaking Belgium, distorts competition for 
the domestic channels and hinders the purpose of the legislation in effect. The spill-over is a 
problem for the domestic media both in ensuring sufficient funding, but also for the state in 
supporting a national domestic perspective.  
The minority servicing is an option dependent on the state, either to supply these services or 
letting the minority buy access in so far they are able. 
This said, I can also identify the (dubbed) channels of multinational corporations like Disney, 
Discovery or MTV networks (and in principle also the BBC) distributed into most of the markets 
studied, which can be considered a different type of spill-over which affects them all. In other 
words, it might not just be spill-over but rather channels targeting a specific market dubbed in 
the language in question in order to achieve economies of scale and avoiding minimum efficient 
scale difficulties of focusing on a single domestic media market. 
The main challenge from a national legislative perspective is the loss of advertising revenue 
which in small streams ends up elsewhere, if not in the neighbouring market, then in an 
multinational corporation. This is especially evident in Switzerland, where the cost-structure in 
securing national domestic television in the language areas is extremely high. The consumer 
demand could probably be met through foreign channels, but news, debate, cultural programmes 
and fiction with a domestic perspective cannot. The second related problem is the loss of 
effective domestic regulatory measures if, for instance, OFCOM neglects the control of channels 
targeting foreign markets, making it possible to by-pass not only national legislation in the 
markets they are targeting, but also EU legislation; see Svendsen (2011) for a further discussion 
of this. The foreign spill-over of share indicates a difference between small markets with a same-
language large neighbour (with regional extension), but it is also possible to identify some 
impact of international competition affecting the markets through competition with domestic TV 
stations.  
The small markets with a large same-language neighbour have to be considered more vulnerable 
due to the threat of the regionally extended function of secondary markets. But there are also 
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other causes, such as increased international competition, where increased vulnerability from an 
economic perspective is due to the diversion of domestic funds to international players in small 
streams. Increased competition can be considered an on-going process in many small markets in 
particular, which can harm the domestic media companies and production, due to very scarce 
resources. 
 
In a green paper from the European Commission (1994) on “Strategy options to strengthen the 
European programme industry in the context of the audiovisual policy of the European Union” 
there are similar perceptions on the myriad  European cultures and languages argued in the 
conclusion of the analysis in chapter 4, where suggestions as to how to overcome the language 
barriers are presented in point 3.3.1: “Besides the obvious structural defects in the European 
audiovisual industry, observers over the last thirty years have generally pointed to the linguistic 
and cultural diversity of Europe to explain or justify its permanent state of crisis and 
underdevelopment. … it is worth noting that the 'digital revolution' brings with it the potential to 
overcome or even capitalize on what has hitherto been seen as a structural constraint. On the 
language front, digital compression makes it economically viable to edit and broadcast works in 
a number of languages. … Compression cuts costs drastically and allows a wide variety of 
combinations to be used in the same broadcasting medium thus offering audiences increased 
possibilities of access to European programmes. These new technical possibilities must be used 
to the full in order to remove partitions between national markets and enable programmes to 
cross borders.” 
This in effect, as argued by the European Commission, would change the market towards less 
importance for domestic markets; the conceptual difficulty here is the ignorance of culture, with 
it denoted as being similar to language and nothing more. The belief in the usage of technology 
only is an illusion: what is required in the legislation is an understanding of identification with 
the programming, where cultural proximity plays an important role; as argued by Straubhaar 
(2003: 85), cultural proximityxlii is "... the tendency to prefer media products from one's own 
culture or the most similar possible culture". The application of the concept is related to the 
difference between foreign and domestic media; see also Straubhaar 1991 and 2001 for further 
information and elaboration on the concept. The neglect of taking into consideration culture and 
the difference in culture across the European single market can very well be an explanatory 
factor of why  there is no direct single market, but rather a set of individual markets with little 
spill-over besides the same-language markets. 
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5.3.3 Language and the next door challenges  
Studying the figures on the small markets sharing a large language helps establish a preliminary 
argument on the difference between these markets and others with a separate language. There 
were several different indications of sharing a language as well as neighbourhood effects in 
general. 
Based on the data, I can identify the following criteria which establish different conditions 
between markets sharing a large market and the conditions of externalities, aka foreign 
penetration. 
a) Channels in national languages which escape from domestic policy to avoid regulatory 
criteria, for instance for advertisement breaks. 
- This is perceived especially in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, but also in other 
markets. Usually this is done to avoid national domestic legislation on advertising if 
the other markets have looser rules on the subject.xliii 
 
b) International satellite channels/Pay-TV 
- This is perceived in most markets across Europe to a varying degree in both small and 
large markets. Large markets in particular have several of these thematic channels; 
this is somewhat dependent on the distributive platforms of pay-TV. 
 
c) Foreign channels spill over due to minority: Heterogeneity vs Homogeneity 
- This is both a potential benefit and a threat under assumption of the importance of 
national unity and culture. This is especially the case if there are large minorities; an 
instance of this is perceived in Slovenia with among others Italian, Hungarian and 
Roma minorities, as well as in Estonia and Latvia with large Russian minorities. 
 
d) Larger neighbour channel spill-over in smaller states 
- Small markets sharing the same language as a larger market neighbour appear to have 
an impact, especially when these markets have large market benefits and language. 
 
I will primarily discuss the question of small markets with large market same-language 
neighbours. This is because these markets and states face competition to an increased degree due 
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to their having a form of what I define as a secondary marketxliv function which can enlarge the 
market of the large neighbour with its smaller next-door counterpart.  
Basically, commercial media companies should utilise economies of scale and a) purchase 
stations; b) penetrate into the neighbouring market to establish cross-viewing; or c) target the 
sale of popular programming. Cross-viewing is a challenge as it can potentially divert revenue 
from the domestic market and thus increase pressure on the domestic market players and their 
dependency on foreign imports.  
In other words, for small markets with same-language large neighbours, there is a risk of 
increased competition for the same revenue, with the difference that this is diverted outside the 
domestic market. This is a general problem of the media market, but it should be especially 
visible in these types of markets due to the effect of the secondary market function, which is 
partly due to language and regional extension, enabling commercial companies to utilise 
economies of scale through an enlarged domestic market with the potential for both increased 
audiences and enhanced profit. However, this is primarily a predicament for small markets with 
same-language larger neighbours, and not per se a general small market problem.  
The challenge of revenue diversion is one facing all markets due to fragmentation of audience, 
and these markets could indicate what increased dependency on international programming from 
multinational corporations would entail. As the first part of the argument stated, based on the 
characteristics of media goods, the small media markets, particularly in television broadcasting, 
will have difficulties obtaining sufficient revenue to function efficiently. Small markets with 
same-language large market neighbours will have increased vulnerability due to this, and if 
multinational corporations manage to divert revenue from the domestic market. This can be a 
threat for the local zone of creativity for producing original domestic content in these markets. 
In this way, language becomes both a benefit and a disadvantage. The way small markets react to 
the lack of independence can also differ from market to market, depending on different 
conditions (Hallin, 2009), but small markets with large same-language neighbours have a special 
problem due to language (Puppis et al., 2009) and are not able to use the same strategies as other 
small markets. Small markets in a specific small language area can protect their electronic media 
market through language combined with regulatory measures, as has been the case in the Nordic 
countries (Lund & Berg, 2009).  
Small markets with same-language large neighbours are not able to use the same protective 
strategies. When studying the share of markets in countries such as Austria, Ireland and 
Switzerland, I find indications for a higher degree of foreign television penetration, which is not 
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normally visible in similar small markets. Language area becomes a way of distinguishing small 
markets from each other: when examining the Scandinavian markets (Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden), the potential of cross-viewing is there, but is quite limited. Another issue concerns the 
Slavic languages in Eastern Europe: although somewhat similar, they are still different 
(somewhat comparable with Scandinavia, but with more variances).  
Small markets in larger language areas face different challenges than other small markets. The 
cross-viewing in Switzerland, Austria and French-speaking  Belgium, where protection through 
language and high levels of subisidised national production are not sufficient to secure the 
domestic market, makes different strategies more necessary than in other less vulnerable 
markets, especially because of the dependence of the public broadcasters in Austria, Ireland and 
Switzerland on advertisement revenue. Language can in this way influence the degree of 
vulnerability of a small market.  
In other words, if a small market has the same language as a large neighbour, especially if there 
is regional extension, then it risks being considered a secondary market for its large neighbour’s 
media activities, and this foreign media dominance can potentially challenge its cultural identity. 
Language can either protect or harm small market media markets.  
Regional extension combined with a shared language establishes the potential of a secondary 
market effect, when the market can be considered both markets at the same time for a 
commercial television company (if possible under existing legislation) which enables utilisation 
of economies of scale effectively. 
Traditionally, I would discuss television markets as having the characteristics of a closed market 
with high barriers to entry, but the secondary market effect entails open (dynamic) markets with 
low(er) barriers to entry, as these have already been bypassed in the country of origin.  
Secondary market effects seen in countries such as Switzerland, Austria, Ireland, and French-
speaking Belgium can thus become threats to national cultures and potentially create difficulties 
in establishing local zones of creativity. Furthermore, there might be difficulties in securing 
original domestically-produced content as the import potential is increased. Overall, these 
markets face similar conditions to a large market, but the domestic market does not have the 
critical mass of the large same-language neighbour.  
These conditions entail difficulties for these markets in securing cultural heritage as well as in 
preserving national identity without market intervention lending a protective measure, which is 
exactly what has been applied through PSBs in these markets, albeit differently. Austria, 
Switzerland and Ireland all have in aggregated figures some of the best funded PSBs in Europe 
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(2007). Note that the effect of the secondary market is also visible in smaller markets, such as 
Flemish-speaking Belgium and Cyprus, but to a significantly lesser extent. What appears to be of 
importance is the maturation of the media market in combination with the potential of profit that 
establishes the incentive to utilise the economies of scale, along with the interest of the 
consumers in the small markets sharing a language to increase the channel supply with low-cost 
programmes. 
All pay-tv markets have and utilise the potential of bundling to finance small channels by 
packaging them with more popular ones. Large markets with pay-tv have a higher potential of 
securing financing for niches in this way, as the collective funding system will ensure that the 
weight felt by the individual consumer is relatively low compared to the total cost of the channel. 
Against this there is the neo-classical concern of consumer sovereignty which is disregarded in 
this way, as consumers pay for unwanted content. The state, market and civil society are all 
involved here. Market concerns are based on consumer sovereignty, while those of the state 
encompass both consumer and public interest, and civil society groups have an interest in 
securing a broad variety of content and the potential in large markets to fund channels for niche-
groups. What this also shows is that cable (as well as other pay-tv forms) is generating turnover 
and thus economy: this is also indicated by the profitability of HBO in the US. 
The secondary market effect comes into play here, as this also occurs in the situation where 
small markets share the same language while also having regional extension: the extra market 
helps increase revenue.  
Although I argue for the secondary market function of these market-types, this does not imply 
that the small markets sharing a language but not having regional extension are less vulnerable; 
there is just a different effect. Beside the potential of using their other same-language market 
channels, if the distributors are interested, it also enables for instance Austria to use German 
public broadcaster correspondents in various parts of the world. Similarly, Danish television 
stations are able to use Swedish and Norwegian, due to the language similarity.  
Consequently, I argue that it is possible to identify a secondary market function for small 
markets which worsens the conditions for securing public interest in the markets with regional 
extension and also threatens their cultural identity in the long term, but this can also help 
establish some large market benefits. The main challenge for these markets is securing their local 
zone of creativity of production, which can easily be overwhelmed by the large market same-
language neighbour. 
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5.3.4 The difference in competitive conditions between large and small markets 
Size influences the level of commercial private television share, especially the domestic, but also 
the level of public private share, both domestic and total. However, especially the total public 
share which is a consequence of the small markets with similar language large neighbours. The 
reason for this is that the smaller the market in terms of population, the fewer consumers there 
are to sustain the commercial media, while in economically larger markets the consumers can 
afford to pay more and the state can subsidise broadcasting to achieve a specific purpose. 
Basically, there is a limit to how much the market can sustain domestically, especially in very 
small markets, which is also why larger international companies can compete effectively against 
domestic television as their market surpasses that of a particular domestic market. 
The larger (measured both by economy and population) European markets have the potential to 
sustain stronger commercial television channels, but the same is the case for public television 
channels. This is a consequence of the conditions described in chapter 4.5; where relative size 
influence means that strong economy markets can sustain stronger public companies, and also 
that the market with both a large population and strong economy can sustain both a strong 
private commercial and public presence. This also indicates that smaller markets risk facing 
difficulties when subjected to high levels of international competition, as they do not have the 
same amount of tools to secure a strong domestic presence. 
This is also an indication of the commodity-type TV-programmes; as defined above, they are 
non-rival and either non-excludable or excludable, meaning that the cost of the first copy is the 
primary expense equalling the cost of production: this means that the smaller the potential 
audience of a given regions is, the fewer there are to pay the production costs. There should 
therefore be less high-quality television available in small markets only supplied through that 
market. Secondly, the distribution of television originally had the characteristics of a natural 
monopoly; again technological development has reduced this issue, but the capital investment 
(e.g. the sunk-cost) in establishing platforms is relatively high.  
There are therefore usually conditions of oligopoly in the distribution markets. The market is not 
able to efficiently allocate resources due to its conditions, especially those of scarcity, and this 
leads to market failures and thus almost always state intervention. The small markets are less 
able to allocate sufficient resources efficiently to allow competition due to market imperfections. 
It is intriguing to note that small television markets with a large same-language neighbour are the 
least concentrated. There are some different reasons for this: 
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First of all, those in Central Europe have a very developed infrastructure, combined with a strong 
public broadcaster which is partly funded by advertising. As such, in order to secure the desired 
domestic media goods and services, some of these markets have focused on securing 
programming through public broadcasters, which then compete against foreign broadcasters in 
the same language.  
Secondly, the same-neighbour large market broadcasters perceive the territories as an 
enlargement of their market, especially if regionally extended. French-speaking Belgium appears 
to be a case in which the public broadcaster is relatively weak even compared to its Flemish 
neighbour, leading to the question of whether its strategy is to focus on particular services and let 
the rest be serviced by private operators. Nonetheless, it certainly appears that if regionally 
extended, large markets have the potential to affect their smaller neighbours sharing the same 
language.  
In other words, these types of small markets are under pressure from their larger same-language 
neighbours hindering their options, or rather changing the rules of the game. It should be taken 
into consideration that some cultural connectedness and regional nearness is necessary to 
establish the enlarged or secondary market. 
International competition and the increased fragmentation of audiences will help increase the 
diversity of the market, which is seen in the rise in international channels and other niche-
channels launched by both public and private domestic broadcasters. Consequently, the domestic 
broadcasters help increase fragmentation to avoid the slow but certain bleeding of audience share 
to other new niche-channels, with the result that niche content and audience segmentation are in 
progress. While in general having resulted in lowering the share of the market leaders, most 
notably in Sweden and the UK (Eurodata TV, 2009), this also indicates a rise in international 
competition from large media corporations as well as the increasing competition for revenue 
(advertising, cable relay or otherwise).  
Although this development has yet to be completed, it indicates the problems the broadcast 
media are currently experiencing: niche-channels like Disney, Cartoon Network, Animal Planet 
and more are part of international corporations diverting revenue from domestic TV, increasing 
the competition for revenue, usually without carrying domestic content, generating problems for 
the small markets in securing nationally produced content.  
The primary problems lie in the risk of lowering of programme quality, reduced informational or 
cultural programmes, and an increase in imported programming, all resulting in the primary issue 
for small markets of financing the domestic content. 
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The main issue encompasses the foreign companies utilising their economic prowess to: 
a) purchase and distribute popular formats and content, while small market broadcasters 
who lose revenue are less able to invest in content. The consequence of this development 
is that while content in general becomes more diverse, the level of national content is 
reduced. In short, small markets risk being flooded with foreign content, which in itself is 
not a problem, unless in combination with reduced domestic quality content as well as 
b) investment in new platforms such as HD where the large media companies are able to 
introduce content before small market broadcasters; in contrast large markets continue to 
be able to finance the development. While large market domestic broadcasters might 
have the financial strength to keep up, their small market counterparts are hardly able to 
do so.  
 
This analysis has shown some of the variety of television competition, with the difference being 
heavily dependent on the level of state intervention. The UK is an example of this, where both 
the BBC and Channel 4 are public channels balancing the market. This brings into question the 
levels of competitive advantage public broadcasters possess, especially when compared to the 
multinational corporations’ turnover.  
Public broadcasting constitutes a condition of market intervention establishing market barriers 
through its existence; the benefit of this is the level of public benefit it provides, which can have 
a detrimental effect on private competition. The economic large markets, especially if they also 
have small populations, have stronger PSBs, leading to assumptions of these having a 
competitive advantage in providing their services in the public interest. However, due to their 
existence, they also help the training of creative personnel, thereby helping to maintain the 
creative zone which otherwise could have been reduced. What is substantiated is that this 
establishes a potential which is not easily imitated and with little prospect of substitution. Where 
programmes can both be imitated and have high a factor of substitution, the development of 
talent is a process where domestic accountability helps secure an industrial sector. 
Public and private operators compete for the same scarce time-resources available for 
consumers, where competitive advantages become important, and where the potential for 
reducing imitation and substitution of programmes becomes viable to secure distinctiveness. 
What is of concern is the condition of economically weak markets, where the impact of 
economically strong private operators can distort the benefits of the public broadcasters if not 
regulated so as to ensure the private operators provide services on behalf of the public good. The 
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emphasis here is on the production industry as well as the local pool of talent, which can be at a 
disadvantage compared with private operators with a focus on profit. 
Studying the differences in the level of public and private competition in Europe indicated a 
strong effect of size for public and private channels, especially domestic channels. Indeed, it 
appears that political intervention strongly impacts the scale of competition and that any 
discussion of a level playing field in Europe is difficult because if all should have equal 
opportunity based on the country of origin principle, this might actually mean that domestic and 
foreign channels have unequal opportunity as a consequence, as they are subject to different 
regulatory demands.  
Should a level playing field have full impact it should entail the existence of a single European 
market for TV. However, for a single European market for TV to exist would mean that heavy 
state intervention by public broadcasters would present a separate challenge, as these also – with 
their varying degrees of strength and impact – should be limited. However, that would mean 
limiting the protection of what is in the preamble of the treaty, namely the protection of diverse 
European culture and heritage.  
The point to make is that the idea of a single European market for TV should not be considered 
viable when taking into account that myriad European languages and cultural difference, if a 
single European market actually were to be implemented, would be hard pressed. This also 
means that it would be beneficial to study the market concentration level in the individual 
markets, which will be done below. 
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5.4 Research Question E: How does size influence the level of 
concentration in television markets?  
5.4.1 Introduction 
The influence of size is evident in the analysis of the first hypothesis, but this also showed 
massive differences in scale of public funding, which could circumvent part of the influence of 
size as based on the similar characteristics. Secondly, what I identified in chapter 5.3 was that 
size influences the level of public and private television share, especially the domestic television 
share. Here the relationship between size and market concentration will be studied. 
I shall examine the relation between size and the level of market concentration in television 
markets. Based on the results of the analysis in chapter 4, I might not identify that smaller 
markets are more concentrated as per the second hypothesis, but this would still be in line with 
theory as argued in chapter 2, as television markets in general have a drive towards 
concentration.  
One of the reasons that this might not entirely be the case is due to the level of state intervention 
in the markets, which is evident in the analysis in chapter 5.3 above as well as chapter 4.3.  
This means that size is not the only variable influencing the TV market concentration levels, but 
rather is a function of a combination of factors including regulatory measures taken by the state, 
besides the drive towards concentrated markets as a consequence of media market 
characteristics.  
The argument is therefore based on the theoretical discussion in chapter 2, media market 
characteristics, that the television markets in general have characteristics of imperfect 
competition based on market and content good characteristics, and thus tend to be concentrated. 
The theory of oligopoly, being especially relevant for TV markets, is deeply embedded in 
literature, but little research has been carried out to indicate the overall market structure of 
television markets using cross-market methods.  
My research is based on my systematic research of literature on oligopoly, and especially the 
following literature. Oligopoly has been studied intensively using different methods, but for 
Cournot, oligopoly (1839) means in some instances studying this using imperfect competitive 
factors as done by Okuguchi (1998, 2000), but also under assumptions of perfectly competitive 
factors markets as done by Vives (1999) and Martin (2000). A main challenge lies in the method 
of measurement where Hannah and Kay (1977) have argued on behalf of one-parameter 
concentration indices, containing both concentration radio index (CR), and the Herfindahl-
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Hirschman Index (HHI). Both the CR and HHI are commonly used; see for instance Whinston 
(2006) for application in horizontal mergers, and Porter & Zona (1993, 1999) for studying 
collusion in relation to state highway construction and school milk contracts.  
However, there have been cases such as the electricity market where it has proved an inadequate 
measure, as indicated empirically by Borenstein, Bushnell and Knittel et al (1999). Other 
researchers such as Cowling & Waterson (1976) have utilised a separate perspective by using a 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium, along with Clarke & Davies (1983), who applied the method to 
establish an industrial diversification index. 
Nonetheless, analyses of competitive behaviour using market concentration measured 
horizontally will provide a picture of the competition in the individual markets. The analysis will 
help establishing indications of the market structures and concentration levels in European 
television markets. 
The purpose of this analysis is to establish an initial perspective on market concentration and 
competition in European television markets, in order to document empirically the relative 
concentration levels. This is done to substantiate whether small markets are more concentrated 
than large, or if TV markets overall are relatively concentrated. This is based on the theoretical 
chapter 2 which states that TV market generally generate a drive towards high concentration. 
This will be discussed in more detail below, where market concentration from a policy 
perspective will be discussed. 
 
5.4.1.1 Market concentration from a policy perspective 
In order to present the challenges perceived from a policy perspective, I will present and work 
through some of the arguments found in a European Commission staff working document on 
media pluralism.  
There is a potential policy interest in this particular study related to the scale of market 
concentration and the ownership of media TV companies as well as to the difference in small and 
large markets.  
One of the premises argued in chapter 2 is that television markets should be relatively 
concentrated, particularly the small markets, as revenue is scarce, meaning that only a few 
companies are able to survive as a consequence of relatively high investment and operating 
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costs. However, as discussed in chapter 5.3 above and chapter 4.3 and 4.5, I cannot ascertain this 
as the scale of political intervention also plays an important role. 
In the European Commission working paper on Media Pluralism (2007) it is stated that: “In the 
last ten years, media concentration has been an important issue in all parts of Europe. A major 
concern is the possible domination of a number of markets by national and international 
companies. In this respect, the question of audience and readers plays an important role. A few 
companies may control the majority of TV channels and newspapers, potentially leading to an 
enormous opinion-forming power in that market.” … “While competition policy is one central 
aspect of pluralism, it is difficult to pin down how much size matters or which way competition 
policy is good or bad for pluralism: a number of studies already signal that even if media 
concentration is limited, this does not necessarily mean that media pluralism is ensured. And the 
mere fact that concentration takes place does not automatically indicate that there is a loss or a 
lack of media pluralism. Several aspects have to be taken into account. Furthermore, the question 
of concentration has always to be considered in the light of the size of a particular geographic or 
linguistic market”. …. “The fact that only a few players are present in a small market may not in 
itself threaten media pluralism as long as companies respect internal codes that promote diversity 
of opinion”. 
The European Commission states the concerns about market domination in general. Furthermore 
– in line with theory – it is stated that concentration does not necessarily present a challenge for 
media pluralism. What is particularly interesting is their argument that concentration has to be 
considered in the light of the size of a geographic or linguistic market.  That perception is in line 
with the results of the analysis in chapter 5.3.2-5.3.3, which indicate that some markets have 
particular challenges as a consequence of language. But are high concentration levels worse in 
larger markets than in small? Rather than differentiating by size, it could be that market 
intervention or the role of international companies in markets have resulted in different 
competitive conditions, and that what is important is the actual structural conditions in each 
market. This analysis could help to provide a partial answer to this. 
It is for instance common knowledge that the increase of niche-channels has led to audience 
fragmentation, visible by studying the leading channels’ audiences decline. This development 
could over time result in an undermining of the FTA (free-to-air) advertising-funded business 
model. This can lead to a negative spiral as a potential adverse effect of less available revenue 
for domestic production of original content.  
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What I will show is that large markets can be as concentrated as their small counterparts as a 
result of government intervention and the general characteristics. 
This is in line with theory as the economies of scale in the television market can be argued to be 
a consequence of the initial sunk-cost investment combined with continuous investment in 
programming, i.e. media content goods which, being non-competitive in nature, can be re-used 
as long as there remains interest in the material.  
The increase of pay-tv in combination with the new technological development of digitisation 
has increased the benefits of the economies of scale of the platform by enabling potential access 
to an increased amount of TV channels; this can reduce barriers to entry on the one hand, but it 
also strengthens the potential of utilising economies of scale. This is the consequence of media 
market characteristics as presented in chapter 2. 
This can also lead to an increased move towards combining pay-tv with advertisements to 
supplement financing, as these are not per se mutually exclusive. This, in combination with 
exclusivity on particularly attractive content goods, can secure a financial basis for commercial 
television, especially in a small market where revenue is particularly scarce. The process has 
accelerated as a consequence of digitisation, which has increased the potential for more channels 
with high levels of market penetration.  
This can create a drive towards either more concentrated or more pluralistic markets measured 
by the existing players’ strategies in the eye of changing rules of the game. 
From a consumer perspective, the best cases of increasing supply of channels will establish 
higher levels of individual choice in the TV markets, but with the risk of there being little 
domestically-produced content available in the market, or in the worst cases, ruinous 
competition. This is also where the difference between concentrated markets can have an 
influence, as there is a potential for investment in original programming to secure audience 
viewing of particular channels, especially if this enables high profit margins (EC, 2007). This is 
where the separate challenge evolves, as there are no clear-cut studies indicating a relationship 
between efficient TV markets also having large investments in originated programming, 
especially not in small markets. 
Basically, the state runs into a paradox of choice with an increasing supply of television channels 
in the market drawing audiences from generalist channels, while at the same time risking the 
level of original domestic content as this in essence threaten the economy of generalist channels 
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usually financing the most domestic content. In short, concerns of competition versus cultural 
concerns of securing original domestic content. 
As presented above there is a difference in the results of market concentration in different 
industries, but little research has been carried out on this for the television industry in Europe. I 
will therefore establish the degree of market concentration in the TV industry across the sample 
markets to establish the relative level of concentration. This will help first of all to establish if 
there is a relationship between the size variables and market concentration. Market concentration 
might not be a consequence of size alone, but rather appears to be a form of externality of the 
combined effects of the market conditions and political intervention – but as size influences the 
scarcity conditions it remains important to investigate.  
I will identify the market concentration levels as well as international ownership in the included 
markets. I will do this by examining the relationship between size and market concentration 
(measured both by HHI and CR), to identify the strength of the relationship based on the sample. 
I will investigate this using comparative method by applying multiple regression analysis on the 
relationships and by using the statistics for the individual markets. 
Furthermore, I will use the data to establish the ownership strength in the individual markets in 
order to draw up an overview table of the strongest media companies in Europe.  
This will help to identify international ownership and is followed by a discussion on market 
concentration and the influence of multinational corporations and lastly by a conclusion.  
 
5.4.2 Regression analysis on the relation of size on market concentration 
Here I conduct the regression analysis of the size variables on the level of market concentration. 
The purpose is to examine whether there is a relationship between size and market concentration 
using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index measurement, denoted respectively HHI (calculation 
based on all-day viewing) and HHI prime (calculation based on prime-time viewing). 
Furthermore concentration ratios will also be applied as measure using CRx as abbreviation, i.e. 
CR1-6. First I will identify the relationship between size and HHI, followed by size on CR. 
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Table 22: The influence of size on market concentration measured by Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) 
*** (**) [*] denote significance at p < 0.01, (p < 0.05), [p < 0.1] / [note that the Belgium total is 
applied]. The regression statistics are available in appendix C.4.1 and C.4.2. 
 
The regression analysis results for the overall model are non-significant for HHI (all) as well as 
for HHI (prime). This does not mean that the results are insignificant, but rather that the HHI 
levels are too similar between the small and large sample markets to establish a linear 
relationship. The reason for this is lack of variance in the concentration levels in the sample 
markets. The size of economy was significant for both regressions, using single regression 
analyses yielded relationships with a strength of 8,6 % for all-day and a little stronger for prime-
time with 13,4 %.  In short, size is non-significant in relation to HHI for the overall model, but 
with a weak relationship for economy alone.  
Small markets should be more concentrated than large ones as a consequence of the media 
market and content good characteristics, but theoretically large ones would have a similar drive 
towards concentration.  
In short, this indicates that television markets in general are concentrated. The concentration 
ratio in the individual markets does not have to be very different, especially since most markets 
Market concentration HHI (all) HHI (prime) 
Population Economy Population Economy 
Coefficient  2.657 .020* -1.314 .027** 
SE 5.338 .012 5.565 .012 
Obs. 26 26 
Adj. R2 .056 .099 
R2 .132 .171 
Prob > F .197 .116 
Durbin-Watson 1.266 1.328 
VIF 1.018 1.018 
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have strong public broadcasters which are either independent of or only partly dependent on 
commercial revenue.  
Parts of this are also because of the foreign owned companies reaping benefits of scale, and it 
also becomes fairly clear that this is a consequence of state intervention practices in the 
individual markets. 
This might not look interesting as it could be interpreted as if size does not matter. But it actually 
is interesting, as it indicates that there is a high concentration in television markets in general 
(see appendix C.3-C.4 and D for the descriptive statistics).  
Let’s go through the argument in more detail: larger markets could be less concentrated than 
small markets, but in general they appear to be similar in level of concentration to small markets. 
This also means that the companies in the larger markets have a higher potential for profit, as 
their “basis” for generating revenue is larger – as per the leverage argument from the 
introduction.  
Basically, this means that as larger markets are as concentrated as small markets, the companies 
should have a higher potential turnover as the larger markets (pay and advertising as well as 
potential public revenue) have a larger critical mass than the small markets.  
Similarly, this substantiates some of the considerations of the influence of state intervention 
circumventing the number of players there otherwise could be in the market.  
This underlines the fact that PSBs help set the rules of the game in the market, especially since I 
identified in chapter 4 the tendency for strong economic markets to have stronger and better 
funded public broadcasters than small markets. The reasoning behind this is that the (usual) dual 
funding structure of the PSBs increases the market volume and as such does not destroy the 
potential for commercial players in the market, even if they do carry advertisements.  
An exception to this can be seen in small same-language markets with regional extension, where 
the large market broadcasters can divert advertising revenue from the market, thus limiting the 
ability of a number of domestic companies to reach efficient scale.  
In this sense, the public broadcasters help secure a minimum level of competition in the markets, 
while they also as a consequence of their remit are obliged to invest in and produce original 
domestic programming. 
This also means that the assumption linking market concentration based on advertisement 
revenue as in the Commission’s working paper on media pluralism (2007) does not take into 
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account the total TV market volume including subscription and public subsidy. That working 
paper states (2007) that: In smaller markets it is economically impossible for the advertising 
spend to sustain more than a few broadcasters. The size of the TV advertising market in 2004 in 
Finland, for example, was 230 million €, in Hungary 242 million € and in the Czech Republic 
246 million € compared with a market size in Germany of 4235 million €, United Kingdom 5537 
million € or Italy 4124 million €…. “The fact that only a few players are present in a small 
market may not in itself threaten media pluralism as long as companies respect internal codes 
that promote diversity of opinion.”  
What this study does indicate is that the assumptions of the EU based on the media reduces 
complexity, as this does not take into account foreign penetration and increased dependence on 
foreign content in smaller markets, as they in principle could have a similar level of television 
companies, but a massive difference in number of channels. Added to that is the challenge of the 
country of origin principle, meaning that a channel can be targeted towards a specific market 
from for instance the UK, even though it carries domestic content from the target market. 
This does not establish a direct critique of the EU, but it does question whether or not the 
premises of the EU legislation on TV in effect favour particular types of markets or large 
companies. The lack of the inclusion of public and subscription revenue as well as in principle 
supplementary revenue limits the breadth of the EU perception of the individual markets, and the 
consideration of trans-market, cross-channel ownership. Not only this, it lacks understanding of 
the consequence of the country of origin principle. This finding does appear to carry some policy 
implications requiring further investigation. 
At the same time, it underlines the impact of political intervention in the markets, as this 
primarily remains dependent on the regulatory measures taken in the individual markets to 
ensure competition on the one hand, while securing the domestic production industry and 
original domestic works of creativity on the other.  
The trend in the TV industry is towards concentration in either duopolies or oligopolies; the 
more concentrated the more potential for profit. But several markets are, as a consequence of 
their platform competition and digitisation, in a process of securing more channels. What this 
study indicates is that the strategic behaviour from a company perspective is to deter entry or 
aggressively fight entry by establishing niche-channels for segmented audiences to secure 
profitability.  
This technological development is taking place in conjunction with a process where the increase 
in pay-penetration increases the potential of the new channels to be funded by subscription 
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revenue, and thereby limits the dependency of the commercial companies on advertisement 
revenue.  
In this game, the public broadcaster plays the actual role of balance, forcing the individual 
commercial broadcasters to adhere to a certain level of quality if they want to secure an 
audience; this also happens in some markets by actively establishing their own niche-channels in 
direct competition with commercial actors.   
I will now attempt to identify a relationship between the size variables and the increase in market 
concentration from CR1 to CR6 which will enable a differentiated perspective from the HHI 
calculation. Note that this is not individual channels, but the combined number of channels for 
the company in question: see appendix D for the overview. For Italy this means that RAI is the 
largest media company measured by the combined share of 42.1 % based on the following nine 
channels: RAI DUE, RAI GULP, RAI SPORT PIU, RAI TRE, RAI UNO, RAISAT CINEMA, 
RAISAT EXTRA, RAISAT PREMIUM and RAISAT YOYO. In this way I can view it in 
relation to the effect it has on the i’th company share based on the equation in chapter 
3.3.2.4.2.1.2, Concentration Ratio (CR). Should this also indicate that there remains little 
difference between small and large market concentration levels, then it follows that the part of 
the second hypothesis concerning the influence of size on market concentration is not 
substantiated. 
The reason for applying the combined share of the largest companies, and not the share of the 
largest channels is to exemplify that the three largest channels might be owned by either the 
same company, two companies or even three companies. If that combined share was 50 % the 
three different situations would constitute different market situations. 
In table 23 below, the results of the regression analysis of the size variables on the level of 
market concentration using CR1 to CR6 will be presented. The purpose is to examine the 
hypothesised relationship between the size and market concentration denoted respectively CR1, 
CR2, CR3, CR4, CR5 and CR6. This will establish if, statistically based on the sample, I can 
identify a relationship between the variables. 
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Table 23: The influence of size on market concentration measured by concentration ratio (CR) 
*** (**) [*] denote significance at p < 0.01, (p < 0.05), [p < 0.1] / [note that the Belgium total is applied]. The regression statistics are 
available in appendix C.4.3-C.4.8. 
 CR1 CR2 CR3 CR4 CR5 CR6 
 Population Economy Population Economy Population Economy Population Economy Population Economy Population Economy 
Coefficient -.007 .000 .030 .000* .049 .000 .072 .000** .058 .000** .057 .000*** 
SE .067 .000 .103 .000 .103 .000 .083 .000 .071 .000 .064 .000 
Obs. 26 26 26 23 23 23 
Adj. R2 .033 .064 .019 .172 .234 .305 
R2 .111 .139 .097 .247 .304 .368 
Prob > F .260 .179 .308 .058 .027 .010 
Durbin-Watson 1.460 1.465 1.600 1.847 1.720 1.626 
VIF 1.018 1.018 1.018 1.010 1.010 1.010 
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Table 23 shows that the overall model on the influence of size for CR1-3 was non-significant 
based on the sample. This does not mean that the results are insignificant, but rather that the 
concentration levels by CR1-3 are too similar between the small and large European television 
markets to establish a linear relationship. In other words, they are not sufficiently different 
between small and large markets to claim a causal relationship at CR1-3. In contrast the CR4-
CR6 ratio is significant with an explanatory strength of 17.2 % for CR4 at p < 0.1, 23.4 % for 
CR5 at p < 0.05, and 30.5 % for CR6 at p < 0.01. 
The results of CR1-3 indicate that markets at these levels of market concentration are relatively 
similar – but also that the inclusion of more companies has a positive influence on the strength of 
the relationship. This indicates that when the number of companies is four or more, the larger the 
size variable is, the more concentrated the market. Presented slightly differently, the larger the 
size variables, the more potential there is for an increasing number of companies. This is realistic 
as larger markets have a higher critical mass available for an increasing number of companies, 
and because in larger markets companies can achieve minimum efficient scale with lower share 
numbers, than in smaller markets. Studying the betas (in appendix C.4) it is evident that 
economy plays an important role for concentration, as this also represents the level of available 
revenue (critical mass) in a market, and thus influences the number of channels that can be in the 
market for that amount of revenue. 
Recalling the individual coefficients for size of economy and population in table 22, the 
strongest – and the only one that is significant - is size of economy. This indicates that the larger 
the economic purchasing power per capita, the more potential there is for a higher number of 
television providing companies.  
This makes sense, as what I measure for economy is the relative purchasing potential for each 
consumer, and the more resources there are available per capita, the more demand there can be 
for television, for instance à la carte channels.  
The larger the size of the economy, the more channels can be supplied, especially in 
economically developed markets - with encrypted distribution allowing for subscription revenue. 
Segmentation of channel audience allows more targeted commercials or content directed towards 
a specific niche.  
The increase in channel supply can be done by large players, either domestically or 
internationally. Domestic players using this strategy are usually former companies with 
generalist channels using new possibilities for potential profit, and to deter competition.  
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International players usually target markets with their niche channels, for instance Disney using 
children’s channels to target as many markets as possible where there is potential profit. This can 
increase diversity in content output, but it might also mean higher percentages of re-runs and 
acquired content, to make ends meet if the level of competition becomes too high, especially in 
markets with weakly developed pay-subscription.  
In weaker economy markets the increase in channels will usually not be supplied – or only to a 
degree where it is financially feasible – as the critical mass in the markets is insufficient to 
sustain larger number of companies and the result if it happened could easily be cut-throat 
competition with downward spirals of quality and overall diversity.  
For both measures I find an indication of oligopoly market structures for the European markets, 
but with high levels of variation for the individual markets. I will study this further below by 
comparing the individual markets. I have found the size variable significant in relation to the 
horizontal market concentration levels for CR4-CR6, but not for the HHI measurement, nor for 
CR1-3. The coefficients (especially when studying the beta coefficient, see C.4) indicate that 
economy is the strongest explanatory part of the size variable in this multiple regression.  
My point is that this is a consequence of varying levels of market intervention, which remains 
somewhat independent of size variables, or rather circumvents the market. The larger markets 
are thus able to have more companies competing with the public companies, as these have higher 
chances for succeeding in achieving minimum efficient scale, as the included 4th-6th company is 
relatively smaller measured by share, than the 1st to 3rd company.   
I have shown that, based on the size definition, it is possible to identify a significant relationship 
between size and market concentration levels based on CR4-CR6, but not for the HHI 
measurement, nor for CR1-CR3, which I argue is a consequence of market intervention. The 
economy part of the size variable does however appear to exert some influence. Note that the 
HHI measurement is an overall concentration measure where it is evident that most markets are 
moderately to highly concentrated; this also means that it makes sense that there is a limited 
direct link to size, especially in the eye of the rather strong state intervention in the form of 
public broadcasters present in more of the sample markets. The size influence CR4-6 is 
interesting and substantiates my initial argument that the market characteristics are similar, but 
that the larger the market, the more potential there is for an increasing number of companies, i.e. 
due to higher potential for achieving minimum efficient scale due to more resource availability. 
In the CR1-CR3 public broadcasters hold important positions for most sample markets, which 
tells us about the influence and effect of state intervention. 
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5.4.3 Market concentration comparatively 
Below, I will introduce and discuss the individual market concentration measured by CR1-6 for 
all-day viewing, and HHI for both all-day and prime-time viewing. The reason for showing both 
is that all-day viewing illustrates the general level of competition, while the prime-time slots are 
where the toughest competition between the companies lies.  This is to be expected, as prime-
time is when the audience primarily view television. This also means that this is when the 
“premium” content, such as first run home-grown shows and high-profile news programmes are 
launched, i.e. when channels roll out what they believe can attract the most viewers. This shows 
in the HHI figures that while prime-time is different in each of the markets, this is dependent on 
that particular market’s working culture, and I have therefore applied the individual market 
prime-time definitions. The purpose of these tables is to study differences in market 
concentration to indicate the importance of market intervention.  
First I will present the CR index followed by the HHI figures. 
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Table 24: CR1-6 index based on combined company audience all-day viewing (ordered 
alphabetically). 
Source: Original data categorisation. The table is based on the table in appendix D, and was 
constructed following chapter 3.3.2.4, How does size influence concentration in television 
markets? The calculations are based on the equation from chapter 3.3.2.4.2.1.2, Concentration 
Ratio (CR). The table only depicts all-day viewing, but prime-time is also available in appendix 
D. The abbreviation n.a. equals that the data was not available in the dataset. Source data: 
Audience data is from EURO Data TV and the national audience measurement agencies. 
Ownership data is based on MAVISE and Amadeus databases in combination with annual 
reports.  
 CR1 CR2 CR3 CR4 CR5 CR6 
Austria 42,5 58,1 72,7 81,3 85,5 88,5 
Belgium Flemish 40,3 67,5 78,4 82,3 85,8 87,3 
Belgium French 26 46,1 63,2 80,3 85,6 87,6 
Bulgaria 40,2 54,4 71,5 78,4 81,1 82,6 
Cyprus 21,2 41,2 58,6 70,5 74,2 76,8 
Czech Republic 38,2 68,8 86,5 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  
Denmark 40 68,9 77,4 83,4 86,3 88,2 
Estonia 22,6 43,2 59 71,8 75,2 77,1 
Finland 44,7 76 90,1 90,9 91,6 92,2 
France 34 63,3 76,1 78,9 80,9 82,6 
Germany 26,6 48,2 71,5 86,8 89 90,1 
Greece 18,3 35,4 50,6 64,2 75,3 85,7 
Hungary 24,6 45,9 59 63,8 67,7 70,2 
Ireland 36,6 48,8 57,3 62,9 67,9 72,3 
Italy 42,1 81,8 86,2 89,3 90,3 90,8 
Latvia 22,6 43,3 58,6 69,3 72,2 72,4 
Lithuania 27,7 50,4 64,7 72,4 78,1 79,3 
Netherlands 34,9 58,5 77,8 82,3 85 86,9 
Norway 37,5 68,5 78,2 87,5 91,9 93,8 
Poland 44,5 68,3 85,6 87,5 89 90,3 
Portugal 30,5 59,9 84,8 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  
Romania 25,9 38,9 46,3 51,1 55,7 59,7 
Slovakia 35,1 57,1 74,1 n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  
Slovenia 37,7 69,2 74,9 79,3 81,5 83,2 
Spain 23,2 41,7 58,7 68,4 74 77,5 
Sweden 34,2 63,3 79,5 89,1 91,7 93,5 
UK 33,4 56,3 68,2 75,1 81,2 87 
Average 32,8 56,4 70,7 77,0 80,7 83,2 
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Table 24 shows the calculated concentration ratio based on the primary owner of the largest 
television companies in each market. The table shows CR1-6, except for three markets where the 
CR1-3 could be calculated. These are Portugal, Slovakia and the Czech Republic where it was 
mainly possible to identify the three largest media companies: however, leaving them out when 
they all reach above 70% on the CR3 ratio would not be reasonable as they all represent markets 
with high concentration levels. I will not include these markets in the description below, but keep 
in mind that they are more concentrated than in general.  
The CR ratio scores across the markets indicate some interesting similarities and differences. The 
reason for using all-day consumption is that this measure represents the general level of 
competition. The purpose is to study differences in market concentration to indicate the 
importance of market intervention, and to establish indications for the type of market structure. 
Note that the difference between the CR ratios is important: Italy for instance only has a 
difference between CR5 and CR6 of 0.5% but this also means that CR7 cannot increase more 
than 0.5% from CR6. This tells us about the maximum size of the remaining players in the 
market. 
The markets with the highest ratio based on the six largest companies can be distinguished 
between those above 60-69%, 70-79%, 80-89% and 90+% ratios: 
• The six markets with CR6 equal to or above 90% concentration level are 93.8% in 
Norway, 93.5% in Sweden, 92.2% in Finland, 90.8% in Italy, 90.3% in Poland and lastly 
90.1% in Germany.  
• There are nine markets (not counting Flemish- and French-speaking  Belgium separately) 
with ratios equal to or above 80%: Austria with 88.5%, Denmark with 88.2%, Belgium 
French with 87.6% and Flemish with 87.3%, UK with 87%, Netherlands with 86.9%, 
Greece with 85.7%, Slovenia with 83.2% as well as France and Bulgaria both with 
82.6%.  
• Seven markets have 70% ratio: Lithuania with 79.3%, Spain with 77.5%, Estonia with 
77.1%, Cyprus with 76.8%, Latvia with 72.4%, Ireland with 72.3%, and Hungary with 
70.2%.  
• Romania is the only market with less than 70%, having a CR6 ratio of 59.7%.  
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Studying these figures establishes a first synchronic perspective on the TV market concentration 
levels. What I have identified is that the television markets are mainly highly concentrated 
markets showing oligopoly tendencies and what is also evident is the degree of difference 
between the markets for the most part. The CR6 index shows me that from an overall 
perspective, I can substantiate the high concentration claim for the TV markets, but also that 
there is a set of markets viable for further research on market competition. The ratios also 
indicate that the market is usually dominated by roughly three-four companies, and usually not 
above six. This also helps explain why the linear relationship that was expected between size and 
market concentration was non-significant. 
The table shows quite a diverse picture of the structures in the individual markets, but it also 
indicates a trend of high concentration levels, which is emphasised by the CR4 ratios based on 
Albaran & Mierzejewska (2004): “a simple way to measure concentration is to use the four 
largest companies, i.e.… If the four-firm ratio is equal to or greater than 50 percent … then the 
market is said to be highly concentrated”.  
In figure 8 below the CR4, except for three markets where just the CR3 is used, is presented to 
show the degree of concentration. 
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Figure 8: Highly concentrated markets based on CR4 (by level of concentration from low 
to high) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Similar to table 24 
 
The figure shows that all TV markets, when using Albaran & Mierzejewska’s definition of the 
consumption figures, have: CR4≥50% = highly concentrated markets and that none are below 
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50% ratios. Indeed all except Romania would be highly concentrated even at CR3. The average 
is 77.5%, which underline the strong oligopoly tendencies in TV markets. 
Applying as a rule of thumb that CR4≥80% establishes challenges for competition, this is the 
case for 12 local markets (counting Belgium once): Austria, Belgium (Flemish- and French-
speaking), Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal and Sweden. While this method is not conclusive, it does indicate high levels of 
concentration. Furthermore, the table also indicates very diverse market structures in the sample. 
I will look into this below where the figures are recalculated into HHI. But first I will examine 
the relative position of the PSBs in the sample. 
The differences between the included markets are highly dependent on the scale of government 
intervention as based on the relative PSB market strength. I will use the PSB position in CR1-6 
to provide an example of how PSBs function as balances against commercial companies. 
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Table 25: PSB rank in the concentration ratio (ordered alphabetically)xlv 
Source: Original data categorisation based on appendix D.  
 First PSB rank Second PSB rank Third PSB rank 
CR position 1 Austria (ORF), Belgium 
Flemish (VRT), Cyprus 
(CYBC), Denmark 
(TV2/Denmark), Finland 
(YLE), France (France 
Televisions), Germany 
(ARD), Ireland (RTE), Italy 
(RAI), Netherlands (NPO), 
Norway (NRK), Poland 
(TVP), Spain (RTVE), 
Sweden (SVT), UK (BBC) 
  
CR position 2 Belgium French (RTBF), 
Czech Republic (CTV), 
Greece (ERT), Portugal (RTP), 
Slovakia (STV), Slovenia 
(RTV) 
Denmark (DR)  
CR position 3 Bulgaria (BNT), Estonia 
(ERR), Hungary (MTV), 
Latvia (LTV), Lithuania 
(LRT), Romania (TVR) 
Ireland (BBC – 
UK), Slovenia (HRT 
– Croatia), UK 
(Channel 4 Group),  
 
CR position 4  Austria (ARD - 
Germany), Belgium 
Flemish (NPO – 
Netherlands), 
Belgium French 
(France Televisions - 
France), Germany 
(ZDF) 
Ireland (Channel 4 
Group – UK) 
CR position 5   Austria (ZDF - 
Germany) 
CR position 6  Cyprus (ERT – 
Greece), Estonia 
(VGTP – Russia), 
France (ARTE), 
Netherlands (ORN 
TV), Spain 
(ASSOCIATION 
RELATIVE A LA 
TELEVISION 
EUROPEENNE),  
Germany (3SAT – 
joint operation), 
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Table 25 shows the position of the public media companies in the individual markets, where 
foreign PSBs have the name of the market of origin stated as well. In a majority of markets (15 
counting Flemish-speaking Belgium), the PSBs are market leading; in seven markets they are 
secondary; in five they are third. This means that the PSBs in general are among the strongest 
companies, and – usually – major domestic players. While there are differences in the relative 
strength of these, there are also markets with more than one PSB in CR1-6, such as Denmark 
where public companies hold both first and second position, Germany where they hold both first, 
fourth and sixth, as well as Spain, France and Netherlands where they hold first as well as sixth 
position.  
PSBs can function as a balance to the commercial companies, i.e. taking their relative market 
position into consideration. The most competitive markets are those with the weakest PSBs, and 
I can therefore show that government intervention does work in the sense of ensuring that 
audiences view domestic broadcasters, which insofar as they are defined as PSBs would 
broadcast content in the service of the public interest. While differences can also be related to the 
choice between state or commercial models towards the media, all included markets have 
relatively heavy regulatory regimes in TV, even if the deregulatory trend since the 1980s and 
1990s has removed some restrictions. 
My research aim is not to evaluate whether strong PSBs are beneficial or not, but conclusively 
these companies are surprisingly popular, even in a situation where fragmentation of audiences is 
a trend. The conclusion on PSBs is that without them, especially in small markets, the 
availability of domestic programmes would be limited, especially for genres like information and 
drama.  What is important to remember is that the PSBs represent direct state intervention in the 
market with the purpose of securing public interest. Looking at the differences in programming 
output in the Nordic market, I see a significant difference between the output of the main public 
and private companies (see Lund & Berg, 2009).  
The balance argument holds interest for public media companies as they have to secure some 
degree of legitimacy based on content and services provided, but at the same time they have to 
compete with their commercial counterparts. 
Below, I will investigate the market concentration levels measured by HHI for both all-day and 
prime-time viewing. This will establish the relative market concentration levels in the individual 
markets while taking into consideration the differences in company strength using the HHI 
measurement. 
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5.4.3.1 HHI measurement 
The application of the CRx measurement showed that the markets included are highly 
concentrated based on the CR4 figures, but I also identified high levels of difference. As such I 
will establish an HHI which gives greater weight to the share of the larger companies; this also 
means that even though I lack some small companies, this has little impact on the HHI (EU, 
2004). The remaining share is diverted into single share companies to establish the HHI as 
correctly as possible (Tirole, 1988). The figures will be presented in table format below and 
include both all-day and prime-time viewing to establish the level of difference. 
 
The measurement will be applied to establish an initial level of market concentration based on 
the HHI level set by the US Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (1992, 
revised 1997) in their Horizontal Merger Guidelines (hereafter US guidelines) for concentration 
of market shares in section 1.5, which are the following: “The Agency divides the spectrum of 
market concentration as measured by the HHI into three regions that can be broadly 
characterized as unconcentrated (HHI below 1000), moderately concentrated (HHI between 
1000 and 1800), and highly concentrated (HHI above 1800)…”. Applying this framework will 
help establish the concentration level based on another method of measurement.    
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Figure 9: Market concentration measured by HHI for both all-day and prime-time 
consumption (ordered by prime time) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own categorisation of data based on the constructed table in the appendix D. Similar to 
table 24. The calculations are based on the equation from chapter 3.3.2.4.2.1.1, Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index HHI.  
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Figure 9 shows overall similarity between the all-day and prime-time HHI figures where the 
averages are 2068 for all-day and 2362 for prime-time. Both indicate – on average - highly 
concentrated markets, but it also shows differences in the individual markets. This picture with a 
stronger prime-time concentration was what could be expected as the audience views most 
television in the evening. This is what increases the incentive for broadcasters in general, and 
commercial broadcasters in particular, to roll out their most audience-attracting programming to 
secure viewers and thus revenuexlvi. 
The large Italian market is the most concentrated in the involved sample with an HHI of 3388 in 
all-day and 3563 in prime-time consumption; this is heavily reliant on the duopoly relation 
between the public broadcaster RAI and Mediaset S.P.A. This is closely followed by the small 
market in Finland for all-day consumption with an HHI of 3186 and 3227 in prime-time, where 
there is a similar pattern with the public broadcaster YLE and the Bonnier owned MTV Media; 
the main difference lies in the strength of the third competitor where Nelonen Media is stronger 
than Sky (Newscorp) in Italy. 
The high Italian and Polish market concentration is to some degree attributable to the positions 
of RAI and TVP, the same being the case in Norway and Denmark as well as in several other 
markets. The established duopolistic and oligopolistic market competition actively limits entry 
by applying deterrent niche-channel strategies.  
The degree of market concentration appears to have a significant relationship to the scale and 
scope of government intervention in the markets as also indicated in table 25 above, especially 
when combined with figure 9 above.  
Romania is the least all-day concentrated with HHI of 995 in all-day, increased to 1176 in prime-
time, but it is not that far from the Greek, Latvian and Hungarian markets. This establishes an 
indication of market similarity, where I can claim that both small and large markets can be more 
or less competitive, depending on the market barriers to entry and exit combined with the 
regulatory conditions and PSBs in the markets. 
What remains are that both the most and least concentrated markets are large ones and this also 
indicates something about the influence of market intervention. Large markets like UK, 
Germany, France, Italy and Poland are all highly concentrated in all-day viewing as well as 
prime-time, while the others are moderately concentrated in these instances like Spain,. These 
large markets have heavy governmental intervention in the media in common, using reasonably 
funded PSB in combination with strong commercial broadcasters. Similarly all small markets 
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range from moderate to high concentration levels. The main difference is Romania, which based 
on all-day viewing is unconcentrated. 
One interpretation of these results could be that size does not matter, as I expected smaller 
markets to be more concentrated based on the second hypothesis. But size does matter, as the 
differences lie in the strength of the companies in each market, meaning that the large market 
companies with similar strength to a small market, have more potential revenue as a consequence 
of critical mass and the market characteristics, as argued in chapter 2 and shown in the analysis 
in chapter 4 based on the first hypothesis. 
The is because scarcity conditions have to be kept in mind when interpreting the results as this 
links the results with the level of funds in each market. A large market television company with a 
similar strength of concentration (level of audience share) would have a higher potential turnover 
due to critical mass, than a similar strength small market television company. Thus, what I have 
identified substantiates my first hypothesis researched in chapter 4. Importantly it also 
documents that small and large markets are usually highly concentrated when studied using this 
method of measurement. 
The market difference when using HHI in contrast to the CR analysis shows the differences 
related to relative company strength. Table 26 below illustrates in more detail that, based on the 
sample, the television markets in general range from moderately to highly concentrated, whereas 
only a one can be defined as unconcentrated. The unconcentrated market is around the borderline 
towards moderate concentration. This remains in line with the theory stating that television 
markets will be concentrated, but it does question whether small markets should be more 
concentrated than large ones. It also shows that the markets where the PSBs have the weakest 
market position are the ones with the least concentrated markets measured by HHI.   
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Table 26: Difference between all-day and prime-time 
 Low 
concentration 
Moderate 
concentration 
High concentration 
All-day Romania Hungary, Latvia, 
Estonia, Spain, Greece, 
Cyprus, Belgium 
French, Ireland, 
Lithuania 
Austria, Belgium Flemish, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Slovenia, Netherlands, UK, 
Germany, Poland, Italy, Sweden, 
Norway, Slovakia, Portugal,  
Prime- 
time 
 Romania, Hungary, 
Latvia, Estonia, Spain, 
Cyprus, Greece 
Belgium French, Ireland, Lithuania, 
France, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Netherlands, 
UK, Belgium Flemish, Denmark, Austria, 
Germany, Poland, Italy, Finland, Sweden, 
Norway, Slovakia, Portugal, Czech 
Republic 
Source: Original data categorisation based on the results in figure 9 
 
Table 26 shows that for all-day consumption, 17 markets (counting the Flemish-speaking 
Belgium) can be considered highly concentrated, while nine (counting French-speaking 
Belgium) are moderately concentrated and one can be considered unconcentrated, albeit at the 
margin of moderate concentration. In prime-time consumption, this changes to 20 highly 
concentrated markets (counting both Flemish- and French-speaking Belgium), seven moderately 
concentrated and none unconcentrated. 
This original data categorisation substantiates the argument that the TV market carries an 
inherent drive towards concentration. But it also shows a great deal of variation between both 
small and large markets. This indicates that I cannot per definition expect size automatically to 
have significance on the level of market concentration, as state intervention practices offset or 
balance commercial market logic.  
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I argue that what influences market concentration is a combination of factors, where market 
intervention in the form of a public broadcaster and other regulatory conditions impacts by 
changing the rules of the game.  
This should not be interpreted as meaning that size does not matter, as a similar ratio would 
mean that size actually impacts, the reason being that the difference is in the size of the 
companies required to reach an equal level of concentration. For instance the German market 
competition between the public broadcasters (ARD, ZDF) and the main commercial companies 
(RTL and ProSieben.Sat.1) consists of stronger companies (measured by revenue) than the 
Danish, Swedish and Norwegian market companies,  even though the overall competition in 
these markets is similar between purely publicly funded public broadcasters, a large domestic 
company (TV2/Denmark, TV2/Norway and TV4/Sweden), and the two main commercial 
competitors (owned by ProSieben.Sat.1 and MTG in all three markets).  
Even though the Nordic markets are overall a little more concentrated than the German and the 
UK markets, this does not in any way mean that the companies in the Nordic markets are 
stronger in level of relative economic capability. 
The case of Romania with a level of concentration around the threshold between low and 
moderately concentrated markets is interesting, as it is the only one. One of the evident reasons is 
the relatively limited public broadcasting intervention strength and that Romania has high 
audience fragmentation levels.  
The relative strength of the market intervention caused by public broadcasters also shows that I 
cannot isolate the actual effect of size in this. The argument that small markets have less critical 
mass and thus should be more concentrated rings true, but government intervention through PSB 
using public revenue means that I cannot fully substantiate this.  
The main point here is that interventions in the market ensure that the critical mass is surpassed 
in terms of what the market can yield in commercial terms and thus change that condition: this is 
one of the situations where the characteristics of market and content goods are leveraged by 
direct intervention. 
The data supports the hypothesis of concentrated TV media markets, but also that there are major 
differences between the included markets. I also see that PSBs highly influence the concentration 
level as a consequence of the market positions.  
As a rule of thumb, the TV markets are oligopolies for all included European markets, where the 
main question is what type of oligopoly there is, i.e. is it a duopoly with a weak third, or are there 
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three-four companies of almost the same size? Different market constellations can result in 
differences in terms of services provided and in quality of content. It is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation to investigate actual effects of different oligopoly market structures.  
The PSBs appear to hold a significant position in several of the markets. There are reasons to be 
concerned in some markets based on their constellation for television, while the multinational 
corporation challenge appears most viable for the Eastern European markets. 
The TV markets are fairly concentrated. Part of this is related to the relative strength of the PSBs 
and their position in the markets.  
Moderate and strong PSBs (usually) with state funding and privileges function as market 
correctors which can change the rules of the game in the market. PSBs distort market 
competition per definition.  
However, correcting market failure, understood as per the established merit-good definition of 
the state, is the purpose of their existence. In effect, PSBs can function as quality standard setters 
for content in general, as well as for news and information in particular.  
This can also help the AV-industry in the individual markets, as the public company has to train 
media professionals and fund television content, which will not otherwise be financed to the 
same degree.  
Furthermore, it appears that it is the regulatory measures and PSBs that set the rules of the game 
for commercial broadcasters. This means that large markets can be as concentrated as small 
markets as a result of government intervention. The point is that size is not alone in influencing 
the TV market concentration levels, but rather this is a function of a combination of factors 
including regulatory measures taken by the state, and especially the effect of the PSBs – as they 
remain the largest companies in most of the sample markets. 
The current condition of the TV industry is moderate to high levels of concentration for most 
markets in either duopolies or oligopolies. The public broadcaster in this game plays the actual 
role of balance by setting a level of quality for the individual commercial broadcasters to 
compete against if they want to secure an audience. I have established that the TV markets range 
from moderate to high concentration levels in most domestic markets measured by HHI and 
highly concentrated measured by CR4. Furthermore, I have sought to present the relative 
position of the PSBs in this measurement, and the level of government intervention appears to 
have an effect on the level of market concentration.  
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I find an indication of oligopoly market structures for the European markets, but with high levels 
of variation for the individual markets in terms of specific type of oligopoly. 
Below, transnational ownership considerations are presented and discussed in relation to the 
considerations above on ownership and indirect considerations on large market player benefits. 
 
5.4.4 Transnational ownership of television companies 
There are dwarfs and giants in the TV markets. While the audience trend moves towards 
increased fragmentation, the ownership of these outlets, it has been argued, is becoming 
increasingly concentrated. Above, I have presented the market concentration levels in the 
individual markets and here the intention is to show the ownership across markets using these 
figures. 
 
The purpose of studying transnational ownership of television companies is twofold:  
1. Firstly it is done to identify the competition public TV companies is subject to in small 
and large markets, and if there are changed conditions of competition in a way where a 
“dominant” public television company in a particular market is actually in international 
comparison under pressure due to the strength of multinational corporations.  
2. Secondly it is done to determine whether the multinational corporations appear to benefit 
from economies of scale and thus having a benefit of size, by entering multiple markets, 
thus increasing their crucial mass. multinational corporations can in principle be small in 
one or more particular market, but when combined could actually be a large player. This 
would also mean that these companies are not in the same way subject to the conditions 
of size as domestic companies in small markets, as their markets are larger (i.e. more than 
a single domestic market) than most domestic broadcasters, and especially most public 
broadcasters.  
 
To study this particular aspect of size, such companies much reach across at least two markets. 
By defining multinational corporations as companies owning multiple stations and outlets 
internationally, I should be able to measure the relative share levels in the individual markets 
based on primary ownership.  
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Public media are usually argued to be acting on behalf of the public interest (at least in most of 
the included markets) with some differences in the scale and scope of government influence.  
All types of ownership can be accused of having a bias of one type or another, the public towards 
government policies, the private towards their commercial interests, and the non-profit private 
media towards their particular cause. The benefit of a combination of public and private media is 
that they effectively have to compete for the audience, and this can yield benefits to the quality 
of content insofar as the competition is advantageous; should it be disadvantageous, the quality is 
at risk of worsening as a consequence of cost-saving or profit-optimisation due to ruinous 
competition. As indicated by Park (2005), high levels of competition may result in reduced levels 
of diversity; this has also been shown by Richard van der Wurff and Jan Van Cuilenburg (2001) 
in their study of the Dutch market, where they identified that competition can lead to ruinous 
competition with high-levels of low-quality programming. 
When concentration of ownership is discussed as being problematic, it can be argued that this is 
a consequence of high levels of concentration of media ownership which increase the risk of 
very few agents having potential influence on both economic and political affairs and thus being 
unaccountable to the public.  
Accountability is a key term here, especially when it comes to ensuring that the media are 
following public interests and not only particular commercialxlvii or state interests.  
The public TV media have served as an effective counterweight, ensuring that the commercial 
media have not been able to monopolise information streams, as well as how this information is 
presented.  
A second concern is that even though there might be an increase in fragmentation, as a 
consequence of increasing channel-supply, this does not mean that these are not owned by the 
same companies. If there is an increasing amount of outlets in combination with fewer owners, 
diversity is not necessarily increased, but is not necessarily decreased either. 
The questions of interest are whether the multinational corporations (a) are actually pan-
European and (b) if they are marginal factors or (c) if they have the potential for a significant 
impact in terms of share of consumption by their supplied services.  
In table 27 below, I will show the trans-market share of the primary media companies in the 
individual markets which are present in the CR1-6 in two or more markets. The domestic public 
media have been retained in the table, but names of the foreign public TV companies involved in 
cross-viewing have been removed, but can be seen in the appendix D under the individual 
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sample market. It is a matter of argument, but there is cross-viewing especially in Austria, 
Switzerland, Flemish-speaking Belgium and Ireland, as well as in some of the Eastern European 
markets, as per chapter 5.3.2.4.  
I have plotted the share figures of the largest companies with similar primary ownership in the 
table, but keep in mind that only those companies in the top six in combination with having a 
presence in two or more markets are included. 
 The table illustrates a proxy for trans-national ownership in the included markets based on the 
primary ownership principle and derived from the six largest media companies in the individual 
markets. As the included companies are the largest in the individual markets, this means that in 
companies with low share ratings, as can be the case with specialist channels such as CNN, 
Disney, Discovery and MTV/VIACOM, there is more cross-ownership than indicated in the 
table.  
I have decided on this method to simplify the output. While I have the other figures for several of 
the markets, it became evident that there were massive differences in each of them, based on 
regulatory frameworks and the strength of the public TV media. I have decided to keep the 
strongest channels in the individual markets to establish a first synchronous perspective of trans-
national ownership; this makes it easier to correct the figures before beginning the establishment 
of time-series data. This table is relevant solely for Europe as I lack more global-wide data to 
establish a more coherent picture of trans-national ownership. The abbreviations used in table 27 
are shown below. 
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Abbreviation Name 
Nat. PSB National PSBs 
For.PSB Foreign PSBs 
P7S1 ProSiebenSat.1 Media AG 
RTL Bertelsmann & RTL group 
Disney The Walt Disney Company 
MTG Modern Times Group 
VIA VIACOM INC (Video & Audio Communications) 
DIS Discovery Communications Inc. 
BON Bonnier AB 
MAI MEDIA AD INFINITUM 
BOU BOUYGUES (TF1) 
ITV Independent Television 
NC News Corp. +BskyB 
VIV Vivendi SA 
Mset Mediaset S.p.A. 
PRI PROMOTORA DE INFORMACIONES SA (\Prisa\) 
LA7 LA 7 TV 
TW/CEME Time Warner & Central European Media Enterprises 
ANTV ANTENNA TV S.A. 
PBK PIRMAIS BALTIJAS KANALS SIA 
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Table 27: Cross-ownership share of a company having a CR1-CR6 in the individual market and reaching two or more markets 
 
Nat. 
PSB 
For. 
PSB 
P7S
1 RTL Disney MTG VIA DIS BON MAI BOU ITV NC VIV Mset PRI LA7 
TW/ 
CEME ANTV PBK 
AT 42,5 12,8 15, 14,6 
               
 BE FL 44,2 
 
10,
   
1,5 
  
3,8 
         
 
BE FR 20,1 17,1 
 
26 
  
2 
  
5,3 17,1 
        
 
BG 14,2 
    
17,1 
      
40,2 
    
2,7 
 
 CH 33,1 8,9 8,9 14,2 
      
5 
        
 CH IT 32 22 
            
25,6 
 
1,3 2,5 
 
 CH DE 32,8 17 13 16,2 
               
 CH FR 30,6 15,9 
 
12,1 
      
18,1 
      
2,2 
 
 CY 21,2 2,6 
                
17,4 
 CZ 30,6   
  
17,7 
           
38,2 
 
 
DE 43 
 
21, 23,3 
  
2,2 
            
 
DK 68,9 
 
8,5 
 
2,9 8,5 
 
1,9 
           
 
EE 15,8 3,4 
 
1,9 
 
22,6 
             
12,8 
EI 36,6 13,5 
         
4,4 5,6 
      
 
ES 26,7 
             
18,5 9,7 
   
 
FI 44,7 
 
0,8 
   
0,7 0,6 31,3 
          
 
FR 35,7 
  
12,8 
      
29,3 
  
2 
     
 GB 45,3 
  
6,1 
       
22,9 6,9 
      
 GR 17,1 
  
13,6 
              
15,2 
 
HU 13,1 
 
21, 24,6 
 
4,8 
             
 
IT 42,1 
   
1 
       
4,4 
 
39,7 
 
3,1 
  
 
LT 14,3 
    
27,7 
             
5,7 
LV 15,3 
  
2,9 
 
20,7 0,2 
     
22,6 
      
10,7 
NL 36,8 
 
19, 23,6 
  
4,5 2,7 
           
 NO 37,5 
 
9,7 
 
4,4 9,3 
 
2,9 
           
 
PL 44,5 
     
1,5 1,3 
     
1,9 
     
 
PT 29,4 
              
30,5 
   
 
RO 7,4 
 
4,8 
              
25,9 
 
 SE 34,2 
 
9,6 
 
1,8 16,2 
 
2,6 29,1 
          
 SI 31,5 4,4 
 
2,2 
 
5,7 
 
1,7 
         
37,7 
 
 SK 22 
                
35,1 
 
 US 
    
13,4 
 
12,2 
     
10,3 
    
13,4 
 
 
Source: Original categorisation of data based on appendix D   
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Table 27 shows that the multinational corporations’ impact in most markets is not one of 
domination, as in most they have not reached a level of direct threat to the individual ecologies. 
But they have reached a level where further research would be valuable, especially in Eastern 
Europe and on the role of the RTL group and Pro7.Sat1 in Europe.  
Information-wise, the table includes the figures of the 20 commercial media companies present 
between the six largest TV media companies in the 29 included markets (counting Flemish- and 
French-speaking Belgium separately) and not counting the three Swiss regions. I will not report 
on the three Swiss linguistic areas, but they have been retained to show that language matters in 
terms of cultural proximity. Note that the US has been included, as many of the largest 
companies originate there, in order to secure some comparison. Markets such as Bulgaria reach 
60%, French Belgium 50.4%, the Czech Republic 55.9%, Hungary 50.7%, Lithuania 57.1 and 
Netherlands 50.1%. Sweden also yields a positive with 59.3%, primarily due to TV4 majority 
holder Bonnier, but there are differences in the type of potential threat this represents. The main 
challenge in the Netherlands lies in the strength of two European multinational corporations, the 
RTL group and Pro7.Sat.1. In French-speaking Belgium, it is the foreign penetration that has 
influence, while the main challenge in Eastern Europe is a consequence of market development 
flowing from their acceptance into the EU, i.e. regulatory and legislative alignment. Here, it is 
interesting to look at the potential challenges facing the Eastern European markets. For the most 
part domestic companies continue to dominate, and while there are differences, the levels of 
potential threat have to be studied individually using in-depth case-study methods. 
First, there are seven companies operating in two markets (Swiss regional): Bonnier which is 
present in Sweden and Finland; MEDIA AD INFINITUM is in Flemish- and French-speaking  
Belgium markets; ANTENNA TV S.A is present in Cyprus and Greece; ITV is in the UK and 
Ireland; PROMOTORA DE INFORMACIONES SA (Prisa) is in Spain and Portugal, Media Set 
is in Italy and Spain, and Vivendi operates in France and Poland. Secondly there are two 
companies present in three markets; PIRMAIS BALTIJAS KANALS SIA is in the Baltic markets 
of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; BOUYGUESxlviii (TF1) is in France, Switzerland and French-
speaking  Belgium. These are not the companies I have a main interest in. Below, I will study 
the companies present among the six largest companies in at least five markets. I will not go into 
detail about each of the companies, nor include all their properties in this particular study. 
 
Walt Disney Company is present as one of the six largest companies in five of the markets, 
being in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Italy primarily with children and youth channels, but 
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also in the US with the Disney/ABC television group. The children and youth channels are 
actually broadcast by satellite to most European markets as subscription channels; in fact Disney 
Channel in 2009 had 194.3 mn. subscribers around the world, albeit with around 98 mn. of these 
in the US (WDC, 2009xlix). To this I can add ESPN, AETN/LIFTIM as well as other cable type 
properties, such as Jetix, Disney XD and Playhouse. By using the pay-TV development and 
digitalisation, Disney has managed to utilise their economies of scale as well as scope. An 
indication of this is the increase in revenue from $24.4 bn.  in 1999 (Disney, 1999), to $36.1 bn. 
in 2009 (Disney, 2009). This is a reduction from the $37.8 bn. in 2008, but still better than the 
$35.5 bn. in 2007, meaning that they are beginning to regain ground after the financial crisis. 
 
News Corporation is present in six markets as one of the largest six companies in: Bulgaria, 
Ireland, the UK, Italy, Latvia and the US. The company represents a total revenue of $30.4 bn. 
in 2009, an increase from $21.8 bn. in 1999. The News Corporation has interests across a wide 
spectre of media outlets, ranging from newspaper and information services in the UK and 
Australasia and internationally, to the Fox Broadcasting Company, 20th Century Fox, Sky Direct 
satellite television and the publisher HarperCollins (News Corporation, 1999, 2009). 
 
Time Warner & Central European Media Enterprises is present in six TV markets. Time Warner 
operates in Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and the US. Time 
Warner’s assets are in networks, filmed entertainment and publishing with the companies HBO, 
Turner Broadcasting System, Warner Bros. Entertainment and Time Inc. In addition Time 
Warner has a 31% stake in CEME. Time Warner’s total revenue in 2009 amounted to $25.8 bn., 
a decrease from $26.5 bn. in 2008 due to the economic crisis (Time Warner, 2009.)l. 
 
Discovery Communications Inc. is present in seven TV markets as one of the six largest: 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and Slovenia. Discovery 
Communications Inc.’s primary business consists of its US networks, their international 
networks and its auxiliary business related to commerce, education and other activities. It has 
channels like Discovery Channel, TLC, Animal Planet, Discovery Health, Own, Discovery 
Kids, Hub, Science Channel, Planet Green, Investigation Discovery, Military Channel, Fit TV 
and HD Theater. The company revenue in 2009 was $3.5 bn., a small increase from 2008 when 
the revenue was $3.4  bn.  
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VIACOM is one of the six largest companies in eight of the TV markets: Flemish and French 
Belgium, Germany, Finland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland and the US. Company-wise, it 
owns media network properties including MTV Networks (MTV, VH1 CMT, LOGO, 
HARMONIX and MTV Games), Nickelodeon (Nickelodeon, Nick@nite, Nick.com, Nick Jr. 
Teennick, Nicktoons and more), Comedy Central (Comedy Central, Spike TV and TV Lnd) and 
Bet Networks. Under filmed entertainment it has Paramount Pictures, Paramount Vantage, 
Paramount Classics, MTV films and Nickelodeon Movie brands. Total revenue in 2009 
amounted to $13.6 bn., a decrease from $16.6 bn. in 2008, but more than the $13.4 bn. in 2007 
(Viacom, 2009). The company has been able to utilise its properties and intellectual property on 
an international scale. While National Amusements Inc. is a majority owner of both VIACOM 
& CBS, I have kept the two separate here in terms of ownership.  
 
Discovery Communications Inc. is an interesting case as its activities are primarily related to 
TV; this can help in the understanding of the drivers in the contemporary TV industry. Its 
revenue is divided between $1.7 bn. for distribution (i.e. subscription), $1.4 bn. for 
advertisement and $375 million from other sources. The international network reaches roughly 
685 mn. subscribers in 170 countries, but its advertisement revenue  only counted for 29% in 
contrast to the 51% of the US network (Discovery Communications, 2009); this also establishes 
an indication of revenue dependency.  
As stated in the Discovery Communications annual report (2009): “Nearly 50% of Discovery’s 
revenue is generated from recurring subscriber fees through multi-year contractual relationships 
with our distribution partners. This long-cycle revenue provides top-line sturdiness and helps 
insulate the company from choppy and difficult environments, such as we experienced this past 
year. Importantly, Discovery’s revenue is also geographically diverse with more than one third 
generated outside of the U.S., including many of the fastest-growing pay-TV markets in the 
world“… “Internationally, Discovery’s networks leveraged the continued secular growth trends 
of pay-TV around the globe to expand its subscriber base and deliver 9% affiliate revenue 
growth, excluding the impact of foreign currency fluctuations”.  
In a similar way to Disney, Discovery also piggy-backs on the spread of pay-penetration to 
increase global reach, which enables utilisation of economies of scale in particular, but also 
scope. This is also substantiated in the report where it is stated that “The segment [International 
networks] maximizes the use of shared content and our global programming pipeline in order to 
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drive consumer engagement and efficiencies across all core brands, and delivers locally 
targeted customized programming, on-air content and schedules in 38 languages via more than 
100 localized feeds”. …”Our media content spans genres including science, exploration, 
survival, natural history, sustainability of the environment, technology, anthropology, 
paleontology, history, space, archaeology, health and wellness, engineering, adventure, 
lifestyles and current events. This type of programming tends to be culturally neutral and 
maintains its relevance for an extended period of time. As a result, our content translates well 
across international borders and is made even more accessible through extensive use of dubbing 
and subtitles in local languages, as well as the creation of local programming tailored to 
individual market preferences.”. In a sense, Discovery attempts full utilisation of the benefits of 
its particular portfolio, with the benefits granted by its brand.  
 
Disney, Discovery, Viacom, but also partly Time Warner and News Corporation, have followed 
a similar strategy internationally when it comes to utilising economies of scale, but have 
operated slightly differently when it comes to scope. A primary perspective here is that in a 
sense their primary market is the US, but the development of the international entertainment 
business has encouraged and made viable a more global business perspective which these 
companies have utilised. This development continues as the TV markets and their auxiliary 
businesses mature. 
 
Modern Times Group (MTG) is present in 10 of the markets, consisting of the Nordic countries 
(Denmark, Norway and Sweden), the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and other 
Eastern European markets, i.e. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia. The MTG 
properties range from Free-TV, Pay-TV (VIASAT, TV1000) through to radio, online activities 
and studios. MTG revenue amounted to 14.2 bn. SEK in 2009, an increase from 13.2 bn. SEK in 
2008).  
 
ProSiebenSat.1 Media AG is present in 11 of the markets (not counting the German- and 
French-speaking Swiss regions). They operate in the Scandinavian markets (Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden and Finland), in Central Europe (Austria, Germany, Flemish Belgium, Switzerland, the 
Netherlands) and in Eastern Europe (Hungary and Romania). The company has made a 
complete list of properties available in its financial statement and management report for 2009: 
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its core business mainly consists of free-TV, but also includes pay-TV and radio activities. The 
company reaches 78 mn. European TV households and had consolidated revenue of €2.76 bn. in 
2009, a decrease of 9.6% compared to the revenue of €3.05 bn. in 2008 (Pro7.Sat.1, 2009)li.  
 
Bertelsmann (RTL group) is present in 12 of the markets (not counting the German-speaking 
Swiss region). The markets where they are among the six largest players are Austria, French 
Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, France, the UK, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, the Netherlands and 
Slovenia. The company’s consolidated revenue in 2009 was €15.36 bn., a decrease from the 
2008 revenue of €16.24 bn. The RTL group represented 34.4% of the total revenue in 2009 
equal to €5.4 bn., a drop from €5.77 bn. in 2008. This makes RTL group with its content 
production arm Fremantle Media a leading player in the European TV landscape. The revenue 
originated mainly in Europe, with 34.4% from Germany, 58.1% in the other European markets, 
5.1% from the US and just 2.4% from other markets. Its properties cover both radio and 
television in the RTL group; the publishers Random House [books] and Gruner + Jahr 
[magazines] as well as the media and communications services provider Arvato. A complete list 
of properties and subsidiaries is available in its annual report (Bertelsmann, 2009) 
 
The larger corporations are active in several markets, but usually through different means and 
using different strategies. Buy-ups appear to have been the way forward, pursuing the more 
profitable markets first. The overall influence of multinational corporations appears remarkably 
balanced by both domestic public and private companies. Some multinational corporations have 
a major presence in particular areas, but the picture was far more diverse than anticipated before 
starting the investigation.  
 
5.4.5 Discussion on market concentration and the influence of multinational 
corporations 
While I cannot ascertain that the multinational corporations pose a direct threat in most markets 
based on these figures, this has been perceived in the context of strong PSBs. This is not the 
entire explanation and what table 26+27 substantiates is that the PSBs in effect balance the 
commercial strength, where it does not matter if the competitor is domestic or foreign. The main 
challenge lies in ensuring that the PSBs have sufficient revenue to secure their role in the market 
in the eye of increasing competition. Studying the multinational corporations’ presence in the 
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individual markets, I see three large European players RTL, Pro7.Sat.1. and MTG. RTL and 
Pro7.Sat.1. are clearly the largest in terms of economic capability. These companies are the ones 
with the strongest presence in most of the included markets. The individual companies present 
among the six largest companies in at least five markets are presented below. I will not go into 
detail for each of the companies, nor include all their properties in this particular study. 
The markets with the highest rate of multinational corporations are in the Eastern European 
market: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania and Slovenia have the most. Besides 
these, there are also some in Central Europe based on RTL and Pro7.Sat1 ownership. But what I 
can see here is also that in most markets, the strength of the PSB is capable of balancing the 
commercial companies. The main concern is that the market strength in some cases appears to 
be divided between two primary players with a weaker third/fourth. What should have increased 
focus is the actual conduct of the companies in the individual markets in order to investigate 
what happens when there are relatively few competing companies. There would be merit in 
investigating the effects in the Eastern European region, which has high level of foreign entry in 
terms of both acquisitions and foreign penetration. This would help to establish the differences 
between domestic and foreign company conditions. 
Studying the development of the companies, I see that they increasingly take advantage of their 
potential for economies of scale by using niche-channels to enter new multi-channel markets, or 
to launch new channels in already established markets to secure full utilisation of resources and 
investment in content. The benefits for the multinational corporations lie in the potential for 
bundling rights and purchasing power for premium sports, where the companies dependent on 
single markets risk being unable to fund these rights. In effect I find that there is a three-tier 
system in the domestic market competition between PSBs and both domestic and/or 
international players, potentially with local auxiliaries. Studying the ownership features also 
indicates that there is a dual market between players with primarily domestic interests and those 
with a more pan-regional or international interest. This indicates that I should distinguish 
between competition at the local level and competition in the global marketplace, e.g. those 
competing in a particular market and the battle over the most attractive content rights 
(potentially bundled) across territories. 
The transnational-ownership in TV markets does not appear to be a considerable danger in terms 
of audience consumption in most markets, although there is high impact in certain countries.  
What does appear interesting is the economic strength of these companies in contrast to the 
public companies. Furthermore, there is a question of cultural proximity on the one hand and 
international niche-channels on the other when studying the impact of multinational 
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corporations in the markets. Some of the markets with larger same-language neighbours have 
very high foreign penetration share rates, which should not be considered a direct result of 
multinational corporation impact, but rather linked to the cultural proximity thesis. As defined 
by Straubhaar (2003: 85), cultural proximity is "... the tendency to prefer media products from 
one's own culture or the most similar possible culture". Overall, the domestic companies, 
including the public ones, dominate the TV market for the most part. 
Both the critical and the more realistic approaches to media ownership and concentration have 
merit. In the individual markets, there can be high levels of concentration which can be 
detrimental for the market, but on the other hand, in terms of multinational corporations, I can 
see an advent in the aftermath of digitalisation and growing pay-penetration which increases the 
globally available consumer group. 
What I am interested in is whether the multinational corporations have an impact or significance 
outside their home-markets. Several large media conglomerates within TV are only present in 
their domestic and neighbouring markets. Can these be considered more problematic than a 
situation where Berlusconi controls Media Set on the one hand, and at the same time was in a 
position with the potential to influence the Italian PSB RAI? Is the strength of the Pro7.Sat1 in 
the Nordic markets any threat when taking into consideration the market structure? Companies 
such as Disney and Discovery are taking advantage of the digitalisation process to enable them 
to increase revenue globally. Technological development drives these trends and increases 
audience fragmentation and thus alters market conditions. But overall, the TV market structure 
is relatively stable. 
In terms of impact, Herman and McChesney (1997) argued that the influence of globalisation on 
national cultures can in the worst cases be considered destructive, and in the best varied. The 
central point is the growth of transnational corporations, increased internationalisation and  
centralisation of media control. They state: “We regard the primary effect of the globalization 
process – the crucial feature of globalization, and manifestation of the strength of the great 
powers and TNCs whose interests they serve – to be the implantation of the commercial model 
of communication, its extension to broadcasting and the ‘new media’ and its gradual 
intensification under the force of competition and bottom-line pressures. The commercial model 
has its own internal logic and, being privately owned and relying on advertiser support, tends to 
erode the public sphere and create a ‘culture of entertainment’ that is incompatible with a 
democratic order. Media outputs are commodified and are designed to service market ends, not 
citizenship needs”.  
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While I can contend that the TV markets are global if a company is able to utilise economies of 
scale, this is an argument with limitations. While I accept that the multinational corporations are 
able to penetrate more and more markets, and in this way can grow in the maturation process of 
the TV markets thanks to digitalisation and increased pay-penetration, this does not necessarily 
entail a high-level threat to the domestic media systems in the short term. However, should these 
organisations reach a level where they have a major impact, there is a risk of revenue being 
diverted to international companies which can put increased pressure on the domestic TV 
industry; in particular, it is also important to take into account the risk of accountability 
displacement. 
The finding that, from an overall perspective, it remains the domestic companies which 
dominate in the analysis, is in line with Tunstall (2008), who argues that national media 
industries are dominant worldwide, and that the US media have a relatively small market share 
in other countries. This is based on the argument that audience preferences are national, cultural 
and linguistic.  
However, what is often forgotten is that even though national media companies are dominant, 
the question remains whether this is with domestic programming or foreign. This makes the 
understanding of domestic companies a bit elastic as I can reasonably argue that for the most 
part it is foreign in small markets.  
This conclusion is in an overall perspective substantiated in this analysis as well. Although there 
are markets where the multinational corporations have a larger role, the audience continues to 
prefer domestic channels and domestic content, which is in line with Sinclair, Jacka and 
Cunningham (1996), who note that although TV is increasingly global in an industrial sense and 
even when taking the multi-channel development into consideration, it remains more local (i.e. 
domestic) than global (i.e. international) in the increasingly multi-channel market. Straubhaar’s 
(1991) argument on cultural proximity in this sense rings also true, as such behaviour from the 
audience will generate advantages to local TV production. While the market concentration 
generally ranges from moderate to high, domestic media companies retain the major positions in 
most of the markets, but there are conditions in certain parts of Eastern Europe which warrant 
increased scrutiny. 
Under conditions of increasing returns to scale, minimum efficient scale of companies is a 
condition of interest as this can establish a negative influence on the influx of new entrants. The 
threat towards domestic markets thus arrives from international channels utilising economies of 
scale to their benefit; measured in terms of competition this is beneficial, but in regard to the 
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consumer interest in domestic production, there are two possible outcomes: either the companies 
in the market will secure share through domestic programming and premium rights, or they will 
attempt to reduce costs by acquisitioned programmes.  
This can be a benefit to the content producers able to utilise scale economics, as indicated in 
other industries (Bernard & Jensen, 1999, 2004) where companies exporting tend to be more 
efficient than their non-exporting counterparts, meaning that exporting companies either face 
more competition and adapt or have to be more efficient to enter the export markets. This is also 
why an international focus can be important for commercial TV operators to ascertain their 
business success.  
Instead of perceiving the current development as a direct threat to television, it is more a 
development towards increased competition and diversification of television products, which 
will focus the media companies either towards niche-markets, or other revenue sources. 
Competition can be beneficial if it forces broadcasters to compete over the quality of their 
programming content, which is where a standard-setting PSB is beneficial as it can raise the bar.  
However, there can also be adverse effects if this develops into a continuous downward spiral of 
ever-cheaper domestic productions, as most audiences cannot evaluate programme quality due 
to information asymmetries. This can result in cut-throat competition. 
I have identified that in most markets PSBs continue to be dominant, but also that there are, 
especially three large scale international players (mainly Pro7.Sat.1. and RTL, but also MTG) in 
Europe, which in comparison rival many PSBs and other domestic companies in their domestic 
markets. The large-scale companies have the benefit of being able to apply economies of scale 
when producing and purchasing rights, as they can buy bundles. In contrast this places small-
market domestic public players (financed by a single domestic market) at a disadvantage as they 
compete against the strength of a large market multinational corporation.  
This is especially the case as a consequence of the country of origin principle where the large 
companies can use this principle to potentially benefit from the lowest denominator in 
advertising rules.  
This also means that the large international players could place strong competitive pressure on 
private domestic players, which are limited by scarce resources in a single market and not able 
to utilise a similar benefit of scale economies.  
Secondly, I find the data substantiate the risk of regulation failure if the perception of the EU 
being a single television market gets greater weight. The regulation in place appears to benefit 
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large-scale players and competition, meaning that it directly furthers the convergence of the 
markets; however television content is also an important cultural production, which does not 
necessarily benefit from being subject to convergence, as it might harm diversity. If the 
regulation in place risks harming the diversity of European culture based on a perspective of 
increasing competition and belief in a single European market for television, is this really the 
approach politicians want to take – especially in small markets?   
The investigation into the transnational impact of using the country of origin principle in 
regulation shows that regulatory measures do indeed have significant impact, but also that while 
using the country of origin principle does increase the potential for competition, it also 
potentially differentiates the conditions of different players in the same market, as some might 
be under domestic regulation, while others might be under regulatory jurisdiction in another 
market. This is indeed beneficial in terms of establishing a single European market, but for a 
single domestic television company competing with both a public and a foreign commercial 
company under different regulation, it could very well generate unfortunate consequences. As 
the individual EU markets can have “harsher” regulation, it actually means that companies in 
principle can “shop” for the least harmful or most beneficial regulation. 
 
5.5 Conclusion on the investigation of the second hypotheses 
5.5.1 Introduction 
The second hypothesis is only partly verified based on the two analysed research questions. Size 
does influence competitive conditions in television markets, where there are different levels of 
critical mass in different market sizes, as indicated in the analysis of the first hypothesis in 
chapter 4. This analysis thus also helps substantiate the first hypothesis. However, this does not 
automatically entail that a market becomes more concentrated, as state intervention has to be 
taken into account, as most markets have either one or more strong PSBs. Size influences the 
level of share of public companies, but also private domestic commercial share, but not to the 
same degree market concentration, as based on HHI most markets are moderately to highly 
concentrated, while they are all highly concentrated measured by CR4. Moreover, a significant 
influence could not be identified based on CR1-3, but only on CR4-6, meaning that size could 
hold influence as the number of companies included increases. State intervention appears to be 
highly important for the functioning of the European television markets, and EU legislation 
likewise. The level of state intervention influences the rules of the game and alters the markets. 
Based on literature this is possibly acting as a counterweight to the commercial market tendency 
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for concentration, and increasing the overall diversity of content output. What was basically not 
taken into account in the hypothesis was the importance of the state, which thus has been 
described in more detail in the analysis, and furthermore that the challenge of using the concept 
of the level playing field in conditions where equal opportunity might have a different effect 
than intended, as equal treatment, might actually result in unequal results. 
State intervention crystallised in the form of public policy regulates the media and establishes 
the rules of the game for the conduct of media companies. In essence, these rules should 
establish a level playing field, ensuring equal rules for all players. The challenge is that this is 
not necessarily what secures the best possible solution, especially not in small markets, as 
regulation determined at an international level is usually unable to take into account specific 
conditions in the individual markets. 
Imagine a football field where the players fight the opponents and cooperate in order to win 
under a specific set of rules. As long as the referee is fair, the players are equal in terms of the 
rules, but still different in terms of skill and strategy. The problem is that the teams have 
different monetary volume and different potential of capitalisation, thus yielding different 
incentives and potential for investing in domestic talent and securing a broad selection base of 
developing talents over time. Public broadcasting can be understood as an entity in this game, 
where the companies are both players and part of the rules. I argue that in the best cases, the 
public companies with a non-profit perspective and purpose of existence of public interest act in 
accordance and produce domestic content.  
In short, they balance the market by setting standards in it, not primarily with the purpose of 
limiting the conduct of commercial media companies, but by securing some volume of domestic 
content and some level of quality. The level of domestic content and the quality of the content in 
essence become a barrier to entry. If new entrants want to access the market with more than a 
niche function, the company will have to match up to some degree by producing particular 
genres as the public broadcasters do. Usually these genres are informational, especially news 
and high quality fiction, such as domestic drama.  
Chapter 5.3 on public-private competition indicates this nicely, but not sufficiently to verify the 
argument. Therefore, I studied the smaller same-language markets, where some indirect results 
also indicated this first of all by those channels using the European competition rules to 
circumvent stricter national legislation, by for instance selecting the UK as country of origin, 
and also with the secondary market effect of larger neighbour channels spilling over into their 
smaller same-language markets, caused in essence by what Straubhaar (2003) called cultural 
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proximity. This is a concept more or less useful for most of the difficulties related to 
international channels as well as to spill-over effects. This also indicates the impact of language, 
where small markets with separate language and culture continue to have an inherent benefit as 
a protective mechanism; however, language is not always a benefit, especially when the market 
is sufficiently small to encompass scarcity challenges too large to circumvent in potential 
competition with international players. 
There is no real clarity on what a level playing field constitutes. First of all there are huge 
differences between public and private players, and the focus will have to be on establishing as 
transparent a market as possible if the intention is to institute effective competition without 
destroying PSBs, which are the primary content producers in most European markets. Or rather, 
asking the question of balance is a problematic approach: what is required is in effect a 
transparent level playing field in which the public and private broadcasters can compete, and 
fulfil their cultural function as per their remit.  
Market concentration measured by HHI does not carry relation size. The important influences 
are public policy (i.e. regulatory measures) and the strength of the public broadcaster. While this 
seems much too simple an answer, it remains in the logic of market failure, but in some markets 
it is like walking on a knife-edge: it is too easy to fall down in the wrong place, with consequent 
adverse effects. 
Arguments for strong public broadcasters lie in the range of quality, universality in reach and 
content, and domestic production over concerns of cultural identity, i.e. news perceived from a 
domestic perspective.  
Combined, the concept of public policy with a public broadcaster can assist in securing a 
reasonable market situation in which domestic cultural interests are taken into account by public 
broadcasters acting as stewards of the playing field, while not actually being the judges. PSBs 
set the bar for access, and they do it based on a public mandate; private competitors can easily 
find such competition unfair and unreasonable, but the fact remains that their concerns are about 
profit and their shareholders, and not about what is in the best interests of the public.  
In short, private media do not exist primarily to serve the public; they exist to serve their 
owners, and their conduct has to be perceived in this light. Competition might be considered 
unfair, but it remains a traditional clash between commercial and cultural interests.  
In essence, what I have attempted to show empirically are the rules of the game in practice. 
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5.5.2 Market concentration and ownership 
As I have documented, there are usually three-four primary companies in a single domestic 
market, and no more than six. This means that the TV market studied remains under conditions 
of oligopoly. The primary players continue to be domestic for most markets, questioning the 
impact of multinational corporations; however, accountability displacement is a major concern 
when it comes to multinational corporations, and while this could be serious, it does not appear 
to be so in most of the markets. However, the conduct of the Eastern European and the Italian 
markets could warrant some attention. 
Political intervention works: PSBs remain in most markets in strong positions balancing 
commercial activities and widening the choices available for the individual citizens. In the battle 
between commercial players, the PSBs influence the result, showing that the state using 
regulatory measures as well as PSBs balances that market.  
Overall market concentration in TV markets measured this way does not appear for the most 
part to be a serious threat, with some exceptions such as the Italian situation in the research 
years 2007-2009. 
What I have identified is that the TV markets remain under fairly high concentration levels, but 
also that they remain dependent on the impact of the domestic TV market ecology and strength 
of PSBs. The interdependency between politics and markets appears to be important for 
understanding the TV market concentration ratios and why for the most part they remain 
dominated first of all by domestic players more than their international counterparts. PSBs often 
help secure this market situation. Based on the concentration ratios discovered, I cannot 
automatically claim that the levels are too high to warrant attention, but rather that it is 
important to focus on the actual conduct in the individual markets, where TV market dominance 
such as in Italy could be perceived unhealthy in terms of free access to information based on 
editorial independence. On the other hand, in the markets where concentration remains balanced 
between public, private domestic and private global/pan-European players, no single company is 
able to attain a monopoly.  
Global/pan-European players act side by side with domestic private and public players. Local 
players remain dominant in the battle for the TV market ecologies, and while the global/ pan-
Europeans attempt utilisation of economies of scale, their effects remain fairly limited. The 
global players, while increasing their revenue, do not have manageable control over the markets 
in the analysis; rather, they utilise economies of scale.  
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While domestic private players remain fairly strong in the competition with both global 
multinational corporations and local PSBs, it is clear that the relationship between politics and 
the market remains inherently interlinked.  
The TV markets remain heavily regulated and in most of the studied markets the PSBs manage 
to keep strong positions in the domestic media landscapes, which could not happen without the 
political resolve to secure this. The global players challenge domestic TV, but for now local 
domestic companies remain dominant. 
The European countries have a state-oriented approach to the TV markets which contrasts with 
the more market-oriented approach in, for instance, the US. The PSBs are accountable to the 
public, but in principle also to the state. Furthermore, the PSBs have the potential to act as a 
counterweight to intrusive global players insofar as the regulatory measures allow this. In this 
sense the PSBs (usually) have less revenue than multinational corporations when measured 
against the total turnover, but in terms of means available for investment in the domestic market, 
the PSB can be better off and thus retain the potential to compete for audience.  
The main challenge lies in the fight for premium rights, where the multinational corporations 
such as News Corporation can have an interest in furthering pay channels using the exclusivity 
potential of premium rights. The multinational corporations have advantages in terms of bidding 
for rights and being able to recoup possible losses in one market using revenues from others to 
ensure competitiveness. This is a benefit for the multinational corporations, as they can grow by 
using the on-going global trend until saturation is reached in the global market. 
From a general perspective, TV markets generally operate under conditions of oligopoly, but 
with significant differences in terms of oligopoly type, i.e. what difference does it make in a 
society if there is a dominant company with a few followers, or a duopoly structure?  
I could not identify strong relationships between the size variables and the market concentration 
levels measured by HHI and from CR1-3; however, this is probably a consequence of the 
market intervention practices and the relative market strength of the PSBs – as was indicated by 
the quantitative data the PSBs in most markets remain the largest companies. PSBs are able to 
function as counterbalances in their domestic markets [procuring domestic production of 
creative works of art]. That PSBs function as counterweights to the increasing 
commercialisation and profit-oriented conduct of private broadcasters makes sense, but only 
insofar as they are kept in check by other types of companies to avoid reaching monopolist 
conditions in the individual markets.  
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It could be argued that the role of the PSBs worsens the conditions for commercial broadcasters 
as they divert share and potentially revenue from those, but on the other hand, it secures 
organisations able to invest in national production and take risks with potentially non-profitable 
projects, and which are usually funded mainly by public funds. What was identified was a 
positive relationship between size and CR4-6 becoming stronger from the 4th to the 6th company, 
meaning that in practice the larger market can have more firms achieving minimum efficient 
scale. 
State intervention continues to be a major factor influencing the scale of market concentration, 
but also one which will prove important to balance the potential development of multinational 
corporations. However, in line with Bargadian (2000), narrow government or private enterprise 
control over the media would not be feasible; rather, the challenge lies in securing multiple 
information streams where particular concerns might bias one stream of information, but not all.  
The TV market is turning increasingly global in terms of international trade and ownership, but 
the local is what primarily interests the audience. While international channels and technological 
development create a drive towards decreasing concentration, the domestic media approach is 
similar in that they also can establish specialist channels using similar technology. On the other 
hand, this creates a drive towards increasing concentration as it can deter or oust external 
players.  
Therefore, the development is dependent on government intervention, domestic commercial 
media company strategy as well as the advantages for multinational corporations in a particular 
market. If the world market follows the current trends of increasing pay-penetration and market 
maturation, the multinational corporations will be able to employ their financial strength, media 
content and knowhow to utilise economies of scale and scope to a significant extent. However, 
even if this happens, the impact of their existence will be dependent on the counter-strategies of 
domestic companies, if they are able to utilise any. 
Overall, this indicates that barriers of entry are set by the state and the conditions of market 
structure are thus related to the regulatory regimes in the individual markets based partly on 
licensing practice, available number of competing platforms, strength of the public broadcasters 
and the type of political regime, where conditions of corporatism or clientelism can establish 
barriers to entry to secure a particular set of rules of the game, which is in line with Hallin & 
Mancini (2004).  
The argument is based on the logic of both high fixed sunk-costs and continuous costs for 
domestic production in combination with some degree of limited spectrum, all establishing 
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conditions of economies of scale as well as scope in the condition of the media content. As 
indicated by the study above, this appears to have established significant variation in the 
regulatory models in the individual markets depending on what is perceived as state interests, 
meaning that regulating with the intent of having a single European market for television 
generates unintended effects.  Heavy domestic market regulatory measures appear to be taken to 
secure individual market production industries in combination with securing state-merited 
interest by applying PSBs. This is a condition in Europe that is highly dependent on cultural and 
political path-dependency of a long running history. However, this also demonstrates that many 
of the barriers in Europe are politically constructed, as barriers to entry protect domestic market 
activities by limiting entry for foreign players. 
 
This is similar to the argument presented in the Commission’s working paper on Media 
Pluralism (2007); on the point of media content it is argued that: “Diversity of ownership of 
media outlets is not sufficient per se to ensure media pluralism of media content. The way media 
content is produced also has an impact on the overall level of plurality in the media. 
…Television viewers who switch from one channel to another often see the same news reports, 
documentaries or dramas. The reason for this uniformity is that the newsrooms of media 
companies do not themselves produce all their articles or programmes. They use outside 
agencies that supply information, photos, newsreel, broadcasts, documentaries, series and films. 
News agencies play an important role especially for broadcasters in smaller countries, unable 
to afford a full network of foreign affairs correspondents. …The intense competition between 
newspapers or television channels may not itself guarantee pluralistic content. This raises the 
concern of whether, and if so to what extent, inadequate competition among information sources 
can have a negative effect on the functioning of democratic society, owing to a pluralism 
deficit”. …”  “Strong ownership could strengthen the position of media companies vis-à-vis 
other actors in the value-chain such as printers. In those countries where newspapers or 
channels are owned by large media groups, smaller newspapers or channels can benefit from a 
strong owner who, apart from the economies of scale aspect, holds sufficient command in the 
industry production line to be able to negotiate effectively with strong news agencies, newsprint 
producers, right holders, global advertising agencies etc….” 
However, in the analysis I conducted, besides not being able to identify a difference between 
small and large markets in the sample, I also found high degrees of variation in the 
concentration levels in the individual TV markets. It is important to remember that the 
competition in the TV markets is primarily indirect and based on substitutable products closely 
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related to the choices of broadcasters competing on which genre and quality level of 
programming they intend to produce. In this the choice made by the state to use  public 
broadcasters as intervention mechanisms for domestic production protects the individual 
domestic markets by securing domestic content.  
Discussing competition without considering the actual products provided is problematic, 
especially considering that I discuss easily substitutable products depending on taste, where 
quality is almost impossible to measure reasonably.  
Public broadcasters in this sense compete against private broadcasters by offering directly 
substitutable products, and if the private companies are not able to compete, then this might be a 
decision based on the type and quality of the required services, rather than undue distortion.  
What is important from a policy perspective is to establish transparency to secure a level playing 
field in order to enable the potential beneficial effects of PSBs in the market to be furthered. 
The point is that there are no guarantees of securing pluralism of views, nor the production of 
domestic content by weakening the PSBs. Rather, it appears that in a European context, it is the 
state intervention either directly using PSBs or indirectly using regulatory measures to coerce 
commercial broadcasters to produce specific content or ensure that specific rights should be 
available FTA – like for instance in Germany - all measures taken to ensure domestic content 
production. 
When regulating media markets the state is caught between concerns for competition and 
diversity. Thus, the state can end up in a catch-22 situation: we want competition to secure a 
diverse media landscape, but we also need some degree of concentration to ensure that the 
companies can function in the market with economies of scale and increasing returns. If we do 
not want competition, we are in practice foolish, as we do not attempt to secure the interest of 
the consumers by having a diverse market. However, we are also foolish if we have too little 
concentration; in that case we risk that the citizens/consumers suffer anyway, as what they are 
offered might be of lesser quality and mostly of foreign origin.  
In short, we are foolish if we focus only on competition and foolish if we do not secure 
competition: the catch is that we do not know if there actually is a balance. We want domestic 
original content, and the simplest way of securing this is through the public broadcasters, 
especially in small[er] markets, and this is what happens in Europe. However, as long as there 
remains a primary focus on the national level, rather than global, more effort should be put 
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towards limiting the adverse effects in the market by monitoring the actual conduct of TV 
companies comparatively. 
 
5.5.3 Regulating the levelled playing field 
All countries analysed have chosen to intervene in the market to secure the provision of services 
in the public interest, but this does not mean that the private media will not compete against the 
public institutions or that the regulatory barriers are equal. Instead, there are differences in the 
playing field where the rules are usually determined by the state and the EU.  
In the markets where public media companies are sufficiently strong, these are in effect set by 
them as per their remit. When merit goods are taken into account the exact types of services 
provided are different in the markets in question. It is important to remember that television for 
the commercial private media is first and foremost an industry with the purpose of making a 
profit: as such they have to take into account the demand function as well as the potential of 
product diversification and audience segmentation.  
This also means that there will be a drive towards reaching high levels of market concentration 
to enable a profitable business in a single market, or to use economies of scale and reach for the 
global market with thematic channels. The public media has a role of serving the public or civic 
interest on behalf of society. This means a difference between purpose and perspective on the 
audience, but this does not change the fact that both have to take into account the function of 
demand. I therefore distinguish between programming targeting the population in general and 
niche-programming targeting specific groups. 
Overall, the general picture of media competition in the markets studied is one of mixed systems 
in which both public and private media players are present, but with varying degrees of strength. 
The main difference lies in what has been the point of origin for the media system, or rather 
what has been the main battleground for media development. Was it the state or the market? In 
line with theories on market intervention, I distinguish between two principal approaches as 
either state or market based; it is also possible to imagine a civil society approach based on a 
non-commercial, bottom-up evolution. In Europe, the state was the basis for the evolution of the 
broadcast media beginning with public media monopolies. Private media developed in 
competition with the public media organisations providing access to new programming and 
often new voices. The private media thus helped create a more diverse media environment. In 
contrast to the European development, the private media were the base in the US, where public 
media fulfil a more civic function of niche programming. 
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I will not engage in discussion of either the vices or the virtues for public or private 
broadcasting, but rather illustrate the current situation of market competition and identify the 
market leaders. Public and private media both supply services to the public, albeit with different 
purposes, but as long as the de-merit characteristics of the services are limited and there is an 
interest they both carry societal value. 
Media content can entertain as well as inform, but this does not mean that entertainment 
surpasses the need for information, neither that there is no need for entertainment. The challenge 
lies in securing variety, where neither conditions of complete monopoly, nor ruinous 
competition are the rule of the game. Private media can provide services of public interest as 
well as public media can; the main difficulty is to ensure a certain standard of quality, universal 
access and a variety of genres. There can be adverse effects of both public and private media 
concentration; private media conglomerates using their companies to present ideological 
perspectives on public policy, or public media presenting biased state perspectives and more, but 
there is no iron law stating that this per definition is what will happen.   
This is related to the conceptualisation of market structure, where the trend within media is a 
move towards increasing market concentration. There is a benefit in retaining a competitive 
pressure in the market to ensure that it does not reach conditions of monopoly (Doyle, 2002). 
The purpose of competition is to secure multiple sources of information; to avoid uniformity of 
programming; diversity in information sources; and ensure quality competition as lack of 
competition can lead to decline of overall quality. On the other hand, there are also benefits of 
increasing market concentration, such as with companies utilising economies of scale and scope, 
gaining easier access to capital, higher revenue and thus potential of investing more in diversity 
of content (Meier & Trappel, 1998). The problem is that it is quite difficult to know which 
conditions lead to what for the television markets.  
While this study establishes some general ideas, the difference in scale and scope of political 
intervention makes this even more challenging. This is especially true due to conditions of 
asymmetric information, which are caused by the audience’s lack of information on quality.  
In short, commodities such as television programmes are not easily evaluated by viewers. This 
difficulty was showed by Richard van der Wurff and Jan Van Cuilenburg (2001) in their study 
of the Dutch television market where they showed that high levels of low-quality programming 
can lead to ruinous competition. This study questioned the relationship between product 
diversity and competition; however the authors also showed that moderate competition may 
increase diversity, which indicates that competition is a function of a complex set of variables. 
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Theory states that both monopoly and hyper-competition can lead to less distinctive 
programminglii. 
What I expect is in line with Dimmick (2005): as niche-channels grow in number, the markets 
end up in situations where the aggregated ratings rival or surpass the broad generalist channels, 
but channels serving mass-audience interests will remain for now. The main concern here is that 
due to the characteristics of the media content. It cannot be expected that extreme conditions of 
competition is viable in a media market. On the other hand, as conditions of monopoly might 
lead to other concerns and potential uniformity, this is also not a viable solution.  
I will make the point that while competition is probably not that different in small and large 
markets based on the dependency of the funding regime and regulatory measures influencing the 
barriers of entry and exit.  
What remains important is a role for public television companies to secure diversity in 
competition with private media. 
The public broadcasters act in the service of the public by supplying services of merit, but this 
should not stop competition between public and private players. The public broadcasters will, if 
funded sufficiently, act as standard setters and the private media have to comply with this to 
some degree to attract an audience. Public media can in this way establish the rules of the game. 
During the recent work on the revision of the broadcast communication, Information Society 
and Media Commissioner Viviane Reding (EurActiv, 09.03.2009liii) argued that “the 
Commission would have to weigh the need to uphold the public good derived from public 
service broadcasters against the principle of competition”.  
This is exactly the conundrum in the question of competition, as public media per definition will 
intervene in the market and thus distort competition in the service of the public; but at the same 
time it should not destroy the market for private operators.  
It can be argued that the services provided by the public media should provide a contrast to the 
private media: what gain in services do the public and civil society receive? The logic between 
public and private media is different, as long as the purpose of the public media is to serve the 
public and not generate revenue for the state.  
The private media will have to meet some minimum requirements in order to compete, and this 
is usually set through policy and public media standards: this also means that there will be 
difference between markets. The argument on the balance between public and private will thus 
259 
 
mean sufficient clarity between public and private media roles to ensure competitive conditions, 
allowing both to thrive. 
The is in line with the argument from Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes (2009) after the 
decision on the amended broadcast communication: "The new Communication strikes the right 
balance between the interests of public and private media to ensure healthy competition in the 
very rapidly evolving media environment, to the benefit of Europe's citizens. Public 
broadcasters will be able to take advantage of the development of digital technology and 
Internet-based services to offer high quality services on all platforms, without unduly distorting 
competition at the expense of other media operators". Studying the arguments of the European 
Commission on the adoption of the new broadcast communication (2009), there are questions 
revolving around the difficulty of the competitive conditions. What is healthy competition in the 
first place? What is undue distortion of competition at the expense of other media operators? 
There are several difficulties revolving around public and private media competition: there is 
little general knowledge of the workings of competition and competitive pressure of public and 
private media companies in a comparative perspective. 
I have presented a picture of the competition between public and private operators. I cannot 
answer the questions opened up by the statements of the Commissioners, nor would that be 
viable, but I document the variety between the markets included, and I question the 
conceptualisation of healthy competition and undue distortion; when studied, the concerns 
appear more to be on the behalf of the private operators, than in securing civil society interests.  
The perspective presented as an option for the rules of the game in the Commission’s green 
paper (1994) on strategy options to strengthen the European programme industry was that: 
“With a view to a European Union policy to boost the programme industry, the development of 
the market by the establishment of infrastructure, the liberalization of services and the removal 
of obstacles to the single market is the first objective. Improving the transparency of the 
audiovisual market calls for better cooperation between the Community and national authorities 
responsible for applying the rules of competition and cooperation between the Community and 
anti-trust authorities in non-member countries. …”The Commission believes that existing rules 
in the European Union to promote European programmes provide a sound framework for the 
cross-border development of the programme industry that should be retained for the time 
being.” 
This is what has been attempted in the EU, but with little actual success as the individual 
European markets are significantly different from the more single US market; stated otherwise, 
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the perception of a single European market remains an ideal difficult to reach in the face of 
differences in regulatory regimes and the role of the PSB in the individual markets.  
The question to be asked is whether the PSBs should be allowed to utilise economies of scale by 
permitting cooperation across the EU market to increase the number of players capable and 
willing to raise the European market up to the next level. This is already the case to some degree 
through the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), where the PSBs negotiate for rights, 
primarily sports, and stage events like the EUROVISION song contest. This type of cooperation 
could be increased, but would at the same time risk hampering competition in the domestic 
markets due to scale benefit. In short, there are no easy solutions.  
The main focus on media competition in chapter 5.3 was the level of public and private share, 
where a picture of the difference caused by size was established. It is important to recall that 
television media competition focuses on scarcity of time for both audience viewing and 
advertisement spots in and between programmes. There are also scarcities of advertising 
revenue, of premium rights and of talent as well as of consumer willingness and resources 
available for pay-tv.  
In most markets public and private media fight to secure these limited resources. The result of 
this battle is measured in market share divided by public and private companies. This entails that 
large populations equal a higher potential for private operators using economies of scale and 
have a greater pool of consumers with which to lower the average cost due to collective funding 
functions. This would also mean that public television overall should be stronger in 
economically large markets, especially if they are small measured in terms of population.  
The analysis in chapter 4 of market volume and expenditure on original production indicated 
that this could be a function where size impacted relative to the small population and small 
economy categories, while the large economy and small population category would face 
different challenges. This also means that the maturation of the markets is important as this 
points to the level of potential for foreign investment in the market to reap the benefits of the 
maturation processliv. 
 
5.5.4 The level playing field 
Competition between public and private media runs along the lines of time consumption on 
audience viewing for specific types of programmes and population segments The competition in 
the individual market runs between channels having different segmented audiences and hence 
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markets; the increase in niche-channels has also changed the focus in several markets, where 
application and utilisation of rights across markets have increased in importance. 
I can identify a similar argumentation structure in a green paper from the European Commission 
(1996: 14) on “Strategy options to strengthen the European programme industry in the context 
of the audiovisual policy of the European Union”. Here, there are several intriguing observations 
that continue to hold merit, such as in point 2.3.4 on industrial imperative:  “This all points to an 
industrial imperative in terms of both the size of the structures involved and the way in which 
they operate. The globalization of the market and the increase in production and promotion 
costs demand not only talent but also industrial structures of the critical size needed to secure 
the necessary financing and to constitute programme catalogues which have appeal for the 
different markets. … Quite apart from critical size, another element in the industrial imperative 
is the modus operandi. With the economics of the sector being conditioned more and more by 
individual consumer choice it is important, if programmes are to find their public, that each 
production should determine the market segments on which its profitability can be guaranteed. 
To this end structuring the information flow between the different operating markets and the 
programme industry is just as vital as providing information for the public. And the constraints 
affecting audiovisual production vary depending on whether it is targeted at the world market, a 
local market or a very specialized segment of a transnational market.” 
A level playing field is a condition where the players in a particular market are required to abide 
by the same rules and consequently have equal opportunity to compete. The metaphor of a 
playing field is used to indicate the condition of equal opportunity for the individual actors to 
prevail as it is compulsory to play by the same set of rules. As in football, this can require the 
interference of an external player in the form of a referee to monitor and enforce the rules as a 
consequence of potential collaboration, free riding, cheating, unsavoury action and other 
activities with potential adverse effects for equal market competition. The government can claim 
to play that role, although for some state intervention in the market distorts equal competition, 
while for others it is important to set, secure and implement the rules to be followed by 
establishing some minimum set of rules for the market. This is what happened in the European 
Community with the establishment of the TWF (1989, 1997) and the AVMS directive (2007, 
2010) setting some minimum rules and requirements for the competition within the European 
audio-visual industry.  
What is important to conceptualise is that new entrants should follow similar rules as the 
existing companies without being faced with extreme regulatory barriers to entry, while 
competitive barriers to entry might exist as a consequence of individual market competition and 
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company market power. The challenge here is that this is an area of business which carries 
distinctiveness as a consequence of public interest. The problem with the level playing field is 
that some operators in Europe face regulation while their competitors do not, such as in 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden, where some of the commercial operators are in effect under UK 
jurisdiction as well as potentially adhering to different copyright rules. In the current era of 
convergence, I also have to take into account that the media content could in principle be 
accessed online from anywhere in the world unless a barrier based on country of origin has been 
set up to prevent this. For example, top US shows could be viewed online before they are shown 
on TV in Europe. 
If there is a perception that specific TV content production and services are in the public 
interest, these will interfere with the level playing field, albeit to a varying degree depending on 
the method applied for provision. The public broadcasters with their remit to inform, educate 
and entertain do in effect interfere with the level playing field as they compete for the same 
scarce time resource as the commercial companies, usually while carrying special privileges 
such as must-carry, public funding and more. This is why the overall perception of a level 
playing field as traditionally applied does in effect have a different function in most European 
television markets. 
The challenge here is that the public television organisations establish a competition which is 
different from other fields as they compete for the same scarce time resource of the audience. So 
how can an equal field of competition be established within the markets when there remains an 
interest in the provision of services in the public interest, while on the other hand we do not 
want to distort competition unduly? And at the same time when some channels in a specific 
domestic market can be subject to different regulatory settings due to the use of the country of 
origin principle in EU legislation? 
 As pointed out in the Commission’s working paper on media pluralism, point 2.7 (2007): 
“Broadcasting in Europe has since its beginning undergone an exceptional development: from 
single, national radio channels with only a few hours of daily broadcasting to the multichannel 
systems of today, where radio and television is broadcast 24 hours a day to listeners and viewers 
all over the continent; from broadcasting as a public monopoly to the present “dual system”, 
where public broadcasters live side by side and compete with a still growing numbers of private, 
commercial media corporations. Both public service broadcasters and commercial broadcasters 
contribute to media pluralism and this dualism itself further strengthens pluralism. High quality 
information is an important remit of public service broadcasters and fulfilment of this remit 
makes an important contribution to media pluralism. A functioning dual system also means that 
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it must be balanced. Even if the broadcasting regulation is in place, the implementation of 
legislation while ensuring media pluralism is crucial.” 
While mainly relevant for the EU markets, the condition here has been to establish some 
financial clarity of commercial and non-commercial activities. This means that public financing 
must be done in accordance with the EU articles on state aid and that their commercial activities 
have to be carried out in accordance with normal market standards and separate from their 
public activities as well as in accordance with the financial transparency directive. Furthermore, 
the provision of new AV services should be tested as to the degree to which they are in 
accordance with the democratic, social and cultural needs of society and do not have undue 
effects on market trade and competition as per the new broadcast communication. This also 
means that the state should ensure that the public funding does not distort trade and competition 
in the markets and that the impact on market competition should be balanced with the assumed 
benefit of the new services for society.  
These are conditions with the intention of levelling the playing field between public and private 
operators, but these will have effect in the sense of minimum requirement and increased 
transparency. It does not in effect have the same result as within other business types as the 
definitions of the public service remit and funding regimes are left in the hands of the individual 
states as per the protocol on PSB from the Amsterdam Treaty; these will have tremendous effect 
on the actual rules of the game within the individual markets.  
The reasoning behind this is that the EU rules attempt to establish a transparent market with 
relatively easy entry conditions for new entrants and fair competition between public and private 
television companies, while taking into consideration the aims of the state in relation to the 
provision of services in the public interest. This means that no matter what, under the current 
legislation, there will be an imbalance where it cannot be argued that there is a level playing 
field in the traditional competition policy sense.  
Furthermore, this might be a benefit for broadcasting as the existence of PSBs can be argued to 
carry some important functions for society where they can help establish positive spirals of 
competition based on state-merited interest. These functions are the standard setter, i.e. quality 
benchmark across that particular media market for competition in relation to at least domestic 
content; this also makes a difference to primary acquisitioning and format dependent 
commercial broadcasters.  
This can also help accustom consumers to seeing high quality domestic content, and this helps 
pressurise commercial actors to compete at that level. This also entails that PSBs should carry 
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obligations to secure a broad provisioning of genres of high quality. Intervention in the 
conventional way using PSBs can benefit the democratic, cultural and social conditions of civil 
society. But this also means that the perception of a level playing field has to be considered 
rather differently when discussing broadcasting markets with PSBs as they can in effect be used 
by the state to set the market standards for a broad range of services in the public interest. 
The question here is whether a reasonable conceptualisation of balance using a singular 
definition can be upheld under the current European regulatory regime where there is significant 
variance in the competition between public and private broadcasters in the individual markets, 
not to mention the increasing cross-border penetration of television channels, particularly with 
international content. I find that the application of balance illustrates more of a conceptual 
illusion than a useful policy concept. What is and remains important is the market transparency 
enabling each part in the dual broadcasting system to have established ideas of role, where the 
remit of the PSB as set by the individual merited state interest remains paramount. In effect this 
also means that the rules of the game are set, not by the PSB per se, but rather through the state 
in the defined remit, which again illustrates the impact of political intervention in the European 
TV markets. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusions and implications of regulation 
6.1 Major findings 
To sum up my thesis, I claim that size does indeed matter. As promised at the beginning, I have 
conducted a broad empirical study containing both small and large European television markets. 
I have verified to some degree the economic argument based on scarcity considerations 
established in the introduction and chapter 2.  
The TV markets in particular are challenged by size, as has been indicated before; what is also 
evident is that public intervention plays an important role and has long been implemented to 
take into account the conditions that are a consequence of size, i.e. scarcity and lack of critical 
mass. The economic argument holds, and is thus by default an argument on behalf of public 
intervention in the media.  
The two hypotheses were investigated in chapter 4 and chapter 5 respectively and are presented 
below. 
The first hypothesis studied was as follows: Size is linked to scarcity and therefore influences 
the critical mass of television markets: meaning that size influences the critical mass in 
television markets based on availability of revenue understood as monetary TV market 
volume and the availability of original domestic content. Consequently the larger a market is, 
the greater is the potential volume of the television market and domestic production.  
 
This was investigated based on three research questions in chapter 4.3-4.5: 
1. Research question A: How does size influence the availability of revenue in television 
markets (TV market volume)? The larger a television market is, the more revenue should 
be available, which again sets the frame for the potential number of companies and the 
level of domestic production as this is based on scarcity considerations. 
2. Research question B: How does size influence the level of original domestic content in 
television markets? The larger a television market is the more original domestic content 
should be available as the incentive for companies to invest in content should be higher. 
3. Research question C: Is there a relative influence of size (varieties of size) on TV market 
volume and production of original domestic content? Size influence could also be 
viewed relatively based on small and large categories, meaning that a large market 
measured by population, can be small measured by economy, which can result in 
different implications for policy.  
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This has been done using comparative analysis of the mechanisms of TV markets in terms of 
scarcity and critical mass, using proxies of size, TV market volume and domestic production. 
What has been shown is exactly one aspect of how size matters, but it also shows that there is an 
interplay between the varieties of size.  
 
The study of the first hypothesis in chapter 4 verified that larger markets have more market 
volume and higher levels of investment in original production as stated by the argument on 
market leverage as consequence of similar media market characteristics. The results of the 
analysis substantiated the first hypothesis, but also showed that the politics cannot be left out, as 
this is an immensely important factor in the television markets, and one which alters the rules of 
the game in the individual markets. 
There is a significant difference in scale between small and large market TV market volume as 
well as domestic production. I also identified a positive correlation on the relative influences of 
size based on categorisations of population (small, large) and economy (small, large) in relation 
to the scale of TV market volume and domestic TV content.  
As assumed, the analysis in chapter four on scarcity and critical mass clearly showed what I 
expected in terms of substantiating the argument, but there were interesting findings, as can be 
seen by some policy implications which are presented in chapter 6.2 below, on scarcity and 
critical mass. 
The second hypothesis studied is as follows: Size influences the competitive conditions in 
television markets. This is a consequence of imperfect competition due to the characteristics 
of media markets and media content in combination with differences in critical mass 
(scarcity). Consequently the larger a market is, the better conditions there are for private 
commercial media, as the larger markets can sustain a higher number of companies, which 
should show in lower degrees of market concentration - if not at the overall level, then as the 
number of companies increase. 
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This was investigated based on two research questions in chapter 5.3-5-4 respectively: 
4. Research question D: How does size influence the conditions of competition in 
television markets? This will be divided into two separate sub questions: 
a. How does size influence public and private television? 
b. Is it possible to identify differences in small television markets with same-
language large neighbours? 
5. Research question E: How does size influence the level of concentration in television 
markets? This will be divided into two sub questions: 
a. How does size influence market concentration from an overall structural 
perspective? 
b. Is it possible to identify any trends concerning ownership of multinational 
companies? 
This has been done using comparative analysis of TV markets in terms of competition, using 
proxies of size, public and private competition, foreign penetration, market concentration and 
international ownership.  
The investigation of the second hypothesis in chapter 5 partly verified the hypothesis, but also 
showed that it is difficult to establish the influence of size on competition with certainty due to 
state intervention practices. 
I have shown the influence of size on market competition. The analysis confirmed the general 
argument, but also indicated that a lot more emphasis should be placed on scale, scope and type 
of public intervention to identify influences and effects. The barrier to entry argument is related 
to this, as TV markets in general remain quite concentrated.  
Public intervention is evidently part of this, as PSBs are among the strongest companies in most 
European markets. Domestic companies continue to lead, but foreign ones are increasing, albeit 
for different reasons, as some markets have same-language larger neighbours, some large 
minorities and others companies using the country of origin principle to achieve increased 
efficiency, see chapter 5.3.2.4 concerning foreign penetration.  
Share of domestic and total public broadcasting (competition) is stronger in larger markets, but 
the same is the case for private domestic broadcasting, but less for total private broadcasting. 
Nonetheless, the larger the size of economy and population, the larger the market share of 
domestic channels. Domestic share continues to dominate in most television markets. 
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There appears to be a rather strong intervening variable in terms of public intervention.  
Additionally, I could not identify an influence from the size variables on the market 
concentration measurements based on HHI and CR1-3, but then again, this is because in general 
TV markets are moderately to highly concentrated, meaning that the theory holds in general as 
the difference between large and small markets level of concentration is limited, but also that the 
scale and scope of public intervention play important roles. 
Using the CR4 >50% as a measure of strong competition led to the finding that all included 
markets being are strongly concentrated. However, the size influence on CR4-6 was increasing 
and indicates that size does influence market concentration, but that it is based on the number of 
possible companies in a market. 
Both measures indicated that the TV market have oligopoly markets structures, dominated by 
usually three to four companies. 
Studying the rank and position of the PSBs in the individual market showed that these 
organisations – in most markets – continue to be if not the strongest, then one of the strongest 
television companies, measured by share. 
International ownership was not identified as a serious challenge in most markets, as domestic 
television companies mostly retained the strongest position. But some companies like RTL, 
Pro7.Sat.1. and MTG have successfully utilised economies of scale and scope in Europe being 
present in 10 or more markets, where they are among the six largest companies. 
There were interesting findings, such as for instance in some implications for policy which are 
presented in chapter 6.3, market competition, below. 
Through the analyses in chapters 4 and 5, I have verified the first hypothesis and partly verified 
the second, meaning that the argument presented in the introduction us also substantiated, i.e. 
that small and large markets are subject to similar market and content good characteristics, 
which in effect leads to different market conditions as a consequence of size.  
But there is a required add-on to this, which is that public intervention remedies, or rather 
leverages, the influence of size to some degree, which makes it quite reasonable to just take the 
influence of size for granted.  
Unfortunately, this is not optimal, as a comprehension of how size influences is important when 
establishing regulatory measures. But as size conditions are something people live and work in 
and with, these are continuously taken into account per default as a consequence. Small and 
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large markets have different conditions in television markets and this study has helped highlight 
the externalities of size. 
Subjecting dissimilar markets to similar policies – as in the EU - thus risks leading to 
unintended externalities and in worst cases adverse effects. The analysis has substantiated that 
size matters for the TV markets. Size specifically matters for TV markets, but also for the media 
markets in general, albeit with varying effect depending on type. However, there is also more 
than size, which was indicated when the second hypothesis was only partly substantiated. The 
analysis made it evident that the influence of the state (politics) should not be underestimated. 
Size remains quite difficult to examine without also studying political intervention. In many 
ways, political intervention has been a long-term practice for TV, which helps leverage parts of 
the challenges for the TV markets. The private TV channels have increased in number with 
enhanced competition for the public media as a consequence. This development has in the long 
run been a benefit for both.  
The importance of the state (with the PSBs) in setting the rules of the game is not forgotten, but 
is often neglected in actual empirical analysis. While this dissertation only scratches at the 
surface of the importance and influence of state intervention, the results of the analysis verify 
this.  
This is because, that from a state perspective, there are several difficulties related to the 
television markets and media content good characteristics:  
a) There is a relatively low limit to how many competing companies there can be within each 
market.  
b) Television companies risk problems of achieving sufficient scale: this is primarily the case if 
the focus is on a single domestic market, unless they work with other similar, single domestic 
market broadcasters in the purchase of rights.  
This leads to media market tendencies of concentration; few domestic actors; market structures 
of duopoly or oligopoly; and a high cost of producing original content on a range of genres, with 
imports important for almost all marketslv.  
In other words, small markets have less potential for commercial funding than their large 
counterparts, especially if original content in the national language is taken into consideration. 
Production of programming for a limited audience in a specific language and cultural setting is 
costly and is usually provided by commercial operators in small markets due to high costs.  
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At the same time, programmes are available in international trade from both large and small 
markets in abundance, especially from North America, at a lower price than the cost of home-
production and co-production in the domestic market.  
Certain goods and services will simply not be offered if the language area is too small to be 
profitable due to minimum efficient scale, e.g. lack of critical mass.  
In many ways, what I have established is an argument for public intervention into the media. 
What has been identified forms part of where the rules of the game in the individual markets are 
established between the domestic and international regulation as well as domestic and 
international competing companies. Especially small markets benefit from a strong PSB, but 
there are also benefits for large markets. Through this thesis I have established a perception on 
the influence of size which fits well with the research carried out before and recently in the 
Special Gazette issue (2009) and the book edited by Lowe and Nissen (2011). 
Below, the conclusions of the analysis in chapter 4 based on scarcity and critical mass (chapter 
6.2) and chapter 5 based on market competition (chapter 6.3) are presented with an emphasis on 
the conclusions and policy implications.  
Following this, there are chapters on the regulatory dilemma – economic versus cultural 
concerns (chapter 6.4), the implications for policy (chapter 6.5), the implications for EU 
regulation (chapter 6.6) and finally Implications for public service broadcasting (chapter 6.7), 
which are used to discuss and generalise the argumentation for the media more generally. 
 
6.2 Scarcity and critical mass 
Size is a significant factor for addressing the challenges that face television markets in Europe 
(at least, and probably also beyond). This is an oversight in the construction of media policies, 
especially worrisome because the trends indicate a growing lack of appreciation for market 
differences in the drive for market harmonisation in Europe.  
Small and large states alike face complex challenges in managing as well as developing 
television markets, especially in securing adequate provision of originated content. Whenever 
the number of people (club) that is interested in a genre of content or kind of service is not large 
enough or rich enough to attract sufficient commercial investment, it can only be secured by 
policy intervention. Securing this very often requires subsidy, as the evidence clearly shows in 
markets of every type and size.  
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Although media industries are certainly in a period when old business models are not working 
well and demands for change in the interests of economic viability are understandable, this does 
not alter the fact that many and specific genres are still needed and at a certain quality. This is 
especially important for informational and cultural programming for smaller groups.  
I have investigated the influence of size empirically in three ways: first by TV market volume, 
secondly by expenditure on originated TV content, and thirdly by investigating the relative 
importance of size in my four varieties of size. The analysis of the influence on the size on TV 
market volume revealed a relationship between size of population and economy. This has 
relevance from a policy perspective. The emphasis in Europe continues to be based on securing 
a single market, which emphasises competition rules. But it is also the case that European policy 
is a bit schizophrenic in that individual member states are supposed to focus on securing media 
services that address the democratic, cultural and social needs of host societies, but handling 
these has often created dilemmas for competition policy.  
It is also important to keep firmly in mind the fact that European countries are all relatively 
small in comparison with the truly big countries, especially the USA. All EU member states 
would have to be combined just to reach the approximate size of the USA. Thus, it is not 
actually surprising that managing to compete with American products has required high levels 
of subsidisation. 
The analysis revealed a relationship between size and the level of expenditure on originated 
content. In media, everyone helps to pay the costs for content and can receive some 
approximately equal amount of the goods. This means, however, that when there are fewer 
people to pay for the content, then the provision must either be of smaller scale or of reduced 
quality. In this way, larger markets are more able to provide higher levels of expenditure on 
originated content, and at the same time also represent the highest levels of public subsidisation. 
This is especially evident for UK and Germany, which differ quite a lot from markets such as 
Poland and Romania.  
The analysis also revealed the influence of size on the basis of relative importance as this 
depends on size variety. I found statistically significant effects for the categorised size variables 
on both TV market volume and expenditure on originated content, and moreover the interaction 
between the variables supported the validity of the proposed model.  
This suggests that the most appropriate perspective reckons with distinctive challenges that 
respective markets face, in combination with difference in political interest as expressed by 
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public subsidy and regulatory measures, as well as more general historic and cultural traditions 
in these markets. As argued earlier, similar policy does not fit all size of markets. 
Of course TWF, now AVMS, has helped establish European television as an integrated market, 
and this has benefited the development of many companies that are able to utilise economies of 
scale to function more efficiently. But this has also certainly challenged particular market types 
with a level of competition they cannot easily withstand, and in fact can only cope with 
adequately by erecting certain barriers to entry.  
I do not intend to imply that current European media legislation does not allow for consideration 
of the distinctive needs of markets in different member states; indeed, the treaties make this 
possible, but the utilisation of the legislation tends to drown in considerations of market 
competition, rather than cultural distinctiveness. Taking this into account, then, EU policy has 
both merits and de-merits, which reveals a peculiar kind of schizophrenia as suggested earlier.  
The short conclusion of the analysis in chapter 4 is that size matters in defining the level of 
market volume and originated content. Further, I have substantiated that the four varieties of 
size are significant in identifying differences in the interaction of the categorised size variables. 
This indicates that when one discusses size, he or she should take into account not only the 
relative size of population but also the level of economic development vis- à-vis per capita 
purchasing power. Also notable is that the level of political intervention in media markets 
clearly impacts the level of TV market volume and expenditure on originated content through 
public subsidy, and this is especially the case in the economically strong markets. 
The model has policy implications for media market regulation. Policy-makers should take into 
account the differences that size makes on system parameters and operational possibilities. The 
individual state should, from an EU perspective, be allowed to take into account particularities 
in their domestic markets, allowing for more independence in state policy based on material 
characteristics. EU media policy has helped establish conditions that have made it feasible to 
secure growth across borders, enabling the broadcasting industry to prosper by utilising 
economies of scale and scope.  
That is well and good. But this does not mean that the interests of big media corporations are 
identical with the interests of respective member states. On the contrary, conditions are often 
identified where cultural concerns are opposed to and by commercial concerns, and where large 
media corporations deploy strategies that can be favourable in some cases and detrimental in 
others.  
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This, however, requires further research with that particular focus and is not a topic of 
investigation in this study. As noted in the comparative analysis, US market volume is larger 
than the combined EU market in terms of available revenue. At the same time, the originated 
production in Europe is far more segmented across member states, with several barriers to entry 
that hamper efficiency in the smaller markets, and which must also compete with content 
produced in the bigger, wealthier European markets (primarily the UK and Germany). It is 
therefore important to recognise that Europe does not have one dual system, but rather some 
diversity of dual systems. 
Finally, the influence of public funding in Europe has secured considerable originated content in 
many markets, certainly more evident than what has been produced by the commercial sector 
alone. This has been especially significant in facilitating the potential of the smaller markets to 
offset key challenges related to the lack of critical mass. Even for the larger markets, which are 
still quite small in comparison with the USA, public subsidy has done much to sustain their 
production industries and to increase the competitiveness of their markets, shrill claims to the 
contrary notwithstanding. The Big 5 markets in Europe represent the majority of expenditure on 
originated content (about three-quarters of the total). Thus, it is undeniably the fact that public 
funding is the cornerstone for securing originated European content. It is difficult to see any 
realistic ‘exit strategy’ that would not have calamitous impacts in the face of increasingly sharp 
and effective international competition. 
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The overall implications of this research can be summarised: 
1. Markets are not the same, but often quite different due to differences in domestic 
conditions. This strongly challenges European legislation to evolve policies that are 
appropriate for application that properly address the respective interests of every size of 
member state. 
2. Media companies in larger states that are able to utilise large market scale benefits are 
reaping the benefits of EU policies today, while those in smaller states are mainly facing 
keener challenges, especially their PSB operators. These cannot enjoy the same scale 
advantages because they are limited to domestic markets and entrusted with the specific 
purpose of securing domestic production. 
3. Currently, EU media policy mainly benefits member states that have both large size of 
population and economy markets, while member states with small population and 
economy markets suffer the most adverse effects of various trends, including 
deregulation and stricter governance on matters of subsidy. 
4. No one-size-fits-all policy is a best option for Europe as a whole because in matters of 
media, it is not (and might never be) exclusively a single market. In media, at least, 
Europe is a union of numerous single markets, each with its own distinctive conditions, 
needs and interests. There cannot be unity without accommodating diversity. 
5. EU media policy that is oriented to benefit the interests of the media industry in larger 
and wealthier member states is likely to have a detrimental impact by limiting the 
options for smaller state policy responses. 
6. Political intervention through public subsidy is of cornerstone importance for securing 
domestic production throughout Europe. 
7. PSB operators are the best instruments currently available for securing adequate 
domestic production in both small and large domestic markets. There is nothing so far to 
suggest that PSB is replaceable or substitutable. 
8. Key differences between small and large markets are accounted for by the public media 
sector because it does the best job of offsetting scarcity. 
 
Scarcity of revenue, i.e. based on critical mass, influences the amount of profitable channels 
with quality content. Too much competition, cut-throat competition, can easily yield not more, 
but less quality of content, as revenue scarcity will limit the rationale for commercial investment 
in the production of originated content goods, when international productions can be 
acquisitioned more cheaply.  
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While it is correct that more channels yield more content, not all content is of equal quality, and 
it can to a high degree be foreign or have high levels of repeats. A state has a choice in terms of 
regulation and potential of subsidisation to secure its warranted level of quality, if any, of 
broadcasting services of originated content. 
PSBs have in many European markets functioned as standard setters of quality, as audiences 
could always choose these services instead of the commercial for-profit channels. However, we 
should not be blind to the fact that commercial for-profit services can create higher quality 
content in several genres, and do so today, but this requires either the potential for sufficient 
revenue, or a regulatory/legislative requirement to do so for the television companies/content 
producers.  
This is also why critical mass becomes one of the primary challenges for small markets, as many 
channels in a zero-sum advertising revenue game can result in a downward spiral of declining 
quality. 
The question raised in this analysis is whether the media should be treated as an ‘ordinary 
business’, no different from other industries such as pork bellies or detergents. If the answer 
acknowledges there are significant differences, then a one-size policy is not appropriate for a 
multi-sized Europe.  
Personally, the analysis leads me to conclude that it is far from any ordinary business, despite 
having business interests and an important role in business generally. Media are distinctive in 
that both market and content good characteristics create imperfect conditions for competition 
and limit investment in original production as a result of uncertainty of profitability. This is 
clearly especially the case in smaller markets.  
Political intervention in the European television market is an important remedy for problems in 
securing adequate originated production, although of course different conditions warrant 
different policy strategies and designs. 
That there is no one-size-fits-all policy does not mean that member states should do anything 
they please; accountability demands transparency and benefits from constructive friction. The 
level of originated media content depends on relative market leverage in combination with the 
level of public subsidy and regulatory measures governing the market. While common 
challenges based on market and content good characteristics affect large and small markets 
similarly, they clearly have different degrees of market leverage. This analysis provides an 
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empirically based way to perceive size, one that takes into account the variability of markets as a 
function of size in various dimensions.  
Only considerable qualitative research in each market can answer many of the questions that 
remain of concern. But this study takes a good step towards establishing the necessity for 
policy-makers to make TV broadcasting policy that accounts for differences based on size 
characteristics. 
 
6.3 Market competition 
The competitive conditions in television markets have been in focus several times, but with little 
comparative material reaching across both small and large markets. I have studied market 
competition as a stepping stone to both confirm and question parts of theory, not because the 
current lines of thought are mistaken, but because the effect of political intervention has been 
ignored to some degree.  
I have studied the influence of size on competition understood as influence on public and private 
channel market share, market concentration and transnational ownership. This also led to 
findings on the relative influence of PSBs in the individual markets. 
The results of the analysis only partly verified the hypothesis, as the influence of size was not as 
assumed. Larger markets had both stronger public (domestic and total) and private (mainly 
domestic, but also in total) share levels. Larger markets can thus be argued to have better 
conditions for television, but foreign penetration (as measured based on the country of origin 
principle) also influences this, as well as the scale of political market intervention.  
Television markets in general proved to be relatively concentrated which indicates imperfect 
competition as assumed, but because of the scale of market intervention, it is difficult to actually 
claim that smaller markets are more concentrated. On the other hand, as the results are measured 
by comparable ratios, this also means that a large market with a relatively similar level of 
concentration to that of smaller markets, would have larger companies measured by turnover. 
This is in line with the analysis in chapter 4 on scarcity conditions.  
Market concentration in television markets is – in accordance with general economic theory - 
relatively high. This result is linked to market scarcity conditions combined with the media 
content good characteristics. Without market intervention the markets could be more 
fragmented, similar to the Romanian market with a weak market intervention, depending on the 
type and construction of distribution networks. Nonetheless, there is a limit to the number of 
277 
 
companies in particular markets able to reach efficient scale, but this could also change if 
international channels become increasingly available, and potentially increase pressure on the 
business models of domestic television companies. 
There are two factors circumventing the logic on the influence of size, which were quite 
interesting findings. These were a) PSBs/state regulatory conditions and b) multinational 
corporations.  
Both of these alter the original logic on the influence of size. For the PSBs as a consequence of 
reducing scarcity artificially (increasing market volume and funding a television company that 
would not otherwise be in the market) as well as increasing barriers to entry, and for the 
multinational corporations because they can utilise economies of scale and scope when buying 
bundled rights (sports and other content) as well as using international channels (for instance 
like Discovery by producing relatively culturally neutral content). 
Additionally, I empirically identified that TV markets are in general under conditions of 
oligopoly, usually with between two and four main companies. Primarily, the structure is one of 
duopolies (two companies) with one or two smaller competing companies (there are different 
variations). From an overall perspective, the market concentration levels range between 
moderate and strong with massive differences in relation to market structure, which indicate 
differences in the actual conduct of the involved players. 
However, I could not identify significant correlations between the size variables and the 
calculated market concentration ratios for HHI and CR1-3, i.e. meaning that there is too little 
difference between smaller and larger markets’ concentration levels to establish a significant 
relationship. This does not mean that relationship between size and market concentration is a 
myth, but rather that market concentration in general tends to be high for television, especially 
as political intervention influences this heavily and in effect sets the rules of the game in the 
individual markets. 
This is also why and where the TWF directive and now AVMS have a positive effect due to the 
potential of increased competition. Size however influences CR4-6, not strongly, but it indicates 
that the larger markets have potential for more companies achieving sufficient scale. i.e. sustain 
a larger number of companies.  
Political intervention in the market in effect changes the link argued theoretically between size 
and market concentration, meaning that small markets do not per definition have to be more or 
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less concentrated as this depends on the particular regulatory setting combined with the 
influence of the PSB. 
The scale of political intervention is important, especially in terms of the role of PSBs. 
Surprisingly, in most markets PSBs remain strong, especially where channel portfolio is allowed 
to increase. This somewhat places a wooden stake in the assumption that the PSBs are dying; 
rather, they are changing, although this remains very market specific; in some markets they 
improve, in others they decline. It is interesting to note that state-oriented approaches to the TV 
market yields different results to one that is market-oriented; this is not surprising because it is 
different, but rather because both approaches to media policy can yield both positive and 
negative externalities in terms of competition and domestic production. PSBs in principle act as 
counterweights to commercialisation, if allowed and at the same time kept in check to avoid 
monopolist conditions. Political intervention comprises more than PSBs, but these organisations 
continue to have an important role in contemporary society, and will remain in most markets as 
the primary producers of domestic content, as well as an alternative voice to the private 
commercial players. 
This argument is based on the effect of PSBs, as they can circumvent the logic of the market by 
reducing the effective scarcity level in a particular market using public subsidy. This increases 
the barriers to entry effectively for new players, and thus establishes a situation in which 
companies with a competitive advantage can enter the market. For instance, multinational 
corporations are able to utilise economies of scale [and scope] using satellite channels with their 
content, which then increases audience fragmentation in markets where this is possible due to 
rises in pay-penetration. Domestic companies try to avoid the competition of the new entrants by 
a variation of strategies, usually in the form of active defence by introducing new channels, to 
avoid bleeding of share by increasing their portfolio.  
Markets for the most part continue to be dominated by local players, rather than global ones. In 
this sense multinational corporations are no direct threat in most markets, but there are some 
signs of change in Eastern Europe in terms of foreign ownership. The question is, is this is 
beneficial or will it result in adverse effects? However, multinational corporations help balance 
domestic commercial and public players and in this sense can be argued to increase competition 
(especially under duopoly structures). 
 
The overall implications of this research can be summarised as follows: 
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1. Market concentration: oligopoly is the rule of the game. The dominating companies are 
in most markets domestic, but this does not mean that they primarily carry domestic 
content. Smaller markets are not per definition more concentrated than their large 
counterparts, but this is heavily dependent on the scale of market intervention in the 
individual markets. Although the overall level of concentration is high, the level of 
concentration in TV markets does not appear to be a serious threat to society – in most of 
the analysed markets.  
2. Political intervention works. Market intervention in the form of combining public policy 
and a (sufficiently funded) public broadcaster appears to secure a market where merited 
public and domestic cultural interests are taken into account. Public broadcasters in most 
markets represent one of the largest market players and this appears to have a beneficial 
effect. There are no guarantees of securing pluralism of views, or the production of 
domestic content when financial stability is under pressure. However, it appears that, in 
the European context, the state through intervention - either directly using PSBs and/or 
indirectly using regulatory measures - coerces or incentivises commercial broadcasters to 
follow a specific behaviour, such as for instance producing merited types of content like 
news. 
3. Level playing field. The scale and scope of market transparency is of tremendous 
importance for the level playing field, as transparency enables each type of player in the 
dual broadcasting system to have established ideas of role and current competitive 
pressures. Balance between the different types of players appears important to ensure 
that no single company can attain a monopoly. International players challenge domestic 
TV companies, but for now the domestic companies remain dominant in most markets. 
The remit of the PSB as set by the individual merited state interest remains paramount in 
this. In effect, this also entails that the rules of the game are set not by the PSB per se, 
but rather through the state in the defined remit, which again illustrates the impact of 
political intervention in the European TV markets. 
4. Overall barriers to entry are set by the state. This means that the conditions of market 
structure relate to the regulatory regimes in the individual markets. But in the European 
context they are also heavily influenced by the EU with both beneficial and adverse 
effects, the reason being that there is no single fit policy for dissimilar markets. 
Language plays an important role – albeit not to the same degree as just 10-15 years ago 
– and continues to influence the barriers to entry. For some markets this is beneficial, 
while for others it means more competition. 
5. Clash of cultural versus market/competition concerns. Public concerns over the type of 
programming provided clash with market interest in securing profitability of 
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programming. This is only natural, but it remains a condition through not only the 
individual markets, but also in the EU. There is an inherent double bind in terms of an 
action paradox between wanting to secure domestic culture vs. competition. If domestic 
culture is promoted it is good, but it can have adverse effects on competition and vice 
versa. There is no simple solution, as this paradox – the catch 22 - remains inherent not 
only in the European legislation, but also in the legislation in the individual European 
member states. 
 
Competition in the markets is required to secure a diverse media landscape, but some degree of 
concentration is required to ensure that the companies have sufficient scale to function in the 
market with economies of scale and increasing return to scale characteristics. We are justly 
trapped between concerns for competition and diversity where market concentration plays a 
major role. Can we have a highly concentrated yet diverse content market with several outlets, 
or does this require a moderately concentrated market with several owners? The concern for a 
level playing field is part of this, where the main purpose is to secure visible rules of the game, 
and thus also what is expected of the PSB. PSBs have provided merit goods in the public 
interest, but have also been attacked for distorting competition, and they in effect increase 
concentration as a consequence of their function. PSBs increase the barriers to entry for new 
entrants and to some degree hinder other companies in the market, as the latter have to provide 
either better quality programmes or more service in order to compete with a for-free service. But 
this is in essence why the PSBs exist – to rectify market failure and secure a certain level of 
domestic content and quality. 
An interesting effect which can be argued to be a consequence of PSBs is that if they are 
sufficiently funded they will indirectly force private commercial broadcasters to achieve some 
degree of strength to enable competition with the PSB. Otherwise, they would have to find a 
niche or lose the competition, as they would be hard pressed to achieve sufficient revenue 
otherwise. 
The analysis has shown that the influence of size on market concentration is somewhat 
challenging to define as a consequence of political intervention. More knowledge is required on 
the actual conduct in relation to type of policy as well as the real effect of regulatory measures. 
However, this is an interesting finding in itself as it provides some perspective on the theoretical 
discussion and demonstrates that large markets intervene as much as the small in the European 
context. This is also emphasised by the analysis on scarcity and critical mass.  Furthermore, the 
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analysis indicated a regulatory dilemma facing European markets in terms of weighing 
economic versus cultural concerns. 
 
6.4 Regulatory dilemma – economic versus cultural concerns 
The basic dilemma in regulating the media (not only television, but also other platforms) at both 
national and European levels is weighing cultural versus economic (or business) interests. On 
the one hand there is an immense pressure from business interests, such as interested 
organisations (for instance The Association of Commercial Television in Europe (ACT) and The 
European Publishers Council (EPC))  and in the US for liberalisation of the media marketslvi 
both in the EU, WTO and GATT (Hesmondhalgh, 2002). On the other hand, the European 
member states (as well as the EU) have an interest in generating cultural cohesion as well as 
sustaining the common European heritage, cultural diversity and media pluralism as mentioned 
in the preamble of the treaty. Within the EU this is apparent between DG Information Society 
and Media that is responsible for media initiatives, like AVMS (Audio Visual Media 
Service)/TWF (Television Without Frontiers) directives, and DG Competition, which is 
responsible for securing free trade and competition in the EC. This division places the 
administration of issues concerning state aid and competition under the remit of DG 
competition, making it quite an important part of the European media regulation. The issue is 
evident in regard to state aid to PSBs and the question of their potential market distortions. It is 
over these issues that the economic and commercial interests collide with the cultural, 
democratic and social interests of the member states. 
The EU is Janus-faced between competition/market and culture bound together, but this is no 
different than in the individual states. European regulation is divided between two sets of 
interests: 
• Cultural vs. business/economic interests  
• European vs. national interests (national media legislation vs. European legislation). 
The dilemma consists in weighing cultural against economy/industry interests at both national 
and European levels.  
 
The European concern is competition; the concept of cultural exception is applied strictly in 
regards to the European Commission’s control over the state aid rules, but on the other hand 
national culture is protected by the concerns of the individual member states.  
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It is important to be aware of the dilemmas between the member states and the EC Treaty. The 
“more economic” approach of DG competition could reduce the protection of culture in the 
small language areas of the community (consisting of more than half the members). In many 
ways it appears that this particular issue of weighing culture versus economy is a general 
dilemma constituted by a smaller set of dilemmas concerning the regulation of the media 
environment.  
 
Table 28: Dilemmas of EU media regulation 
Culture 
Versus 
Economy/Business/industry 
Cultural diversity Liberalisation 
Public interests Private interests 
Media pluralism Media concentration 
Market failure Government failure 
National media Transnational media 
Public media funding Private media funding 
Public service media companies Commercial media companies 
 
The dilemmas should not be viewed as separate, but rather as interconnected and dependent. In 
many ways the PSBs are serving the general interests in the individual member states and at the 
same time securing the technological development, particularly in the smaller markets, where 
the private media would not have any incentive to do so, equally or rather especially so in terms 
of content production of certain genres. The PSB’s obligation is to reach as much of the 
population as possible, which is why the concept of reach instead of share is usually deployed as 
a measure of success (at least for the non-commercial PSB), where the primary incentive of 
private media is to focus on the largest possible population density (and possibly creating niche 
services to secure other segments) and share.  
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My point here is that at some point there has to be an understanding of the benefits the PSBs 
have for the member states that would not be economically viable for private media companies.  
The main point for the private media is that the PSBs distort competition when they offer 
services which the private companies could have supplied. These allegations (both the right and 
wrong) question the role of the public service media role in society.  
The problem is in many ways that we are not really able to evaluate the role of the public service 
media and we lack the correct measures if we are to assess the cultural, social and democratic 
benefits they generate. However, as shown in the thesis, there is a strong argument on behalf of 
public intervention in the media, and that PSBs have a beneficial effect. There is no claim that 
this could not be done through other methods. 
My argument is that the European regulation of the audio-visual media markets results in a 
conflict between the upholding of the ideals of the common European cultural heritage and 
media pluralism against the ideals of free market competition and trade. A worst case scenario 
of this conflict comprises regulation errors (both government and market failures) that might end 
up damaging European cultural diversity to enhance economic competition and free trade, while 
not gaining the wanted result. The issue concerning PSB access to the new media environment 
(IP-based services) is the current one of interest. My concern is that if the media regulation is 
not better coordinated in regard to protection of culture, including the public service 
broadcasters at both national and European levels, it might end up disrupting exactly what it was 
initially proposed must be protected in the preamble of the treaty – the common European 
cultural heritage. 
Some of the key reasons for regulating the media, in this case TV, is to: 
• Secure cultural diversity and national cultural embedded content.  
• Ensure national identity and cultural cohesion through a common frame of reference.  
• Invest in national production due to the heavy investments necessary for the production 
of informational goods, drama, art, literature, children’s programming etc. which might 
not be profitable.  
• Invest in and act as drivers of new technology. 
 
Size is important as an understanding of the potential of the individual member state to secure 
domestic production. Competition might be considered unfair, but it remains a traditional clash 
between commercial and cultural interests. In essence, what I have attempted to show 
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empirically is the result of the rules of the game in practice. The analysis shows that PSBs 
remain paramount for securing domestic production. 
The picture concerning the dilemmas and the EU is of course more complex than presented 
here. The rules on state aid are briefly set out below to illustrate that the dilemmas are in a way 
inherent in the legislation. 
 
Table 29: Rules on state aid based on The Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) 
Article 107, paragraph 1 General ban on state aid 
Article 107, paragraph 2 and 3 Exemptions for the ban on state aid 
Article 108 Administration and procedure  
Article 109 The power to regulate 
Article 106, paragraph 2 Public services 
Article 14 Services in the general economic interest (SGEI) 
Protocol 26 Protocol on services of general interest  
Protocol 29 Protocol on the system of public broadcasting in the member 
states  
 
The legislation stated in the table above represents the articles concerning state aid in the 
European context. The culture–economy dilemma is integrated in those rules, meaning that there 
is a wide range of opportunities for securing the services furthering cultural goals. 
The legislation in place allows different situations to be taken into account as long as the main 
principles are followed. The member states notify the EU of new state aid schemes in order to 
ensure that these schemes are in accordance with the TEUF and that there is no unreasonable 
distortion of competition. In short, the state aid rules can be considered somewhat beneficial as 
they force a more comprehensive perspective on the influence of state aid in the individual 
market. 
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This is a benefit as it requires the individual member states to take the effect of competition into 
account when establishing new state aid schemes, and thus makes it more difficult to cut 
corners. While this pulls in the direction of taking competition more into account, it is helpful 
for securing some degree of a level playing field, not only in the individual member states, but 
also across borders. There are risks of negative externalities as it might position different 
companies in different competitive conditions, if they broadcast from one EU member country 
into another, which can establish a comparative advantage for one of the companies, depending 
on individual member state legislation and the competitive situations in the individual markets. 
This can also help competition, but may have negative consequences for domestic services 
funded by the same type of revenue. 
My point is that tension between provision of merited goods in the public interest (irrespective 
of the method) and competition is almost impossible to avoid. This is because public 
provisioning will always influence the market, and because of that TEUF is beneficial as it 
secures a continued focus on competition, while the member states might primarily be focused 
on the particular goods and not so much the influence of the market competition. This way the 
member states are forced to take into account the influence of the intervention on competition: it 
might very well be that the intervention is in line with cultural, social or democratic concerns, 
but is it the appropriate measure and is it proportional to the intent? In this way the EU is 
beneficial, but when a single fit line of thought is established in polices across dissimilar 
conditions as in AVMS, there are risks of adverse effects for domestic cultural production. 
Every regulatory measure has externalities (positive and negative), and it is important to realise 
the consequence of the principles on which regulation rests, as it will influence actual conduct, 
and where the effect of the intervention depends on the conditions in the individual markets, i.e. 
it does not have similar influence everywhere as there are dissimilar conditions.   
Combined, the concept of public policy with a public broadcaster can assist in securing a 
reasonable market situation where domestic cultural interests are taken into account by public 
broadcasters acting as stewards of the playing field, while not actually being the judges. PSBs 
set the bar to access, and they do so based on a public mandate; private competitors can easily 
find such competition unfair and unreasonable, but the fact remains that their concerns are about 
profit and their shareholders, and not necessarily what is in the best interests of the public.  
In short, private media companies do not exist to serve the public, they exist to serve their 
owners, and their conduct has to be perceived in this light. Competition might be considered 
unfair, but it remains a traditional clash between commercial and cultural interests.  
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In essence what I have attempted to show empirically is the result of the rules of the game in 
practice. 
The Janus-face of the EU regulation carries more benefits than adverse effects as it challenges 
national culture and secures both independent production and European works. The European 
Commission’s general media policies with a one size fits all principle carry both positive and 
negative effects. The EC influence on the state aid rules secures an important focus on equal 
competition and a level playing field, while the DG information society and media secures 
knowledge and information on the individual markets in a comparative perspective. 
When regulating media markets, we are trapped between concerns for competition and diversity 
and the EU legislation reflects exactly that. Thus, we can end up in a catch 22 situation: we want 
competition to ensure a diverse media landscape, but we also need some degree of concentration 
so that the companies can have sufficient scale to function in the market with economies of scale 
and increasing returns to scale characteristics. If we do not want competition, we are in practice 
foolish as we do not attempt to secure the interest of the consumers by having a diverse market. 
However, we are also foolish if we have too little concentration, as in that case we risk that the 
citizens/consumers suffer anyway, as what they are offered can be content of less quality and 
mostly of foreign origin.  
In short, we are foolish if we focus only on competition and foolish if we do not secure 
competition: the catch is that we do not know if there actually is a balance between the different 
concerns (culture vs. competition).  
The EU wants to further a single European market for television to ensure competitiveness. This 
is done using – among other instruments – directives like TWF before and now AVMS (2007, 
2010) based on the country of origin principle. Such regulation in effect lowers the barriers to 
entry, establishes general content requirements, and thus allows a freer competition across 
borders for television channels; however, it also differentiates players, as although the intention 
was to establish equal opportunity for all, in effect players in different markets have different 
opportunities, depending on the actual set of regulatory measures in that particular market. 
We want domestic original content, and the simplest way to secure this is through the public 
broadcasters, especially in small[er] market conditions, and this is what happens in Europe. 
However, as long as there remains a primary focus on the local rather than global, more 
emphasis should be put on limiting the adverse effects in the market by monitoring the actual 
conduct of TV companies comparatively. 
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6.5 Implications for policy 
The point of this chapter is the demonstrate that the economic argument applied in the thesis 
holds for informational types of content as well as other types of high quality domestic content 
across platforms. This thesis in a way presents arguments on behalf of political intervention in 
the media, but with a focus on securing their independence. 
A policy is usually adopted for a specific purpose in one particular context, and cannot be 
designed to take into account all future developments, so while it might carry beneficial effects 
under the conditions when the policy was established, it might easily carry adverse ones under 
other conditions. Applying the language from economics, I can argue that policy carries 
externalities which are either positive or negative as well as conditioned for adverse [or 
favourable] effects. In short, the state has choices but has difficulties in establishing the potential 
[adverse] effects or externalities of a given policy. 
The normative argument of state intervention in the media - for democratic societies. There is a 
general belief that the individual consumer has the right to choose and purchase what he or she 
wants, when he or she wants it (neoclassical economy). Unfortunately, consumers sometimes 
have limited information, there is limited competition and they can make a lot of unfortunate 
choices as a consequence (market failure). This is part of the argument for the media: a lot of the 
content, especially informational, would not be produced by commercial companies as a 
consequence of non-profitability, especially in small markets. Consumers would not normally 
have any incentive for purchasing such goods, nor for demanding them. However, in order for 
democratic society to function, such types of goods, preferably independent of particular 
interests so as to secure some degree of unbiased information, are required.  
What is important from a state perspective is not only what the consumer wants, but what the 
citizens need in order to navigate in democratic society. The citizen needs to be enlightened to a 
certain degree and this is an important function of the media, and also part of the legitimacy of 
political intervention in the media. Public service media has done this for a long time, and 
newspapers likewise. This is in a way part of the journalistic ethics: the argument in general also 
holds for editorial goods, but this is not the point here. What are required are merited goods, 
which should not be rejected due to fear of paternalism or the so-called justified belief in the 
individual choice. Merited goods can be secured through regulation or provided otherwise; there 
is no requirement that they have to be under state control. The method of providing merited 
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content has changed with the introduction of new media, which has challenged the traditional 
way such services were provided for society. 
The challenge created by the new media (IP-based) and increased internationalisation is 
increased choice, which is a great benefit but also a great challenge for the media. The challenge 
lies in the difficulty of securing interest in their particular content in competition with other 
time-consuming activities, entertainment or otherwise. This has placed some types of media 
(mainly print media, but also some TV channels dependent on advertising revenue) in peril as 
their business model has come under pressure. This is not really a problem for most public 
media. The economic logic of public service media is that of collective funding, i.e. that the 
many pay for a service that is in the public interest to be catered – indeed a paternalistic interest 
or rather a merited good – at least insofar as the particular public media has some kind of state 
funding (licence fee, grant or otherwise).  
For media based on dependency on subscription in combination with advertising which 
primarily provide news and current affairs, this has proved a challenge where free choice is 
available as the increased number of substitutable products (especially if they are free) creates 
pressure on their business model. Having to sell a good which has a lifetime of mainly a day or a 
few days in a situation where information flows more or less freely online is challenging.  
Language and ownership to rights have helped TV so far, albeit the offers online are increasing, 
but for the newspapers this is rather different. For some time the customers buying newspapers 
(single copies or subscription) have helped pay for the provision of information to the many 
(due to the news cycle). This development has been amplified through the new media where the 
main trend has been to provide these goods freely (for advertising revenue), but where most in 
reality is paid for primarily by the print version, meaning the paying customers (keep in mind 
the dual-market system where the readers are sold to the advertisers).  
However, for other media, like TV, subscription revenue has proved a smart way forward as the 
system of pay television (especially packages where the consumers pay for a few high profile 
channels and for some extra channels as well) functions like a club good (the many pay for all 
users, however limited). Using this method, TV channels such as CNN are distributed 
internationally, but also in the domestic market the subscription model is an effective method for 
securing revenue (but mainly if there is a package system). Note that this is true for both merited 
content and other content types.  
The challenge for the newspapers is that the (now) limited subscribers paying for the service 
have numerous alternative channels of information, usually even that particular newspaper’s 
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online site. This means that there are substitutable goods easily available and that the consumers 
can easily opt out and go for the free services. This has resulted in a predicament for some 
media types, while others have benefited – mainly TV and online services.  
Media concentration is an important concern here, as it in essence is a domestic question; 
unfortunately, it is also an extremely complex question due to international development as the 
global markets have opened online and increased national competition. The competition from 
free content online and thus increased competition for advertisement revenue has eroded the 
effectiveness of the newspaper business model. But it is also a challenge that faces other media 
types. This is a regulatory challenge for the politicians insofar as they want to protect a merited 
public interest in specific content, editorial or otherwise. There is a limit to the number of 
companies in the individual markets which can help leverage the required informational goods 
at both the local and national level: a certain degree of market concentration is required for a 
company to secure sufficient scale to allow this and continue to provide local news production. 
In short, it’s the economy, no more, no less. Revenue is required to fund informational goods 
(and other types of merited content) and the arguments concerning scarcity and critical mass 
continue to hold for both small and large markets, even online. It is just that with the current 
development, we risk having fewer editorial goods or rather less funding of editorial goods than 
before the new media. As a consequence of new media and technological development, 
advertising revenue has been diverted to non-media services which places the typical media 
funding under pressure: this will continue until a reasonable [or rather more stable] business 
model has been established.  
Basically, the eco-systems in the individual markets have been placed under pressure and new 
predators take part in the hunt for advertising revenue to increase turnover. Size emphasises 
such a challenge, as there are limited stable sources of revenue available. The argument is thus 
useful for other types of media and not only TV, although TV has been used as a particular case 
study. However, the effect is of course different. 
This thesis has helped identify the influence of size more in-depth in terms of establishing a 
general argument based on economic logic, where the main principle is that the market 
characteristics across small and large markets are similar, and that it is the scarcity conditions 
(of various types) that influence the market’s ability to provide various types of content goods.  
This also showed that public intervention in the media has some beneficial advantages and 
remains important in order to circumvent some of the market characteristics. However, more 
research is required to establish how different policies influence different types of markets in 
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order to establish an idea of best practices. In a similar vein, we require information on the 
influence of market concentration in the individual markets, especially from a comparative 
perspective (internationally), and not only from the individual single market. Without 
comparing, we cannot perceive difference, whether this is done diachronically across one of 
more markets, or synchronically.  
I argue that even though that there are several challenges in comparison, it remains important to 
secure further knowledge of the relationship between policies and the influence of media outlets. 
If we want to establish a more comprehensive understanding of the production of media content 
(journalistic, television, radio or otherwise), comparison is important to establish differences in 
the individual markets. 
Comparative research emphasising both a state and market perspective is important, but 
inclusion of the separate civil society perspective helps to conceptualise the interrelation in the 
individual markets and the effects of different policies, as different markets have different levels 
of civil society trust. 
The thesis establishes a way forward in the process of establishing a more coherent discussion 
on the implications of size. I have studied different aspects of size from a structural perspective 
using the mechanics of the TV media markets as a case. The analysis establishes an argument on 
behalf of intervention and regulation of the TV market in particular, but also media markets in 
general, insofar as there is a merited public interest for democratic society. 
I have done as stated in the introduction and the result is a combination of we already knew with 
some surprises. I make no claim that size is investigated in totality, but rather that this thesis is 
one particular perspective on the influence of size where I can claim that size matters for the 
most part, but that state intervention also has to be taken into account. I hope that this thesis 
opens the way for more new research within the media into not only size, but also on public 
intervention and the role of the state. The state–market relationship is also somewhat ignored 
within the media, which is unfortunate as it continues to play a huge role in society. More 
comparative and in-depth case analysis is required to establish in more detail the role of the state 
in relation to the media. 
Size of economy is paramount in terms of leveraging the TV market and media content 
characteristics. Population impacts the level of available revenue, as more people establish a 
larger critical mass to secure collective funding from and also constitute a larger talent mass. 
The scarcity of resources is a serious challenge as this influences domestic production of 
merited content. This can be generalised to other media types, such as for instance newspapers 
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and other media companies producing different types of media content goods, like editorial 
goods.  
This is most easily perceived by the current crisis in the newspaper industry, where the former 
ecosystem (streams of revenue) has been altered. Money is required to secure merited content 
goods and under conditions of financial difficulties this challenge is emphasised.  
This impacts the scale and scope of market concentration and thus the barriers to entry and exit 
in the market. Under such conditions, it becomes quite logical that when the state finances 
public service institutions or subsidises other types of media [usually editorial media content as 
well as domestic movie- and TV-content] in combination with public regulation, it influences 
the rules of the game in the market, for TV as well as for other types of media.  
Studying the market indicates that applying a broad approach to the media markets generates 
better results in terms of securing the merited content, than by fragmented and case-by-case 
action. In the future, public intervention in the media – no matter by which type - should be 
closely investigated to identify, using comparative methods, how such interventions influence 
the conduct and rules of the game.  
Media markets require more in-depth study on the policies in different markets across media 
types to show the influence of the state, and thus how different approaches yield different 
results. Size matters, but economic strength in combination with public service broadcasting 
institutions is a strong influence on the impact of size in both small and large markets.  
This, however, does not change the catch 22 situation between balancing the interests of 
wanting competition versus wanting to secure culture, which in many ways spells out the current 
dilemma of European media politics. 
 
6.6 Implications for EU regulation 
Conceptualisation of policy implications have been discussed and presented above, and while 
there are implications for the media due to policy, there are also consequences for the state, 
market and civil society. In many ways, polices weigh different interests and choices are made 
in terms of which preferences to weigh higher than others, and when it comes to the issue of 
size, small markets in particular can be subject to unintended effects based on regulation made 
in the EU. 
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The understanding of policy implications is similar to the line of thought from economics based 
on market and government failure. I argue that while discussing policy implications in general, 
in principle there should be a distinction between the implications for the state, the market and 
civil society; this can emphasise the understanding that there can be consequences of both 
intervention and non-intervention in different areas.  
Furthermore, we have to acknowledge change or the possibility for change due to at least the 
three push/pull factors argued by McQuail (2000, 1992), meaning that states have made 
different strategic choices for their media systems based on their perception of development. If 
we look into the conceptualisation of the media system, it can be argued that it is shaped and 
transformed by three inter-related push/pull factors in the form of the political, economic and 
technological spheres. These three factors are interdependent and influence each other. The way 
the media is organised in a given society can be related to the inter-dependence between these 
three forces (McQuail, 2000).  
This constitutes one of the challenges concerning small/large state discussion, namely the 
different strategic choices and the way the different markets cope with neo-liberalism and 
liberalisation when introduced to foreign or new mediaplayers, or new technology: how do the 
media players and politicians react? Do the commercial market players ignore the new 
technology or do they embrace it? Such a perspective has roots in political economy and is a 
way to conceptualise reasons for change and unintended long-term adverse effects of policy.  
Basically, the analysis shows that PSBs with a certain level of minimum resources are very 
beneficial in a small markets. The benefit of the PSBs is the versatility of their potential to cope 
with change and adapt the organisations (slowly) to new purposes.  
I have established a particular way of conceptualising the potential policy implications of size 
for Europe, but the study has verified that the PSBs are a brilliant utilisation of policy with 
which to secure merited content across platforms: paradoxically it is competition that endows 
these companies with the required drive.  
Unfortunately, we have seen that, due to the PSBs’ provision of online services with merited 
content, they engage in competition with companies they only indirectly competed with 
traditionally. These companies unfamiliar with that type of competition are of course against 
such an intrusion. But can we rightly claim that PSBs should not be present and compete on this 
platform, insofar as this is used by the citizens in order to keep themselves informed? What is 
important is that the relative strength between public interest is measured against the existing 
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commercial services. Unfortunately, the balances between those separate concerns are quite 
difficult to weigh. 
Distinctiveness is in a way the key word. The focus has been on the distributionlvii of 
broadcasting from a regulatory perspective more than on the content, except when it comes to 
securing European content, as per the cultural quotas in TWF/AVMS. The difficulty faced is a 
paradox. It should be evident that the necessity for regulation lies not only on the distribution 
side, but also and especially so on the content side, particularly in small markets. The problem 
faced in regulatory texts and in general in broadcasting is the lack of thought about the inter-
relation between regulation, competition, policy, public interest and the economics inherent in 
the media.  
Usually we think of the interaction between regulation, competition and policy when studying 
the political economy and regulatory aspects of the media, but there has been some neglect in 
including the frame of public interest in the analyses, and how the inherent conditions in 
television make some of ways of thinking about competition difficult.  
In other words, what must be taken into account are the different interests of the state, the 
market and the civil society, and policy development has to include conceptualising the impacts 
which policy will have. Even so, there is a choice between whose interests to advance and which 
to prevent. Here is one of the areas where the impact of being small versus large can be felt. As 
the main markets compared in this study are democracies, a main purpose remains the diffusion 
of information to ensure an informed public, which lies in line with the argument on merit goods 
on the one hand, but more importantly makes debates on regulation of the media a core 
discussion for both state and civil society. The point of interest here is public interest in high 
quality journalism for informational programming, as well as high quality domestic 
programming of other genres like drama. 
What I argue is that policies have implications in different areas and that a particular policy 
option cannot take all beneficial or adverse effects into account. The influence of size is in a 
way often taken into account indirectly, as this influences the very conditions of how the media 
operate, but doing this also leaves open the difficulty of applying universal policies across a 
number of countries with different conditions in the name of competition and efficiency.  
My argument is that the interests not only have to include the market and industry perception, 
but also the state, and civil society. The lack of inclusion of such concerns might create a kind of 
competitive market, as competitive as possible with the broadcast market and media content 
good characteristics, but will involve a cost of national culture, especially in small markets. In 
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relation to the media, it has to be recognised that there are not only market concerns, but also 
important functions of the democratic state in informing the public, and the public potential of 
monitoring the state. This is of course not all, as there are also entertainment purposes and more. 
But public intervention helps secure the important elements of news, current affairs and debate 
(informational genres) which in small markets are difficult to provide under the market 
conditions; to this can be added high quality fiction. Control over the media by conglomerates 
can – if not kept in check by the state - result in situations where the concerns of retaining power 
or profit are ruled above the concerns of the [uninformed] public. 
This dilemma is also quite evident in TV markets from a business perspective, as pointed out by 
Thomas Ebeling, CEO of ProSiebenSat.1. Media Group: “News is important for the image of 
politicians but not necessarily for all viewers,” … “Our company loses about €50 million every 
year with the news business in Germany. We had to solve this problem.” German politicians 
skewered Mr. Ebeling for his inconvenient truth.” (FTM, July 9, 2010: Television News: New 
course or main course). This is not just an economic – culture perspective: it is also a question of 
merited public interest. Even large markets such as Germany have problems in terms of funding 
news production. But as pointed out by Torsten Rossmann (CEO of N24), N24 could not go 
down the road of partisanship like Fox News. “He argued how the new N24 profile should be 
"We will produce a different, stronger news format.” When asked if that meant giving N24’s 
newscasts a particular political spin, like News Corporation’s Fox News in the United States, 
Rossmann demurred. “I have always refused,” he said to media website viSdP (July 2). 
“Decades of the audiences’ experience with public service information allow no room for 
partisanship. N24 is a balanced, critical and business-friendly (channel) in the tradition of the 
German journalism.” (FTM, July 9, 2011: Television News: New course or main course). This 
informs us from the business side of the beneficial externality of PSBs, in that they have a set of 
functions in society that help secure the ability of the individual citizen to navigate in 
democratic society, insofar that they invest the time . 
I show that funding of public media and specifically types of content is required to ensure a 
healthy production environment, [balanced] informational content and a certain level of quality. 
This is caused by the conditions of scarcity and market characteristics.  
The analysis in chapters 4 and 5 shows that this is an important part of securing production. I 
have indicated that the market was subdued by policy and PSBs in order to save what is 
considered public interest, thus protecting the distinctiveness of the individual market by 
changing the rules of the game.  
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A level playing field is required because of that to ensure equal chances for success where the 
publicly owned company does not hold a publicly entrusted mission. Where public interest 
enters the game, the rules change as the public broadcaster rightly can distort competition based 
on its entrusted mission with public money.  
The private company can of course challenge the PSB trying to do better, but that is also part of 
the game, as this equals the PSB setting the bar. This analysis substantiates this, but also that 
state intervention – national as well as EU - plays a major role in the competitive conditions in 
the individual markets. 
 
6.7 Implications for public service broadcasting 
Public service broadcasting is known to hold great importance for society (see for instance 
UNDP, 2004). This thesis demonstrates that all markets can benefit from PSB, but in particular 
small markets. The current challenges of PSB have been argued before (Tracey, 1998; Lund, 
Nord & Roppen, 2009), but few studies have demonstrated this development from a political 
economy point of view including the potentials of PSB as a cultural policy tool with increased 
importance – especially in relatively small media markets. 
This thesis carries a main narrative on the influence of size, or rather the similarities and 
difference between small and large markets in Europe. I have - in line with other literature on 
the influence of size - shown that size is indeed important. Nonetheless, it is also a narrative that 
shows the importance of state intervention into the media markets, and thus in the European 
context the importance of PSB. 
Public service broadcasters are part of the European cultural heritage. From the beginning of 
radio transmission of news and concerts to include television and now online content, these 
institutions have been present to serve the public interest with a mandate to inform, educate and 
entertain. 
 
Studying the European television markets I found that PSBs continue to be important in 
contemporary Europe: 
• The analysis in chapter 4 indicated the strength of PSBs, measured by public funding, 
and also showed the level of investment in originated production. The analysis made 
clear that markets with high levels of public funding usually also had high levels of 
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funding in production of domestic content. This shows the importance of PSBs in each 
market as a provider of content for the population, and thus that they function as a 
method of securing continued content production in general, but for small markets in 
particular. 
• The analysis in chapter 5 showed that the PSBs were, if not the largest television 
companies, then usually the second largest, in each domestic market. This is a testament 
to the importance of these organisations, and their ability to attract audience to 
domestically originated content. The generalist channels have been under threat, but 
most PSB have launched new more thematic channels to curb the decline. The chapter 
also substantiates that PSBs help balance the market by presenting a not-for-profit 
alternative. In other words they set the standard and help secure a certain level of market 
concentration, meaning that the presence of a strong PSB will function as a 
counterweight. 
 
The political intervention indicated in the analysis is evidence of the importance of PSB, but 
also that politics circumvent traditional economic logic. In television markets PSB continues to 
hold major strength in terms of market share and makes a major contribution to domestic 
content production. The thesis shows that PSBs in the European context are functioning as the 
main pillars of domestic content production, and thus per default as safe keepers of the audio-
visual content production industry in Europe. 
In many ways the PSBs are central in continuously securing domestic content production and 
thus ensuring domestic talent a “sandbox” where they can experiment and learn the business. 
This also tells us that without the PSBs there would be a high chance that domestic production 
of content would be downgraded to a much smaller scale in all markets, but especially in the 
smaller ones. 
This is important as markets without a diverse audio-visual content production industry will 
become increasingly dependent on foreign productions. While this might not seem problematic 
at first, it would challenge part of the reproduction of cultural identity and the common frame of 
reference in society, as content mirrors contemporary and past “societies” way of life (such as 
norms, values and perspectives on life). This is not to say that domestic content would disappear 
completely, but many genres of content are unprofitable to produce (too costly and time-
consuming) measured by the potential return especially in smaller markets. 
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Furthermore, PSBs present a not-for-profit perspective and secure additional pluralism of views 
in a market. PSBs help diffuse news and debate in domestic markets as well, which would not 
otherwise be present to the same degree. 
PSBs can in the same vein function as a balancing force in a market, being counterweights to 
commercial pressure. Meaning that if PSBs are sufficiently funded they will indirectly force 
private commercial broadcasters to achieve some degree of strength to enable competition with 
the PSBs as well as balance the views on society. 
Right now European media are standing in the middle of a converging media environment 
changing the way media content is received by increasing the number of ways content is used 
and created. Radio and television continue to be well-used media, but consumption of content in 
changing. The change means that PSB now competes more directly with publishers, especially 
newspapers, for audience online. This has placed increasing pressure from publishers on 
politicians to ensure a level playing field online. 
This presents several challenges for PSB in the near future: first of all, to provision their content 
on all platforms to ensure that the audience can receive it, and secondly to be allowed a strong 
presence online. 
Formerly the media economic ecology was mainly domestic, meaning that advertisers were 
highly dependent on mass-media (radio, television and print) to reach their target consumers. 
Online advertisement changed this and “set advertising free” in the sense that you can easily be 
subject to domestic commercials even by visiting international sites, as well as the power of 
companies like Google (also includes YouTube) in attracting advertisement revue. This has hit 
publishers of mass media print publications especially hard, as news was presented free of 
charge online without sufficient advertisement revenue to cover the costs. In many ways the 
print subscription model impeded incentive for innovation, as their main turn-over is generated 
by the printed paper (bundled news and other informational content). Thus by offering content 
for free online, they directly cannibalised their own funding model, in a way a version of Tiroles 
(1997) replacement effect. 
In other words their business model broke down, as the subscriptions and advertisement of the 
print edition paid for the online edition. Basically, the revenue that formerly went to the 
publishers now goes to online sites, often international companies, and not towards securing 
domestic production. The reason for this is that it’s cost-efficient to the advertisers to focus on 
the legacy media to the same degree as the eyeballs went online. 
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This tendency increase pressure on the PSBs because commercial companies feel their 
continued existence is threatened. Thus they attempt to limit the scale of PSB exploration and 
use of resources of delivering content online. Nonetheless the presence of PSBs online is 
completely in line with what the commercial television and radio companies were subject to 
formerly. PSBs represent a market intervention not only to secure a certain level of content 
online, but also to secure general availability of domestic content. The main difference lies in 
the characteristics of distribution, but there is no real difference in terms of content. Content 
does not diminish even if +1 person uses it whether it online, radio or television. The difference 
lies in the fact that people have to pay for accessing the content (i.e. the streamed/downloaded 
bits). What will change in the future as mobile broadband and other ways to access the internet 
increase in penetration and capacity, is how people access the content. The thesis stresses the 
importance of PSB content production and the value of this for democratic and cultural 
reproduction in a domestic society. 
On-demand content online does not disappear after use like flow television content where the 
programmes follow a particular schedule. It can be used by all who are able to access it 
continually, unless encrypted. This is because of the media content characteristics, which makes 
production of content dependent on some type of collective-funding model. But in contrast to 
free-to-air broadcast, bandwidth is used when streaming, downloading or viewing material 
online. This means that the original distribution argument based on the airwaves public good 
characteristics is altered. Even so, this change just alters the original argument on PSB from the 
technical perspective to revolve more around the importance of the content and services 
provisioned by PSBs and their effects for culture and democratic society, than on the form of 
distribution. This will involve even more policy challenges in regards to net neutrality and the 
question whether all bits are equal or not, which become increasingly important as audience 
moves online, even though they also remain on the original radio and television platforms.  
Nonetheless from a pure market failure perspective it could be questioned whether or not PSBs 
should be allowed to compete directly online. On the other hand this increases the tension 
between market failure arguments and the proponents of the democratic, cultural and social role 
of the PSBs. Clearly I find that there continues to be a market failure as per the challenges of 
securing domestic content, but also that the benefits of a PSB like institution should not be 
underestimated – especially not as a policy tool. 
The future for the media markets is uncertain as we have only scratched the surface of the 
change the current premise of convergence will bring. None the less the argument about the 
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importance of PSBs will continue to impact as cultural policy tools as long as there is a desire to 
secure originated production of content. 
It might be appropriate to restate the words of Juneau (1997): “a strictly commercial approach to 
television – even in large and rich markets – is not reconcilable with cultural goals. Such an 
approach is even more unrealistic in smaller countries and in most countries of the world”, to be 
that a strictly commercial approach to public service content irrespective of platform – even in 
large and rich markets – is not reconcilable with cultural goals. Such an approach is even more 
unrealistic in smaller countries and in most countries of the world”. The reasoning for this is that 
PSBs do not usually focus on profit, but rather on how they can best serve the public, which 
should not focus on an individual platform, but rather on the main purpose of creating new 
original content in each market and distributing it to the public irrespective of platform. 
 
All in all, my research-based claim is that size matters for European TV markets - what is 
evident also is the benefit of PSBs in general, and for small markets in particular. The influence 
of size is probably also true for other platforms that have not been studied empirically in this 
thesis, but of course I cannot say anything in general about this. Such statements would involve 
more research with the purpose of investigating this in detail. My thesis indicates that it is 
important that such research includes comparative economic analysis, and does not depend only 
on qualitative studies and normative arguments. The frame of research I have used to analyse 
European TV markets is one method of doing so, and will be applicable for other platforms as 
well. Using such a framework could help increase understanding of the importance of size for 
other platforms, especially taking the current media development into consideration where 
diffusion of content increasingly ignores borders and international players more easily than the 
TV markets can penetrate into markets with their content. This is especially true since the 
challenge and importance of securing high quality domestic content in a variety of genres will 
continue to be a challenge in the future in spite of the current development. This is why the 
argument of size will remain important even in the future, as my research indicates that securing 
high quality culturally embedded content is one of the main challenges for smaller markets. 
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8. Endnotes 
 
                                                 
i
 Europe is understood as being compromised of the following markets: Austria, Belgium, 
Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdoms.  Albania, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Poland, Russia, Serbia, Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine 
ii
 The EU consists of the following 27 member states: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and United kingdoms 
iii
 Western Europe is understood as: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, 
Norway, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdoms 
iv
 The market is defined empirically as the territory boundaries related to copyright. It is thus 
limited to the same area as that where the same entity has a monopoly on violence. Large media 
companies can easily acquire the rights to programmes, events and more, but have to do so for 
every single copyright territory. Bundling is an option for same or similar language areas. 
v
.Efficient scale in small markets requires relatively high levels of market share, evident in high 
degrees of market concentration. Particularly in a situation where advertising and subscription 
revenue are garnered by international owners or investors, the distinctly domestic aspects of a 
TV market are correspondingly weakened. When taking into consideration digitisation, this 
problem may actually worsen, if not in terms of channel supply or overall content, then at least 
at the level of domestic content supply. 
vi
 Even in cases of subscription funding, if lacking the critical mass to facilitate production, there 
can be no guarantee of sufficient revenue to secure the content necessary to satisfy either 
consumer or public interests. The greater the number of subscribers, the further the cost is 
spread due to the intrinsic character of broadcast properties as non-rivalry goods. 
vii
 Public subsidy is a viable way of securing the level of provision of desired in media content 
by a particular market. But this does not necessarily mean that size will determine the level of 
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public subsidy because that is inherently a political decision and always hinges, to a high degree, 
on the agreed legitimacy of market intervention. 
viii
 I argue that domestic content, while potentially non-excludable, is for the primary market 
audience. Culture and language almost per definition act as excluding factors which influence 
what and where the firm acquires productions for domestic audiences. 
ix
 I will apply the following definition of a state as argued by Weber, cited by Pierson (2004: 6): 
“A compulsory organization with continuous operations will be called a ‘state insofar as its 
administrative staff successfully upholds the claims to the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical force in the enforcement of its order. … [The modern state] possesses an administrative 
and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which the organized activities of the 
administrative staff, which are also controlled by regulations, are oriented. This system of orders 
claims binding authority, not only over members of the state, the citizens, most of whom have 
obtained membership by birth, but also to a very large extent over all action taking place in the 
area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory organization with a territorial basis. Furthermore, 
today, the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the state or 
prescribed by it. …The claim of the modern state to monopolize the use of force is as essential 
to it as its character of compulsory justification and continuous operation”.  
When I discuss or mention the state, I mean the entity with the potential to intervene into the 
market using regulatory measures in the form of restraints or benefits, and with the potential to 
penalise those not abiding with the set rules. This also means that it is the entity with an interest 
in securing the mirroring of a specific cultural and historical context to ensure cohesion of the 
area within its control. 
x
 Homogeneity and heterogeneity 
xi
 Establishing new channels targeting a wide range of nations using dubbing of native speakers 
to increase audiences, financed either as pay channels or through encrypting (thereby altering 
the public good to a club good). Advertisement is now possible and potentially profitable if the 
infrastructure is available. 
xii
 Eastern Europe is understood as Albania, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, 
Russia, Serbia, Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine 
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xiii
 One point to study is whether it is primarily the large countries that penetrate their smaller 
same-language neighbours or if this can also be the case for small country neighbours. Argued 
another way: there is no lack of foreign channels penetrating the different media markets; a 
simple look at the MAVISE database from EAO shows that the difference lies in the choices of 
the audience and the national channels available, as well as in the relative impact of the cross-
viewing. 
xiv
 The dependence on advertisement revenue in these small nations with large neighbours has 
both beneficial and adverse effects: First, it can help establish the advertisement market, but at 
the same time it risks crowding out domestic private commercial operators, and secondly, the 
PSMs become increasingly vulnerable to cross-viewing as they risk losing advertisement 
revenue to foreign media companies. On the other hand this probably remains the best option to 
lessen the financial burden of funding. 
xv
 This is from a national perspective, multinational corporations from large and small nations 
are very well able to benefit from economies of scale and scope, for instance by increasing the 
number of targeted countries. 
xvi
 The European Economic Area (EEA) consists of the following countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Republic of Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK. Note the Switzerland is not part of the EEA, but has similar rights in some 
cases. 
xviihttp://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/services/services-dir/faq/200410-faq-point06_en.htm 
Webpage assessed March 14th 2012.  
xviii
 I will apply the US guidelines here, although there are some differences in approach 
xix
 Efficient scale in small markets requires relatively high levels of market share, evident in 
high degrees of market concentration. In particular, in the situation where advertising and 
subscription revenue are garnered by international owners or investors, the distinctly domestic 
aspects of a TV market are correspondingly weakened. When taking into consideration 
digitisation, this problem may actually worsen – if not in terms of channel supply or overall 
content supply, then at least in the level of domestic content supply. 
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xx
 Even in cases of subscription funding, if lacking the critical mass to facilitate production there 
can be no guarantee of sufficient revenue to secure the content necessary to satisfy either 
consumer or public interests. The greater the number of subscribers, the further the cost is 
spread due to the intrinsic character of broadcast properties as non-rivalry goods. 
xxi
 Public subsidy is therefore a viable way of securing the level of provision desired in media 
content by a particular market. But this does not necessarily mean that size will determine the 
level of public subsidy because that is inherently a political decision and always hinges, to a 
high degree, on the agreed legitimacy of market intervention. 
xxii
 Note that there are also several conditions of scarcity involved in the production of creative 
works, such as qualified personnel, investment and resources in general. This can also have an 
influence on the production process as the lack of incentives relates back to the production 
process where the risk is an actuality. Initiation of production is without knowledge of whether 
or not and on which scale it will be profitable. 
xxiii
 Large markets should be able to provide these goods more efficiently than small markets as 
the same quality cost of production is independent of size, but dependent upon the amount of 
potential consumers – e.g. non-rivalry and thus independent of consumption. The main reason 
for this is that the costs of production of these goods are similar (e.g. the cost of producing the 
first copy), meaning that the more people that are available, the more the cost can be spread out. 
xxiv
 Public subsidy is way of securing certain provision of media content in a particular market; 
however, this does not necessarily mean that size impacts the level of public subsidy, as it is 
inherently a political decision as to how high or low a scale and scope a market intervention has. 
xxv
 I argue that domestic content, while potentially non-excludable, is for the primary market 
audience. We can argue that culture and language almost by definition will act as excluding 
factors which influence what and where the firm can acquire productions for domestic 
audiences. 
xxvi
 Computed using alpha = .05 
xxvii
 The partial eta square is a nonlinear figure, with similarities to the R-square in the 
regressions above. 
xxviii
 Computed using alpha = .05 
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xxix
 R Squared = .860  and Adjusted R Squared = .840 
xxx
 R Squared = .765 and Adjusted R Squared = .733 
xxxi
 The UK with the BBC, Channel 4 and ITV, Germany with ARD being Länder-based with a 
national channel and ZDF which make us identify a difference in the dual systems in the form of 
single/duo system difference similar to the ones in Denmark and Norway. 
xxxii
 Perfect competition: a market characterised by having many suppliers of a homogeneous 
product where no single company or group is capable of dominating the market. The market 
thus has no barriers to entry and due to the firms being price-takers, the main means of 
regulation is the number of goods produced by the individual company (Albarran, 1996; Doyle, 
2002; Hoskins 2004; K&W, 1997). The main difficulty here is that in order for a competitive 
market to exist, all companies have to be price-takers without being able to influence price. This 
sets up requirements for a large number of either actual or potential sellers offering a 
homogenous good combined with no existing barriers to entry/exist as well as perfect 
information. 
xxxiii
 Monopolistic competition is a market in which there are several supplies of a similar 
product, without direct substitutes. The individual firm attempts to differentiate its products 
through various means such as advertisement, promotion, placement, service, quality and so on 
to ensure that its product is perceived differently to the others and thus is selected for purchase. 
Prices therefore become variable and the individual companies can function both as price-setters 
and price-takers. The information flows are thus imperfect, and the barriers of exit and entry 
relatively few. The market becomes characterised by a large number of companies offering 
heterogeneous products, consumers thus have imperfect information, and the main competition 
is non-price based, e.g. based on the difference between a particular good and the others’ similar 
brand. 
xxxiv
 Oligopoly is a market characterised by being dominated by a few, but more than one, 
suppliers of the same commodity type, being either homogeneous or heterogeneous. There are 
several different potential market structures under conditions of oligopoly and duopoly. There 
are thus conditions of imperfect competition; there is no monopoly but the companies have a 
certain market power to potentially influence the market price. The limited number of producers 
can lead to collusion between the companies, or usually the companies observe the competitors’ 
conduct and strategies, e.g. their strategic behaviour. An oligopoly market structure is the most 
323 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
common due to factors of economies of scale, barriers to entry and horizontal/vertical 
integration due to buying up and fusion of companies. The company market power and price-
setting can be established in different ways; for instance as a leader-follower game or in tit-for-
tat games. Depending on information flows, we can assume that the companies will either 
collude in order to increase profit, potentially achieving monopoly rent, or alternatively compete 
on price and production resulting in minimisation of the profit. 
xxxv
 Monopoly is a market dominated by a single producer/firm and there are no immediate 
substitutes available. The difficulty here is that other producers cannot enter the market due to 
barriers, such as regulatory measures, or alternatively due to conditions of natural monopoly. In 
this instance, the firms become price-setters and not price-takers. The market power of the firm 
is dependent on the commodity type and the market, but will in the monopoly situation be high 
(Albarran, 1996; Doyle, 2002.; Hoskins 2004; K&W, 1997). The monopoly market structure 
enables the firm to utilise its market power to raise prices above the competitive level by 
reducing output, due to a lack of substitute suppliers and products. The monopolist can thus 
achieve super-normal profits, or monopoly rent because of the lack of market competition (see 
Von mises, 1998). Monopolies can be established and maintained by barriers to entry limiting 
other companies in their potential competition with the monopolist. Without such hindrance, 
competing companies could emerge to pursue the super-normal profit margins. This is also the 
reason why society has an interest in limiting traditional monopolies. In cases with natural 
monopoly conditions, the situation changes, as in a traditional market situation a profit-
maximising monopolist would increase prices and thus create ineffectiveness and charge higher 
than average costs to consumers, leading to an overall loss for society. As such, states should 
hinder and split monopolies. The problem with natural monopolies can be solved either by 
establishing state-owned companies or by regulating the natural monopoly by limiting the price-
level, thus ensuring that super-profit margin levels are not reached. There are different 
approaches to natural monopolies, namely state-oriented and market-oriented. A market-
oriented approach for national monopoly involves auctioning off the authorisation or licence 
(Demsetz, 1968; Posner, 1972), as seen for instance with G3 frequencies. 
xxxvi
 Product differentiation is understood as the differences between the existing offered 
products as perceived by the consumers (Albarran, 1996). This is basically a question of 
whether the buyers consider the products as homogeneous or if there are differences in quality, 
design, reputation or similar between the competing products which can establish differences in 
consumer preference (Bain, 1968, Albarran, 1996). For instance, whether consumers would 
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rather watch public broadcasting than private commercial programmes. From a producer’s 
perspective, differentiation of products is profitable insofar as it leads to brand loyalty, meaning 
conditions where consumers continue to purchase a particular product even though the price is 
higher than that of competitors (Hoskins, 2004) – an example being Apple’s IPod, IPhone and 
IPad.  
Howard Truckman (1998) argued in the following way for non-profit organisations: “When the 
funders of nonprofits are well informed, the existence of substitutes competing for support puts 
pressure on competitors to be efficient in production and distribution. The widespread TV 
broadcasts of Sesame Street, for example, may have affected the type of education provided by 
such substitutes as early childhood education centers and producers of children’s books. 
Similarly, the presence of competitive cable TV stations creates pressures for public TV stations 
to differentiate their products. Awareness of substitutes creates an incentive for nonprofit 
managers to monitor developments by competitors, as this serves to keep nonprofits competitive 
in their service offerings”.  
The point here is that the companies competing have to position their products in markets with 
differentiated goods as a contrast to their competitors. In that sense product differentiation 
becomes important for markets with imperfect information on the one hand, but it also remains 
important for those with imperfect competition. This is also what is perceived as happening in 
the market: when public and private domestic broadcasters established thematic channels to 
counter competition and provide national perspectives, what they did  in effect was establish 
substitutable products, heterogeneous from their own original, but more or less homogeneous 
with the potential entrants. Product differentiation has been applied to a high degree within 
media to secure market share and has been driven by the development in pay-penetration. 
xxxvii
 Market barriers can be divided into two categories: structural and due to regulatory 
regimes. This can be coupled with conditions where a particular structure faces the danger of 
new entrants, making it behave differently than it would otherwise. Besides this division, we can 
also distinguish between entry and exit barriers. Entry barriers equal the relative degree of 
difficulty for new entreat companies to enter a particular new markets as compared to benefits of 
the existing companies (Bain, 1968), and exit barriers equal the investment made to enter the 
market, the bound capital also called sunk-cost, which is lost when exiting the market.  
From an overall perspective a distinction can be made between barriers like state regulation, 
economies of scale, and vertical and horizontal integration (Albarran, 1996; K&W, 1997). The 
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variables influence the relative strength of competition of already established companies (Bain, 
1968). 
State regulation is especially important in relation to the media, due to the expected potential 
influence on politics and culture, as well as the potential scarcity of frequencies (Hoskins, 2004). 
Regulation can be used to establish regulatory barriers upholding specific market conditions, 
such as a monopoly structure. But also in instances of patent rights and copyright, regulatory 
measures can secure development and innovation in society, thus limiting the opportunity for 
copying products and gaining profit from the one originally holding the cost of the invention. 
Other traditional measures are limitations on companies’ potential of competing on equal terms, 
as the condition with public broadcasters can be (Bain, 1968; Hoskins, 2004; K&W, 1997).  
Companies able to maintain and establish a position of technological superiority should be able 
to function as a short-term barrier to entry. Technological superiority is seldom long-term, as 
competitors can invest in and upgrade production facilities or technology to match the market 
leader. Such barriers are influenced by network externalities, meaning that more consumers 
using a particular commodity has an advantage in attracting new customers; such conditions can 
lead to a monopoly, even if the product in question is inferior to that of competitors. 
Monopolists controlling resources or other input necessary for an industry can hinder access to 
the market and thus in principle control access if there are no alternatives to the resources or 
inputs in question.  
Economies of scale are experienced when average costs are reduced when production increases. 
Factors like production technology, high fixed cost and sunk-cost explain the effect. Through 
production technology companies can achieve scale economies by specialisation, which results 
in more efficient workers. 
Sunk-cost, irreversible investment when the operation is established, such as tracks or other 
equipment, leads to high levels of efficient scale. The markets thus have to be of a certain size, 
e.g. critical mass, to be able to hold more than a few competitors. 
Both conditions involve explanations of why monopolies are established and maintained. Seen 
in relation to media, sunk-cost is an important variable, especially when perceived as continuous 
operations. 
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Vertical integration takes place when a company controls more parts of the total production and 
sales process. If a company owns/controls infrastructure, production, distribution and sales to 
consumers we talk about vertical integration. Companies using vertical integration effectively 
can function as an established market barrier to new entrants (Albarran, 1996; Nissen, 2006).  
Horizontal integration is understood as when a company integrates different areas, such as tv, 
radio, music and so on (Nissen, 2006). Private commercial media companies tend to have higher 
degrees of horizontal integration than public, which can lead to increased concentration in the 
media markets. Combinations of vertical and horizontal integration can utilise the inherent 
potential of economies of scope and scale due to the media commodity, which in the most 
extreme cases makes almost equal natural monopolies (Doyle, 2002; Hoskins, 2004): this is 
related to the non-rival conditions and the production cost being independent of consumption, 
which establishes increasing returns to scale. 
xxxviii
 Market cost structure is characterised by the market production price, meaning the total 
cost, e.g. both fixed and variable costs, dependent on raw material, workforce and so on. High 
fixed costs lead to concentrated markets like newspapers and cable television, where there are 
economies of scale, e.g. a reduction of [the cost of?] average production of the next unit 
(Albarran, 1996). 
xxxix
 Industries such as pharmaceuticals, natural sciences requiring special lab facilities, airlines 
and others also operate under such conditions of high fixed costs. 
xl
 The Danish case is due to state ownership of the hybrid commercial broadcasters 
TV2/Denmark with a total network share of 40 %. 
xli
 Hybrid broadcasters are commercial television companies with public service obligations 
(they can be either publicly or privately owned). 
xlii
 The cultural proximity thesis was a response to cultural imperialism theories by for instance 
Schiller (1969), as well as the economics theories on production by for instance Waterman 
(2005) and Wildman & Siwek, (1988) that emphasised an explanation based on superior quality 
as acquired by higher budgets enabled by the prospect of syndication revenue established by 
selling the programmes. However, as seen in chapter 4, the US market volume is such that 
whether or not the programme is exported, the potential is sufficient to finance production. 
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xliii
 Documentation of this remains highly difficult to obtain as it would require knowledge of 
where the actual editorial decisions were made, as well as knowledge of why the UK, for 
example, would be a better market for this. 
xliv
 Note that this should not be understood in the same way as secondary markets within 
financial and capital markets where it means something different. 
xlv
 Not all markets have two PSBs; therefore it is only the markets with more than one PSB 
within CR1-6 that are present in the other columns. 
xlvi
 This is, however, not the case in the entire sample; in  markets like France and Spain, all-day 
viewing is more concentrated than the prime-time. The incentive consideration is again in focus 
as what can be observed is that as the number of services offered increases, the audience 
becomes more diffused. This means that prime-time concentration will increase insofar as the 
largest broadcasters are able to retain their audience share either by increasing the number of 
channels or by using attractive programming. 
xlvii
 Commercial interests here simply entail that the particular outlet is not inclined to stop 
particular programmes as a consequence of the indirect power of their advertisers. The 
commercial media have to make a profit, so this is not the discussion; the concern is that the 
owners of private commercial media dictate specific biased ways to present information to their 
audiences.  
xlviii
 Please note that there are several specialist channels available across Europe supplied by 
this owner, but which have too little audience to register within the six largest media companies. 
xlix
 The Walt Disney Company (2009): ”Factbook 2009” 
l
 Time Warner Cable Inc was separated from Time Warner Inc in March 2009, which is the 
reason for the lower revenue than that reported in and before 2006. 
li
 The drop in revenue can be seen as a consequence of the [financial?]crisis, but they also 
positively mention the hybrid model for commercial broadcasters consisting of both distribution 
and advertising revenue, thereby reducing the effect of the crisis. It is a similar argument to the 
one supplied by Discovery in this context: “Over the past few years, stations in the Danish TV 
market have significantly reduced their dependence on the advertising market by establishing 
what is known as a “hybrid” revenue model: stations finance themselves with cable fees in 
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addition to TV advertising revenues. …”Digital television [in Denmark] led to the establishment 
of a hybrid revenue model there, based on revenues from both TV advertising and distribution 
fees. Depending on the station, distributors pay from EUR 0.50 to EUR 3 per month for the right 
to distribute and market the channel.”  This change in revenue is not only happening in 
Denmark, but may very well be one of the drivers of both audience fragmentation as well as a 
potential for decline in market concentration, but it also indicates that as the markets continue to 
mature internationally, we will see an increase in audience fragmentation; the question is what if 
any effect it could have on market concentration. 
lii
 In a similar vein, Hjarvard (1999) showed that competition had not improved the quality of 
news broadcasts; instead, the consequences were more sensationalism and less informative 
news. The same was demonstrated by OSI (2005), concluding that increasing commercialisation 
has led to decreases in overall programming quality (transition markets), the so defined 
dumbing-down effect. 
liii
 EurActiv (2009): “State TV pushing for Reding input on broadcast rules”, 9 March, 2009 
liv
 Maturation is also occurring as a consequence of increasing pay-penetration, which enables a 
more profitable business either by relying solely on pay as funding, or by combining pay and 
advertising. Paradoxically, the subscription model known from the newspapers’ glorious past 
has shown a way out for the economically pressed advertising-funded commercial broadcasters, 
especially following the implementation of digital standards, where encryption and inclusion in 
pay-tv packages has shown the way forward. While this is a solution for now, which should 
generate some envy taking into consideration the current challenges facing the newspapers, the 
funding model will be faced with challenges in times to come - not immediately, but there are 
both regulatory and content perspectives. Related to regulatory processes, we could ask the 
question: why should consumers pay for more channels than they actually use? More pointedly, 
we could ask why consumers should pay for an increasing number of channels with little or no 
domestic content, which they either never view or only watch for a miniscule amount of time? 
Secondly, most new TVs available in 2012 are either internet-ready or wifi-ready or simply have 
integrated wifi and thus potential online access. Copyright continues to bar the use of content to 
some degree based on borders, but many options remain for viewing content online using a TV, 
so why should I wait to see a series on a national/international channel when it can be viewed in 
for instance the US almost as soon as it has been broadcast? 
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lv
 This is also where the dependency hypothesis becomes interesting, as the acquisitioned 
content will have to make sense for the audience, i.e. cultural background, history and more. 
This is also why larger cultures can have benefits in their exports through proximity or for 
cultural identification reasons. 
lvi
 In principle the pressure mostly concerns the AV area, as the broadcasting areas of TV and 
radio have been subject to stricter regulation than for instance the press and magazines. As such 
there has been a greater acceptance of state intervention in broadcasting. 
lvii
 Interestingly enough, change is one of the reasons behind discussions of the legitimacy crisis 
for public broadcasters based on changing conditions of broadcasting due to technological 
development, which also reduces the original logic of the argument legitimising public 
broadcasting. As put by Dyson & Humphreys (1990: 21): “... [T]echnological change ... 
removed another major rationale for public regulation – the scarcity of frequencies. In this 
respect broadcasting no longer appeared to be a natural monopoly whose supply must be 
regulated. With so many possibilities for delivering broadcasting … the regulatory issues shifted 
to competition, efficiency and consumer preference. Broadcasting lost its distinctiveness … and 
became subsumed in a wider consideration of the future information economy”. The discussion 
of the media shifted due to technological development and continues to change in the process of 
new media; in that respect the understanding of what is in the interest of the state, market and 
civil society shifts, leaving great difficulty in perceiving consequences. The point here is that 
yes, technology is not really as effective an argument as it once was. But this does not really 
change the fact that the technological debate is no longer the real argument on behalf of PSBs. 
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This appendix is a supplementary document containing information relevant to the 
doctoral process and the thesis: “As a matter of Size - THE IMPORTANCE OF CRITICAL MASS AND 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF SCARCITY FOR TELEVISION MARKETS”. 
The purpose of the appendix is to allow scrutiny of the information and statistics in 
the thesis, as well as to present some of the work done during the doctoral 
process. 
In this appendix the following information is available: 
A. Categorical variable overview 
B. Published articles: 
i. B.1: Denmark, Sweden and Norway : Television Diversity by 
Duopolistic Competition and Co-Regulation (co-author) 
ii. B.2: Financing Public service broadcasting: A Comparative Perspective 
(main author) 
C. Multiple regression statistics 
i. C.1: Multiple regression statistics for TV market volume 
ii. C.2: Multiple regression statistics for original domestic content 
iii. C.3: Multiple regression statistics for public and private competition 
iv. C.4: Multiple regression statistics for market concentration 
D. Market concentration: Company individual share and combined share (concentration 
ratio (CR)) of the 6 largest companies (ordered alphabetically) in each sample 
market 
 
Ad.1. The categorical variable overview section contains the categorical information 
on which countries are small and large based on the applied variables of 
population, economy and language. 
Ad.2. The two published articles, not related directly to the dissertation, but based 
on work in the doctoral work period, to which I have contributed. This is not the 
only published material, but the part unrelated to the thesis. 
Ad.3. The multiple regression statistics have been made available in their entirety 
for scrutiny. 
Ad.4. The more original contribution used in the study of market concentration is 
made available, as this is not available for purchase, but constructed specifically for 
the analysis in chapter 5. 
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Appendix A: Categorical variable overview 
 
Markets Economy Population Large same-language neighbour 
Austria Large Small YES Germany 
Belgium Large Small YES France 
Bulgaria Small Small NO  
Croatia Small Small NO  
Cyprus Large Small NO  
Czech Republic Large Small NO  
Denmark Large Small NO  
Estonia Small Small NO  
Finland Large Small NO  
France Large Large NO  
Germany Large Large NO  
Greece Large Small NO  
Hungary Small Small NO  
Iceland Large Small NO  
Ireland Large Small YES UK 
Italy Large Large NO  
Latvia Small Small NO  
333 
 
Lithuania Small Small NO  
Luxembourg Large Small YES France, Germany 
Netherlands Large Small NO  
Poland Small Large NO  
Portugal Small Small NO  
Romania Small Large NO  
Slovakia Small Small NO  
Slovenia Large Small NO  
Spain Large Large NO  
Sweden Large Small NO  
Switzerland Large Small YES Italy, France, Germany 
Ukraine Small Small NO  
United Kingdom Large Large NO  
Source: Own depiction based on IMF & EUROMONITOR 
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Appendix B: Published articles 
 
During the doctoral process I contributed to two published articles not included in the dissertation. These 
articles are based on work done during the process and material which was not related directly to the 
research question in the thesis. 
 
The two articles are: 
Lund, Anker Brink & Christian E. Berg (2009): “Denmark, Sweden and Norway: Television Diversity 
by Duopolistic Competition and Co-Regulation”, International Communication Gazette, 71(1-2), pp.19-
37 
 
Berg, Christian Edelvold & Anker B. Lund (2012): “Financing Public Service Broadcasting: A 
Comparative Perspective”, Journal of Media Business Studies, 9(1), pp.7-22 
 
The articles are included below. 
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Appendix B.1: Denmark, Sweden and Norway: Television Diversity by 
Duopolistic Competition and Co-Regulation 
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Appendix B.2: Financing Public Service Broadcasting: A Comparative 
Perspective 
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Appendix C: Multiple regression statistics 
 
The primary statistic technique applied is multiple regression. The technique is 
used to predict the variance in a dependent variable based on independent 
variables. The multiple regressions will establish the proportion of the variance in 
the dependent variable that the set of independent variables explain (size of 
economy and population). This is done at a specific level of significance, i.e. by a 
significance test of R2. The multiple regressions on the hypothesised relationships 
are tested using a significance level of 5%. 
These settings are used when the multiple regression are conducted in each of 
research questions A, B, D and E, which specify a linear relation of the independent 
size variables and the dependent. Note that all regressions are tested for 
multicollinearity using VIF with an acceptance criterion of VIF < 5 (Belsey, Kuh and 
Welsh, 1980) and for serial correlation using the Durbin–Watson test with an 
acceptance criterion of equal to or below 3 (Field, 2005). 
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Appendix C.1: Multiple regression statistics for TV market volume 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
GDP measured at 
Purchasing  Power Parity Population in mn's TV MV 
N Valid 26 26 26 
Missing 0 0 0 
Mean 28645.38 19.112 2834.631 
Std. Deviation 10374.775 23.0741 3784.3133 
Minimum 11489 .9 62.3 
Maximum 52479 82.3 14126.3 
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Variables Entered/Removedb 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Population in mn's, GDP measured 
at Purchasing  Power Parity 
. Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: TV MV 
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. 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-
Watson 
1 .969a .938 .933 979.9005 1.883 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: TV MV 
 
 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 3.359E8 2 1.680E8 174.932 .000a 
Residual 22084714.710 23 960204.987 
  
Total 3.580E8 25 
   
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: TV MV 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1(Constant) -1853.402 581.526 
 
-3.187 .004
  
GDP measured at Purchasing  
Power Parity 
.062 .019 .169 3.238 .004.983 1.018 
Population in mn's 152.816 8.568 .932 17.835.000.983 1.018 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1(Constant) -1853.402 581.526 
 
-3.187 .004 
  
GDP measured at Purchasing  
Power Parity 
.062 .019 .169 3.238 .004 .983 1.018 
Population in mn's 152.816 8.568 .932 17.835 .000 .983 1.018 
a. Dependent Variable: TV MV 
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Appendix C.2: Multiple regression statistics for original domestic content 
 
 
Statistics 
 
GDP measured at 
Purchasing  Power Parity Population in mn's EOC 
N Valid 26 26 26 
Missing 0 0 0 
Mean 28645.38 19.112 721.65 
Std. Deviation 10374.775 23.0741 1208.355 
Minimum 11489 .9 11 
Maximum 52479 82.3 4512 
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Variables Entered/Removedb 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 Population in 
mn's, GDP 
measured at 
Purchasing  
Power Parity 
. Enter 
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Variables Entered/Removedb 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 Population in 
mn's, GDP 
measured at 
Purchasing  
Power Parity 
. Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: EOC 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .923a .853 .840 483.826 .853 66.469 2 23 .000 1.914 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: EOC 
 
ANOVAb 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 31119025.070 2 15559512.535 66.469 .000a 
Residual 5384022.814 23 234087.948   
Total 36503047.885 25    
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Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .923a .853 .840 483.826 .853 66.469 2 23 .000 1.914 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: EOC 
 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -
789.041 
287.129 
 
-2.748 .011 -1383.013 -195.070 
  
GDP measured 
at Purchasing  
Power Parity 
.022 .009 .189 2.340 .028 .003 .041 .983 1.018 
Population in 
mn's 
46.042 4.231 .879 10.883 .000 37.291 54.794 .983 1.018 
a. Dependent Variable: EOC 
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Appendix C.3: Multiple regression statistics for Public and private 
competition 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
GDP measured at Purchasing  
Power Parity 
26 11489 52479 28645.38 10374.775 
Population in mn's 26 .9 82.3 19.112 23.0741 
Domestic Public Share 26 7.4 68.9 31.288 13.8225 
Total Public 26 7.4 68.9 33.133 14.9681 
Private share 26 1.6 73.0 44.817 18.6742 
Total Private 26 23.7 78.7 54.971 12.5893 
Valid N (listwise) 26     
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Appendix C.3.1: Public domestic 
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Variables Entered/Removedb 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 Population in 
mn's, GDP 
measured at 
Purchasing  
Power Parity 
. Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Domestic Public Share 
 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .721a .520 .479 9.9808 .520 12.475 2 23 .000 1.792 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: Domestic Public Share 
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ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2485.391 2 1242.695 12.475 .000a 
Residual 2291.156 23 99.615   
Total 4776.547 25    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: Domestic Public Share 
 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1(Constant) 3.903 5.923  .659 .516  
GDP measured at Purchasing  
Power Parity 
.001 .000 .640 4.391.000.983 1.018 
Population in mn's .156 .087 .260 1.782.088.983 1.018 
a. Dependent Variable: Domestic Public Share 
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Appendix C.3.2: Public total 
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Variables Entered/Removedb 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 Population in 
mn's, GDP 
measured at 
Purchasing  
Power Parity 
. Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Total Public 
 
 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .742a .550 .511 10.4677 .550 14.059 2 23 .000 1.906 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: Total Public 
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ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 3080.900 2 1540.450 14.059 .000a 
Residual 2520.174 23 109.573   
Total 5601.075 25    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: Total Public 
 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 2.068 6.212  .333 .742   
GDP measured at Purchasing  
Power Parity 
.001 .000 .705 4.998 .000 .983 1.018 
Population in mn's .100 .092 .155 1.098 .284 .983 1.018 
a. Dependent Variable: Total Public 
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Appendix C.3.3: Private domestic 
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Variables Entered/Removedb 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 Population in 
mn's, GDP 
measured at 
Purchasing  
Power Parity 
. Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Domestic Private Share 
 
 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .737a .543 .503 13.1589 .543 13.674 2 23 .000 2.200 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: Domestic Private Share 
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ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 4735.525 2 2367.762 13.674 .000a 
Residual 3982.620 23 173.157   
Total 8718.145 25    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: Domestic Private Share 
 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1(Constant) 77.120 7.809  9.875 .000  
GDP measured at Purchasing  
Power Parity 
-.001 .000 -.715 -5.030 .000.983 1.018 
Population in mn's .239 .115 .296 2.079 .049.983 1.018 
a. Dependent Variable: Domestic Private Share 
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Appendix C.3.4: Total Private 
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Variables Entered/Removedb 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 Population in 
mn's, GDP 
measured at 
Purchasing  
Power Parity 
. Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Total Private 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .562a .315 .256 10.8593 .315 5.300 2 23 .013 2.134 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: Total Private 
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ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1249.998 2 624.999 5.300 .013a 
Residual 2712.263 23 117.924   
Total 3962.261 25    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: Total Private 
 
 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 74.325 6.445  11.533 .000   
GDP measured at 
Purchasing  Power Parity 
-.001 .000 -.564 -3.244 .004 .983 1.018 
Population in mn's .014 .095 .026 .147 .884 .983 1.018 
a. Dependent Variable: Total Private 
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Appendix C.4: Multiple regression statistics for Market concentration 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
GDP measured at Purchasing  
Power Parity 
26 11489 52479 28645.38 10374.775 
Population in mn's 26 .9 82.3 19.112 23.0741 
HHI all-day 26 995 3388 2066.35 628.418 
HHI primetime 26 1176 3563 2326.31 670.423 
CR1 26 18.3 44.7 32.769 7.7424 
CR2 26 35.4 81.8 56.392 12.2018 
CR3 26 46.3 90.1 70.719 11.8515 
CR4 23 51.1 90.9 76.761 10.3529 
CR5 23 55.7 91.9 80.478 9.2354 
CR6 23 59.7 93.8 82.965 8.6424 
Valid N (listwise) 23     
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Appendix C.4.1: Market concentration measured by HHI all-day 
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Variables Entered/Removedb 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 Population in 
mn's, GDP 
measured at 
Purchasing  
Power Parity 
. Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: HHI all-day 
 
 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .363a .132 .056 610.499 .132 1.745 2 23 .197 1.266 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: HHI all-day 
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ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1300426.784 2 650213.392 1.745 .197a 
Residual 8572317.101 23 372709.439   
Total 9872743.885 25    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: HHI all-day 
 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1430.906 362.304  3.949 .001   
GDP measured at 
Purchasing  Power Parity 
.020 .012 .337 1.719 .099 .983 1.018 
Population in mn's 2.657 5.338 .098 .498 .623 .983 1.018 
a. Dependent Variable: HHI all-day 
 
 
 
 
363 
 
 
Appendix C.4.2: Market concentration measured by HHI primetime 
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Variables Entered/Removedb 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 Population in 
mn's, GDP 
measured at 
Purchasing  
Power Parity 
. Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: HHI primetime 
 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .413a .171 .099 636.429 .171 2.371 2 23 .116 1.328 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: HHI primetime 
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ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1920693.834 2 960346.917 2.371 .116a 
Residual 9315967.705 23 405042.074   
Total 11236661.538 25    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: HHI primetime 
 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 1579.598 377.692  4.182 .000   
GDP measured at 
Purchasing  Power Parity 
.027 .012 .417 2.177 .040 .983 1.018 
Population in mn's -1.314 5.565 -.045 -.236 .815 .983 1.018 
a. Dependent Variable: HHI primetime 
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Appendix C.4.3: Market concentration measured by CR1 
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Variables Entered/Removedb 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 Population in 
mn's, GDP 
measured at 
Purchasing  
Power Parity 
. Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: CR1 
 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .332a .111 .033 7.6128 .111 1.429 2 23 .260 1.460 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: CR1 
 
 
368 
 
 
 
ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 165.650 2 82.825 1.429 .260a 
Residual 1332.965 23 57.955   
Total 1498.615 25    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: CR1 
 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 25.749 4.518  5.699 .000   
GDP measured at Purchasing  
Power Parity 
.000 .000 .335 1.686 .105 .983 1.018 
Population in mn's -.007 .067 -.021 -.104 .918 .983 1.018 
a. Dependent Variable: CR1 
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Appendix C.4.4: Market concentration measured by CR2 
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Variables Entered/Removedb 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 Population in 
mn's, GDP 
measured at 
Purchasing  
Power Parity 
. Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: CR2 
 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .373a .139 .064 11.8037 .139 1.857 2 23 .179 1.465 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: CR2 
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ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 517.575 2 258.788 1.857 .179a 
Residual 3204.523 23 139.327   
Total 3722.098 25    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: CR2 
 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B 
Std. 
Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 43.652 7.005  6.232 .000   
GDP measured at 
Purchasing  Power 
Parity 
.000 .000 .361 1.851 .077 .983 1.018 
Population in mn's .030 .103 .056 .289 .775 .983 1.018 
a. Dependent Variable: CR2 
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Appendix C.4.5: Market concentration measured by CR3 
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Variables Entered/Removedb 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 Population in 
mn's, GDP 
measured at 
Purchasing  
Power Parity 
. Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: CR3 
 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .312a .097 .019 11.7389 .097 1.241 2 23 .308 1.600 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: CR3 
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ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 342.038 2 171.019 1.241 .308a 
Residual 3169.443 23 137.802   
Total 3511.480 25    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: CR3 
 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 60.465 6.967  8.679 .000   
GDP measured at Purchasing  
Power Parity 
.000 .000 .284 1.424 .168 .983 1.018 
Population in mn's .049 .103 .096 .482 .635 .983 1.018 
a. Dependent Variable: CR3 
 
 
 
 
 
375 
 
 
 
Appendix C.4.6: Market concentration measured by CR4 
 
 
376 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removedb 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 Population in 
mn's, GDP 
measured at 
Purchasing  
Power Parity 
. Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: CR4 
 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .497a .247 .172 9.4201 .247 3.287 2 20 .058 1.847 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: CR4 
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ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 583.275 2 291.638 3.287 .058a 
Residual 1774.759 20 88.738   
Total 2358.035 22    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: CR4 
 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 62.496 5.948  10.507 .000   
GDP measured at 
Purchasing  Power Parity 
.000 .000 .452 2.319 .031 .990 1.010 
Population in mn's .072 .083 .168 .861 .399 .990 1.010 
a. Dependent Variable: CR4 
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Appendix C.4.7: Market concentration measured by CR5 
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Variables Entered/Removedb 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 Population in 
mn's, GDP 
measured at 
Purchasing  
Power Parity 
. Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: CR5 
 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .551a .304 .234 8.0823 .304 4.363 2 20 .027 1.720 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: CR5 
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ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 569.981 2 284.991 4.363 .027a 
Residual 1306.458 20 65.323   
Total 1876.439 22    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: CR5 
 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 66.283 5.103  12.989 .000   
GDP measured at 
Purchasing  Power Parity 
.000 .000 .515 2.749 .012 .990 1.010 
Population in mn's .058 .071 .152 .809 .428 .990 1.010 
a. Dependent Variable: CR5 
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Appendix C.4.8: Market concentration measured by CR6 
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Variables Entered/Removedb 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 Population in 
mn's, GDP 
measured at 
Purchasing  
Power Parity 
. Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: CR6 
 
 
 
 
Model Summaryb 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change 
F 
Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .607a .368 .305 7.2042 .368 5.830 2 20 .010 1.626 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: CR6 
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ANOVAb 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 605.204 2 302.602 5.830 .010a 
Residual 1038.009 20 51.900   
Total 1643.212 22    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Population in mn's, GDP measured at Purchasing  Power Parity 
b. Dependent Variable: CR6 
 
 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 68.326 4.549  15.021 .000   
GDP measured at 
Purchasing  Power Parity 
.000 .000 .570 3.193 .005 .990 1.010 
Population in mn's .057 .064 .159 .893 .382 .990 1.010 
a. Dependent Variable: CR6 
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Appendix D.: Market concentration: Company individual share and 
combined share (concentration ratio (CR)) of the 6 largest companies 
(ordered alphabetically) in each sample market 
 
                                                     
1
 This does not include the channels owned and operated by XYZnetworks of which Foxtel is a co-owner 
Market concentration: Company combined share (concentration ratio (CR)) of the 6 largest 
companies (ordered alphabetically) 
2008 CR CR1: 
Player1 
CR2: Player 
2 
CR3: Player 3 CR4: Player 
4 
CR5: 
Player 5 
CR6: Player 
6 
Austria Name ORF - Pro7.Sat1 
Media 
RTL GROUP SA ARD ZDF ATV 
PRIVATFER
NSEH-GMBH 
Channels ORF 1, 
ORF 2, 
3SAT 
Pro7, Sat.1., 
Kabel 1, Puls 
4 (SEVENONE 
MEDIA 
AUSTRIA 
GMBH) 
RTL , VOX RTL2* 
& Super RTL* 
(*with TELE-
MÜNCHEN 
FERNSEH-GMBH & 
CO. 
MEDIENBETEILIGU
NG KG/ Walt 
Disney), 
ARD, ARD3 ZDF ATV 
Type public private private Public Public private 
Share 42,5 15,6 14,6 8,6 4,2 3 
Share 
Prime 
48 12,4 13,4 8,4 4,6 3,5 
CR (X) 42,5 58,1 72,7 81,3 85,5 88,5 
CR Prime 
(x) 
48 60,4 73,8 82,2 86,8 90,3 
Ownership Austria Pro7.Sat1 
Media 
BERTELSMANN AG Germany Germany ATV PRIVAT-
TV SERVICES 
AG 
Australia -
regional 
Name Seven 
Networ
k 
National 
broadcasting 
network 
Nine 
Network 
Southern Cross 
Television 
ABC – 
Australian 
broadcasting 
corporation 
Foxtel1 SBS TV – 
Special 
Broadcastin
g Service 
Channels Prime/7
QLD 
WIN/NBN SOUTHERN CROSS 
TAS,  SOUTHERN 
CROSS TEN 
ABC 1 Arena, 
Arena+2, 
BIO., 
Comedy 
channel, 
comedy 
channel+2, 
crime & 
investigatio
n, Fox 
Classics, 
Fox classics 
+2, Fox8, 
fox8+2, 
history 
channel, W. 
SBS 
Type Private Private Private Public Private Public 
Share 21,9 20,8 17,3 13,5 5,3 4,3 
Share 
Prime 
21,9 23,6 18,1 15,4 3,9 5,6 
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2
 TV% has a share of 1,7 of the whole day and 1,1 In prime time and thus surpass MTW networks on share in 
primetime, but we keep MTV as primary due to the whole day perspective needed when including children’s 
channels 
CR (X) 21,9 42,7 60 73,5 78,8 83,1 
CR Prime 
(x) 
21,9 45,5 63,6 79 82,9 88,5 
Ownership Seven 
Media 
Group 
PBL Media Southern Cross 
Media Group 
(*Macquarie Media 
Group) 
Australia Proprietary 
ltd. Joint 
venture, 
btw, Telstra 
(50 pct.), 
News 
corporation 
(25 pct.) & 
CMH -
Consolidate
d Media 
holding (25 
pct.= 
Australia 
 Joint 
venture 
between 
Seven 
Network 
Ltd. & 
Kohlberg 
Kravis 
Robers & 
Co 
CVC Asia 
Pacific 
    
BE FL Name VRT VLAAMSE 
MEDIA 
MAATSCHAP
PIJ 
SBS NPO MEDIA AD 
INFINITU
M 
MTV 
NETWORKS 
Channels EEN, 
KETNET/
CANVAS 
VTM, 2BE VIJFTV, VT4 Nederland 
1+2+3 
Vitaya Nickelodeon/
MTV NL 
Type Public Private Private Public Private Private 
Share 40,3 27,2 10,9 3,9 3,5 1,5 
Share 
Prime 
41,8 33,3 11 3,3 1,8 0,5 
CR (X) 40,3 67,5 78,4 82,3 85,8 87,3 
CR Prime 
(x) 
41,8 75,1 86,1 89,4 91,2 91,7 
Ownership Belgium 
State 
VLAAMSE 
MEDIA 
MAATSCHAPPI
J 
PRO7Sat.1 Netherlands MEDIA AD 
INFINITUM 
 
BE FR Name CLT-
UFA SA 
RTBF TELEVISION 
FRANCAISE 1 
(TF1) 
France 
Televisions 
Belgium 
Television 
MTV 
NETWORKS 
EUROPE 
Channels Club 
RTL, 
RTL-TVI, 
PLUG 
RTL 
LA UNE, LA 
DEUX 
TF1 France 
2+3+5/Arte 
AB3, AB4 Nickelodeon/
MTV (FR)2 
Type Private Public Private Public Private Private 
Share 26 20,1 17,1 17,1 5,3 2 
Share 
Prime 
37,9 24,2 11,8 11 5 0,7 
CR (X) 26 46,1 63,2 80,3 85,6 87,6 
CR Prime 
(x) 
37,9 62,1 73,9 84,9 89,9 90,6 
Ownership RTL 
Group 
SA 
Belgium BOUYGUES France MEDIA AD 
INFINITUM 
MTV 
NETWORKS 
EUROPE 
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Bulgaria Name News 
Corp 
NOVA 
TELEVISION 
EAD 
BNT DIEMA 
VISION EAD 
CENTRAL 
EUROPEAN 
MEDIA 
ENTERPRI
SES 
PLANETA TV 
Channels bTV, 
GTV 
(now 
named 
bTV 
comedy) 
Fox 
Crime, 
FOXLife 
Nova TV BNT 1, BNT SAT DIEMA, DIEMA 
2, DIEMA 
FAMILY 
RING 
(Enterprises
-
TIMEWARNE
R) TV2, 
BGTV 
(CEM), 
Cartoon 
Network 
(Turner – 
Time 
warner) 
Planeta TV 
Type Private Private Public Private Private Private 
Share 40,2 17,1 14,2 6,9 2,7 1,5 
Share 
Prime 
42,4 19,3 14,4 6,7 2,6 0,8 
CR (X) 40,2 71,5 54,4 78,4 81,1 82,6 
CR Prime 
(x) 
42,4 76,1 56,8 82,8 85,4 86,2 
Ownership  Balkan 
News 
Corp. 
MTG Bulgaria  TIME 
WARNER 
 
Canada Name CTV 
Globem
edia Inc 
i 
Canwest 
Global 
Communicati
ons 
Corporationii 
Corus 
Entertainment 
Inc 
CBC/SRC Astral 
Media Inciii 
Rogers 
Communica
tions Inc 
Channels A, 
Animal 
planet, 
BNN 
Bravo!, 
Business 
News 
network, 
TV Land, 
TSN, 
Star!, 
Space, 
RDS, 
MTV, 
Muchmo
remusic, 
muchmu
sic, 
Discover
y, 
Discover
y 
civilizati
on, CTV, 
CTV 
Newsnet
, couttv 
Canada, 
comedy
+, 
BBC Canada, 
BBC kids, 
DEJA view, 
Discovery 
health, E! 
Canada com, 
Global, IFC, 
MEN TV, 
Movietime, 
Mystery 
HG TV, 
History+, 
Showcase 
action, 
showcase 
diva, 
showcase+, 
slice 
VIVA, W-network 
+Treehouse, 
Telelatino+, Movie 
central  1,  Movie 
central 2,  Movie 
central 3, HBO 
Canada East, HBO 
Canada West, 
HBO+, Discovery 
kids, Drive-in-
class, Encore, 
Cosmo TViv, CMT, 
Peachtree, Scream 
CBS, SRC, 
Newsworld 
Canal d, 
family+, M 
(TMN1), M 
EXCESS 
(TMN3), M 
Fest 
(TMN5), M 
Fun (TMN4), 
MOREPIX, 
MPIX, 
Teletoon 
ENG+, 
TELETOON 
Retro ENG 
BIO, City TV, 
CP24, 
G4techTV, 
OLN, 
SportsNet 
East+, , 
SportsNet 
ont+, , 
SportsNet 
PAC+, , 
SportsNet 
West+ 
Type private private private public private private 
Share 22,3 14,1 7,8 7,1 5,5 5 
Share 
Prime 
23,4 13,7 6,5 9,4 3,9 5,5 
CR (X) 22,3 36,4 44,2 51,3 56,8 61,8 
CR Prime 
(x) 
23,4 37,1 43,6 53 56,9 62,4 
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Ownership    Canada   
       
Canada - 
quebec 
Name Groupe 
TVA 
Astral Media 
Inc. 
SRC/CBC CTV 
Globemedia 
Inc v 
Remstar 
Corporatio
n 
Société de 
télédiffusio
n du 
Québec 
Channels TVA, 
Prise 2, 
Mystere, 
LCN,  
LES 
IDEES 
DE MA 
MAISON, 
ARGENT 
Z-tele, VRAK, 
Teletoon ENG, 
Teletoon FR, 
Series+, 
SUPER ECRAN 
1,  SUPER 
ECRAN 2,  
SUPER ECRAN 
3,  SUPER 
ECRAN 4, 
MPIX, 
Musicmax, 
Musiqueplus, 
Historia, 
Cinepop, 
Canal D, 
Canal Vie, 
SRC, Newsworld, 
CBC, ARTV 
CTV, TSN, 
Muchmusic, 
RDS, RIS, 
Space, 
Discovery 
TQC Tele-Quebec 
Type Private Private Public Private Private Public 
Share 31 25,9 15,8 8,3 7,3 3,6 
Share 
Prime 
28,5 20,6 20,8 12,3 7,8 2,6 
CR (X) 31 56,9 72,7 81 88,3 91,9 
CR Prime 
(x) 
28,5 49,1 69,9 82,2 90 92,6 
Ownership Quebeco
r Media 
 Canada   Government 
of Quebec 
(i.e. 
Provincial 
crown corp) 
 Quebeco
r Inc 
     
Croatia Name HRT RTL 
HRVATSKA 
D.O.O. 
NOVA TV D.D. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Channels HTV1, 
HTV2 
RTL Televizija NOVA TV N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Type Public Private Private N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Share 46,6 22,9 19,5 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Share 
Prime 
44,7 22,8 23,3 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
CR (X) 46,6 69,5 89 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
CR Prime 
(x) 
44,7 67,5 90,8 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Ownership Croatia RTL Group CENTRAL 
EUROPEAN MEDIA 
ENTERPRISES 
N.A. N.A. N.A. 
  Bertelsmann Time Warner N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Czech 
Republic 
Name CET 21, 
S.R.O 
CT CESKA 
TELEVIZIE 
FTV PRIMA, 
S.R.O. 
N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Channels NOVA 
TV, 
NOVA 
Cinema 
CT1, CT2, 
CT24, CT4 
Prima N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Type Private Public Private N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Share 38,2 30,6 17,7 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Share 
Prime 
42,6 29,8 17,7 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
CR (X) 38,2 68,8 86,5 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
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3
 Please note, that this represent only the channels included in the CR, as I do not have share figures below 0,1 it 
would be misleading to include all the networks channels. The picture established is a minimum CR based on the 
channels included. 
CR Prime 
(x) 
42,6 72,4 90,1 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Ownership CENTRA
L 
EUROPE
AN 
MEDIA 
ENTERP
RISES 
Czech 
Republic 
MODERN TIMES 
GROUP MTG AB 
N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Cyprus Name CYPRUS 
BROAD
CASTIN
G 
CORPO
RATION 
SIGMA 
RADIO T.V. 
PUBLIC 
LIMITED 
ANTENNA TV TELETYPOS 
CYPRUS 
LIMITED 
C.N.C. 
(CYPRUS 
NEW 
CHANNEL) 
PLUS T.V. 
GREEK 
RADIO 
TELEVISION 
(ERT) S.A. 
Channels CYBC1, 
CYBC2 
SIGMA ANT1 MEGA Plus TV ERT World 
Type Public Private Private Private Private Public 
Share 21,2 20 17,4 11,9 3,7 2,6 
Share 
Prime 
18,1 22,3 19,8 12,1 3,5 2 
CR (X) 21,2 41,2 58,6 70,5 74,2 76,8 
CR Prime 
(x) 
18,1 40,4 60,2 72,3 75,8 77,8 
Ownership Cyprus DIAS 
PUBLISHING 
HOUSE 
ANTENNA TV S.A. TELETYPOS 
S.A. 
 Greece 
       
Denmark Name TV2/ 
Denmar
k 
DR TV 3 SBS Walt 
Disney 
Discovery 
Channels3 TV2, TV2 
Zulu, 
TV2 
Charlie, 
TV2 
Film, 
TV2 
News, 
TV2 
Sport 
(split) 
DR1, DR2, DR 
Update 
TV3, TV3+ 
 
Kanal 4, Kanal 
5, SBS NET, 
The voice 
Disney, 
Toon 
Disney, 
Playhouse 
Disney, 
Jetix 
Discovery, 
Animal Planet 
Type Public Public Private Private Private Private 
Share 40 28,9 8,5 6 2,9 1,9 
Share 
Prime 
41,9 35,4 7,4 4,8 1,6 1 
CR (X) 40 68,9 77,4 83,4 86,3 88,2 
CR Prime 
(x) 
41,9 77,3 84,7 89,5 91,1 92,1 
Ownership Danish 
State 
Danish State MTG Pro7Sat1 Walt Disney 
company 
Discovery 
communicati
ons Europe 
Ltd 
Estonia Name MTG KANAL 2 AS ERR - EESTI 
RAHVURSRINGH
ÄÄLING 
(Estonian public 
broadcasting) 
PIRMAIS 
BALTIJAS 
KANALS SIA 
All-Russian 
State 
Television 
and Radio 
Broadcasti
ng 
Company  
(VGTR) 
BALTIC 
MEDIA 
ALLIANCE 
LTD 
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4
 Lagardere pose a particular difficulty as it has co-ownership of channels with France Television of the children’s 
channel GULLI; as well as Canal + with Group Canal + SA, the other channel included is Virgin 17 (MCM). I have 
decided to split the share figure between the groups to ensure that Largardere has a place in the CR rating, 
otherwise the CR positions would be ARTE in 5 and either NRJ Group or Groupe AB in 6. 
Channels TV 6 (TV 
3 AS),  
3+ (3,6; 
3,7) 
(VIASAT
) 
Kanal 2, Kanal 
11 
ETV, ETV 2 PBK RTR 
PLANETA 
REN TV 
Estonia 
Type Private Private Public Private Public – 
Russian 
Private 
Share 22,6 20,6 15,8 12,8 3,4 1,9 
Share 
Prime 
24,7 24,1 16,4 12,9 2,7 2,7 
CR (X) 22,6 43,2 59 71,8 75,2 77,1 
CR Prime 
(x) 
24,7 48,8 65,2 78,1 80,8 83,5 
Ownership  SCHIBSTED 
ASA 
Estonia  Russian 
State 
RTL group SA 
      Bertelsmann 
AG 
Finlandvi Name YLE MTV Media Nelonen Media SBS MTV Discovery 
EU 
Channels YLE1, 
YLE2, 
YLE 
TEEMA, 
YLE 
FST5 
MTV3, MTV Oy 
Pay TV, Sub 
JIM, NELONEN, 
URHEILUKANAVA, 
Nelonen pay TV 
The Voice/TV 
Viisi 
Music TV 
(MTV) 
Discovery 
Type Public Private Private Private Private Private 
Share 44,7 31,3 14,1 0,8 0,7 0,6 
Share 
Prime 
41,7 35,4 15,1 0,6 0,6 0,4 
CR (X) 44,7 76 90,1 90,9 91,6 92,2 
CR Prime 
(x) 
41,7 77,1 92,2 92,8 93,4 93,8 
Ownership Finish 
State 
Bonnier Sanoma Pro7Sat1 MTV 
Networks 
Discovery 
communicati
ons Europe 
Ltd 
       
France Name FRANCE 
TELEVI
SIONS 
Television 
Francaise 1 
(TF1) 
Metropole 
Television 
Largardere4 Canal Plus 
France 
ARTE 
Channels France 
2, 
France 
3, 
France 
4, 
France 
5, 
GULLI 
(with 
lagarder
e as 
secondar
y) 
 
TF1, TMC M6, W9 MCM, Canal+ 
(1,6 rest split 
with Canal 
Plus France) 
GULLI ( split 
ownership 
with France 
TV, 0,7 count 
here) 
 
Canal 
+(1,7, rest 
counted in  
lagardere), 
i>TELE, 
ARTE 
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5
 Prime time viewing is based on terrestrial viewing 
6
 Phoenix and KIKA are both channels jointly operated by ARD and ZDF, i’ve chosen to place them at ZDF. The 
respective share is 1,3 for all day and 0,7 for prime time for KIKA and 0,9 and 0,7 for phoenix.   
Type Public Private Private Private Private Public 
Funding Licence 
fee, ads 
Ads, sub Ads, sub Ads, sub Ads, sub State 
Share 34 29,3 12,8 2,8 2 1,7 
Share 
Prime5 
31,8 29,6 12,7 2 2 2,9 
CR (X) 34 63,3 76,1 78,9 80,9 82,6 
CR Prime 
(x) 
31,8 61,4 74,1 76,1 78,1 81 
Ownership France Bouygues RTL Group Largardere Group 
Canal+ SA 
(VIVIENDI) 
/ Lagardere 
ASSOCIATIO
N RELATIVE 
A LA 
TELEVISION 
EUROPEENNE 
Germany 
Germany 
Name ARD Pro7Sat1 RTL Group SA ZDF VIACOM/M
TV 
Networks 
3SAT 
Channels ARD, 
ARD3 
(BFS,  
HESSEN 
FERNSE
HEN, 
MDR 
FERNSE
HEN, 
NDR 
FERNSE
HEN,  
RBB 
FERNSE
HEN, 
SUDWES
T 
FERNSE
HEN, 
WDR 
FERNSE
HEN) 
Kabel 1, RTL, 
Pro 7, Sat.1, 
N24 
RTL, RTL II, Super 
RTL, VOX 
ZDF, 6Phoenix, 
KIKA 
Comedy 
central, 
MTV, Nick, 
VIVA 
3SAT 
Type Public Private Private Public Private Public 
Share 26,6 21,6 23,3 15,3 2,2 1,1 
Share 
Prime 
30,4 18,6 24 16,3 1,4 1 
CR (X) 26,6 48,2 71,5 86,8 89 90,1 
CR Prime 
(x) 
30,4 49 73 89,3 90,7 91,7 
Ownership German 
state 
PROSIEBENSA
T.1 MEDIA AG 
Bertelsmann AG German state VIACOM Jointly 
operated by 
ARD, ZDF, 
ORF and SRG 
       
Greece 
Greece 
Name TELETY
POS 
S.A. 
ERT - GREEK 
RADIO 
TELEVISION 
S.A. 
ANTENNA TV S.A ALPHA 
SATELLITE 
TELEVISION 
S.A. - 
 
ELEFTHERI 
TILEORAS
SI S.A. 
NEW 
TELEVISION 
S.A. 
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Channels MEGA NET, ET1, ET3 Antenna Alpha Alter Star 
Type Private Public Private Private Private Private 
Share 18,3 17,1 15,2 13,6 11,1 10,4 
Share 
Prime 
20 18,1 13,7 15,5 8 9,7 
CR (X) 18,3 35,4 50,6 64,2 75,3 85,7 
CR Prime 
(x) 
20 38,1 51,8 67,3 75,3 85 
Ownership  Greece  RTL group SA   
    Bertelsmann   
Hungary 
 
Name MAGYA
R RTL 
TELEVÍ
ZIÓ RT. 
MTM-SBS 
TELEVÍZIÓ 
ZRT. 
MAGYAR 
TELEVÍZIÓ RT. 
VIASAT IKO 
ROMANIA 
SRL 
CHELLO 
MEDIA 
PROGRAMM
ING BV 
Channels RTL Klub TV2 M1, M2 TV6, VIASAT3 COOL, F+, 
Sport Klub 
MINIMAX/A+
, TV Paprika 
(Chello 
Central 
Europe), 
Spektrum ( 
CESKA 
PROGRAMOV
A 
SPOLECNOST
, S.R.O.), 
MGM ( MGM 
CHANNEL 
NLF Ltd 
owned by 
Sony and 
Liberty 
Global) 
Type Private Private Public Private Private Private 
Share 24,6 21,3 13,1 4,8 3,9 2,5 
Share 
Prime 
30,8 23,7 13,5 4,3 3,9 1,2 
CR (X) 24,6 45,9 59 63,8 67,7 70,2 
CR Prime 
(x) 
30,8 54,5 68 72,3 76,2 77,4 
Ownership  RTL 
Group 
SA 
Pro7Sat.1. 
Media AG 
Hungary MTG IKO 
ROMANIA 
SRL 
Liberty 
Global 
 Bertelsm
ann 
     
       
Italy Name RAI MEDIA Set NEWSCORP TELECOM 
ITALIA SPA 
 
DISNEY  
Channels RAI 
DUE, 
RAI 
GULP, 
RAI 
SPORT 
PIU, RAI 
TRE, RAI 
UNO, 
RAISAT 
BOING 
(BOING 
S.P.A.); 
Canale 5, 
ITALIA 1, 
RETE 4, (RETI 
TELEVISIVE 
ITALIANE 
S.P.A. 
(R.T.I.)) 
CULT, FOX, FOX 
+1, FOX CRIME, 
FOX CRIME +1, 
FOX LIFE, FOX 
LIFE +1, FX, 
National 
geographic, 
NATIONAL GEO. 
WILD, (1,8 (1,1) 
FOX international), 
La 7 Disney 
channel, 
Disney 
channel +1, 
Jetix, 
Jetix+1, 
Playhouse 
Disney, 
Toon Disney 
7 Gold 
(Puglia, Lazio 
& Calabria) 
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CINEMA, 
RAISAT 
EXTRA, , 
RAISAT 
PREMIU
M, , 
RAISAT 
YOYO 
SKY Calcio, SKY 
cinema 1, sky 
cinema +1, Sky 
cinema family, sky 
cinema hits, sky 
cinema mania, sky 
cinema max, sky 
show, sky sport 1, 
sky sport 2, ky 
sport 3, sky 
supercalcio, sky 
tg24, sky vivo 
(SKY 2,6 (3,2)) 
Type Public Private Private Private Private Private 
Share 42,1 39,7 4,4 3,1 1 0,5 
Share 
Prime 
44,1 39,8 4,3 2,6 0,6 0,7 
CR (X) 42,1 81,8 86,2 89,3 90,3 90,8 
CR Prime 
(x) 
44,1 83,9 88,2 90,8 91,4 92,1 
Ownership ITALY Mediaset 
S.P.A. 
(FOX international, 
SKY) 
(LA7 
TELEVISIONI) 
Disney Regional 
channels 
Ireland Name RTE - 
RADIO 
TELEFIS 
EIREAN
N 
TV3 
TELEVISION 
NETWORK 
LIMITED 
BBC BRITISH SKY 
BROADCASTI
NG LIMITED 
("BSkyB") 
CHANNEL 
4 GROUP 
ULSTER 
TELEVISION 
PLC 
Channels RTÉ1, 
RTÉ2, 
TV3, Channel6 
(now 3e) 
(CHANNEL 6 
BROADCASTI
NG LIMITED) 
BBC1, BBC2 SKY 1 
SKY NEWS 
SKY SPORTS 1 
SKY SPORTS 2 
SKY SPORTS 
NEWS 
CHANNEL 4, 
E4 (4 
ventures 
limited) 
UTV 
Type Public Private Public Private Public Private 
Share 36,6 12,2 8,5 5,6 5 4,4 
Share 
Prime 
43,1 13,1 8 4,7 4,7 4,5 
CR (X) 36,6 48,8 57,3 62,9 67,9 72,3 
CR Prime 
(x) 
43,1 56,2 64,2 68,9 73,6 78,1 
Ownership Ireland TULLAMORE 
BETA LIMITED 
UK BRITISH SKY 
BROADCASTIN
G GROUP PLC 
UK ITV family 
    News Corp   
Japan - 
Kanto 
Name NHK Fuji News 
Network INC 
Nippon 
Television 
Network (NNN) 
All-Nippon 
News 
Network 
(ANN) 
Japan 
News 
Network 
TV Tokyo 
Network 
Channels NHK1, 
NHK2, 
NHKBS1, 
NHKBS2 
FUJI TV NTV ( Nippon 
Television) 
TV ASAHI TBS TV Tokyo 
Type public Private Private Private Private Private 
Share 18,8 18,2 18 16,2 15,5 7,7 
Share 
Prime 
17,8 18,8 17,7 15,9 15,4 10,2 
CR (X) 18,8 37 55 71,2 86,7 94,4 
CR Prime 
(x) 
17,8 36,6 54,3 70,2 85,6 95,8 
Ownership Japan Fuji Media 
Holdings 
Nippon Television 
Network  
Corporation 
TV Asahi 
Corporation 
Tokyo 
Broadcastin
g System 
Holdings 
TV Tokyo 
Corporation 
  Sankei Shimbun Yomiuri Shimbun Asahi Shimbun Mainichi Co-owned 
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shimbun by: 
(majority) 
Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun & 
Mainichi 
Broadcasting 
System 
Latvia Name NEWS 
Corpora
tion 
MTG LATVIJAS 
TELEVIZIJA SIA 
PIRMAIS 
BALTIJAS 
KANALS SIA 
BALTIC 
MEDIA 
ALLIANCE 
LTD 
MTV 
NETWORKS 
Channels LNT 
(19,3; 
19,6) 
(LATVIJA
S 
NEATKA
RIGA 
TELEVIZ
IJA AS), 
TV5 
(3,3; 
3,5) 
(BETE 
SIA) 
TV3, TV6 (TV3 
Latvia), 3+ 
(Viasat) 
LTV 1, LTV7 PBK REN TV 
BALTIJA 
(2,5; 2,4), 
Perviy 
Baltijskyi 
Muzykalnyi 
Kanal 
MTV Latvija 
Type Private Private Public Private Private Private 
Share 22,6 20,7 15,3 10,7 2,9 0,2 
Share 
Prime 
23,1 21,3 18,9 11,4 2,6 0,1 
CR (X) 22,6 43,3 58,6 69,3 72,2 72,4 
CR Prime 
(x) 
23,1 44,4 63,3 74,7 77,3 77,4 
Ownership News 
Corp 
MTG Latvia  RTL group 
SA 
VIACOM 
     Bertelsmann 
AG 
 
Lithuania Name UAB 
TELE - 3 
UAB 
LAISVAS IR 
NEPRIKLAUS
OMAS 
KANALAS 
LRT LIETUVOS 
RADIJAS IR 
TELEVIZIJA 
UAB 
BALTIJOS TV 
PIRMAIS 
BALTIJAS 
KANALS 
SIA 
UAB 
LIETUVOS 
RYTO 
TELEVIZIJA 
Channels TV3, TV6 LNK, TV1 LTV, LTV2 BTV PBK LIETUVOS 
RYTAS TV 
Type Private Private Public Private Private Private 
Share 27,7 22,7 14,3 7,7 5,7 1,2 
Share 
Prime 
27,9 28,5 14,2 7,3 5,7 1,1 
CR (X) 27,7 50,4 64,7 72,4 78,1 79,3 
CR Prime 
(x) 
27,9 56,4 70,6 77,9 83,6 84,7 
Ownership MTG AMBER TRUST 
S.C.A 
(primary) 
Lithuania UAB 
KONCERNAS 
ACHEMOS 
GRUPE 
 UAB 
LIETUVOS 
RYTAS 
  UAB 
KONCERNAS 
MG BALTIC 
(secondary) 
    
Netherlan
ds 
Name NPO - 
Netherl
ands 
Public 
Broadca
sting 
CLT-UFA SA 
(RTL) 
SBS 
Broadcasting 
/ProSiebenSat.1 
MTV 
Networks 
Discovery Omroep 
Reclame 
Nederland 
(ORN TV) 
Channels Nederlan RTL 4, RTL 5, NET5, SBS6, Comedy Animal Omrop 
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d 1, 
Nederlan
d 2, 
Nederlan
d 3 
RTL 7, RTL 8 Veronica Central, MTV,  
Nickelodeon, 
TMF 
planet, 
Discovery 
channel, 
Fryslân, RTV 
Noord, RTV 
Drenthe, RTV 
Oost, 
Omroep 
Gelderland, 
RTV Utrecht, 
Omroep 
Flevoland, 
RTV Noord 
Holland, 
West, RTV 
Rijnmond, 
Omroep 
Zeeland, 
Omroep 
Brabant 
Type public Private Private Private Private Public 
Share 34,9 23,6 19,3 4,5 2,7 1,9 
Share 
Prime 
37,3 26,9 22,4 2,2 1,4 1,5 
CR (X) 34,9 58,5 77,8 82,3 85 86,9 
CR Prime 
(x) 
37,3 64,2 86,6 88,8 90,2 91,7 
Ownership  Netherla
nds 
RTL GROUP Pro7Sat1 Media VIACOM Discovery 
Communicat
ions Europe 
Limited 
 
  Bertelsmann     
New 
Zealand 
Name TVNZ MediaWorks 
New Zealand 
Sky Network 
Television 
Limited 
Discovery 
Communicati
ons, Inc. 
Turner 
broadcasti
ng System 
Maori TV 
Channels TV ONE, 
TV2 
C4, TV3 Prime, Sky Movies 
1, Sky movies 
great, Sky sport 1, 
Sky sport 2, The 
Box 
Discovery 
channel (sat), 
Discovery 
Channel 
(terr.), Animal 
planet 
Cartoon 
Network 
Maori TV 
Type Public Private Private Private Private Public 
Share 45,8 18,8 14,2 2,2 0,7 0,5 
Share 
Prime 
51,9 21,7 12,9 1,1 0,3 0,7 
CR (X) 45,8 64,6 78,8 81 81,7 82,2 
CR Prime 
(x) 
51,9 73,6 86,5 87,6 87,9 88,6 
Ownership New 
Zealand 
majority 
Ironbridge 
Capital (70 
pct) 
Majority 
Nationwide News 
Pty Limited (43,65 
pct.) 
 
Discovery 
Communicatio
ns, Inc. 
Time 
Warner 
Maori / NWZ 
       
Norway 
 
Name NRK TV2/Norge SBS TV3/Viasat Disney Discovery 
Channels NRK1, 
NRK2, 
NRK3/Su
per, 
TV2, TV2 
Sport TV2 
Nyhetskanale
n, TV2 Zebra, 
TV2 Film 
kanalen 
Kanal 5, Kanal 9, 
Fem, The voice, 
TV3, 3+, TV3 
Danmark 
(0,1), TV3 
Sverige (0,1), 
Viasat 4, 
Viasat History, 
TV1000 
Nordic, 
TV1000, 
TV1000 +1, 
TV1000 
action, 
TV1000 
Disney 
channel, 
Playhouse 
Disney, 
Toon 
Disney, 
Jetix 
Discovery, 
Discovery 
Civilization, 
Discovery 
Science, 
discovery 
travel and 
living, Animal 
planet 
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 Disney has a share of 1,3 all day and 0,6 in prime time based on Disney channel, Jetix and Jetix play 
Classics, 
TV1000 
Family, TV6 
action /nature 
world (0,1), 
Action 
6/nature 6 
world (0,1) 
Type Public Private Private Private Private Private 
Share 37,5 29,1 9,7 9,3 4,4 2,9 
Share 
Prime 
42 31 10,1 8,6 1,7 1,9 
CR (X) 37,5 68,5 78,2 87,5 91,9 93,8 
CR Prime 
(x) 
42 73 83,1 91,7 93,4 95,3 
Ownership Norwegi
an State 
Apressen & 
Egmont 
Pro7Sat1 MTG Walt Disney 
company 
Discovery 
communicati
ons Europe 
Ltd 
       
Poland7 Name TVP TVN SA TELEWIZJA 
POLSAT S.A. 
CANAL+ 
CYFROWY 
SP. Z O.O. 
VIACOM Discovery 
Channels TVP1, 
TVP2, 
TVP 
INFO, 
TVP 
KULTUR
A, TVP 
Sport, 
TVPOLO
NIA 
ITVN, TVN, 
TVN24m TVN, 
TVN METEO, 
TVN Style, 
TVN Turbo, 
TVN24, TVN7, 
TV4(POLSKIE 
MEDIA S.A.) 
POLSAT, POLSAT 
CAFE, POLSAT 
NEWS, POLSAT 
PLAY, POLSAT 
SPORT, POLSAT 
SPORT EXTRA, 
POLSAT2, 
SUPERSTACJA 
ALE KINO, 
CANAL+, 
CANAL+ 
SPORT, 
MINIMINI, 
ZIGZAP/HYPE
R, 
KUCHNIA.TV, 
PLANETE 
COMEDY 
CENTRAL, 
MTV 
POLSKA, VH 
POLSKA, 
VIVA 
POLSKA, 
 
(MTV 
NETWORKS, 
PARAMOUN
T) 
Discovery, 
Discovery 
Science, 
Discovery 
Civilization, 
Discovery 
World, 
Animal Planet 
Ownership 
A 
Public Private Private Private Private Private 
Funding       
Share 44,5 23,8 17,3 1,9 1,5 1,3 
Share 
Prime 
43,9 26,8 19 1,2 1 0,8 
CR (X) 44,5 68,3 85,6 87,5 89 90,3 
CR Prime 
(x) 
43,9 70,7 89,7 90,9 91,9 92,7 
Ownership  Poland ITI HOLDINGS 
SA, 
INTERNATION
AL TRADING 
AND 
INVESTMENTS 
HOLDINGS SA 
POLSAT CYFROWY 
S.A / POLARIS 
FINANCE B.V. 
CANAL 
OVERSEAS 
(CANAL+ 
FRANCE) – 
LAGARDERE/G
ROUPE 
CANAL+ 
SA(VIVIENDI) 
VIACOM DISCOVERY 
COMMUNICA
TIONS 
EUROPE 
LIMITED 
Portugalvii Name TVI-
TELEVI
SAO 
INDEPE
NDENTE
, S.A. 
RADIO E 
TELEVISAO 
DE 
PORTUGAL, 
SGPS, S.A. 
(RTP) 
SOCIEDADE 
INDEPENDENTE 
DE 
COMUNICAÇAO, 
S.A. (SIC) 
N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Channels TVI RTP1, RTP2 SIC N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Type Private Public Private N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Share 30,5 29,4 24,9 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
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Share 
Prime 
35,8 26,7 24,2 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
CR (X) 30,5 59,9 84,8 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
CR Prime 
(x) 
35,8 62,5 86,7 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Ownership 
/group 
GRUPO 
MÉDIA 
CAPITAL 
SGPS 
S.A. 
Portugal IMPRESA-
SOCIEDADE 
GESTORA DE 
PARTICIPAÇOES 
SOCIAIS, S.A. 
N.A. N.A. N.A. 
 PROMOT
ORA DE 
INFORM
ACIONE
S SA 
("Prisa") 
  N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Romania Name PRO TV 
SA 
Intact Media 
Group 
 
TVR - 
TELEVIZUNEA 
ROMANIA 
 
AMEROM 
TELEVISION 
SRL 
 
REALITATE
A MEDIA 
SA 
OCRAM 
TELEVIZIUN
E SRL 
 
Channels ACASA, 
MTV 
Romania
, 
Sport.ro, 
PRO TV, 
PRO 
Cinema 
/+Turne
r/Timew
arner 
Cartoon 
network 
(2,4 / 
1,5) 
ANTENA 1, 
ANTENA 2, 
ANTENA 3, 
EUFORIA 
TVR 1, TVR 2, TVR 
CULTURAL 
KISS TV, 
PRIMA TV, 
REALITATEA 
TV 
Oglinda TV 
(OTV) 
 
Type Private Private Public Private Private Private 
Share 25,9 13 7,4 4,8 4,6 4 
Share 
Prime 
28,1 15,2 8 5,3 3,3 4 
CR (X) 25,9 38,9 46,3 51,1 55,7 59,7 
CR Prime 
(x) 
28,1 43,3 51,3 56,6 59,9 63,9 
Ownership CENTRA
L 
EUROPE
AN 
MEDIA 
ENTERP
RISES 
Intact Media 
Group 
 
Romania Pro7Sat.1 REALITATEA 
MEDIA SA 
OCRAM 
TELEVIZIUNE 
SRL 
 
 TIME 
WARNER 
     
Slovakia Name MARKIZ
A - 
SLOVAK
IA, 
SPOL. S 
R.O. 
STV - 
SLOVENSKA 
TELEVIZIA 
MAC TV s.r.o. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Channels TV 
MARKIZ
A 
STV 1, STV 2, 
STV 3viii 
TV JOJ, TV JOJ 
plusix 
N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Type Private Public Private N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Share 35,1 22 17 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Share 
Prime 
37,7 22,6 19,7 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
CR (X) 35,1 57,1 74,1 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
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CR Prime 
(x) 
37,7 60,3 80 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Ownership CENTRA
L 
EUROPE
AN 
MEDIA 
ENTERP
RISES 
Slovakia HRVATSKA 
RADIOTELEVIZIJA 
N.A. N.A. N.A. 
 Time 
Warner 
  N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Slovenia Name CME RTV - 
RADIOTELEV
IZIJA 
SLOVENIJA, 
LJUBLJANA 
MTG HRT RTL Discovery 
Communica
tions ltd. 
Channels Kanal A 
(11,9; 
11,5) 
(KANAL 
A, 
d.o.o.), 
POP TV 
(POP TV 
(24,6; 
31,4)DR
UZBA 
ZA), TV 
PIKA 
(CME, 
foreign, 
(summer 
2009), 
TV NOVA 
(CME,for
eign) 
Slovenija 1, 
Slovenija 2, 
Slovenija 3, 
TV Koper 
CAPODISTRIA
, Tele M 
TV3 (5,2;4,8)( 
PRVA TV, d.o.o.), 
TV 1000 (0,5; 0,3) 
HRT 1, HRT 2, RTL, RTL 2, 
RTL Croatia, 
RTL 
Madzzarski, 
VOX (0,3; 
0,2) (VOX 
FILM- UND 
FERNSEH 
GMBH & CO. 
KG) 
Animal 
planet, 
Discovery 
Type Private Public Private Public Private Private 
Share 37,7 31,5 5,7 4,4 2,2 1,7 
Share 
Prime 
42,2 33,0 5,1 3,6 2 0,8 
CR (X) 37,7 69,2 74,9 79,3 81,5 83,2 
CR Prime 
(x) 
42,2 75,2 80,3 83,9 85,9 86,7 
Ownership TIME 
WARNER 
Slovenia MTG Croatia RTL Group Discovery 
communicati
on Europe 
     Bertelsmann  
Spain 
 
Name RTVE GESTEVISIO
N 
TELECINCO 
SA 
 
ANTENA 3 DE 
TELEVISION SA 
SOGECABLE La Sexta CANAL SUR 
TELEVISION 
SA 
Channels 24 
horas, 
ClanTVE, 
TVE 1, 
Teledepo
rte, 
Castilla 
La 
Mancha 
Televisió
n (CMT), 
La 2 
FDF, Tele 5, 
TELECINCO 2 
ANTENA 3, 
ANTENA.NEOX, 
ANTENA.NOVA 
CANAL PLUS, 
CANAL PLUS 
2, CANAL 
PLUS 30, 
CANAL PLUS 
ACCION, 
CANAL PLUS 
ACCION...30, 
CANAL PLUS 
COMEDIA, 
CANAL PLUS 
COMEDIA...30
, CANAL PLUS 
DCINE, CANAL 
PLUS 
DEPORTES, 
CANAL PLUS 
La Sexta, 
Hogar10, 
Canal Sur, 
ANDALUCIA 
TV 
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 TV4 purchased the C More Entertainment Group in December 2008, these channels are thus placed under TV4 
instead of the former owner Pro7Sat1, the c+ channels combined share is 1,2 and in primetime 1 
EVENTOS, 
CANAL PLUS 
FUTBOL, 
CNN+, 
CUATRO,  
VIAJAR 
Type Public Private Private Private Private Public 
Share 23,2 18,5 17 9,7 5,6 3,5 
Share 
Prime 
21,3 20,4 16,3 10,6 5,6 3,3 
CR (X) 23,2 41,7 58,7 68,4 74 77,5 
CR Prime 
(x) 
21,3 41,7 58 68,6 74,2 77,5 
Ownership Spain, 
CORPOR
ACION 
DE 
RADIO Y 
TELEVIS
ION 
ESPANO
LA S.A 
MEDIASET 
S.P.A. 
GRUPO PLANETA 
DE AGOSTINI SL./ 
RTL Group 
PROMOTORA 
DE 
INFORMACION
ES SA 
(\Prisa\) 
GESTORA 
DE 
INVERSION
ES 
AUDIOVISU
ALES LA 
SEXTA S.A 
(GAMP) 
 
RTVA - 
RADIO Y 
TELEVISION 
DE 
ANDALUCIA 
       
Sweden Name SVT TV48 TV3/VIASAT SBS Discovery 
EU 
Disney 
Channels SVT1, 
SVT2, 
SVT24, 
Barn/ 
Kundska
pskanale
n 
TV4, TV4 
Guld, TV400, 
TV4 +, TV4 
Film, TV4 
Fakta, TV4 
Science 
fiction, TV4 
Komedi, C+ 
Action, C+ 
comedy, C+ 
Drama, C+ 
First, C+ Hits, 
C+ Sport 1, 
C+ Sport 2 
TV3, TV6, TV8, 
ZTV, Viasat 
Explorer, Viasat 
Nature/crime, 
Viasat Sport, 
TV1000, TV1000 
Action, TV1000 
Classic, TV1000 
Family, TV1000 
Nordic 
(TV3 Denmark 
0,1) 
Kanal 5, Kanal 
9, The Voice, 
Animal 
Planet, 
Discovery, 
Discovery 
science, 
Discovery 
travel and 
living, 
discovery 
world 
Disney 
channel, 
Playhouse 
Disney, Toon 
Disney, Jetix 
Type Public Private Private Private private Private 
Share 34,2 29,1 16,2 9,6 2,6 1,8 
Share 
Prime 
38,9 29,8 15,2 9,6 1,5 0,9 
CR (X) 34,2 63,3 79,5 89,1 91,7 93,5 
CR Prime 
(x) 
38,9 68,7 83,9 93,5 95 95,9 
Ownership Swedish 
State 
Bonnier AB MTG Pro7Sat1 Discovery 
communicat
ions Europe 
Ltd 
Walt Disney 
company 
Switzerlan
d 
Name SRG 
SSR 
idée 
Suisse 
RTL GROUP 
AB 
Pro7.Sat1 TELEVISION 
FRANCAISE 1 
(TF1) 
ARDx FRANCE 
TELEVISION
S 
Channels SF1, 
SF2, 
TSI1, 
TSI2, 
TSR1, 
TSR2 
M6 (Metropole 
television), 
RTL, RTL 2, 
RTL 9, Super 
RTL (with 
Disney), VOX 
Pro 7, Sat.1., 
Kabel 1, 
TF1, Eurosport ARD, SWR France 2, 
France 3 
Type Public Private Private Private Public Public 
Share 33,1 14,2 8,9 5 4,9 4 
399 
 
Share 
Prime 
40,6 13,3 7,1 4,2 5,2 3,5 
CR (X) 33,1 47,3 56,2 61,2 66,1 70,1 
CR Prime 
(x) 
40,6 53,9 61 65,2 70,4 73,9 
Ownership 
B 
Switzerl
and 
Bertelsmann  BOUYGUES Germany France 
       
Switzerlan
d 
DE 
Name SRG 
SSR 
idée 
suissexi 
RTL Pro7.Sat1 ARDxii ZDF ORF 
Channels SF1, SF 
2 
RTL, RTL 2, 
Super RTL 
(with Disney) 
& VOX (VOX 
FILM & 
Fernsehn) 
PRO7, SAT.1, 
Kabel 1, 
ARD, SWR ZDF ORF1, ORF2 
Type Public Private Private Public Public Public 
Share 32,8 16,2 13 7,1 5 4,9 
Share 
Prime 
40,8 14,2 10,1 7,1 4,9 3,8 
CR (X) 32,8 49 62 69,1 74,1 79 
CR Prime 
(x) 
40,8 55 65,1 72,2 77,1 80,9 
Ownership Switzerl
and 
Bertelsmann Pro7.Sat.1 Germany Germany Austria 
       
Switzerlan
d 
FR 
 
Name SRG 
SSR 
idée 
suisse 
 
TELEVISION 
FRANCAISE 
1 (TF1) 
FRANCE 
TELEVISIONS 
RTL group 
AB 
ARTE Tuner 
Channels TSR1, 
TSR2 
TF1, TMC, 
Eurosport 
France 2, France 3 M6 (Metropole 
Television), 
RTL9 (CLT-
UFA SA) 
ARTE TNT , CNN 
Type Public Private Public Private Public Private 
Share 30,6 18,1 13,2 12,1 2,7 2,2 
Share 
Prime 
36,5 16,5 13,6 12,6 2,3 1,4 
CR (X) 30,6 48,7 61,9 74 76,7 78,9 
CR Prime 
(x) 
36,5 53 66,6 79,2 81,5 82,9 
Ownership 
B 
Switzerl
and 
BOUYGUES France Bertelsmann ASSOCIATI
ON 
RELATIVE A 
LA 
TELEVISION 
EUROPEENN
E (ARTE 
G.E.I.E.) 
Time Warner 
       
Switzerlan
d 
IT 
 
Name SRG 
SSR 
idée 
Suisse 
(IT) 
RETI 
TELEVISIVE 
ITALIANE 
S.P.A. 
(R.T.I.) 
RAI Time Warner TeleTicino 
SA 
LA7 
Televisioni 
Channels TSI 1, 
TSI 2 
Canale 5, 
Italia 1, RETE 
4 
RAI UNO, RAI 
DUO, RAI TRE 
TNT Tele Ticino La7 
Type Public Private Public Private Private Private 
Share 32 25,6 22 2,5 1,8 1,3 
Share 39,4 23,2 19,6 1,5 1,7 1 
400 
 
                                                     
9
 BBC WW and Virgin MEDIA TELEVISON LDT have three joint ventures which channels have been placed under 
Virgin, those are UK GOLD BROADCASTING LTD, UK CHANNEL MANAGEMENT LTD and UK NEW VENTURES LDT, 
see MAVISE DB for further information see www.Virginmedia.com. 
Prime 
CR (X) 32 57,6 79,6 82,1 83,9 85,2 
CR Prime 
(x) 
39,4 62,6 82,2 83,7 85,4 86,4 
Ownership Switzerl
and 
Media Set Italy   TELECOM 
ITALIA 
MEDIA SPA 
       
Turkey Name DOĞAN 
GROUP 
AKS 
TELEVİZYON 
REK. VE 
FİLM. SAN. 
VE TİC. A.Ş. 
TURKUVAZ 
RADYO 
TELEVIZYON 
GAZETECILIK VE 
YAYINCILIK A.Ş. 
HUZUR 
RADYO 
TELEVİZYON 
A.Ş. 
DÜNYA 
İLETİŞİM 
YAYINCILI
K 
HİZMETLE
Rİ A.Ş. 
MERKEZ 
TELEVİZYO
N AŞ. 
Channels Kanal D 
(DTV 
HABER 
VE 
GÖRSEL 
YAYINCI
LIK A.Ş), 
Show TV 
(IŞIL 
TELEVİZ
YON 
YAYINCI
LIK YAP. 
SAN. VE 
TİC. 
A.Ş) 
Show TV ATV FOX SAMANYOLU 
TV 
Kanal 1 
Type Private Private Private Private Private Private 
Share 22 11,4 8,9 8 5,5 3,5 
Share 
Prime 
26,2 15,3 10,1 6,8 7,1 3,8 
CR (X) 22 33,4 42,3 50,3 55,8 59,3 
CR Prime 
(x) 
26,2 41,5 51,6 58,4 65,5 69,3 
Ownership    News Corp   
       
UK Name BBC ITV PLC Channel 4 Group Newscorp Channel 5 
Broadcasti
ng/ RTL 
Group SA 
VIRGIN 
MEDIA INC 
Channels BBC1, 
BBC2, 
BBC3, 
BBC4, 
BBC 
News, 
CBBC, 
CBEEBIE
S 
ITV1, ITV2, 
ITV2+1, ITV3, 
ITV3+1, ITV4, 
ITV4+1 
Channel4+S4C, 
Channel 4 +1, 
4Music, More4, 
More4+1, Film4, 
film4+1, E4, 
E4+1, 4Music 
SKY 1,  SKY 2, 
SKY 3, SKY 
MOVIES 
ACTION/THRIL
LER, SKY 
MOVIES 
CLASSICS, 
SKY MOVIES 
COMEDY, SKY 
MOVIES 
DRAMA, SKY 
MOVIES 
FAMILY, SKY 
MOVIES, 
MODERN 
GREATS, SKY 
MOVIES 
PREMIERE, 
SKY MOVIES 
PREMIERE +1, 
FIVE, FIVE 
US, FIVE 
US+1, 
FIVER, 
FIVER +1 
9ALIBI, 
ALIBI+1, 
BRAVO, 
BRAVO +1, 
BRAVO 2, 
CHALLENGE 
TV, 
CHALLENGE 
TV +1, DAVE, 
DAVE +1, 
G.O.L.D., 
G.O.L.D. +1, 
LIVING,  
LIVING +1, 
LIVING TV 2, 
UKTV FOOD, 
UKTV FOOD 
+1, UKTV 
GARDENS, 
UKTV 
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SKY MOVIES 
SCIFI/HORRO
R, SKY 
MOVIES 
SCREEN 1, 
SKY MOVIES 
SCREEN 2, 
SKY NEWS 
SKY SPORTS 
1, SKY 
SPORTS 2 
SKY SPORTS 
3, SKY 
SPORTS 
EXTRA, SKY 
SPORTS 
NEWS, SKY 
TRAVEL, 
CRIME AND 
INVESTIGATIO
N NW, FX, 
FX+ 
NAT GEO, NAT 
GEO +1, THE 
HISTORY 
CHANNEL, THE 
HISTORY 
CHANNEL +1 
HISTORY, 
UKTV 
PEOPLE, 
UKTV STYLE, 
UKTV STYLE 
PLUS, 
VIRGIN1, 
VIRGIN1 +1, 
WATCH 
Type Public Private Public Private Private Private 
Share 33,4 22,9 11,9 6,9 6,1 5,8 
Share 
Prime 
34,1 26,9 12,1 6,2 6,5 5 
CR (X) 33,4 56,3 68,2 75,1 81,2 87 
CR Prime 
(x) 
34,1 61 73,1 79,3 85,8 90,8 
Ownership  British 
State 
ITV PLC(main) British State Newscorp BERTELSMA
NN 
VIRGINMEDI
A 
       
USA Name NBC 
UNIVER
SAL 
Disney ABC 
Television 
Groupxiii 
TIMEWARNERxiv VIACOM FOX 
BROADCAS
TING 
COMPANY 
CBS 
Channels USA 
Network, 
The SciFi 
Channel 
(syfy), 
The 
Weather 
Channel, 
Telemun
do, 
Oxygen, 
NBC, 
MSNBC, 
CNBC, 
Bravo, 
ABC, ABC 
Family, 
Disney, Toon 
Disney, 
Soapnet, 
ESPNxv, ESPN 
2, ESPN 
Classic, 
Turner 
Broadcasting 
system inc. (10,8; 
9,4) (TRU TV, 
TURNER TV 
NETWORK, TBS, 
HEADLINE NEWS, 
CNN, CARTOON 
NETWORK, ADULT 
SWIM), HOME 
BOX OFFICE (2,3; 
2,1) (CINEMAX, 
HBO, HBO PRIME) 
TV Land, The 
N, Spike TV, 
Nickelodeon, 
Nick at Nite, 
Nick Toons, 
MTV, MTV2, 
Comedy 
Central, 
Country Music 
TV, BET 
(Betnetworks), 
Speed 
Channel, My 
Network TV, 
National 
Geographic
xvi, FOX, Fox 
Nets, FX, 
CBS, Show 
Time 
Networks 
(SHOW TIME 
PRIME, 
SHOWTIME) 
Type Private Private Private Private Private Private 
Share 13,6 13,4 13,1 12,2 10,3 7,5 
Share 
Prime 
14,6 13,6 11,5 8,9 12,6 9 
CR (X) 13,6 27 40,1 52,3 62,6 70,1 
CR Prime 
(x) 
14,6 28,2 39,7 48,6 61,2 70,2 
Ownership     News Corp.  
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i
 This includes the CTV Specially television inc. where 80 pct. is owned by CTW and 20 pct. by ESPN. Included is 
also the discovery channels + animal planet, where 20 pct. remains under the control of discovery 
communications. 
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ii
 CW media inc. is a partnership between CanWest and Goldman sachs where the majority remains in the hands 
of CanWest 
iii
 Teletoon & Teletoon Retro is an joint venture between Corus & Astral media with a 50/50 split, here they have 
been placed under Astral media 
iv
 Cosmo TV is under Corus majority, where a minority share is with the hearst corporations 
v
 This includes the CTV Specially television inc. where 80 pct. is owend by CTW and 20 pct. by ESPN. Included is 
also the discovery channels + animal planet, where 20 pct. remains under the control of discovery 
communications. 
vi
 Finnpanel – TV audience measurement 
vii
 Portugal was decided retained as a CR3 as this was based on the Total universe consisting of 9,459,000 
individuals. The TV companies had other channels, but these were primarily cable or satellite based, the other 
reporting part consisted of the cable universe numbering 4,483,000 individuals, but an aggregation of the total 
with the separate cable universe would entail a total share figure of around 115 pct., making it relatively difficult 
to ensure a reasonable degree of comparability with the figures reported in the other included markets, therefore 
we decided to limit it to the total universe reporting, where the main channels represented 84,8 pct. of all-day 
share and 86,7 prime-time share. This way, while not having CR4-6, still meant the potential to establish a 
comparable HHI index as well as to secure the statistical analysis of competition and market concentration. 
viii
 STV3 has startup 08/2008 and had a 0,2 all-day share measured annually, but 0,5 in the period, we have used 
the annual figure. 
ix
 TV JOJ Plus had startup from 11/2008 and had an annual share of 0,2, but a period share of 1,2 all day. We have 
applied the annual figure 
x
 Please note, that KIKA with 0,6 daytime and 0,4 prime time has not been included as it is operated jointly by ARD 
& ZDF, however if included by 50 pct. it would mean that ARD has higher cumulative share than TF1. On the same 
not 3sat is not included in the public broadcasters. 
xi
 3SAT is a Pan-European television channel carrying primarily cultural programming – it is operated jointly by 
ARD, ZDF, ORF and SRG and is not included in the calculation, the channel represent 1,1 (all-day) and 1 (prime-
time) share. 
xii
 KIKA operated jointly by ZDF and ARD is not included in the calculation, ARTE/KIKA represent 1,7 all-day and 1,4 
prime-time share. 
xiii
 A&E TV Networks is owned by the Hearst Corporation (42,5 pct.), Disney-ABC Television Group (42,5 pct.) and 
NBC Universal (15 pct.). The network represent 4,7 day time share, and 4,4 prime time share (compiled of 
following channels: The History channel, The Biography channel, Lifetime, Lifetime Movie Network, A&E). I have 
not included the share of these in the aggregated CR figures. 
xiv
 CW television Network is owned by CBS (50 pct.) & Time Warner (50 pct.). The CW channel represent 2,1 
daytime share and 1,9 primetime share. These figures are not included in the aggregated CR figures. 
xv
 ESPN INC is split between Disney ABC (80 pct.) and Hearst corp. (20 pct.), the figures have been included under 
ABC-Disney due to the holding of majority. 
xvi
 With National geographic society (50 – 50 split). 
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